Does clarity of central bank communication affect credibility? Evidences considering governor-specific effects

Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.     

Central bank forecasts and private expectations: An empirical assessment from three emerging economies

As part of their monetary policy strategy, many central banks are attempting to manage private sector expectations about key macroeconomic variables. In this article, we investigate whether forecasts provided by central banks in three inflation targeting emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, and Poland) affect the expectations of private forecasters. In particular, we analyze whether the disagreement between the central bank and private sector forecasts applies to explain changes in private sector expectations regarding inflation and economic growth. The findings show that while central bank forecasts are higher than those made by private sector forecasters, the result is an update upwards of private forecasts and that this effect is stronger for GDP growth forecasts than for inflation forecasts.     

Disagreement in inflation expectations: empirical evidence for Colombia

The literature on expectation disagreements in emerging economies is scarce. This paper examines the disagreements in inflation expectations for the Colombian economy during the 2010–2017 period. We combine empirical tests with an analysis of a monthly survey of expectations of financial analysts in Colombia to obtain valuable evidence to formulate guidelines on the expectations modelling in developing economies. The findings indicate that disagreements present inertia and that inflation volatility increases disagreements. However, the central bank’s stance, as established through a press release, can reduce disagreement. Moreover, if central bank communication is clear and there is a credible inflation target, there tend to be fewer disagreements.     

The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts*

Central banks have become remarkably more transparent over the last few decades. In this paper, we study the effects of this evolution, focusing on whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables. We use a large set of proxies for central‐bank transparency in 12 advanced economies. We find evidence for a sizeable effect (e.g., by announcing a quantified inflation objective, or by publishing inflation and output forecasts). However, there are decreasing marginal effects to increases in transparency, and the disagreement among the expectations of the general public is not affected. This suggests that there are possible limits to transparency.     

Fed speak on main street: Central bank communication and household expectations

Central banks emphasize the use of communication as a tool of monetary policy. As central banks increasingly recognize that low public informedness limits their ability to communicate with the general public, several have begun to explicitly tailor their communication strategies for a broader audience. Most research focuses on central bank communication with financial markets, but several recent strands of literature address aspects of communication with households. I survey the literature addressing the rationales and efficacy of central bank communication with households, supplementing this with new evidence from an assortment of consumer survey data. I draw from the literature on rational inattention, financial literacy, and political communication to suggest explanations for limited household receptiveness to central bank communications. Finally, I focus on one specific aim of central bank communication, which is to anchor inflation expectations. Previous literature finds that the announcement of an explicit inflation target helps anchor expectations among financial market participants. Using U.S. consumer survey data, I show that consumers’ expectations are imperfectly anchored and that the anchoring of more informed consumers’ expectations increased more than the anchoring of less informed consumers’ expectations following the Fed’s announcement of a 2% inflation target.     

The reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment obtained from information in official communiqués

Using official communiqués about fiscal policy, we develop a fiscal sentiment indicator, and we verify the reaction of disagreements in inflation expectations to fiscal sentiment. This analysis is relevant to inflation targeting (IT) countries because transparency and communication can influence expectations. The results suggest that a more optimistic fiscal sentiment reduces disagreements in inflation expectations. Estimates show that, for higher disagreements in inflation expectations at 12-month maturity, an optimistic fiscal sentiment can reduce the disagreement more sharply. In turn, the fiscal sentiment effect on the disagreement for the 48-month maturity is stronger the smaller the disagreement is. The results allow us to outline the following policy recommendations. First, an optimistic fiscal environment is important in the task of guiding inflation expectations and reducing inflation uncertainty. Second, fiscal communication is an important tool for the expectations formation process, and therefore it must be carefully managed to help in the task of forward guidance of inflation expectations, being important for the IT regime. Third, both fiscal credibility and monetary policy credibility are important for the expectations formation process, particularly for the reduction of inflation uncertainty, representing aspects that must be preserved in countries that adopt the IT regime.     

CENTRAL BANK STRATEGIC FORECASTING

In most of the literature on transparency it has been standard to assume that central banks release truthful information when communicating with the public. However, the monetary policymaker may act strategically and misrepresent private information intending to reduce economic volatility by manipulating inflation expectations. We set up a simple model which includes misrepresentation as a possible action for the central bank and derive some testable implications. The empirical evidence from the analysis of inflation forecasts of six central banks (Brazil, Canada, England, Iceland, New Zealand, and Sweden) is consistent with the existence of strategic forecasting. (JEL E52, E58)     

Explaining Disagreement on Interest Rates in a Taylor‐Rule Setting

Most studies on disagreement focus on one specific variable, thereby neglecting the fact that disagreement can be co‐moving with disagreement on other variables. In this paper, we explore to what extent disagreement regarding the interest rate is driven by disagreement on inflation and unemployment. This relationship can be motivated by the theoretical concept of the Taylor rule. Using survey microdata for both professional forecasters and consumers, we provide evidence that disagreement on the interest rate is mainly driven by disagreement on inflation. We further show that disagreement is significantly influenced by central bank transparency, as well as news on money and credit conditions.     

Writing Clearly: The ECB's Monetary Policy Communication

The article presents a novel methodology for measuring the clarity of central bank communication using content analysis, illustrating the methodology with the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). The analysis identifies the ECB's written communication as clear in about 85–95% of instances, which is comparable with, or better than, similar results available for other central banks. We also find that the additional information on risk to inflation and especially projection risk assessment contained in the ECB's Monthly Bulletins helps to improve communication clarity compared to ECB's press releases. In contrast, the bulletin's communication on monetary developments has a negative, albeit small, impact on clarity.     

Inflation literacy and inflation expectations: Evidence from Austrian household survey data

Inflation expectations are known to be quite heterogeneous across agents. We investigate whether this heterogeneity is primarily due to differences in people’s understanding of the inflation process and of the goals and intentions of the central bank. Using micro data from a survey conducted among 2000 Austrian households, we construct an indicator of “inflation literacy” from several questions on people’s knowledge about different aspects of inflation. We find that this indicator helps explain both the level and the uncertainty of inflation expectations: Households with relatively higher levels of inflation literacy tend to have lower and more accurate short-term and long-term inflation expectations. Interestingly, however, they are less certain about their inflation expectations than people with lower levels of inflation literacy. We also find that people’s trust in the central bank and in its ability to maintain price stability significantly dampens their inflation expectations.     

Managing financial market expectations: The role of central bank transparency and central bank communication

In this paper, we study the influence of central bank transparency and informal central bank communication on the formation of money market expectations. The sample covers nine major central banks from January 1999 to July 2007. We find, first, that transparency reduces the bias in money market expectations and dampens their variation. Second, informal communications help manage financial market expectations by reducing the variation of expectations. Third, various subcategories of the Eijffinger and Geraats (2006) transparency index lead to a smaller bias in expectations (in particular, evaluation of policy outcome and explanation of interest rate decisions) and to a reduction in the variation of expectations (in particular, explicit prioritization of objectives and provision of information on unanticipated macroeconomic disturbances).     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

Can central bank communication help to stabilise inflation expectations?

This paper examines whether central bank communication stabilises euro area inflation expectations through the information and news channel. A novelty of the study is its use of data from Google Analytics on ECB website traffic as proxy for visitors’ attention to its communication. We conduct several econometric tests with daily data to measure the impact of ECB communication on the information demand of the public and ultimately on inflation expectations. Overall, this study shows that website attention, as captured by search volumes of visitors, influences euro area inflation expectations. We find that increased website attention contributes to narrowing the gap between market-based forecasts and (the mean of) longer-term professional inflation expectations. Our findings add to the theoretical evidence on the existence of an information and news channel.     

Is inflation targeting feasible in Poland?

In this paper we analyze whether inflation targeting is feasible in Poland. There are at least three prerequisites for successful inflation targeting: 1) central bank independence, 2) a high degree of central bank accountability, transparency, and communication to the public, and 3) a predictable and stable relationship between inflation and the instruments of monetary policy. While the first two prerequisites are relatively easy to analyze, the third criterion requires formal statistical analysis, which we undertake in this paper. The first two prerequisites for targeting are found to be met in Poland, and the empirical analysis shows some evidence of significant relationships between inflation and monetary instruments in Poland. Hence inflation targeting appears feasible in Poland.     

货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起

本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。     

Fixed exchange rates,independent central banks and price stability in postcommunist countries: Conservatism and credibility

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are used by governments to achieve stable prices. This article analyzes the mechanisms through which the two monetary institutions could work: Indirectly via a disciplinary effect on money growth rates or via an additional credibility effect on inflation expectations and the cost of capital. I further explain how both discipline and credibility are affected by the distinct flaws of independent central banks and fixed exchange rates: central banks lack transparency and fixed exchange rates take many shapes and are routinely devalued. The argument is tested with quarterly data from postcommunist countries for years 1991 to 2007. The findings show a strong disciplinary effect of monetary institutions on rates of M2 change and an effect on inflation controlling for money growth, but credibility does not extend to lower real short‐term market interest rates. Political institutions do condition the effect of central bank independence, while the types of fixed exchange rates affect money growth rates and inflation to different degrees.     

The time-varying degree of inflation expectations anchoring

Well-anchored inflation expectations have become a key indicator for the credibility of a central bank’s inflation target. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the (de-)anchoring of long-term U.S. inflation expectations has been under debate. We propose a time-varying parameter (TVP) model in order to explore gradual changes in central bank credibility and the corresponding degree of inflation expectations anchoring. Our results confirm that inflation expectations have been partially de-anchored during the financial crisis. However, the TVP model reveals that inflation expectations have been successfully re-anchored ever since.     

The Limits of Transparency

This paper probes the limits of transparency in monetary policymaking along two dimensions: feasibility and desirability. It argues that, due to limited knowledge about the economy, even central banks (CBs) that are considered champions of openness are not very clear about their measurement of the output gap and about their beliefs regarding the effect of policy on inflationary expectations. Consequently, feasibility constraints on transparency are more serious than stylized models of the transmission mechanism would imply. In addition, no CB has made clear statements about its objective function, including in particular the relative weight on output versus inflation stabilization, the policy discount factor and the shape of losses from the inflation and the output gaps over the possible ranges of realizations of those variables.
The paper also argues that there is a trade-off between full transparency and full utilization of information in setting policy and that excessive transparency may facilitate the exertion of political pressures on the CB.
The last section of the paper abstracts from feasibility constraints and discusses the desirable levels of openness in various areas of the policymaking process. It is argued that the strongest case against immediate transparency arises when the CB has private information about problems within segments of the financial system. Premature release of information may, in such a case, destroy efficient risk-sharing arrangements and long-term investments by triggering a run on the financial system. This is illustrated within the context of the classic Diamond–Dybvig model of bank runs. The paper also probes the desirable levels of transparency in other areas of the policymaking process like the bank's objective function, the bank's output target, forecasts of economic shocks, disagreements within the CB board and the publication of CB interest-rate forecasts.     

The influence of learning and price-level targeting on central bank forward guidance

This paper examines how the effectiveness of central bank forward guidance depends on two key channels: the expectations formation process and the monetary policy regime. The results show that rational expectations relative to an adaptive learning rule amplifies the positive benefits a price-level targeting central bank creates for forward guidance. Specifically, forward guidance generates greater amounts of output and inflation under a price-level than inflation targeting monetary policy regime, but rational expectations overstates these positive benefits compared to adaptive learning. The different responses of expectations between rational expectations and adaptive learning to forward guidance are driving this performance gap. Thus, policymakers should consider how expectations are modeled if forward guidance and price-level targeting are implemented in an economy.