国际金融体系改革的战略与实施

由美国金融危机引发的全球金融危机充分暴露了现行国际金融体系的缺陷和弊端,危机也表明,改革国际金融体系、构建国际金融新秩序是至关重要的。在20国集团(以下简称G20)领导人第二次金融峰会上,中国国家主席胡锦涛全面、系统地阐述了中国关于推进国际金融体系改革的主张。毫无疑问,这将对国际金融体系改革产生重要而深远的影响,并将极大地提升中国在国际社会中的影响力。     

新兴经济体与后金融危机时代IMF改革

全球金融危机爆发之后,国际货币基金组织不成功的援助措施使各国要求加快其改革进程。同时国际金融体系也在危机后重组,新兴经济体作为新兴力量在世界经济格局中崛起。新兴经济体成为一支独立的联合力量,并在IMF改革中提出自身的主张,要求获得更多话语权。新兴经济体由于其强大的经济实力和发展中国家的支持,促使发达国家依赖其进行IMF改革。同时,新兴经济体在参与IMF改革中也面临发达国家的压力,综合实力对比与金砖国家之间关系均影响着新兴经济体的合作。     

语录

4月2日,20国集团金融峰会在英国伦敦召开。会议的主要议题是如何应对目前影响全球的金融危机,与会各国都纷纷表达自己在应急举措以及对国际金融体系改革的看法和主张。比较一致的方向是：国际金融体系必须改革,应该提高发展中国家的话语权;但是金融体系应该如何改革,未来的金融体系如何重塑,发展中国家的话语权应该提高多少、是否应该对市场进行严格监管等问题仍是争论和矛盾的焦点,各国纷纷表达自己的观点……     

现行国际货币体系存在的问题与改革建议

国际金融危机让现行国际货币体系固有风险暴露无遗,对危机调节乏力、主要储备货币国家利用其国际货币优势而相继开动印钞机,将危机损失向其它国家转嫁等等不和谐现象再一次证明现代国际货币体系越来越不能适应经济金融全球化发展的要求。推进主要储备货币稳定汇率机制、探索区域货币一体化和改革IMF使其更公平更加强力是未来国际货币体系改革的方向。     

从中国视角看IMF改革

本文从中国政府最近在国际社会积极倡导建立新的国际货币体系的政策导向出发,从中国视角指出了对IMF改革的需求.作为最大的发展中的国家,增加发展中国家在IMF中的代表权的要求自然是排在第一位的,其次是倡导推动SDR成为超主权货币,此外,结合此次危机,还提出了对IMF进行监督机制和贷款杌制的改革.最后,对本文进行小结,指出了中国作为一个负责任的大国在IMF改革中应有的作为.     

浅论IMF的缺陷及改革

IMF在促进国际货币合作,促进国际贸易的扩大和平衡发展,促进国际汇兑的稳定,制定国际收支与汇率的规则与秩序等方面,发挥了重要的作用。但作为国际金融危机拯救者的IMF,在维护国际金融稳定与发展中尚存有诸多缺陷,面对当今国际金融界新的形势和其自身的软肋,IMF的改革势在必行。     

IMF拯救东亚金融危机的方案及其争议

提高利率，实施紧缩性财政政策，并进行结构性经济改革，推动国内经济的市场化和自由化，这是IMF拯救东亚金融危机方案中的主要措施。左翼经济学家认为东亚金融危机只是一场流动性危机，紧缩政策只会使危机国家雪上加霜，而右翼经济学家则认为IMF拯救行动加剧了道德风险问题，使国际金融更加动荡。IMF拯救方案引发的争议正在深入，并向国际金融领域的其他层面渗透。     

特别提款权与大国利益博弈

SDR制度设计是一种国际金融合作方式,是国际货币体系发展和演变的产物,是IMF的一大创造,更是西方发达国家一手主使下创立的。国际金融合作建立在自愿和互利的基础上,只是一种期盼,合作是权力与利益的博弈,权力决定利益。SDR的创设发展和在国际货币体系改革发挥多大作用都是由大国之间的利益博弈决定。因而新兴市场和发展中国家要更理性的认识国际金融合作的实质,谨慎参与。     

当前关于国际货币体系改革的主要观点及应对建议

由美国次贷危机引发的国际金融危机在造成世界经济衰退的同时,也凸显了当今世界经济发展失衡的一个重要根源:目前的国际货币体系存在严重制度性缺陷。改革现行国际货币体系,推动国际货币体系向多元化、合理化方向发展,已成为当今世界经济金融发展的重要问题。     

储备型汇率制度:发行非国际货币的发展中国家(地区)之选择

国际货币与非国际货币之区分构成了当前国际金融体系典型的非对称特征。该种区分必将影响不同国家间汇率及汇率制度的选择。本文试图提出一种观点:发行非国际货币的发展中国家所选择的汇率制度可以形容为"储备型汇率制度"。在该种制度下,中央银行对外汇市场不断进行干预以实现其国际货币储备的不断积累,由此而造成本币长期贬值(或低估)和贸易的持续顺差。该种观点不仅与当今世界汇率与汇率制度分布之事实相一致,而且还可通过一个反映发展中国家中央银行行为的动态优化模型进行严格的理论证明。尽管"储备型汇率制度"可能与当前IMF所规定的反"货币操纵"条款相冲突,但是在当前这种不公正和非对称的国际货币体系下,该制度无疑是发展中国家的最优选择。     

Once Bitten: The Effect of IMF Programs on Subsequent Reserve Behavior

Traditional models have encountered problems in explaining the accumulation of international reserves, particularly in Asia, in the period since the late 1990s. One suggestion has been that countries have sought to self‐insure against future crises, either because of a perceived increase in the cost of crises or because of the perceived conditionality costs of using IMF credits. This paper offers an empirical investigation of these ideas, disaggregating across regions and across IMF facilities. We find that IMF programs have had a significant positive effect on subsequent reserve accumulation, allowing for other determinants, and that this effect endures over time. We also find that the effect differs between Latin America and Asia, and that it is not simply a phenomenon that is associated with the Asian crisis of 1997/98. The paper goes on to discuss the implications for the design of policy and for the reform of the IMF.     

Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities

There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, differentiating between concessional and non-concessional facilities. To carry out the empirical analysis, we construct a new database that compiles a wide array of proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 IMF countries over 1990–2003, focusing on emerging and developing economies. We use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of countries' geopolitical importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients. While controlling for economic and political determinants, our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably lending decisions when loans are non-concessional, whereas results are less robust and in opposite direction for concessional loans. This study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions, potentially affecting the institution's effectiveness and credibility.     

The exploration of economic crises: parameter uncertainty and predictive ability

Over a long horizon, this paper examines joint economic crises and determines the power of 49 variables in predicting such episodes. While incorporating dynamism in the prediction, we generate the predictive power of various specifications and model the uncertainty in the parameters of interest. The results reveal that growth of real gross domestic product per capita, regulation, bank non‐performing loans, interest rate and inflation rate are the most significant variables in predicting the joint economic crises. These variables predict economic crises with about 93% accuracy and can predict joint economic crises in developing countries and recent joint crises.     

IMF conditionality and central bank independence

This paper studies the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in promoting central bank independence (CBI). While anecdotal evidence suggests that the IMF has been playing a vital role for CBI, the underlying mechanisms of this influence are not well understood. We argue that the IMF has ulterior motives when pressing countries for increased CBI. First, IMF loans are primarily transferred to local monetary authorities. Thus, enhancing CBI aims to insulate central banks from political interference to shield loan disbursements from government abuse. Second, several loan conditionality clauses imply a substantial transfer of political leverage over economic policy making to monetary authorities. As a result, the IMF through pushing for CBI seeks to establish a politically insulated veto player to promote its economic policy reform agenda. We argue that the IMF achieves these aims through targeted lending conditions. We hypothesize that the inclusion of these loan conditions leads to greater CBI. To test our hypothesis, we use a recently available dataset on IMF programs that includes detailed information on CBI reforms and IMF conditionality for up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012. Our findings indicate that targeted loan conditionality plays a critical role in promoting CBI. These results are robust towards varying modeling assumptions and withstand a battery of robustness checks.     

Fundamentals versus external shocks: Brazil's growing exposure to currency crises

While financial globalization does not lack theoretical economic merit, the more far-reaching practical consequences of this phenomenon are often not fully appreciated from the vantage point of North America or the European Union. In particular, globalization can make it more difficult for emerging economies to achieve macroeconomic stabilization. This is especially true if the countries in question have chosen the vehicle of pegged exchange rates as an important element of domestic anti-inflation policy. The chief macroeconomic difficulties for emerging economies in a world of volatile capital flows can include a loss of monetary control, a real appreciation of the domestic currency, and a worsening of economic fundamentals leading to damaging currency crises. This paper concentrates on the recent experience of Brazil as illustrative of the abject plight faced by many developing countries attempting to secure economic stabilization against the background of the present globalized international economy.This paper has benefitted from discussion with participants of the Forty-Sixth International Atlantic Economic Conference, Boston, MA, October 8–11, 1998.     

The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Flows

We evaluate the claim that the International Monetary Fund precipitated financial crises during the 1990s, by pressuring countries to liberalize their capital accounts prematurely. Using data from a panel of developing economies from 1982–98, we examine whether the changes in the regime governing capital flows took place during participation in IMF programs. We find evidence that IMF program participation is correlated with capital account liberalization episodes during the 1990s. We verify the robustness of our results using alternative indicators of capital account openness. To determine whether decontrol was premature, we compare the economic and financial characteristics of countries that decontrolled during IMF programs with those of countries who did so independently, and find some evidence of IMF-led premature liberalizations.     

EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND MONETARY COOPERATION: LESSONS FROM EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA*

This paper analyses the mechanisms of, and draws lessons from, currency crises in Asian and Latin American countries in the 1990s and 2000s. In Asian countries fiscal deficits were insignificant in size, and were not part of a crisis trigger, while in Latin America they played a major role in the crisis story. Crisis management by international financial institutions has been evolving over the last 10 years, and private‐sector involvement (PSI) has occupied centre‐stage in efforts to reform the international financial architecture. Sovereign debts, a focus of PSI discussions, were neither a cause nor a propagation of the Asian crises.     

EXTERNAL MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

We employ relative size of International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit as a proxy for interdependent macro variables that are associated with external macroeconomic imbalances or balance of payment (BOP) crisis to investigate how they impact foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Relative size of IMF credit as a share of gross domestic product sends two mixed signals to multinational enterprises (MNEs). First, it is a signal that a country is facing an actual or potential BOP crisis. Second, countries that seek IMF credit typically agree to implement a set of “IMF conditionality” before financial credit is disbursed. This may signal to MNEs that policy reforms that must accompany IMF financial credit may result in ex ante positive economic outlook and stability. We find that relative size of IMF credit is negatively (positively) correlated with FDI inflows to developing countries below (above) a threshold value of economic freedom. The main implication of these findings is that MNEs may view developing countries with below average index of economic freedom as lacking institutional capabilities to implement recommended IMF policy reforms when faced with an actual or potential BOP crisis. Our results are robust across alternative model specifications and consistent with the theory of catalytic finance. (JEL F21, F23, F33)     

Global banking and international business cycles

This paper incorporates a global bank into a two-country business cycle model. The bank collects deposits from households and makes loans to entrepreneurs, in both countries. It has to finance a fraction of loans using equity. We investigate how such a bank capital requirement affects the international transmission of productivity and loan default shocks. Three findings emerge. First, the bank's capital requirement has little effect on the international transmission of productivity shocks. Second, the contribution of loan default shocks to business cycle fluctuations is negligible under normal economic conditions. Third, an exceptionally large loan loss originating in one country induces a sizeable and simultaneous decline in economic activity in both countries. This is particularly noteworthy, as the 2007–09 global financial crisis was characterized by large credit losses in the US and a simultaneous sharp output reduction in the US and the Euro Area. Our results thus suggest that global banks may have played an important role in the international transmission of the crisis.