Government Guarantees, Investment, and Vulnerability to Financial Crises

The paper presents a new model of the East Asian crisis which combines three elements—moral hazard, investment collapse, and multiple equilibria—in a single account. The study locates the causes of the crisis in poor financial regulation, highly leveraged financial institutions, and implicit guarantees to the financial sector. The model has a unique long‐run equilibrium with overinvestment. But in the short run, in which the capital stock is fixed, there may be multiple equilibria. In a crisis the government is forced to renege on its guarantees; the effect is a rapid reversal of foreign capital flows.     

Conflict,growth, distribution,and employment: a long-run Kaleckian model

This paper presents a Kaleckian growth model in which (i) the rate of capacity utilization, the profit share, and the rate of employment are adjusted in the medium run, and (ii) the normal rate of capacity utilization and the expected rate of capital accumulation are adjusted in the long run. The long-run equilibrium is a continuum of equilibria and is characterized by hysteresis in that the long-run position of the economy depends on where it starts. An increase in the bargaining power of workers lowers the rate of unemployment in both the medium-run and the long-run equilibrium.     

Efficiency of Screening and Labor Income Inequality

We analyze the importance of information about individual skills for understanding human capital accumulation and income inequality. The paper uses the framework of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Agents in each generation differ by random individual ability, or talent, which affects the screening process. The human capital of an agent depends on both his talent and his investment in education. The investment decision is based on a public signal (test outcome), which screens all agents for their talents. We analyze how a better information system, which allows more efficient screening, affects investment in education and, hence, income inequality in equilibrium. As a main result, we find that, typically, less inequality in the distribution of actual incomes can only be achieved at the expense of more inequality in the distribution of income opportunities.     

Capital–skill complementarity and the redistributive effects of Social Security Reform

This paper analyses the general equilibrium implications of reforming pay-as-you-go pension systems in an economy with heterogeneous agents, human capital investment and capital–skill complementarity. It shows that increasing funding, by raising savings, delivers in the long run higher physical and human capital and therefore higher output, but also higher across-group wage and income inequality. It also shows that the general equilibrium effects induced by this reform affect groups' sizes in a way that the higher across-group inequality generated by more funding goes with a larger share of the population against redistribution.     

Endogenous Persistent Occupations and Inequality

The paper argues that human capital is the leading force determining inequality persistence. We show that, in a context of a perfect capital market where agents inherit human capital and wealth, it is the inherited human capital level that determines agents' occupational choice and investment. The critical assumption is that the entrepreneurial activity is of increasing returns to scale. This creates a higher profile of revenue for entrepreneurs. Although every agent can choose to become an entrepreneur, and although there is no barrier of entry in entrepreneurship, only those who receive a relatively higher human capital will do so. Agents whose inherited human capital is lower than the human capital threshold, endogenously determined, are better off becoming workers. Even in the context of a perfect capital market, which allows less endowed agents to borrow and invest in education, it turns out that the agents who inherit a low level of human capital bear a greater utility cost in their education investment. So they are better off investing less in education, lending their savings, and working as workers. As a result, agents' occupational choice depends on the intergenerational transmission of human capital. In the long run, the population is polarized into the rich entrepreneurs and the poor workers, magnifying inequality persistence in human capital level and revenue.     

人工智能的财富分配效应研究*

人工智能对经济不平等的影响引起学术界的广泛重视，但是现有研究以分析其对劳动收入不平等的影响为主，关于人工智能对财富分配从而对财产性收入不平等影响的相关研究尚有欠缺。本文通过构建一个连续时间异质性个体动态一般均衡模型，将人工智能对生产技术的影响看作一揽子偏向性技术进步，研究人工智能技术对财富分配的影响。分析发现，人工智能对财富不平等的影响在短期和长期表现有所不同，短期中人工智能技术的应用会提高经济中财富分配不平等程度，而长期中其财富分配效应则取决于人工智能对不同类型技术进步的促进程度。核心机制在于，人工智能技术进步的多样性在短期和长期中对资本回报率产生不同影响，短期中各类技术进步总是会提高资本回报率，而在长期，不同类型的技术进步对资本回报率的影响出现差异。基于以上结论，本文就我国如何在应用人工智能促进增长的同时预防不平等程度扩大提出了政策建议。     

收入不平等对经济增长影响的实证研究

采用联立方程分析方法,实证分析了收入不平等对经济增长影响的三种机制,探讨了收入不平等如何通过影响物质资本投资、人力资本投资和居民消费来作用于经济增长。结果表明,从长期看收入不平等的扩大会刺激物质资本投资,但不利于人力资本投资和居民消费增长,收入不平等对经济增长的长期影响为负。因此,从经济发展的角度政府不应容忍收入不平等的过分扩大。     

Income inequality and FDI: evidence with Turkish data

This article explores how foreign direct investment (FDI) and other determinants impact income inequality in Turkey in the short- and long-run. We apply the nonlinear auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) modelling approach, which is suitable for small samples. The data for the study cover the years from 1970 to 2008. The empirical results indicate the existence of a co-integration relationship among the variables with asymmetric adjustment of the income distribution in the short- and long-run. The negative impact of FDI on the Gini coefficient, decreasing income inequality, is statistically significant in the short- and long-run, though with a quantitatively small impact in both cases. In the short run, GDP growth increases inequality initially, an effect that is reversed in the next period, increases in domestic gross capital formation decreases inequality, and increases in the literacy rate have very minor adverse effects on income equality. However, in the long run these variables have no statistically significant effects on the Gini coefficient. A reduction in the population growth rate reduces inequality in the short run but has no effect in the long run, whereas an increase in the rate reduces inequality in the long run but has no effect in the short run.     

Factor-biased public capital and private capital crowding out

This paper studies the dynamic effects of public investment on private capital accumulation in a general equilibrium macroeconomic model of a small open economy with factor-biased public capital. I show that public investment induces rather complex private capital dynamics—falling in the short and in the long run, but potentially increasing along transition—if public capital augments private capital and private inputs are gross complements in production. Whether private investment is crowded in or out during transition critically depends on parameters that are empirically hard to measure, such as the labor supply elasticity and the elasticity of substitution between private inputs—a small increase in the latter from 0.5 to 0.6, for instance, turns a totally negative transitional effect into a predominantly positive one. These results help rationalize the lack of empirical consensus on the relationship between public and private investment.     

On poverty traps,thresholds and take-offs

Recent studies on economic growth focus on persistent inequality across countries. In this paper we study mechanisms that may give rise to such persistent inequality. We consider countries that accumulate capital in order to increase the per capita income in the long run. We show that the long-run growth dynamics of those countries can generate a twin-peak distribution of per capita income. The twin-peak distribution is caused by (1) locally increasing returns to scale and (2) capital market constraints. These two forces give rise to a twin-peaked distribution of per capita income in the long run. In our model investment decisions are separated from consumption decisions and we thus do not have to consider preferences. Empirical evidence in support of a twin-peak distribution of per capita income is provided.     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

Capital depreciation allowances,redistributive taxation,and economic growth

Are capital depreciation allowances when coupled with capital income taxes good instruments for redistribution in the long run? In a simple two-agent-economy I find that accelerated depreciation is good for growth, but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. However, in a feedback Stackelberg equilibrium, where the government is the leader and the private sector the follower, the depreciation allowance is maximal in the long run, time-consistent optimum. This removes the accumulation distortion of capital income taxes. Furthermore, the latter, and so redistribution, is found to be generically nonzero in the time-consistent optimum, and depends on the social weight of transfers receivers, the pretax factor income distribution, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the time preference rate. Thus, accelerated depreciation allowances are an important indirect tool for redistribution. The tax scheme allows for a separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns for redistributive policies.     

Intergenerational Mobility under Private vs. Public Education*

Intergenerational earnings mobility is analyzed in a model where human capital is produced using schooling and parental time. In steady states more mobile societies have less inequality, but in the short run higher mobility may result from an increase in inequality. Starting from the same inequality, mobility is higher under public than under private education. A rise in income shocks, for example due to increased returns to ability, or a switch from public to private schooling both increase inequality. However, increased shocks raise mobility in the short run and do not affect it in the long run, whereas an increased role for private schooling reduces mobility in both the short and long run. That these differences may help to identify the source of changes in inequality, and other real‐world implications, are illustrated in a brief discussion of time trends and cross‐country differences.     

Minimum Wage Legislation, Investment and Human Capital

A two period, general equilibrium, model is analysed in which agents foresee how the second period outcome is determined by the investment decisions which they make in the first period. These decisions concern the acquisition of human and physical capital. The paper considers the impact of a minimum wage in the second period. It shows that, in equilibrium, this policy increases both types of investment. There is a range of values of the minimum wage at which the increases in investment are obtained without any reduction in period 2 employment. This is welfare-improving for a range of parameter values. Under very specific circumstances, the minimum wage achieves a Pareto efficient outcome.     

Licensing of New Technology Versus Direct Foreign Investment: A General Equilibrium Analysis

In a general equilibrium model with sector-specific capital, a country which licenses new technology and imports capital itself would have lower national income than if it permitted direct investment by foreigners with rights to the technology. However, the reverse can be true if capital is mobile between sectors. Thus, licensing is a poor policy in the short run but can be a good policy in the long run.     

Taxation without commitment

This paper considers a Ramsey model of linear capital and labor income taxation in which a benevolent government cannot commit ex-ante to a sequence of policies for the future. In this setup, if the government is forced to keep budget balance in every period, then it may not be able to sustain zero capital taxes in the long run, as shown in Benhabib and Rustichini (J Econ Theory 77:231–259, 1997) and Phelan and Stachetti (Econometrica 69:1491–1518, 2001). However, (Dominguez in J Econ Theory 135:159–170, 2007) shows that if the government is allowed to borrow and lend to households, the optimal capital income tax still converges to zero in the long run, as long as the value of defaulting is independent of the level of government debt. This paper provides a game theoretic setup with government debt where the value of the worst equilibrium only depends on the initial level of capital and can be determined in advance. This implies that under our assumptions the best sustainable equilibrium has zero capital taxes in the long run, even in the absence of government commitment.     

Modeling services liberalization: The case of Kenya

This paper employs a 55 sector small open economy computable general equilibrium model of the Kenyan economy to assess the impact of the liberalization of regulatory barriers against foreign and domestic business service providers in Kenya. The model incorporates foreign direct investment in business services and productivity effects in imperfectly competitive goods and services markets endogenously, through a Dixit–Stiglitz framework. The ad valorem equivalent of barriers to foreign direct investment have been estimated based on detailed questionnaires completed by specialists in Kenya. We estimate very substantial gains to Kenya from regulatory liberalization in business services, and additional gains from uniform tariffs. The estimated gains increase to 50% of consumption in the long run steady state model, where the impact on the accumulation of capital from an improvement in the productivity of capital is taken into account. Decomposition exercises reveal that the largest gains to Kenya will derive from liberalization of costly regulatory barriers that are non-discriminatory in their impacts between Kenyan and multinational service providers.     

A second chance at success: A political economy perspective

This paper characterizes a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium where agents vote over income taxation that distorts educational investment. Agents become rich or poor through educational investment, and the poor have a second chance at success. The results show the following concerning the cost of a second chance. First, when the cost is low, the economy is characterized by high levels of upward mobility and inequality, and a low tax burden supported by the poor with prospects for upward mobility. Second, when the cost is high, there are multiple equilibria with various patterns of upward mobility, inequality and redistribution. Numerical examples show that the shift from a high-cost economy to a low-cost economy may reduce social welfare.     

Current Account Dynamics in a Small Open‐Economy Model of Status Seeking*

In this paper we analyze the implications of status preference, modeled as relative wealth, for the current account in a small open‐economy framework with capital stock dynamics. We demonstrate that the transitional dynamics of the economy are characterized by two distinct speeds of adjustment: a speed of adjustment arising from status preference and a speed of adjustment arising from installation costs of investment. This structure implies that the current account balance depends on both speeds of adjustment as well as on the long‐run equilibrium, which is a function of the degree of status consciousness. As a consequence, the current account can exhibit nonmonotonic behavior in transition to the steady‐state equilibrium subsequent to a productivity disturbance.     

Wage Inequality,Increased Competition,and Trade Liberalization: Short Run vs Long Run

This paper examines the impact of increased competition and trade liberalization on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the short run as well as the long run. It is shown that an increase in the number of firms in the producer services sector increases wage inequality in the short run even if the income shares of capital in the industrial and agricultural sectors were identical. A decrease in the services sector's fixed cost decreases wage inequality in the short run if the income share of capital in the agricultural sector is relatively large. Owing to the presence of external economies, a decrease in the services sector's fixed cost increases wage inequality in the long run. A decrease in import duty on the agricultural good increases wage inequality in the short as well as the long run but its effect in the long run is stronger due to the presence of external economies in the industrial sector.