Modelling upstream and downstream market power in bilateral oligopoly

This article develops a general model that estimates market power exertion in a bilateral market relationship for processors and retailers where each may also have market power in their primary input market and output markets, respectively. Monte Carlo experiments are used to generate industry data for market structures such as perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony, bilateral imperfect competition with an integrated processor/retailer, bilateral imperfect competition with separate processor and retailer, and bilateral imperfect competition with four adjacent upstream and downstream markets. Then, new empirical industrial organization models are estimated using the data with models that match the market structure under which the data were generated (true) and with models that reflect alternative market structures (alternative). The general model is derived using the production function approach without imposing the fixed proportion assumption. Monte Carlo simulation results indicate that the general model is preferred to alternative models that presume competitive behaviour by processors in primary input procurement and by retailers in the output market. Results indicate that less flexible models lead to biased market power estimates in the presence of market power in the corresponding input and output markets.     

Testing for the principal’s monopsony power in agency contracts

We develop a test for the presence of the monopsony power of the livestock integrator (principal) on the market for contract growers (agents) and estimate the model with the data on swine industry contract settlements. A natural test for the monopsony power of the principal would compare the estimated values of the marginal revenue products with the actual payments that agents receive for their services. The problem with implementing this approach comes from the fact that agents’ abilities and actions are unobservable. Our approach is based on estimating the slope of the inverse supply function for grower input using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators. The model specifies the relationships between the observable consequences and unobservable grower characteristics imposing the first order conditions for principal’s profit maximization. The results show that the null hypothesis of no market power cannot be rejected.

Measuring the degree of competition in Pakistan’s banking industry: an empirical analysis

Pakistan’s banking industry has gone through significant transformation from being in a heavily state regulated and controlled environment to a more liberalized market structure in recent years. This liberalization of banking industry in Pakistan has raised concerns over the dominant banks’ exercise of market power on account of increase in market concentration due to mergers and acquisitions, high profitability in banking sector and increasing interest rate spread. Present study therefore explicitly tests the market conduct of banks using quarterly panel data of 30 banks from 2004 to 2012 and employing Panzar–Rosse, Bresnahan–Lau, Hall–Roeger and Boone’s approaches to study market power. Our findings suggest that Pakistan’s banking industry is working in a competitive environment and we find little evidence for the exercise of market power by the dominant banks. Our results remain robust across all these approaches to measure market power. These findings indicate that the liberalization and deregulation of Pakistan’s banking industry has been successful in improving the competitive conditions in the market.     

Constrained output maximization and US agriculture

This paper presents a framework for estimating an indirect production function and then applies it to aggregate US agriculture. Issues addressed include tests of standard hypotheses about the underlying technology (homotheticity, neutral technical change, etc.) as well as examination of consistency in aggregation and the effects of changes in the level of aggregate expenditure on farm output. Since there already exist several studies empirically describing agricultural production technologies with indirect objective functions, one might fairly ask whether this paper really breaks any new ground? We feel that it does. One reason is that existing studies (e.g. Binswanger, 1974; Lopez, 1980; Ball and Chambers, 1982; Ray, 1982; and Weaver, 1983) all rely on either profit or cost functions. To date there appears to be only one study using an indirect production (Appelbaum, 1979), and it is not in agriculture. This seems unfortunate because there are many instances in agriculture for which an indirect production function (or revenue function approach) seems more appropriate. The reason why relates directly to one's belief about the objective function and constraints farmers face. Ultimately, it seems plausible in a certainty framework that producers maximize profits. And since cost minimization and output maximization are just constrained versions of profit maximization, both cost and indirect production functions are more appropriately viewed as restricted profit functions. What differs is the constraint. Assuming cost minimization implies that farmers are constrained by a fixed output which they must produce; in most instances, this is implausible. More likely, the level of output is itself a choice variable. Output maximization, on the other hand, suggests that the main constraint is the amount of money that producers can muster to hire resources. In other words, farmers may face binding constraints in obtaining the profit maximizing level on expenditure on input utilization. One might think that expenditure may not be a binding constraint because there exists a relatively active US credit market. However, the US credit market is far from being perfectly competitive in a stylized sense, and thus, the possibility of a farmer being able to finance a given level of expenditure may be limited.

Readers familiar with the dual approach to production problems may already be asking why these ideas rule out cost functions since it is well known that the cost function is the distance function of the indirect production function (Blackorby et al., 1978)? In principle, therefore, one could always estimate a cost function and then invert it to obtain the indirect production function. There are two problems with this approach: the first is that if output maximization is truly the objective, output is not predetermined and cannot be treated as exogenous in cost function estimation. Second, estimation of direct and indirect functions using the same data set does not always yield comparable results. Estimation of a transcendental logarithmic (translog) indirect production function and a translog cost function, separately, does not generally yield identical estimates of the Allen elasticities of substitutions. Solving the first problem in simple, but the second suggests that estimation should proceed on the basis of the objective function the researcher deems most appropriate. Therefore, if output maximization is more plausible than cost minimization an indirect production function should be used.

The plan of the paper is as follows. We first outline the theoretical developments necessary to our approach (included are conditions necessary for consistent aggregation over firms). We then present estimates of an indirect production function and use these estimates to investigate the plausibility of various restrictions on the technology, consistency in aggregation, substitution possibilities in agricultural production, and the effect of expenditure on agricultural input utilization. The paper closes with a discussion of the results and suggestions for future research.     

ARE WAGE INCREASES IN CHINESE STATE INDUSTRY EFFICIENT? PRODUCTIVITY IN NANJING'S MACHINE-BUILDING INDUSTRY

Since China's economic reform began, wages in state enterprises have increased at rates much faster than the rate of price inflation. This paper investigates the source of this rapid wage increase for a sample of Chinese state-owned machine-building enterprises to determine whether increased wages can be best explained by changes in productivity, changes in the output market, or changes in input markets. CES production function estimates find the marginal product of labor was stagnant between 1980 and 1992 but initially higher than wages. Rising wages were therefore consistent with other evidence that the reform process cost the state sector its labor monopsony. ( JEL P31)     

Local monopsony and free riders

In an industry with upstream economies of scale in the distribution of differentiated products to retailers which have monopoly power within separate local market areas, the retailers have an incentive to exert monopsony power due to the divergence between average and marginal costs in the distribution of those inputs. The retailers increase their ability to exert monopsony power by forming coalitions (that is, chains) across local markets. Sufficiently large retail chains may force input price below the seller's average cost, thus ‘free riding’ on the level of product variety supported by other retailers. Vertical integration, cartels, or other cooperative behavior, however, can be means to control the level of product variety, and may increase both industry profits and economic welfare. Policy applications to the cable television, motion picture, and pharmaceutical industries are discussed.     

THE EFFECT OF REGULATION ON WAGES AND INTERMEDIATE PRODUCT PRICES UNDER BILATERAL MONOPOLY1

This paper seeks to determine whether, under bilateral monopoly, profit rate regulation induces an input price bias in addition to the well known Averch-Johnson capital intensity bias. Using a Nash-type employer-union, fixed bargaining power model, it is found that regulation may induce lower as well as higher wage rates. Similarly, when the two parties are respectively capital equipment supplier and user, regulation of the user's profit rate has an ambiguous effect on the equipment rental rate. In both cases the input price effect is shown to depend on the elasticity of factor substitution and on how demand elasticity varies with output.     

A Classroom Experiment Demonstrating the Generation of a Market Demand Function and the Determination of Equilibrium Price

Economics instructors continue to look for simple and effective means of motivating students while conveying important basic principles. Dennis Weidenaar describes a supply and demand simulation which can be used in any classroom to show how a market demand function is generated and how equilibrium price is determined. Involving little in the way of preparation, this activity simply calls for the sale of apples to students by the instructor, with individual and aggregate demand schedules being calculated. Such concepts as price and income elasticity, profit maximization, opportunity cost, market organization (monopoly, perfect competition and monopsony), consumer's and producer's surplus, and total, marginal and average revenue and cost can be illustrated through the use of the simulation and the suggested discussion questions.     

我国劝诱性医疗的成因:管制、市场结构还是信息不对称?

本文使用一个价格管制背景下的医疗信号博弈模型讨论了我国劝诱性医疗现象的成因,以及管制、市场结构和信息不对称在导致资源配置扭曲中的作用机制和相互关系。研究表明,在无管制市场中,医生存在以价格承诺实现医疗资源最优配置的动机和可能。在政府对各项医疗收费实施全面价格管制的制度背景下,过低的诊断价格上限将使市场自发的事前价格承诺机制失灵,并诱发欺骗性的诊断结果,而药品和医疗器械使用的价格上限管制则诱使医生以增加药品和医疗器械使用量的数量决策来维持自身的垄断抽租能力。这两种机制的共同作用最终导致了双重劝诱性医疗均衡。在此均衡下,由于公立医院的垄断地位未受影响,故价格管制无法改善患者的福利状况,反而会导致社会的净福利损失。     

Ozone pollution and farm profits in England and Wales

Tropospheric ozone is an air pollutant known to adversely affect crop yields across Europe. Experimental work is underway to quantify yield effects at ambient ozone levels for a number of crops. In this article, we undertake direct, farm-level evaluation of the impact of ozone by estimating a multi-output profit function using a panel dataset of cereal farms in England and Wales. A system of equations, comprising the profit function, input and output share equations is estimated using a fixed-effects seemingly unrelated regression technique, with ozone as a quasi-fixed input. Estimated parameters are used to calculate tropospheric ozone-related profit and output supply elasticities. The main findings from the profit function show that a 10% increase in average ozone levels would decrease variable profits by 1.3% and wheat output supply by 1%. These results are of a significantly lower magnitude, but qualitatively consistent with findings from similar studies carried out in North America.     

Do government owned banks trade market power for slack?

The ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH)’ posits that banks with market power have less incentives to maximize revenues and minimize cost. Especially government owned banks with a public mandate precluding profit maximization might succumb to a quiet life. We use a unified approach that simultaneously measures market power and efficiency to test the quiet life hypothesis of German savings banks. We find that average local market power declined between 1996 and 2006. Cost and profit efficiency remained constant. Nonparametric correlations are consistent with a quiet life regarding cost efficiency but not regarding profit efficiency. The quiet life on the cost side is negatively correlated with bank size, quality of loan portfolio and local per capita income. The last result indicates that the quiet cost life is therefore potentially due to benevolent excess consumption of local input factors by public savings banks.     

A Dynamic Model of Incumbent LEC Response to Entry Under the Terms of the Telecommunications Act of 1996

This paper dynamically models an incumbent Local Exchange Carrier's (LEC's) ability to control market entry with a profit squeeze. The model is consistent with the post-Telecommunications Act of 1996 local exchange market. The model shows that an unconstrained incumbent could choose output prices and input costs to discourage an entrant's output-market production. The impact of a regulatory constraint on incumbent behavior is examined. It is concluded that cost-based input prices may lead to little growth in the entrant's self-provision of inputs and that continuing oversight of output and input prices may be necessary.     

Modeling Mexican agricultural production

Results of time series tests (including unit root and deterministic and stochastic cointegration tests) imply that a mixture of differenced and cointegrated model specifications are warranted for econometric models of Mexican agricultural supplies and input demands. Test results are sensitive to choice of functional form and the set of regressors. For example, share equations should be estimated using differenced data, but output supply and input demand equations generally should not. Generalized Leontief and quadratic functional forms are preferred over the translog. Symmetry and curvature of a restricted profit function are rejected. Short-run output supplies and input demands are generally inelastic. First version received: February 1998/Final version received: November 1998     

Why do Aggregate Production Functions Work? Fisher’s simulations,Shaikh’s identity and some new results

The literature on aggregation has shown that the conditions for successful aggregation of micro production functions into an aggregate production function are far too stringent to be believable (Fisher 1969, 1971). Despite this, aggregate production functions continue being used. The reason is that they seem to 'work'. This happens, however, because underlying every aggregate production function is the income accounting identity that links input and output, i.e. output equals wages plus profits. A simple algebraic transformation of this identity yields a form that resembles a production function (Shaikh, 1974, 1980). This paper uses Monte Carlo simulations to study two questions. First, how much spuriousness can help explain the relatively good fits of the Cobb-Douglas production function? The simulations show that the contribution of spuriousness to a high R 2 is minor once we properly account for the fact that input and output data used in production function estimations are linked through the income accounting identity. It is mostly the link through this identity that explains the results. Secondly, we study how much factor shares have to vary in an economy so as to render the Cobb-Douglas production function with a time trend a bad choice for modelling and estimation purposes. We conclude that the Cobb-Douglas form is robust to relatively large variations in the factor shares. What makes this form often fail are the variations in the growth rates of the wage and profit rates.     

Are you hiring Johnny Football or Johnny Doe? Uncertain labour quality and the measurement of monopsony in college football

I assess monopsony in the college football labour market as it relates to both typical and elite performers, while also accounting for the uncertain performance quality of prospective players who are in this labour market. Existing studies suggest that the marginal revenue product (MRP) of elite collegiate players later drafted into the National Football League (NFL), significantly exceeds their compensation. These comparisons overstate monopsony rents because schools don’t know ex ante which prospects will become these elite performers. Using financial data spanning 2004–2011 from 114 major schools, I estimate the MRP of players sorted into three ex post quality tiers, and find that while eventual NFL draftees generate revenue that significantly exceeds their compensation, a majority of scholarship players do not. Then, using Rivals.com talent ratings of 6,604 prospective players recruited from 2002–2008, I estimate the probability that prospects will reach each ex post quality tier given their ex ante ratings. MRP estimates are adjusted by these conditional probability estimates to reflect the expected MRP of prospects, which allows more appropriate assessment of monopsony rents. I find that schools possess substantially less monopsony power than unadjusted MRP estimates suggest.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.     

Assessing market power in the U.S. commercial banking industry under deregulation

This study attempts to investigate market power in the U.S. commercial banking industry since the U.S. government began to deregulate the banking sector in the early 1990s using the static Bresnahan–Lau model (SBLM) and dynamic Bresnahan–Lau model with error corrections (DBLEC). In particular, panel unit root and panel cointegration techniques are utilized to examine the dynamic model. The empirical results of the SBLM show that the banking industry is highly competitive. The empirical results of DBLEC also suggest that the commercial banking industry is close to being perfectly competitive in the short run. By contrast, the adjustment speeds of the supply and demand sides towards the long-run equilibrium are quite slow in that market, which implies that the U.S. commercial banks enjoy a certain degree of long-run market power.     

Global Warming and German Agriculture Impact Estimations Using a Restricted Profit Function

This study uses the concept of shadow prices formeasuring the impacts of climate change. By estimatinga restricted profit function rather than a cost or aproduction function the explanatory power of the modelis increased because of an endogenous outputstructure. Using low aggregated panel data on WesternGerman farmers, the results imply that the agricultural production process is significantly influenced by climate conditions. Simulation results using a 2 ×CO₂ climate scenario show positive impactsfor all regions in Germany. Interestingly, the spatialdistribution of the gains is indicating no advantagefor those regions, which currently suffer frominsufficient temperature. Finally, the importance ofan endogenous output structure is confirmed by thefinding that the desired product mix will drasticallychange.     

Intertemporal production and intertemporal substitution in output supply and input demand

This article presents an intertemporal model of production with multiple inputs to investigate substitution opportunities facing firms over time. The firm’s intertemporal profit maximization problem is characterized with the familiar cost function, and various intertemporal substitution elasticities are delineated for output supply and input demand. The absence of intertemporal substitution in production can imply production smoothing, and allowance for intertemporal substitution in labour demand reinforces the prediction of the real business cycle model. For aggregate US manufacturing, we find substantial substitution in output supply and labour demand over time due to intertemporal changes in output price and wage rates.     

组织距离对虚拟产业集群内企业创新的影响

用组织距离衡量虚拟产业集群内企业间的"组织接近",在双寡头古诺模型的分析框架下,研究组织距离对虚拟产业集群内企业的创新水平、产量和利润的影响。结果表明:在完全信息情况下,虚拟产业集群内企业的创新投入水平越高,则企业联合利润越大;在不完全信息情况下,集群内企业的均衡产量都是其创新投入水平的增函数,但若逆需求函数的斜率较大,则不完全信息对不拥有完全信息的企业的影响较小。最后求得要实现集群内企业的均衡产量随着组织距离的加大而增加则企业的创新水平要满足的条件。