Audit quality, auditor compensation and initial public offering underpricing

We jointly study the impact of audit quality on auditor compensation and initial public offering (IPO) underpricing using a sample of Australian firms going public over the period 1996–2003. We find that quality (Big Four) audit firms earn significantly higher fees than non-Big Four auditors, and audit quality is positively associated with IPO underpricing. The positive relation between audit quality and underpricing is more pronounced for small issues, IPOs underwritten by non-prestigious underwriters, and those that are not backed by venture capitalists. Taken together, our results suggest that quality auditors serve as a signalling device that enhances post-issue market value of equity.     

Post-IPO Directors' Sales and Reissuing Activity: An Empirical Test of IPO Signalling Models

Signalling models of IPO underpricing argue that owners of high-quality firms signal firm quality by underpricing shares sold at the IPO and retaining a large equity stake because they benefit from IPO signalling by selling further shares in the aftermarket at a higher share price. This hypothesis is tested by examining whether the probabilities and volumes of subsequent share issues or insider sales are related to the proposed IPO signals. There is evidence that post-IPO share issuance is related to initial returns, but the same is not true for insider selling. Moreover, little evidence is found to support the view that the proportion of equity retained by initial owners is an IPO signal. Therefore, the signalling hypothesis is rejected.     

Disclosure of Intended Use of Proceeds and Underpricing in Initial Public Offerings

We use the context of a company's initial public offering (IPO) of equity securities as a capital‐markets setting to empirically study the economic consequences of endogenous disclosure. In particular, we examine the relation between the extent of dollar detail an IPO issuer provides regarding their intended use of proceeds and first‐day underpricing. We document substantial variation in the specificity of this disclosure and find that an increase in such specificity is associated with lower IPO underpricing. Overall, our results suggest that IPOs that provide specific use‐of‐proceeds disclosures have less ex ante uncertainty, in the sense that these disclosures help investors estimate the dispersion of secondary market values. Our paper contributes to the empirical accounting literature by documenting an association between voluntary disclosure and what is arguably the foremost cost of raising initial equity capital (i.e., IPO underpricing).     

UNDERPRICING OF IPOS THAT FOLLOW PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore, PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre‐IPO private placements that help reduce the cost of going public.     

Underwriter reputation and IPO underpricing: The role of institutional investors in the Chinese growth enterprise market

This paper investigates the effects of underwriter reputation on initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market, in light of the conflicting evidence in the literature on IPO underpricing. Using data during the post global financial crisis period, we find that IPO firms with prestigious underwriters have lower market-adjusted initial returns on average. We further find that prestigious underwriters reduce IPO underpricing by minimizing the time gap between the offering and listing, choosing high-quality firms to underwrite, and reducing information asymmetry between issuers and investors. In the presence of institutional investors, however, we find that more underpricing occurs, as these investors tend to obtain access to IPO shares at a higher price discount via private placements. This new finding suggests that the institutional investors have a role to play in the case of high under-pricing, which partly gets corrected via underwriter reputation.     

Acquisition Activity and IPO Underpricing

We propose an “M&A activity” hypothesis as a partial explanation for initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. When going public during active corporate control markets, managers may take actions to safeguard their control. In support of this conjecture, we find that pre-IPO M&A activity directly explains IPO underpricing. We also find that underpricing and ownership dispersion are positively correlated, as are ownership dispersion and the probability of remaining independent. Considering the possibility that some managers take their firms public to be acquired, we find that the positive link between M&A activity and underpricing is not robust for firms that are viewed as likely targets.     

Do Initial Public Offering Firms Purchase Analyst Coverage with Underpricing?

We report that initial public offering (IPO) underpricing is positively related to analyst coverage by the lead underwriter and to the presence of an all‐star analyst on the research staff of the lead underwriter. These findings are robust to controls for other determinants of underpricing and to controls for the endogeneity of underpricing and analyst coverage. In addition, we find that the probability of switching underwriters between IPO and seasoned equity offering is negatively related to the unexpected amount of post‐IPO analyst coverage. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that underpricing is, in part, compensation for expected post‐IPO analyst coverage from highly ranked analysts.     

Underpricing and Firm Quality in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Singapore

Firms seeking initial public listings on the Stock Exchange of Singapore can choose between offering their shares at a fixed price or selling them in two tranches: the first tranche is offered at a fixed price while the issue price of the second tranche is determined via a tender system. Consistent with the existing signalling literature, tendering IPO firms underprice their fixed price tranche more than non-tendering IPO firms. The underpricing in the fixed tranche is recouped through higher proceeds from the tender tranche. Our evidence suggests that IPO firms use the tender option to signal superior firm quality.     

Seasoned equity offerings and the short- and long-run performance of initial public offerings in the UK

In contrast to the US practice, rights issues is the predominant method of raising additional equity capital in the London market. the UK evidence for the period 1980-1991 provides no support to the hypothesis that IPO firms deliberately underprice to signal their quality and facilitate subsequent seasoned equity offerings. the level of initial returns is related neither to the size of the issue nor to the price response at the announcement of a rights issue. the results demonstrate, however, that firms with higher first day returns are quicker in returning to the market for additional equity capital. There is also strong evidence to suggest that the announcement of a seasoned equity offering follows a period of significant rises in the stock prices of reissuing firms. Such gains are, however, dissipated quickly in the 18 months after the announcement of the seasoned equity offering. the level of underperformance is particularly pronounced for firms that raised relatively small subsequent amounts of capital in relation to funds raised at the initial offering. Thus, the paper documents a pattern of post-issue behaviour which is fundamentally similar for both unseasoned and seasoned equity offerings.     

The Pricing of Equity Carve-Outs

This article examines the pricing of stock for 251 equity carve‐outs during the 1986–1995 period. We document a mean initial‐day return of 5.83% and a mean one‐week return of 5.43%. Among carve‐outs, the initial underpricing is lower for issues represented by high prestige investment bankers and those that have a lower offer price. In comparison with 251 initial public offering (IPO) firms matched by size and book‐to‐market ratio of equity, carveouts exhibit significantly lower initial‐day returns, but their buy‐and‐hold returns for sixmonth and one‐year periods are not significantly different from IPOs. The IPO firms have a three‐year return of 28.82% which is significantly higher than the 21.07% return for the carve‐out firms.     

The Post-Issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms

This article investigates the change in operating performance of firms as they make the transition from private to public ownership. A significant decline in operating performance subsequent to the initial public offering (IPO) is found. Additionally, there is a significant positive relation between post-IPO operating performance and equity retention by the original entrepreneurs, but no relation between post-IPO operating performance and the level of initial underpricing. Post-issue declines in the market-to-book ratio, price/earnings ratio, and earnings per share are also documented.     

IPO anomalies and innovation capital

Innovation capital are typically expensed and/or unrecognized as assets under current generally accepted accounting principles. This results in accounting-related information asymmetry. This paper examines the association of innovation capital (as measured here by the proxies of R&D expenditures and granted patents) and initial public offerings (IPO) anomalies. These anomalies include initial IPO underpricing, duration of honeymoon (a distinct feature of the Taiwanese IPO environment), and long-term performance. The theoretical model underlying this research is a signaling model. The results indicate that more innovative firms are more likely to be underpriced, and have longer honeymoon periods than less innovative firms. Further, the more innovative firms have positive and growing long-term market-adjusted returns. This stands in contrast to the declining long-term stock performance of initial public offering firms that is evidenced in the literature. We conclude that pre-IPO research and development expenditures disclosed in the IPO prospectus, official monthly reports of newly developed patents released to the public, and the frequency of patent citations significantly signal both underpricing and future market performance of IPO firms in Taiwan.     

Do media connections help? Evidence from IPO pricing in China

This study examines how social connections between media executives and firms affect initial public offering (IPO) pricing using manually collected Chinese data. We find media-connected firms receive more frequent and more positive coverage than their unconnected peers, resulting in reduced IPO underpricing. However, media-connected firms have worse post-IPO market performance. Although media-connected firms have better pre-IPO accounting performance, they conduct more earnings management under the cover provided by their connected media. Additional results show that the negative effect of media connections on IPO underpricing is more pronounced for media that are not controlled by the central government and are based in the same city as the firm. It is also more pronounced for firms with less institutional ownership and non-state-owned enterprises. Our results remain valid after various robustness tests, such as alternative proxies for IPO underpricing, eliminating alternative hypotheses, matching analysis, instrumental variable analysis, as well as placebo tests. Collectively, our findings suggest that media connections compromise IPO pricing efficiency.     

Do anti-corruption campaigns affect IPO underpricing? Evidence from a central discipline inspection of the CSRC in China

The system of central discipline inspections has become a key anti-corruption governance tool in China since 2013. This paper investigates the impact of a central discipline inspection of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. We find that IPO firms listed during the inspection period exhibit greater IPO underpricing than those listed outside the inspection period. The reason is the increased focus of the CSRC on maintaining capital market stability, which makes it more inclined to approve IPO firms with lower issue prices during the inspection period compared with other periods. We also find that IPO firms listed during the inspection period have better short-term market performance but poorer long-term returns than those listed outside the inspection period. Moreover, the effect of the anti-corruption inspection on IPO underpricing is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises, firms with low-quality auditors and firms located in regions with high corruption. Overall, our paper enriches the literature on IPO underpricing and the economic consequences of the central discipline inspection system.     

The Relation between IPO Underpricing and Litigation Risk Revisited: Changes between 1990 and 2002

This paper reexamines the litigation risk hypothesis of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in different legal and economic environments. When litigation risk is reduced in the three-year period after the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, firms' litigation risk plays a less significant role in IPO underpricing strategy. Furthermore, underpricing deters more traditional IPO lawsuits compared to that effect in the pre-1995 period. In the period after that, however, there is another structural change in which firms again use underpricing as insurance against IPO lawsuits. This underpricing may actually have led to greater litigation relating to IPO allocation irregularities.     

China’s Securities reforms and IPO wealth loss

We revisit initial public offering (IPO) underpricing in China before and after the 2001 China Securities Regulatory Commission reforms targeting the IPO process and strengthening corporate governance, using Habib and Ljungqvist’s (2001) wealth loss measure instead of headline underpricing. Habib and Ljungqvist argue that the extent to which owners care about underpricing depends on both headline underpricing and the percentage of IPO shares issued relative to total shares outstanding. We find that in the post-reform period, relative to the pre-reform period, the wealth loss for pre-IPO owners is lower, the incremental effect of the association between wealth loss and state-retained ownership is significantly positive, and a higher proportion of independent directors on the board moderates the wealth loss. Our findings suggest that the more market-oriented IPO process and the corporate governance reforms provide insiders of Chinese IPO firms with greater opportunities to influence IPO pricing and thereby reduce their wealth loss.     

Property rights and access to equity capital in China

This study uses recent improvements to China's physical and intellectual property protections to test information asymmetry, signaling, and litigation risk theories of initial public offering (IPO) underpricing. We find robust evidence that stronger physical and intellectual property protections are associated with lower initial returns, especially among smaller IPOs and non-equity carve-outs. This result is consistent with the notion that property rights reduce information asymmetry among IPO participants; however, some of China's reforms, including the 2014 establishment of specialized intellectual property courts in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, appear to have increased litigation risk. Additional tests indicate that property rights positively impact the likelihood that an IPO firm is backed by venture capital. Overall, these results are consistent with the idea that strong property rights help alleviate the adverse selection problem that results from information asymmetry among firms and equity investors.     

The pricing and performance of IPOs in China’s poor counties

In the context of China’s drive to alleviate poverty, we focus on the initial public offering (IPO) firms located in China’s poor counties and investigate their IPO pricing and post-IPO performance. Contrary to the findings reported for the U.S., we find that the problem of information asymmetry between Chinese firms located in rural areas and their investors is so severe that these IPO firms are associated with significantly higher underpricing. This effect is more pronounced for firms located in rural areas with poor traffic systems. We do not find significant market performance differences between rural and urban firms after their IPOs, but the operating performance of rural firms improves in the short term. Our additional analyses indicate that rural IPO firms have significantly lower investor attention and higher agency costs than urban firms. Overall, we enrich the literature on IPO pricing and the economic effects of geographic location.     

Seasoned Offerings,Imitation Costs,and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings

This paper presents a signalling model in which high-quality firms underprice at the initial public offering (IPO) in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned offering. The main assumptions are that low-quality firms must invest in imitation expenses to appear to be high-quality firms, and that with some probability this imitation is discovered between offerings. Underpricing by high-quality firms at the IPO can then add sufficient signalling costs to these imitation expenses to induce low-quality firms to reveal their quality voluntarily. The model is consistent with several documented empirical regularities and offers new testable implications. In addition, the paper provides empirical evidence that many firms raise substantial amounts of additional equity capital in the years after their IPO.     

Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?

We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency–cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post–listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness.