关于我国利率和利率传导关系的思考

当前我国银行体系利率大致可分为货币市场利率和信贷市场利率,其中由央行指定的利率主要有存贷款基准利率、再贴现率等。在货币市场上,隔夜同业拆借利率具有基准利率的地位。在信贷市场上,在特定时期,保持适当的存贷款利差具有积极意义。由于一些阻碍信贷市场与货币市场统一的制度安排的存在,这两个市场间的利率传导呈现出一定的不对称性。为推进利率市场化,进一步完善我国利率体系,下一步应逐步弥合市场分割,加强货币市场基准利率建设,培育商业银行利率定价能力。     

The impact of loan prepayment risk and deposit withdrawal risk on the optimal intermediation margin

Numerous studies have analyzed how a bank's intermediation margin varies with respect to such factors as credit quality, funding risk, bank capital, deposit insurance and other factors. However, these studies ignore the potential that loans tend to prepay if interest rates decline and deposits tend to be withdrawn if interest rates rise. Taking this very fundamental fact into account, we derive optimal loan rates and deposit rates when the bank is subject to loan prepayments and deposit withdrawals. Among other things, we find that greater volatility of interest rates tends to increase the margin. The strength of the correlation between the level of interest rates and the propensity to prepay loans (withdraw deposits) also plays an interesting role.     

Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads

This paper estimates the cost arising from information asymmetry between the lead bank and members of the lending syndicate. In a lending syndicate, the lead bank retains only a fraction of the loan but acts as the intermediary between the borrower and the syndicate participants. Theory predicts that asymmetric information will cause participants to demand a higher interest rate and that a large loan ownership by the lead bank should reduce this effect. In equilibrium, however, the asymmetric information premium demanded by participants is offset by the diversification premium demanded by the lead. Using shifts in the idiosyncratic credit risk of the lead bank's loan portfolio as an instrument, I measure the asymmetric information effect of the lead's share on the loan spread and find that it accounts for approximately 4% of the total cost of credit.     

Competition,risk neutrality and loan commitments

We rationalize fixed rate loan commitments (forward credit contracting with options) in a competitive credit market with universal risk neutrality. Future interest rates are random, but there are no transactions costs. Borrowers finance projects with bank loans and choose ex post unobservable actions that affect project payoffs. Credit contract design by the bank is the outcome of a (non-cooperative) Nash game between the bank and the borrower. The initial formal analysis is basically in two steps. First, we show that the only spot credit market Nash equilibria that exist are inefficient in the sense that they result in welfare losses for borrowers due to the bank's informational handicap. Second, we show that loan commitments, because of their ability to weaken the link between the offering bank's expected profit and the loan interest rate, enable the complete elimination of informationally induced welfare losses and thus produce an outcome that strictly Pareto dominates any spot market equilibrium. Perhaps our most surprising result is that, if the borrower has some initial liquidity, it is better for the borrower to use it now to pay a commitment fee and buy a loan commitment that entitles it to borrow in the future rather than save it for use as inside equity in conjunction with spot borrowing.     

票据市场利率体系及其与银行间货币市场整体利率的关系

我国的商业汇票利率体系主要由承兑费率、贴现利率、转贴现利率和再贴现利率构成。其中作为银行间市场业务的票据转贴现，其利率已实现市场化。在监管部门加大力度规范会计科目核算、严查逃避信贷规模的票据业务后，买断性日趋明显，其利率更多受到信贷规模影响，与其它银行间货币市场利率产生了一定背离；回购式转贴现业务则逐步脱离规模互转方式，近期呈现了较强的资金业务特性，利率水平逐步接轨其它银行间货币市场利率。     

Deposit Insurance and Forbearance Under Moral Hazard

We study the efficacy of forbearance using a real options approach. Our model endogenizes moral hazard embedded in credit risk undertaken by the bank. The bank's interest rate risk is modeled as duration mismatch. Other modeling improvements over previous studies include such features as stochastic interest rates and deposits, continuous interest payments on an ongoing deposit portfolio, and a stochastic forbearance period. We find that the bank does have an incentive to engage in undue risk taking. Even in the presence of moral hazard, however, forbearance can still be a desirable course of action in reducing the FDIC's expected liability. In addition, the capital ratio plays an extremely important role in determining the fair insurance premium. Finally, using the mismatch of asset and deposit durations as the correct measurement of interest rate risk, our model reveals that an optimal asset variance may exist for a particular bank, contrary to what the contingent claims framework would predict. Therefore, we resolve the puzzle that banks in practice do not increase asset risk to take full advantage of the limited liability.     

Implications of bank regulation for loan supply and bank stability: a dynamic perspective

ABSTRACT

We show that internal funds play a particular role in the regulation of bank capital, which has not received much attention, yet. A bank's decision on loan supply and capital structure determines its immediate bankruptcy risk as well as the future availability of internal funds. These internal funds in turn determine a bank's future costs of external finance and its future vulnerability to bankruptcy risks. Using a partial equilibrium model, we study how internal funds affect these intra- and intertemporal links. Moreover, our positive analysis identifies the effects of risk-weighted capital-to-asset ratios, liquidity coverage ratios and regulatory margin calls on the dynamics of internal funds and thus loan supply and bank stability. Only regulatory margin calls or large liquidity coverage ratios achieve bank stability for all risk levels, but for large risks a bank will stop credit intermediation.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

The non-monotonic impact of bank size on their default swap spreads: Cross-country evidence

This paper studies the drivers of bank's credit default swap (CDS) spread, taken as a measure of credit risk, by considering the impact of housing market along with a number of bank level determinants, such as regulatory capital, leverage, size, liquidity, asset quality and operations income ratio. We build upon a unique dataset consisting of 115 banks (during pre- and post-crisis periods) headquartered in 30 countries from both developed and emerging countries. Results suggest that CDS spread is driven by asset quality, liquidity and operations income ratio, while bank size is found to have a non-monotonic impact on CDS spread. If the bank is small, an increase in size reduces the average credit risk. If the bank is large enough, an increase in size raises the latter. From our results we derive the level of bank size that minimizes the CDS spreads. Financial institutions growing beyond this threshold are subject to higher credit risk, implying that smaller and medium sized banks are safer than large banks. When considering the estimates in the periods before and after the 2007 crisis, we further find a different extreme point of bank size in the former (approximately 1642 billion Euros) relative to a significantly lower level of optimal bank size (around 70 billion) in the post-crisis period, implying too-big-to-fail and too-big-to-save in the pre-crisis regime.     

银行间市场流动性与金融风险救助机制研究

文章从我国银行间市场结构特征出发,分析了近年来银行间市场利率和流动性大 幅波动的内在机理与原因。研究认为,塔形市场交易结构下,银行间市场存在流动性风险易聚 集不易分散的缺陷,且难以依靠“有形之手”得到弥补。文章结合塔形市场结构的特点建立矩 阵分析法,对40家金融机构资产负债表进行实证分析。结论印证了理论分析,即塔形市场交易 结构下风险冲击影响时间更长,且央行流动性救助效果降低,但流动性救助机制能降低风险对 中小型地方法人金融机构的冲击。因此,有必要建立流动性风险救助机制,弥补银行间市场客 观存在的缺陷,增强中小型地方法人金融机构抵御银行间市场流动性风险冲击的能力。     

2014年上半年货币市场利率运行报告

2014年上半年,在稳健的货币政策基调下,货币市场利率冲高回落,总体平稳,利率中枢下移,波幅收窄,6N份关键时点没有发生大的市场异动。这主要得益于央行货币政策操作稳定市场预期,以及金融机构完善流动性管理措施。此外,交易所市场与银行间市场的利率差异性仍然存在;境外货币市场利率走势背离于境内市场,利差保持较高水平。     

Optimal Bank Reorganization Policies and the Pricing of Federal Deposit Insurance

Optimal dynamic regulatory policies for closing ailing banks and for deposit insurance premia are derived as functions of the rate of flow of bank deposits, and interest rate on deposits, the economy's risk-free interest rate, and the regulators' bank audit/administration costs. Under competitive conditions, the threshold assets-to-deposits ratio below which a bank should be optimally closed is shown to be greater than or equal to one. Optimal deposit insurance premia and probabilities of bank closure are shown to be nondecreasing in the bank's risk on investment and nonincreasing in the bank's current assets-to-deposits ratio.     

Systemic risk in an interconnected banking system with endogenous asset markets

We analyze the emergence of systemic risk in a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets. The model incorporates multiple sources of systemic risk, including size of financial institutions, direct exposure from interbank lendings, and asset fire sales. We suggest a new macroprudential risk management approach building on a system wide value at risk (SVaR). Under the SVaR metric, the contribution of individual banks to systemic risk is well defined and can be approximated by a Shapley value-type measure. We show that, in a SVaR regime, a fair systemic risk charge which is proportional to a bank's individual contribution to systemic risk diverges from the optimal macroprudential capitalization of the banks from a planner's perspective. The results have implications for the design of macroprudential capital surcharges.     

Central Bank Digital Currency,Credit Supply,and Financial Stability

We examine the implications of central bank digital currency (CBDC) for credit supply and financial stability using a monetary general equilibrium model. The introduction of deposits in CBDC account decreases credit supply by banks, raising the nominal interest rate and lowering a bank's reserve-deposit ratio. This increases the likelihood of bank panic in which banks exhaust cash reserves. However, once the central bank can lend all the deposits in CBDC account to banks, an increase in the quantity of CBDC which does not require reserve holdings can enhance financial stability by increasing credit supply and lowering nominal interest rate.     

BANK REGULATIONS,CAPITAL STRUCTURE,AND RISK

The joint influence of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) discount window credit and reserve requirements and FDIC's deposit insurance on a bank's optimal capital structure and asset risk choices is analyzed. The specific seniority of such regulatory claims, and potentially strong negative correlation between bank asset classes, significantly alters our traditional view of such regulatory influences on bank behavior. I find that the discount window's presence does not always prompt bank risk taking and leverage, but it does partially offset such incentives under certain conditions. In addition to its cost, a reserve requirement provides the bank with an indirect subsidy that may encourage deposit funding. Thus, regulatory reforms, such as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which curtail banks' access to the discount window, may not always be appropriate to resolve a bank's incentive for moral hazard behavior. The Fed's presence needs to be more comprehensively examined to design effective regulatory policy.     

Optimal allotment policy in central bank open market operations1

This article derives a central bank's optimal liquidity supply towards a money market with an unrestricted lending facility. We show that when the effect of liquidity on market rates is not too small, and the monetary authority is concerned with both interest rates and liquidity conditions, then the optimal allotment policy may entail a ‘discontinuous’ reaction to initial conditions. In particular, the model predicts a threshold level of liquidity below which the central bank will not bail out the banking system. An estimation of the liquidity effect for the euro area suggests that the discontinuity might have contributed to the Eurosystem's tight response to occurrences of underbidding during the period June 2000 through March 2004.     

Modelling the term structure of interest rates in a small emerging market economy

This paper investigates the term structure of interest rates in a small emerging market economy – the Dominican Republic. The modelling finds a significant dynamic link amongst the day-to-day interbank interest rate and a representative banking system interest rate. But the interbank rate's forecasting power breaks down in the aftermath of the 2003 banking crisis. This episode illustrates how the monetary authorities' credibility with the public and market expectations affect the term structure's reliability.     

Voluntary Reserve Targets

We study monetary policy implementation through an operating regime involving voluntary reserve targets (VRTs). Operating regimes based on reserve requirements may lead to a collapse in interbank trade, as they have since the financial crisis. We show that, no matter the abundance of reserves, VRTs encourage market activity and support the central bank's control over interest rates. We consider (i) the impact of anticipated and unanticipated liquidity injections by the central bank on market outcomes and (ii) a comparison with the implementation framework currently adopted by the Federal Reserve. Overall, a VRT framework may provide several advantages over other frameworks.     

Covered interest parity with default risk

In this paper we derive a simple model of covered interest parity (CIP) with the assumption that interbank money market rates are risky. The model assumes that the default risk of uncollateralised loans can be hedged perfectly by credit default swap contracts. We show that the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied by a band. The location of this no-arbitrage band depends on the relative riskiness of the two counterparties in the CIP trade. We present evidence on the performance of the model for developed currency pairs in 2008–2011. We find that FX swap spreads (CIP deviations calculated from interbank interest rates of two countries) either fluctuated within the no-arbitrage bands or were close to the edges of the no-arbitrage bands.     

银行间利率衍生品市场交易管理业务探索与展望

冲销与电子化交易确认是当今国际场外衍生品市场的新兴交易管理业务,代表着危机后场外衍生品市场信息更透明、更集中的发展趋势。随着国内利率互换交易规模的扩大,制约利率互换市场发展的因素逐渐显现。为此,中国外汇交易中心在中国人民银行金融市场司的指导下深入研究国际经验,在充分调研的基础上积极筹备推出了利率互换冲销和电子化交易确认业务。相关业务的推出与不断完善有效提高了银行间利率互换交易的标准化程度,降低了市场整体风险,提高了市场成员的资本利用效率和授信管理效率,是银行间市场基础设施建设的重要进展。