Why is there money? Endogenous derivation of `money' as the most liquid asset: a class of examples

Summary. The monetary character of trade, use of a common medium of exchange, is shown to be an outcome of an economic general equilibrium. Monetary structure can be derived from price theory in a modified Arrow-Debreu model. Two constructs are added: transaction costs and market segmentation in trading posts (with a separate budget constraint at each transaction). Commodity money arises endogenously as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost) asset. Government-issued fiat money has a positive equilibrium value from its acceptability for tax payments. Scale economies in transaction cost account for uniqueness of the (fiat or commodity) money in equilibrium. Received: February 15, 2002; revised version: August 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This paper has benefited from seminars and colleagues' helpful remarks at the University of California - Santa Barbara, University of California - San Diego, NSF-NBER Conference on General Equilibrium Theory at Purdue University, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics at San Diego State University, Econometric Society at the University of Wisconsin - Madison, SITE at Stanford University-2001, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Midwest Economic Theory Conference at the University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign, University of Iowa, Southern California Economic Theory Conference at UC - Santa Barbara, Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at University of Iowa, University of California - Berkeley, European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory at University of Paris I, Society for Economic Dynamics at San Jose Costa Rica, World Congress of the Econometric Society at University of Washington, Cowles Foundation at Yale University. It is a pleasure to acknowledge comments of Henning Bohn, Harold Cole, James Hamilton, Mukul Majumdar, Harry Markowitz, Chris Phelan, Meenakshi Rajeev, Wendy Shaffer, Bruce Smith, and Max Stinchcombe.     

Children Crying at Birthday Parties. Why?

We consider the problem of dividing a non-homogeneous one-dimensional continuum whose endpoints are topologically identified. Examples are the division of a birthday cake, the partition of a circular market, the assignment of sentry duty or medical call. We study the existence of rules satisfying requirements of efficiency, fairness (no-envy), and immunity to misrepresentation of preferences (strategy-proofness). This work, supported by NSF under grant SES. 0214691, was presented at Laval University, at the May 2004 Israeli-Turkish Conference on Economic Design at Bilgi University, at the July 2004 Meeting of the Society for Economic Design at the University of Mallorca, and at the July 2004 Seventh International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare at Osaka University. I thank Julius Barbanel, Steven Brams, Youngsub Chun, Bettina Klaus, Toyotaka Sakai, and Chun-Hsien Yeh for their comments.     

The all-pay auction with complete information

Summary In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium.We are grateful to Jacques Crémer, Chuangyin Dang, Jürgen Dennert, Chaim Fershtman, Martin Hellwig, Arthur Robson, Heinrich Ursprung, Eric van Damme, Ton Vorst, and the referees for helpful comments. We benefitted from presentations at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona, the European Meeting on the Economics of Information at Tilburg University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings at the University of Illinois, and seminars at Texas A&M University, The Pennsylvania State University, Tilburg University and the University of Montreal. Baye is grateful for support from the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University and the Tinbergen Institute where earlier versions of this paper were completed. Kovenock acknowledges support from Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Tinbergen Institute, the Center for Economic Studies at the University of Munich, the Institut d'Analisi Economica CSIC at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the Krannert School of Management, and the Jay N. Ross Young Faculty Scholar Award.     

“结构转型和中国开放型经济发展”中国留英/留欧经济学会 2014年国内年会征文启事

<正>一、会议背景及主题改革开放30多年以来,中国经济高速增长,逐步形成了全方位、多层次、宽领域的对外开放格局,成为全球发展的主要领导力量,但同时也面临诸多挑战,正处于结构转型,经济可持续发展的关键路口。在国际上,金融危机引发国际政经格局出现深度调整,各种形式的"再平衡"战略相继实施,高端资源要素以及对未来经济发展话语权的争夺愈加激烈;在国内,资源环境承载力逐步进入紧约束期,劳     

Closed-loop equilibrium in a multi-stage innovation race

Summary. We examine a multistage model of an R&D race where players have multiple projects. We also develop perturbation methods for general dynamic games that can be expressed as analytic operators in a Banach space. We apply these perturbation methods to solve races with a small prize. We compute second-order asymptotically valid solutions for equilibrium and socially optimal decisions to determine qualitative properties of equilibrium. We find that innovators invest relatively too much on risky projects. Strategic reactions are ambiguous in general; in particular, a player may increase expenditures as his opponent moves ahead of him. Received: January 3, 2002; revised version: June 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This is the final version of Judd (1985). The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of anonymous referees, Paul Milgrom, seminar participants at Northwestern University, the University of Chicago, the 1984 Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, and Yale University, and the financial support of the National Science Foundation (SES-8409786, SES-8606581)     

Does Gibrat's Law hold among young,small firms?

According to Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the examined period. Aimed at extending this line of investigation, the present paper uses quantile regression techniques to test whether Gibrat's Law holds for new entrants in a given industry: that is for new small firms in the early stage of their life cycle. The main finding is that for some selected industries in Italian manufacturing Gibrat's Law fails to hold in the years immediately following start-up, when smaller firms have to rush in order to achieve a size large enough to enhance their likelihood of survival. Conversely, in subsequent years the patterns of growth of new smaller firms do not differ significantly from those of larger entrants, and the Law therefore cannot be rejected.JEL Classification: L11, L60Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 27th Annual EARIE Conference (Lausanne, 7-10 September 2000) and at seminars held between 2000 and 2003 at the Economics Department of Harvard University, the Catholic University of Milan, the University of Ferrara, the University of Bologna, the Bank of Italy, and Athens University of Economics & Business. We would like to thank Carlo Bianchi, Giuseppe Colangelo, Giovanni Dosi, Steven Klepper (Editor), Stephen Martin, Ariel Pakes, Aman Ullah and, in particular, Helen Louri and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from MIUR (Year 2000; protocol #MM13038538_001; project leader: E. Santarelli) is gratefully acknowledged.Correspondence to: E. Santarelly     

Reforming Undergraduate Instruction in Russia,Belarus, and Ukraine

The authors deal with the restructuring of undergraduate economics instruction at Moscow State University (MSU) since 1989. They examine how closely the reforms at MSU are mirrored by changes at Belarus State University in Minsk and at Kiev State University. They also consider, and often offer an “insider's” perspective on, several issues related to curriculum reform that go beyond what can be determined from published curriculum guides. Specifically, they consider such issues as the training and retraining of faculty members who teach courses in these departments, the use of translated Western textbooks versus locally developed textbooks, and problems that arise in departments where some faculty members teach Western economics but others continue to teach Soviet-style economics.     

Exchange rate models and parameter variation: The case of the Dollar-Mark exchange rate

This paper is drawn from Chapter 3 of the author's doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago (Wolff, 1985). He is very grateful to the members of his dissertation committee — Michael Mussa (Chairman), Joshua Aizenman, Robert Aliber, Jacob Frenkel, David Hsieh, John Huizinga, and Arnold Zellner — and to seminar participants at the University of Chicago, the London Business School and INSEAD for many helpful comments.     

Environmental tax policy in a model of growth cycles

Summary. The purpose of this paper is to consider environmental taxation which would control emissions of firms in a model of growth cycles. In the model presented below, the economy may experience two phases of growth and environmental quality: “the no-innovation growth regime” and “the innovation-led growth regime”. Aggregate capital and environmental quality remain constant in the no-innovation growth regime, while they perpetually increase in the innovation-led growth regime. The paper shows that the tax plays a key role in determining whether the economy stably converges to one of the two regimes or fluctuates permanently between them. It also shows that there is a critical level of the tax and that the economy obtains higher growth rates of capital and environmental quality by raising (or reducing) the tax if the initial tax is below (or above) the critical level. Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research reported here was conducted within the research project “Project on Intergenerational Equity” at Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. I am deeply grateful to an anonymous referee for his or her insightful comments, which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Hiroshi Honda, Yasuo Maeda, Yuji Nakayama, and participants in workshops at Hitotsubashi University, Kyoto University, Nagoya University, Osaka University, University of Tsukuba, Yokohama National University, and University of Tokyo for their valuable comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine.     

A Model of Financial Markets with Endogenously Correlated Rational Beliefs

This paper studies how communication amongst agents influences the equilibria of a financial economy. We set up a standard overlapping generations model with assets, while allowing for heterogeneous beliefs. The paper explicitly describes how communication causes the beliefs of the agents to be correlated. In particular, it is shown that communication may generate large fluctuations even if the unconditional probability beliefs themselves are independent. Because of the complex nature of the problem, we use simulations to examine the characteristics of the equilibria Part of the results presented in this paper is based on my Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge the inspiration obtained from innumerable discussions with Mordecai Kurz about this subject over the years. Also, I appreciate comments from Kenneth J. Arrow and Peter J. Hammond as well as from the participants of the workshop at Stanford University, University of Tokyo and the 1st Illinois workshop in Economic Theory (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and the anonymous referee     

Some benefits of cyclical monetary policy

We show that modeling monetary circulation and cyclical activity offers insights about monetary policy that cannot be had in representative-agent models. Two fundamental ideas emerge: (i) the reflux of money back to the hands of those making current expenditures can be inefficient, and (ii) expansionary policy may accommodate more trade during high-demand seasons, at the expense of less trade in low-demand seasons and a less valuable currency. The paper provides a foundation for the optimality of a cyclical monetary policy. We thank Steve Williamson and, especially, an anonymous referee for helpful comments, as well as insightful discussions in presentations at the Cleveland Fed (2003), University of Iowa (2004), Queen’s University (2004), and more recently at the Chicago Fed, the New York Fed, the Institute of Advanced Studies, Simon Fraser University and the Universities of Vienna, British Columbia, and Victoria.     

Expected utility theory and the experiments

The experimental evidence against expected utility theo or unconvincing. When one modifies the experiments to mi tends to support traditional theory.Dewey H. Johnson Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of South Carolina. I am grateful for comments from seminar participants at the University of Melbourne, University of South Carolina, University of Stockholm, and the University of Western Ontario. John Hey provided a firm, but sympathetic, editorial hand.     

The law of supply in games, markets and matching models

Summary In large games with transferable utility, core payoffs satisfy a comparative statics property: If the proportion of one type of player increases, then the core payoff to that type of player decreases (does not increase). Markets with transferable utility satisfy a similar property: if the aggregate supply of a commodity increases, its value relative to the value of all commodities decreases. In market games, if one type of agent becomes more plentiful, his competitive payoff falls, and its decrease is engineered by a decrease in the relative value of his endowment.We thank Bob Anderson, Joe Farrell, Steve Goldman, Chris Shannon, seminar participants of the Mathematical Economics Seminar at Berkeley (August 1994), the University of Pittsburg (November 1994), Tel Aviv University and the Institute on Rationality at the Hebrew University (January 1995), and especially Vince Crawford for useful discussion.     

Cost Savings From Generation and Distribution with an Application to Italian Electric Utilities*

In the last decade, the European Commission promoted a new regulatory framework aiming at a gradual liberalization of the energy markets. The introduction of competition among generators implies the need to separate generation from transmission and distribution activities. However, if savings can be reached by operating at different stages, vertical separation would increase the costs of providing power. This paper tests for the presence of economies from vertical integration on a sample of Italian local electric utilities and finds evidence of both multi-stage economies of scale and vertical economies. Even if the hypothesis of global subadditivity is not supported, our evidence suggests that a complete divestiture policy would entail efficiency losses. *For helpful comments and discussions, we thank two anonymous referees, Graziano Abrate, Bruno Bosco, Diego Piacentino, and participants at the 31st Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), Berlin, Germany, 2–5 September, 2004, the 60th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance (IIPF), Milan, Italy, 23–26 August, 2004, and seminars held at the Bocconi University, University of Lecce, University of Naples, University of Pavia, and University of Turin, where earlier versions of this paper were presented. The financial support of MIUR (COFIN 2002) and HERMES Research Center is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. **HERMES, Center for Research on Regulated Services, Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto, Via Real Collegio 30, 10024 Moncalieri (TO), Italy, http://www.hermesricerche.it.     

Liquidity and Liquidation

The manager of a firm that is selling an illiquid asset has discretion as to the sale price: if he chooses a high (low) selling price, early sale is unlikely (likely). If the manager has the option to default on the debt that is collateralized by the illiquid asset, the optimal selling price depends on whether the manager acts in the interests of owners or creditors. We model the former case. In equilibrium the owner will always offer the illiquid asset for sale at a strictly higher price than he paid, and will default if he fails to sell. As a result, upon successful sales the illiquid asset changes hands at successively higher prices. We also consider a generalization of the model which permits sellers to finance sales using either debt or preferred stock, or both. This allows derivation of an optimal capital structure. We are indebted to seminar participants at the University of California, Los Angeles; University of California, Santa Barbara; Utah State University; University of Miami; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. We have received helpful comments from Tom Cooley.     

Protection and the Future of Australian Manufacturing

This article was written by Richard H. Snape, Professor of Economics, Monash University. It is a revised version of a paper presented at the convention of the Institute of Industrial Economics (University of Newcastle) on 'The Future of Manufacturing Industry In Australia', Terrigal, 29 April to 1 May, 1977.     

Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria

Summary Decentralizability with respect to an equilibrium concept means that those equilibria for an extensive game and its agent normal form game coincide for any given payoffs. We consider decentralizability of Nash equilibrium, subgame perfect equilibrium, and perfect equilibrium. For each equilibrium concept we give a necessary and sufficient condition on the information structure of an extensive game for decentralizability to hold. When it holds it does not matter if agents with the same objectives decide independently or have someone coordinate their actions.The author thanks Satish Chand, Mamoru Kaneko, Akira Okada and participants at seminars at the Australian National University, Kyoto University, University of Tsukuba, and The First Decentralization Conference in Japan held at Keio University for valuable suggestions and comments.     

Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection

Summary. This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents), then all units of the good are traded, and all agents have positive ex-ante expected payoffs. This feature is present regardless of the quality distribution, and persists in the limit as discounting is made negligible. This offers a sharp contrast to models of centralized trade with adverse selection (Akerlof, Wilson). Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 29, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research was funded by a grant from UQAM. I wish to thank Roberto Serrano and seminar participants at UQAM, Queen's University at Kingston, the 2001 CEME General Equilibrium Conference (Brown University), and the 2001 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Maryland) for comments.     

On the welfare effects of allowing unlimited renegotiation in agency relationships

We study renegotiation in an agency setting where the number of offers and accept/reject decisions parties can make is potentially unlimited. Thus any contract, either on or off the equilibrium path, may be subject to possible renegotiation. We first show that the principal will not be able to gain complete access to the agent’s private information with unlimited renegotiation, unlike when the potential number of renegotiations is finite. Rather the agent either employ a randomized reporting strategy or do not to report at all. We then identify conditions under which expected allocations are most efficient with the contract that induces no agent communication. More significantly, by doing so we also identify conditions under which the parties are made strictly worse off by committing to end renegotiation after a fixed number of rounds. We thank workshop participants at University of California, Irvine, University of Chicago, Duke University, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, University of Houston, London School of Economics, University of Minnesota, Ohio State University, the Carnegie Mellon Accounting Research Conference, the editor, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Intrinsic bubbles and asset price volatility

Summary Under what conditions is the price of a bubbly asset more (less) volatile than the asset's market fundamental? The answer depends on agents' attitudes towards risk. If higher current consumption makes agents more (less) risk averse in the future, then the bubbly asset price fluctuates less (more) than the fundamental. This result shows that the interaction between intrinsic bubbles and asset fundamentals critically depends on a feature of the utility function that does not appear in standard models with time-separable utility.Financial support from the Department of Economics at Texas A&M University, the Office for International Coordination at Texas A&M University, and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Sonderforschungsbereich 303 at the University of Bonn, is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the International Monetary Fund.