An introduction to problems of economic development in the CMEA countries

Through the Asian financial crisis, many key international economic issues have come to the forefront the stability of the international financial system under the IMF, “Asian values”, the universal validity of the Asian Economic Development Model, China's leadership in the regional world economy, Japan's role in the region, and the immunity of Greater China from the current financial crisis. Currently, most Asian countries seem eager to redress structural problems involving the government sector, banking, and corporate governance. In the process of this full scale restructuring, Korea must reevaluate its economic relationship with Central Asia. This paper argues that Korean financial crisis stems basically from the system failure. Furthermore, since a small open economy carries with it intrinsic vulnerabilities, the government should be more careful in securing optimal foreign exchange, opening capital markets based on the economy's absorption capacity. In this respect, the banking industry should be run based on the profitability of capital. Once banking industries are distorted by the practice of government‐led policy loans, it is more difficult to correct those customized distortions. The banking industry should play a larger role as the “brain of the economy”, sensing abnormalities of the economy. Moreover, in today's increasingly interdependent global economic system, no single country can solve its problems without close coordination of its policy with the outside world. An early warning system to signal financial instability would help developing economies in modernizing and strengthening their domestic financial institutions and would also work as a supplement to the IMF standby fund. Also, human resource management has proven too important to be neglected. Central Asia could derive lessons from the above Asian “failure”, not the Asian “miracle”, to avoid inappropriate policies and to deepen its economic development.     

China's Nonfinancial Corporate Debt Dynamics

Since the global financial crisis broke out in 2008, China's nonfinancial corporate debt has been rising steadily and rapidly, posing serious threat to China's financial stability. China's rising corporate debt is mainly attributable to three factors: worsening capital efficiency, worsening corporate profitability and high funding costs. Based on a dynamic recursive model developed in the paper, we simulate the trajectories of China's corporate debt‐to‐GDP ratio, and find that if China fails to reverse the current trends in capital efficiency, corporate profitability and financing costs, China's nonfinancial corporate debt‐to‐GDP ratio will continue to rise without converging to a limit. Against most economists' intuition, given the current trends of changes in parameters, higher economic growth will not help China to escape the corporate debt trap. On the contrary, it will make China's corporate debt problem even worse. To avert a corporate debt crisis, China needs to speed up the structural reform and change the growth paradigm so as to enhance capital efficiency and firms' profitability, while reducing firms' financing costs.     

Restructuring of financial institutions and the corporate sector in Korea

This paper explores causes of the Korean currency crisis which started in November 1997. This paper also presents restructuring proposals and introduces the progress made so far. The urgency for quick restructuring and the necessity of the injection of money from both the government and foreign investors are emphasized. Restructuring of financial and corporate sectors should be pursued simultaneously. In the financial sector, the restructuring of banks should take precedence over other financial institutions. The key task in terms of bank restructuring involves the resolution of bad loans, recapitalization and the expedited reorganization of nonviable banks. Corporate reform is also important. Banks should play a central role in corporate workouts, especially in lowering excessive corporate debt and triggering corporate restructuring based on core competence. Transparency of corporate management, internationally accepted accounting practices, fuller disclosure requirements and stronger monitoring by minority shareholders are prerequisites for effective market discipline. Reform of ownership and governance structure are also important in enhancing managerial accountability of corporates as well as financial institutions.     

Identification of Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Implications for Financial Architecture in Korea

Abstract

The global financial crisis has put a spotlight on concerns about financial system stability. Currently, there are discussions about how to identify systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and how to strengthen regulatory measures for these SIFIs. Against the backdrop, this study aims to identify SIFIs by measuring inter-sectoral financial transactions with the flow of funds (FOF) account as a measure of interconnectedness. The empirical results show that banks or insurance companies can be SIFIs only in terms of size. However, foreign banks' branches (FBB) and credit-specialized institutions can also be SIFIs in terms of interconnectedness. Especially the systemic importance of FBB in Korea has increased considering the fact that financial crisis in Korea resulted mainly from foreign exchange market. Therefore, more specific discussions and regulatory measures for SIFIs will be required from the perspective of capital market development and Korea's situation.     

An empirical analysis of the factors determining the financial crisis in Asia

This article tests a hypothesis that the causes of the Asian financial crisis are weaknesses in the balance sheet of financial institutions, high international interest rates, high short-term external debts, excessive loans, and continuing large current account deficits. It also tests a hypothesis regarding the determination of nonperforming bank loans. Empirical tests are carried out with panel data on seven countries in Asia—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand—for the 1995 through 1997 period. The 3-month LIBOR interest rate and nonperforming loan rates of banks are found to be the major determinants of the Asian financial crisis. The nonperforming bank loan ratios are explained by the corporate leverage ratio. In addition, both the corporate high leverage ratio and LIBOR interest rates are found to significantly affect the outcome of the Asian crisis. Lowering world interest rates and taking the measures of individual Asian countries to reduce nonperforming assets and debt-to-equity ratios would be very effective in preventing reoccurrence of the crisis.     

THE FOUNDATION OF THE MEXICAN WELFARE STATE AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE 1990s

Before 1982 Mexico's welfare state regime was a limited conservative one that put priority on the social security of organized labor. But following the country's debt crisis in 1982, this regime changed to a hybrid liberal model. The Ernest Zedillo government (1995–2000) in particular pushed ahead with liberal reform of the social security system. This paper examines the characteristics and the policy making of the social security reforms in the 1990s. The results suggest that underlying these reforms was the restructuring of the economy and the need to cope with the cost of this restructuring. The paper also points out that one of the main factors making possible the rapid execution of the reforms were the weakened political clout of the officialist labor unions due to their steady breakdown during the 1990s and the increase in the monopolistic power of the state vis‐à‐vis the position of labor during the negotiations on social security reforms.     

Competition in Turkish Banking: Impacts of Restructuring and the Global Financial Crisis

This paper investigates the evolution of competition in the Turkish banking industry by taking into account the transformation in the sector in the aftermath of the country's financial crisis of 2000 to 2001 and the global financial crisis. The results demonstrate that the level of competition in the system did not increase despite the restructuring that was undertaken and the increased foreign bank participation. In addition, the level of competition in the sector deteriorated during the global crisis. There is also some evidence that the market power of banks with different ownership characteristics varied and did not converge over time.     

Corporate Venture Capital and Its Contribution to Intermediate Goods Firms in South Korea*

Set by government, corporate, financial and individual sources, venture capitalists in Korea have adapted themselves to the new and uncertain venture capital market through stand‐alone and syndicated investments. The present study raises questions about whether various financial sources contributed differentially to their portfolio firms during the market boom of 2000. Results show that no single capital source showed better performance, and only corporate venture capitalists contributed to intermediate goods firms. The latter finding might reflect the unique ability of corporate venture capitalists to use vertical value‐chain linkages for their investments.     

The Asian crisis: what did we learn and when did we learn it?

This paper steps back from the detail of the Asian crisis, to ask whether the 1997 crisis advanced our broad understanding of the age‐old problem of economic crises. Some immediate lessons were learned from the failures of the crisis‐response in Indonesia, which was the worst‐affected economy. It is notable, however, how little changed to address the ongoing systemic weaknesses. Three areas of unresolved vulnerability can be identified. First, the sudden stops and reversals of international capital flows. Second, the intrinsic fragility of a financial system that borrows short and lends long. Third, unanchored exchange rates, where the market's price‐discovery can take the rate to levels far from equilibrium, for sustained periods. For more than a decade after the Asian crisis, international capital flows continued to be seen as unambiguously beneficial, with any attempts at capital flow management rejected. At a global level, it was not until the 2008 financial crisis that widespread financial fragility was addressed through tighter regulation and higher capital requirements. On exchange rates, misleading advocacy of corner solutions—either pure floating exchange rates or immutable fixed rates—continued in the face of the real‐world experience that sometimes intervention is needed to maintain an exchange rate close to equilibrium.     

开放条件下中国金融风险预警指标体系研究

本文从金融危机形成机理的分析入手,构建了一套由宏观经济风险指标、金融市场风险指标、银行经营风险指标以及金融开放风险指标等4个子系统组成的金融风险预警综合指标体系。本文采用动态分析的方法,考察该指标体系对我国金融风险变化的预警功效,从而为金融危机的预警提供量化判断依据。研究表明,金融开放带来的跨境短期资本流动变化及其对外短期债务规模扩大的风险,对金融体系安全的影响较大,值得密切关注。     

韩国国有商业银行民营化的进程及启示

本文分析认为韩国国有商业银行的民营化大致经历了大型商业银行的民营化、专业银行的民营化、亚洲金融危机时期的先国有化后民营化以及借助外资力量进行民营化几个阶段。它给我们的启示是实体经济的发展需要金融深化;政府需要积极参与和引导;产权私有化不等于经营自主化;借助外资加速民营化的进程。     

The Global Financial Crisis and Sub‐Saharan Africa: The Effects of Slowing Private Capital Inflows on Growth*

Abstract: This paper uses the bias‐corrected least‐squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator to examine the relationship between economic growth and four different types of private capital inflows (cross‐border bank lending, foreign direct investment (FDI), bonds flows and portfolio equity flows) on a sample of 15 selected sub‐Saharan African countries over the period 1980–2008. Our results show that FDI and cross‐border bank lending exert a significant and positive impact on sub‐Saharan Africa's growth, whereas portfolio equity flows and bonds flows have no growth impact. Our estimates suggest that a drop by 10 per cent in FDI inflows may lead to a 3 per cent decrease of income per capita growth in sub‐Saharan Africa, and a 10 per cent decrease in cross‐border bank lending may reduce growth by up to 1.5 per cent. Therefore, the global financial crisis is likely to have an important effect on sub‐Saharan Africa's growth through the private capital inflows channel.     

South Korea's economic reform and its aftermath

This paper analyzes the process of Korea's recovery from the 1997 financial crisis with several policy implications. The driving force behind the better‐than‐expected economic recovery was the reform measures introduced by the Korean government in four major areas such as the financial, corporate, labor and public sectors. Also, Korea's strong export performance helped by the booming U.S. economy provided a favorable external condition for recoveiy. Internally, surging investment in the IT and venture industries, which was deliberately fostered by the government, along with the revived consumption level, enabled the rapid recovery. However, as the U.S. economy slowed and the technology bubble burst in 2000, the Korean economy went through a mild recession in 2001. Based on the experiences of crisis and recovery, the implication of macroeconomic fundamentals is re‐examined. Even though the strong macroeconomic fundamentals were misleading in preventing the crisis, they later facilitated the Korean economy's recoveiy. As a result of various reform measures, the Korean economy as of today is in a different environment First, the low investment rate along with the decreased saving rate will marie the end of the high growth era. Second, the substantial deterioration of income distribution will be the major task to be tackled with in the future. Third, the Korean economy is now fully liberalized both in the commodity and capital markets with some side effects and merits. Fourth, the loan and deposit structure of the financial sector is significantly altered. Lastly, more fiscal burden is placed on the shoulders of the government due to the heavy debt service burden of public funds and the generous expansion of social welfare programs.     

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANY MODEL IN THE REFORM OF INDONESIA'S BANKING SECTOR

Lack of satisfactory progress with reform of the banking sector may imply that the chosen remedies were unworkable in the Indonesian context. These remedies, suggested by the international community, appear not to have taken proper account of the commercial and political ramifications of the new institutions and mechanisms that were to be put in place. Of key importance is the practical difficulty of finding suitable buyers for banks and assets taken over by the new bank restructuring agency. Almost the entire corporate sector was in distress as a result of the crisis, while foreign buyers were reluctant to commit themselves given an inadequate legal system as well as significant nationalistic opposition to the sale of corporate assets to foreign entities. This article discusses reasons for the failure to achieve several principal objectives of the reforms, and canvasses alternative approaches that might be more successful.     

Causes for business failures: Understanding the 1997 Korean crisis

This paper explains why the Korean business sector is in such bad shape based on the hypothesis that it is partly due to bad management and partly due to bad systems and policies. Bad management of business firms, especially the large ones belonging to chaebols, was a crucial element in fermenting the crisis. This stems from the deeper problem of the lack of an effective corporate governance mechanism. There did not exist effective mechanisms with which inefficient managers could be punished. Thus, when large firms went on prolonged investment binges, nothing could have prevented them. The grave ill effects of financial controls long used by the government, were another crucial elements that instigated the current crisis. The policy, whose essence was to create economic rents through interest rate controls and allocate those rents to designated areas, had produced many ill effects. The policies, among others, made borrowers overly dependent on debts and lenders extremely burdened with non-recoverable loans, making both very vulnerable to bad shocks. If Korea can reform her government-dominated economic system toward a more market-dependent one, she will emerge from the current crisis much stronger.     

What sort of financial sector should Indonesia have?

At the time of the 1997 Asian crisis, Indonesia's financial sector had serious weaknesses. This made it vulnerable to the key element of the crisis: massive reversal of foreign capital flows. Despite huge expenditures on restructuring, many of these weaknesses remain and the current strategy does not seem likely to overcome them. The alternative strategy explored here advocates the creation of ‘savings banks’, holding government bonds as their principal asset. With these safe assets, deposits in such institutions would be secure, even in the event of a major economic crisis. With this safe ‘core’, the rest of the financial system could develop on conventional lines (allowing removal of the current blanket guarantee, and making it more feasible to close banks without this causing a run on the system as a whole). The inherent risk to the taxpayer of another expensive bail-out would be greatly diminished.     

A Case for Economic Capital as a Pillar 1 Regulatory Tool

Regulatory capital – as a tool for financial regulation – has come under scrutiny following the financial crisis of 2007‐2010 in terms of its ability to achieve the major objectives of financial regulations, namely contributing to financial stability; the provision of equally competitive regulatory conditions for financial institutions; and aiming to ensure that regulatory capital requirements are risk‐sensitive. This article investigates and compares the risk‐sensitivity of economic capital and regulatory capital requirements empirically from a systemic and institution‐specific perspective. The results are assessed to determine whether current regulatory capital requirements are representative of the relevant risks financial institutions face. Given these results as well as calls to strengthen Basel's Pillar 2 disciplines in the aftermath of the crisis, it also presents a case for regulators to place a heavier reliance on economic capital – rather than regulatory capital numbers.     

Localization of foreign multinational companies in Korea

In response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis that devastated the Korean economy, the government performed promotional efforts, comprehensive structural reform, and implemented policies to create a favorable environment for foreign direct investment (FDI). While the Korean government announced deregulation plans to support foreign companies, the public also became more aware of the need for foreign capital to overcome the crisis and revive the economy. The change of atmosphere and the perception on the need to induce the inflow of foreign capital provided the basis for this study. In addition, the crucial role of foreign multinational companies and their efforts to achieve market recognition in a more comprehensive way have provoked this study on the localization of foreign multinational companies in Korea. Investment purposes, entry methods, and the degree of competition by multinational companies in Korea were the variables that lead these companies to respond to localization.     

Determinants of bond market development in Asia

One of the major reasons behind the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was the excessive dependence of the Asian economies on commercial banks for domestic financing. The region failed to diversify its sources of corporate financing as it relied mainly on banks since its other types of financing, namely bond markets, were still underdeveloped and their sizes were quite small. On the other hand, the 2008 global financial crisis and the ongoing European debt crisis have led to constraints in acquiring local currency and foreign currency liquidity in the corporate sector in Asia as foreign banks withdrew investments from Asia. Furthermore, Asia needs large long term capital (US$ 750 billion per year for 2010–2020) for developing infrastructure connectivity within and across its economies. Local and regional capital can be channeled for long-term infrastructure projects and other productive investment through bond markets. Having a well-developed local currency bond markets can enhance the resilience of domestic financial sector to external shocks and it can facilitate better intermediation of savings into productive investments in Asia. To enhance corporate bond financing, it is important to examine factors that affect the effective development of bond markets in Asia. The study attempts to identify the determinants of bond market development in Asian economies through examining the relationship of bond issuance with selected key financial and economic factors. It also intends to provide policy recommendations for the further development of the Asian bond market. Major determinants for bond market development in Asia include the size of an economy, the stage of economic development, the openness of an economy, the exchange rate variability, the size of the banking system, and interest rate variability.     

Debt Sustainability and the Ongoing Financial Crisis: The Case of IDA‐only African Countries*

Abstract: The ongoing financial crisis has raised concerns in many circles about a potential future wave of sovereign defaults spreading among developing countries and, therefore, the need for additional rounds of debt relief in poor indebted countries. This paper addresses this issue for a group of 31 International Development Association (IDA)‐only African countries, which are in a fragile debt situation. Using the most recent debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) undertaken for these countries by the World Bank and the IMF, this paper studies the potential adverse effect of the ongoing financial crisis on the countries’ debt burden indicators, as a function of the depth and length of the crisis. The latter is measured by the fall and the duration of such fall in exports revenues, and by the terms at which each country can obtain financing to muddle through the crisis period. The analysis underscores the importance of concessional financing for these countries, especially if the crisis proves to be a protracted one. This, because the likelihood of countries being able to muddle through the crisis without defaulting on their external debt decreases with the hardening of the financial conditions faced by them — alternatively, the size of the downsizing in domestic (fiscal) expenditures needed to ensure the service of their foreign debts increases with the tightening of financial conditions.