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1.
《Services Marketing Quarterly》2013,34(4):29-41
The determinants of the utilization of professional services has been widely studied in the case of the Andersen-Newman (1973) framework. It seems likely that this framework which includes predisposing, enabling and illness level factors as leading to health services utilization might be usefully extended to the analysis of all professional service usage will illness level changing to professional service need level. This paper adapts the P Andersen-Newman framework to all professiona services by reformulating the framework and adds a strategic marketing approach in discussing its application. 相似文献
2.
Dealing with managerial incentive in an oligopolistic competition market where the relevant strategic variables are not directly
quantities but incentive schemes. It is found that, in the sequential delegation model, the leader output will not be affected
by changing the number of the follower firms when there is only one leader. In addition, more equal distribution of the number
of leaders and followers will result in higher industry output, lower price, lower industry profit, higher consumer surplus
and higher economic welfare; moreover, economic welfare in the sequential delegation model is always higher than in a simultaneous
delegation model.
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Leonard F. S. WangEmail: |
3.
技术溢出情况下寡头垄断企业合作创新效率的博弈分析 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
合作创新是典型的合作博弈,有关合作经济组织效率的研究是主流经济学家最有兴趣的主题之一。构造一个两阶段博弈模型对寡头垄断企业合作创新效率进行分析,旨在比较成本节约型寡头垄断企业合作创新与非合作创新的过程及绩效差异,包括市场产出、社会福利的变化,为企业合作创新过程中组织模式的选择提供理论依据 相似文献
4.
寡头垄断下的对外直接投资:一种博奕论解释 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
对外投资决策并非完全依照邓宁的3种优势作出 ,相反在寡头市场结构下主宰对外投资的因素往往是某种博弈的结构。正如理性预期使宏观经济学发生革命一样 ,博奕论广泛而深远地改变了经济学家的思维方式。本文使用博奕论这一分析工具变换角度重新审视了寡头垄断市场结构下 ,跨国公司对外直接投资的若干问题。 相似文献
5.
This paper considers a successive oligopoly setting in which a set of upstream firms sell output non-exclusively to a group of downstream firms using a linear tariff. If the concavity of retail demand is constant then the profitability of horizontal merger at either the upstream or the downstream stage is shown to depend on the number of firms in the stage experiencing the merger and not on the number of firms in the other stage. Furthermore, the profitability of merger at either stage is the same as the profitability of merger amongst a set of vertically integrated firms in a setting in which all firms are vertically integrated. Finally, mergers at either stage are shown to reduce the sum of producer and consumer surplus. Moreover the negative effects of merger on surplus are unambiguously increased by increases in concentration in the merging stage and ambiguously affected by increases in concentration in the non-merging stage.JEL classification: L10, L20, L40 相似文献
6.
Hans‐Theo Normann 《Metroeconomica》2000,51(3):343-366
Conscious parallelism refers to collusive forms of parallel pricing in oligopoly. In this paper, four distinct pricing methods which all impose some form of parallel conduct are analysed. The pricing methods maximize joint profits if, and only if, firms are symmetric. With asymmetries in cost, total gains from collusion are reduced and absolute and relative collusive gains differ between firms. For many collusive optima, low‐cost firms have only little to gain from conscious parallelism. This is particularly the case when the degree of product homogeneity is high. 相似文献
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文章通过构建企业间贸易寡头竞争模型,演示了公司治理结构差异对于企业市场力的影响,认为公司制度的演变在一定的条件下具有与政府政策干预同样的利润转移效应,从而揭示了公司治理结构演变在国际贸易中的作用。 相似文献
9.
This paper considers the relative efficiency of unit tax and ad valorem tax in a Cournot duopoly market in the presence of licensing opportunities after the announcement of the tax rates by the government. In case of fixed-fee licensing, if the unit cost difference of the firms is low and tax revenue of the government is high, then unit tax is more efficient than the ad valorem tax. If tax revenue of the government is low, then ad valorem tax is more efficient than unit tax. Ad valorem tax is more efficient than unit tax in the case of royalty licensing. 相似文献
10.
长期以来,人们从微观经济理论出发,认为竞争是有效的,垄断是无效的。但从世界范围内的产业发展来看,寡头垄断是当今国际市场结构发展的主流。作为一种极具效率的市场结构,寡头垄断的优势有助于推进我国全面小康建设的顺利进行。 相似文献
11.
组建与培育具有国际竞争力的大型国有控股流通企业集团是转型经济时期我国政府的一种积极的市场治理方式。通过构建三类混合寡占零售博弈模型和均衡分析表明,在多种所有制零售企业共同参与竞争时,国内社会总体福利的大小与外资零售企业的信息技术管理水平并不成简单正相关关系;当国有零售企业完全以社会总剩余最大化为目标时,即使其效率低于外资企业、市场的价格小于国有企业的边际成本,它的存在也将提升社会福利;国有零售企业具有规定市场规模、维护市场稳定的重要功能;明确国有流通企业在不同状态下目标函数预期,合理构建零售市场的组织结构与所有制结构,可以有效增强我国零售市场的供给保障和调控能力。 相似文献
12.
Gianni De Fraja Alessandra Staderini 《International Journal of the Economics of Business》1996,3(1):57-67
The paper studies the behaviour of four oligopolistic firms in the Italian coffee market. We study whether their behaviour is better represented by Bertrand behaviour or by collusive pricing. We also investigate the role of advertising in product differentiation. 相似文献
13.
Gila E. Fruchter 《International Journal of Research in Marketing》2011,28(3):218-230
We show that the optimal advertising strategy under the Generalized Bass Model (GBM) involves beginning at an extremely low level (the lower the better) and then increasing spending throughout the planning period. This strategy remains optimal in the presence of decreasing prices that affect both margins and diffusion speed. We provide a simple explanation for why this happens. We further show that the intuitively appealing patterns of continuous decrease or increase-then-decrease (both with an uptick towards the end) identified in earlier research are also possible as optimal dynamic advertising paths under the GBM structure, but only if the advertising at launch is constrained to be higher than a particular threshold, which we identify. The constraint necessary to generate intuitively appealing strategies lowers overall profits. Therefore, the GBM generates advertising policy recommendations that most marketers would deem odd. This casts doubt on the value of the GBM for normative purposes. Other existing diffusion models are preferred when seeking normative guidance on optimal dynamic advertising policies for new products subject to word of mouth. 相似文献
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Karl Aiginger Michael Pfaffermayr 《International Journal of the Economics of Business》1999,6(2):165-180
When competition is tough, firms which do not implement the least expensive technology are forced to exit, or the low cost firms are able to increase their market share. Persistent cost or profit differences require some form of restricted entry, specific intangible assets or oligopolistic co-ordination. If technology or skills is easy to transfer but it is not transferred because of collusion, we have to add a cost side effect ('the staircase')stemming from the non-proliferation of the best technology- to the well-known demand side loss ('the triangle'). This paper presents a model with vertical product differentiation and develops a method which disentangles cost differences coming from vertical product differences and those coming from other sources. Data for the paper industry in the EU, in the US and in Japan indicate that cost differences are large. If at least some part of them comes from oligopolistic co-ordination, then the welfare loss of oligopoly is much larger than the usually measured demand side welfare loss. 相似文献
16.
Donald J. Smythe 《International Journal of the Economics of Business》1996,3(2):185-200
This paper uses the comparative statics method of testing for a monopoly equilibrium to track the competitiveness of the US cigarette industry between 1955 and 1990. The degree of competition ranged from somewhat less than a Coumot–Nash equilibrium would imply to somewhat more. Although the industry's behavior was highly autocorrelated, there were periodic reversions to behavior that was much more competitive than the trend 相似文献
17.
Thomas I. Palley 《Metroeconomica》1997,48(2):161-176
This paper presents a generalized Keynes-Kaldor growth model which incorporates both the Cambridge theory of income distribution and endogenous technical change. Within the model, the rate of aggregate demand growth affects both the level of aggregate demand and the rate of output growth. However, demand growth management can only be used to shift the economy from low to high growth equilibria, and cannot produce continuous adjustments in the equilibrium rate of growth. This reveals that management of the growth trajectory is a qualitatively different problematic from management of the level of output. Lastly, the model highlights ambiguities regarding the adjustment dynamics of demand growth. 相似文献
18.
This paper integrates the Cournot oligopoly model with the Ricardian comparative advantage model. The Ricardian trade pattern is robust, and only can be reversed in extreme conditions. Trade volume increases substantially with increases in competition in world export industries. In a symmetrical world, a threshold level of competition determines whether capitalists as a group usually gain or lose from trade. Under all circumstances workers never lose even if a country has a comparative disadvantage in a perfectly competitive world industry, but workers gain less in that country than they do in the rest of the world. 相似文献
19.
Economic growth requires that firms adopt new technologies. However, it may be insufficient or excessive in less competitive industries from the social welfare point of view. In this case, a government subsidy or tax is necessary. We analyze the optimum subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption by firms when firms maximize the weighted average of absolute and relative profits. We do not consider that firms really maximize the weighted average, but the weight on the relative profit is used as a parameter indicating competitiveness of firm behavior. We show that the optimum policy is likely to be subsidization (or taxation) when the set-up cost for new technology adoption is large (or small). It is likely to be subsidization (or taxation) when competitiveness is large (or small), that is, it is near to perfect competition (or joint profit maximization). 相似文献
20.
Empirical studies of market power focus exclusively on industries with private firms. Yet, it is not uncommon to find private
firms competing with public firms or cooperatives (coops) within the same market. We develop an empirical procedure for measuring
market-power and cost-efficiency effects of concentration in mixed oligopoly consisting of coops and investment-owned firms
(IOF) and apply the procedure to the Swedish beef-slaughter industry. We find that the cost-efficiency effect of coop concentration
more than offset its market power effect, resulting lower beef prices. IOFs are found to be price-takers in both cattle procurement
and beef sales.
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