Pay for play: the financial value of NCAA football players

We explore the financial value of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) football recruits and establish a wage schedule based on the star ratings assigned to high school athletes by an independent talent evaluation agency. Evidence suggests that the contribution of higher-ranking recruits to team wins significantly increases revenues. While the NCAA currently prohibits universities from paying student-athletes, we estimate that if amateurism rules were rescinded and college football players were compensated according to their revenue-generating abilities then five-, four-, three-, and low-star players would be entitled to annual salaries of $799,000, $361,000, $29,000, and $21,000, respectively, in addition to athletic scholarships covering tuition, books, and room and board.     

Valuations and dynamics of negotiations

This paper analyzes three‐party negotiations in the presence of externalities. We obtain a closed‐form solution for the Markov perfect equilibrium of a multilateral non‐cooperative bargaining model, yielding an equilibrium value and dynamics of negotiations that are supported by experimental studies. Players’ values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players’ values are continuous and piecewise linear on the worth of bilateral coalitions, and are inextricably related to their negotiation strategies: the equilibrium value is the Nash bargaining solution when no bilateral coalitions form; the Shapley value when all bilateral coalitions form; or the nucleolus, when either one bilateral coalition among “natural partners” or two bilateral coalitions including a “pivotal player” form.     

Multi-player contests with asymmetric information

We consider imperfectly discriminating, common-value, all-pay auctions (or contests) in which some players know the value of the prize, others do not. We show that if the prize is always of positive value, then all players are active in equilibrium. If the prize is of value zero with positive probability, then there is some threshold number of informed players such that if there are less, all uninformed players are active, and otherwise all uninformed players are inactive.     

Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach

This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well. The authors thank Yukihiko Funaki, Andreu Mas-Colell, David Pérez-Castrillo and Jana Vyrastekova for helpful discussions. We also appreciate the comments from the seminar and conference participants at Keele University, Tilburg University, University of Haifa, University of Warwick, CORE at Louvain-la-Neuve, Catholic University Leuven, Pablo de Olavide University in Seville, University of Vigo, the 2006 Annual Conference of the Israeli Mathematical Union in Neve Ilan, Israel, and the 61st European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Vienna, Austria in 2006. In particular, we are grateful to the associate editor and an anonymous referee. Their valuable comments and constructive suggestions contributed to a significant improvement of the paper. Wettstein acknowledges the financial support of the Pinchas Sapir Center for Development in Tel Aviv University.     

价值理论的困境、出路及创新研究——广义虚拟经济理论关于价值的主要观点

传统价值理论面临对"新经济"解释力、引导力、指导力不足的困境,价值研究的出路在于回到马克思关于生活对象化才是人类活动的最一般图示,劳动对象化只是生活对象化的一个组成部分的科学论断,重新梳理和确立人本立场、关系立场和历史立场.广义虚拟经济理论是对"新经济"条件下价值规律的创新研究,生活价值论、二元价值容介态经济以及新的"...     

Estimating the market value of collegiate football players from professional factor shares

Although the level and growth of revenue in college football has drawn increasing public attention, reliable estimates of the value of college and associated rents remain elusive. Many players do not have easily observable performance statistics and there are significant complementarities. Using a simple estimation strategy based on professional factor shares and rooted in economic theory, we generate estimates of market value for college players across seven National Collegiate Athletic Association conferences using professional football and basketball salaries from 2011 to 2013 as shadow prices. With this method, market value of an average starting football player in a Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conference ranges from $120,000 to $1.7 million per year. The value of superstar players may exceed $4 million per year. We find that rents can flow from the institutions to players in some cases at relatively low-revenue institutions outside the BCS.     

Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

In complex situations, agents use simplified representations to learn how their environment may react. I assume that agents bundle nodes at which other agents must move into analogy classes, and agents only try to learn the average behavior in every class. Specifically, I propose a new solution concept for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations correctly represent the average behavior in every class. The solution concept is shown to differ from existing concepts, and it is applied to a variety of games, in particular the centipede game, and ultimatum/bargaining games. The approach explains in a new way why players may Pass for a large number of periods in the centipede game, and why the responder need not be stuck to his reservation value in ultimatum games. Some possible avenues for endogenizing the analogy grouping are also suggested.     

A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure

The mechanism by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) for non-transferable utility (NTU) games is generalized so that a coalition structure among players is taken into account. The new mechanism yields the Owen value for transferable utility (TU) games with coalition structure as well as the consistent value (Maschler and Owen 1989, 1992) for NTU games with trivial coalition structure. Furthermore, we obtain a solution for pure bargaining problems with coalition structure which generalizes the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.     

An experimental investigation of the explosive effect in almost common value auctions

With only two bidders, a slight private value advantage in a common value auction is predicted to have an explosive effect on the allocation and revenue of the auction when using a second price and/or English clock mechanism. This paper uses the “wallet game” in an English clock mechanism with two players to test these predictions. The results show that the effect is proportional, not explosive, confirming the results of past experiments. A behavioral model with two types of players, naive and sophisticated, is developed and tested against the experimental data. In the model, naive players use a rule of thumb bidding function, while the sophisticated players are fully rational and, when forming their strategy (choosing the best response), correctly account for the probability that a rival is naive or sophisticated. We use cluster analysis to classify the players in the symmetric auctions as naive or sophisticated and a strict win/lose criteria to classify players in the asymmetric auctions. We find that those players classified as sophisticated are more aggressive in responding to high signals or advantaged status than their naive counterparts, but do not lower their bids relative to the naive players when receiving low signals or when regular.     

劳动价值论与生产要素参与价值分配问题研究

马克思劳动价值论中只承认直接从事物质生产的活劳动才创造价值,而作为社会劳动凝结物的劳动手段和劳动对象是物化劳动,只能转移价值,同时也承认非劳动生产要素在价值创造中的作用.笔者梳理了理论界对传统劳动价值一元论的新认识,认为马克思劳动价值论与生产要素参与价值分配并不矛盾.     

新环境资源价值论——兼论生态文明的价值观

新环境资源价值理论从提出到形成体系经历了一个动态发展的过程。以工业文明发展价值观为基础而建立起来的传统环境资源理论,不承认环境资源的价值,存在严重的缺陷;而新型环境资源价值论,敏锐地捕捉到了环境自然资源所具有的二重性价值,并以此确立了科学的生态文明发展之价值观。     

全面薪酬的价值整合机制探析

全面薪酬旨在平衡企业和员工的利益，以求企业价值（企业绩效）与员工价值（员工满意）的双重实现。全面薪酬通过企业价值和员工价值的创造和分享的整合机制来实现两者价值的互动和平衡，进而实现企业价值和员工价值的整合，形成基于价值整合的新型薪酬体系。     

养老保险资源获取途径新探

养老主体是老年人,养老资源的获取应是老年人一生积累和创造的过程,是老年人积极、主动的争取过程,而不是消极、被动的等待外界的救助过程,这种过程可以理解为老年人为实现幸福晚年而进行的养老价值资本的投资过程。提出的养老价值资本思想,为养老资源的获取提供了新的视角。养老价值资本体系的构建,为养老价值资本投资明确了方向,在此基础上建构的养老价值资本分析模型,对养老研究与实践具有重要意义。     

Outside options,component efficiency,and stability

In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value.     

论生态旅游价值--动力、途径与取向问题

随着生态旅游的蓬勃发展和生态价值新哲学思维的兴起,生态旅游价值研究日益成为多学科关注的一个重大课题。本文从主客体的视角剖析了生态旅游价值以及实现其价值的动力和途径,并从形成正确价值观的角度分析了生态旅游的价值取向。     

超组织视角下的员工价值与顾客价值

随着知识经济时代的来临,组织环境日趋复杂,灵活多变,超组织经营理念应运而生.在这一经营理念下的员工价值、顾客价值及企业价值内涵都发生了变化,其相互关系也更加复杂和系统化.员工在组织获取与维持竞争优势中扮演着十分重要的角色,顾客则成为组织应对越来越剧烈的全球市场竞争的关键环节.本文立足于超组织视角,对员工价值与顾客价值进行了全新的界定,并对其相互关系进行了深入分析,提出了知识经济条件下企业创造和平衡员工价值与顾客价值的战略指导思想.     

Congestion games with malicious players

We study the equilibria of non-atomic congestion games in which there are two types of players: rational players, who seek to minimize their own delay, and malicious players, who seek to maximize the average delay experienced by the rational players. We study the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for these games, and we seek to quantify the impact of the malicious players on the equilibrium. One counterintuitive phenomenon which we demonstrate is the “windfall of malice”: paradoxically, when a myopically malicious player gains control of a fraction of the flow, the new equilibrium may be more favorable for the remaining rational players than the previous equilibrium.     

企业品牌核心价值研究

结合品牌核心价值产生的内外部环境,对品牌核心价值的组织构成、品牌核心价值各组成部分的关系及其与外部环境的相互作用机制进行了探讨,提出了品牌核心价值体系的概念,运用柯布-道格拉斯生产函数构建了品牌核心价值体系模型,并运用该模型对如何调整与完善品牌核心价值进行了分析。     

Revenues in discrete multi-unit, common value auctions: a study of three sealed-bid mechanisms

This paper proposes a discrete bidding model for both quantities and pricing. It has a two-unit demand environment where subjects bid for contracts with an unknown redemption value, common to all bidders. Prior to bidding, the bidders receive private signals of information on the (common) value. The relevant task is to compare the equilibrium strategies and the seller’s revenue of the three most common auction formats with two players. The result is that the Vickrey auction always gives the most revenue to the seller, the discriminatory auction follows closely and the uniform auction clearly is the worst due to demand reduction.

二元价值容介态观下的能源价值体系研究

能源经济的良好运行离不开科学合理的能源价格形成机制,而能源价格形成与能源价值构成密切相关。本文结合资源价值理论的研究成果与能源经济环境的变化,基于广义虚拟经济理论的二元价值容介态观,从物理哲学、能源需求、能源交易与虚拟价值理论的不同角度,提出了多维度的能源价值容介态体系,为能源企业管理以及能源价格改革提供了有意义的启示。