Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la Osborne and Slivinski, 1996, Besley and Coate, 1997. As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership

This paper examines capital tax competition in the presence of an interstate transfer policy without federal commitment. Lack of commitment implies that local tax policy is chosen prior to federal transfers. The paper's main result is that ex-post federal policy neutralizes horizontal fiscal externalities, insulating tax policy from capital mobility. Federal policy, however, introduces a new source of inefficiency unrelated to tax competition. Specifically, ex-post transfer payments prove to be equivalent to an interstate revenue-sharing system which may render federal intervention in the presence of fiscal externalities welfare-deteriorating relative to tax competition.     

The Role of Symmetry between the Revenue and the Expenditure Side of the Government Budget in the Debate about the Potential Negative Effects of Tax Competition

The effects of capital tax competition are reconsidered in this paper incorporating the argument that the expenditure structure of public budget should reflect its revenue structure. The paper offers a small open economy model where capital and labour tax revenues are used exclusively on the provision of public inputs. It is shown that if the revenue side of the government budget exactly matches the expenditure side that is if industrial public goods are financed by both private production factors with the weights reflecting the contributions of public inputs to the private factor productivity then public inputs are provided optimally even in the presence of tax competition.     

Redistribution and regional development under tax competition

This paper considers how capital tax competition affects transfer and development policies in the presence of regional income disparity. In each country, development policies determine the number of rich (poor) regions that (do not) engage in production activities, while transfer policies redistribute income between rich and poor regions. The mix of transfer and development policies is inefficient under tax competition: conditional on the equilibrium tax rate, too much revenue is spent on development policies and too little on transfer policies. This analysis of the expenditure mix implies that development policies are used as a means of regional redistribution even if transfer policies are efficient instruments for this purpose. Moreover, it is shown that the overall level of public expenditure may be too high because of the possibility of over-development.     

政府竞争:行政区经济运行中的地方政府行为分析

从政府竞争的角度,为行政区经济形成构建了一个政府行为分析框架.通过对政府竞争和博弈三个层面的考察,揭示区域经济发展中的各层级政府间互动关系,对行政区经济形成的深层次原因提供较为系统的解释.     

Some Comments on Tax Competition and Its Potential Effects on Tax Rates and Revenues

Corporate taxation is seen as the price of investing in a country, that is, the price either for the right to do business within the jurisdiction or for the supply of public goods. If consumption of that right or those public goods is mobile between jurisdictions and price competition ensues which will force prices together. Also, in the case of high tax regimes, a fall in the tax burden would be anticipated. In other words, countries will spontaneously harmonize their tax systems or face the loss of intemational investment and the disadvantages they bring.     

Public input competition and agglomeration

This paper analyzes the impact of public input competition in a New Economic Geography framework. It is shown that regional competition yields an overprovision of public inputs if trade costs are sizable while it leads to underprovision if regions are highly integrated. Moreover, public input competition assures a dispersion of industry as long as trade costs are high but induces agglomeration even for ex ante identical regions if trade costs have fallen below a certain value. Finally, a trade-off between regional convergence and efficiency arises since the efficient distribution of regional infrastructure requires full agglomeration for sufficiently low trade costs.     

Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect

This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic industry with many firms. Each government sets its tax rate strategically to maximize the weighted sum of residents’ welfare and political contributions by owners of firms. It is shown that if the governments care deeply about contributions and trade costs are low, the small country attracts a more than proportionate share of firms by setting a lower tax rate. The well-known home-market effect, which states that countries with a larger market attract a more-than-proportionate share of firms, may be reversed as a result of tax competition by politically interested governments.     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

Even small trade costs restore efficiency in tax competition

We introduce transport cost of trade in products into the classical Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) model of capital tax competition. It turns out that even small levels of transport cost lead to a complete breakdown of the seminal result, the underprovision of public goods. Instead, there is a symmetric equilibrium with efficient public goods provision in all jurisdictions.     

Spatial competition between shopping centers

We study competition between two shopping centers that sell the same set of goods and are located at the extremes of a linear city, without restricting consumers to make all their purchases at a single place. In the case of competition between a shopping mall (set of independent single-product shops) and a department store (single multiproduct shop), we find that: if the number of goods is low, all consumers shop at a single place; if it is moderately high, some consumers travel to both shopping centers to buy each good where it is cheaper (a single good is cheaper at the shopping mall). The shops at the mall, taken together, obtain a lower profit than the department store. Nevertheless, two shopping malls should be expected to appear endogenously.     

Tax competition,uniform assessment,and the benefit principle

In previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents. However, this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment. Here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas, with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods, one for residents and one for business. For “plausible” parameter values, numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm.     

A theory of interregional tax competition

A general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition, where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels. An exact definition of tax competition is provided, and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible. It is argued, however, that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions. Inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled. The amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms.     

A note on tax competition in the presence of agglomeration economies

This paper analyzes tax competition in the presence of agglomeration effects. The obtained results are then compared to the results of the traditional model, without agglomeration effects. As is well known, the presence of a fiscal externality affects the provision of the public good in the standard competitive model of tax competition. In the model with agglomeration effects, in addition to this externality, a new effect shows up. This effect reflects heightened government concern about capital flight, which depresses firm productivity by limiting external economies of scale. As a result, capital tax rates end up being lower than in the case where agglomeration effects are not present, worsening the underprovision of the public good. This conclusion holds in both the competitive and strategic versions of the model.     

Identifying strategic interactions in Swedish local income tax policies

This paper uses data on Swedish local governments to test for strategic interaction in local tax setting. We make use of a number of indirect predictions from the theories of tax competition and yardstick competition in order to test for the presence of strategic interaction in these forms. Using such additional predictions of the theories serves a twofold purpose—first it helps us establish if the spatial coefficient is due to strategic interactions or merely reflecting spatial error correlation, and second, it helps identify the source of interaction. The analysis provides strong evidence for spatial correlation in tax rates among Swedish local governments. Moreover, we find weak evidence of tax competition effects in the setting of tax rates.     

Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions

This paper develops a framework to analyze platform competition in two‐sided markets in which agents endogenously decide on which side of a platform to join. We characterize the equilibrium pricing structure and perform a comparative statics analysis on how the distribution of agents’ preferences affects the platforms’ profits. We also show that the market equilibrium under profit‐maximizing platforms leads to the first best social surplus, which illustrates the importance of the price mechanism to induce more balanced participation across the two sides. This framework can be applied to analyze market competition for “rental” or “sharing” platforms. In addition, we extend our analysis to consider an initial investment stage, which makes participants the owner of some durable goods to rent out.     

Copycat gaming: A spatial analysis of state lottery structure

In models of tax competition, tax instruments are explicit; all parties are aware of the tax and respond to incentives provided therein. In the case of state lotteries, the tax is the amount of sales collected but not redistributed as prizes. Using data from 1967 to 2000, we show that although such a tax is implicit, states still engage in tax competition; if neighboring states raise their prize payout by 10% (thereby lowering their lottery tax), the home state will respond with up to a 5% increase in their prize payout.     

The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction

The article strengthens and provides a dynamic extension of the theory on collective rent seeking and private provision of a public good. Each individual agent within each group chooses in continuous or discrete time a continuous or discrete effort level. The combined effort within each group provides within-group public goods which are used as an input in the between-group n-group competition for an external prize. Intergroup mobility and intergroup warfare are allowed for. Each group and each individual agent within each group get a fraction of the prize based on a linear combination of equity and relative effort. A model/algorithm is developed generating analytical results and simulations illustrating how the interaction within and between groups proceeds through time.     

General equilibrium and optimal taxes

It is shown that if subsidies are not excessive, there exists a general competitive equilibrium in the presence of a complex tax structure. Furthermore, under certain continuity assumptions, a tax structure which is optimal from the social point of view can be determined. Procedures maximize quasi-concave after tax profit functions. Consumers have convex budget sets reflect- ing their income from sales and profits minus taxes on fixed income and progressive sales taxes. Their preferences are interdependent, intransitive and incomplete. The government provides public goods and determines the optimal tax regime on the basis of its preferences on the final competitive consumption allocation.     

Asymptotic stability of a general equilibrium under perfect and monopolistic competition

This study examines the asymptotic stability of a general equilibrium for an economy under perfect and monopolistic competition in which delays in a production process arise. Crucially, we find that the sufficient conditions for the stability of the equilibrium in each model differ markedly. For the stability of the equilibrium under perfect (monopolistic) competition, it is favorable that the slope of every demand curve is gradual (steep).