Arena-based events and crime: an analysis of hourly robbery data

This article makes use of hourly crime counts to model the relationship between events that take place at the Prudential Center in Newark, NJ and robberies, an arena that has caused local controversy regarding the costs and benefits of hosting such an entertainment venue. Results from the econometric model suggest that the NHL’s New Jersey Devils ice hockey games, concerts, and Disney-themed events are all associated with increases in robbery, while various other event categories such as the NBA basketball games played by the Nets and boxing, and mixed martial arts (MMA) matches are not associated with an increase. These findings support two complementary ecological theories of crime that focus on how events provide additional opportunities for crime by increasing the associated benefits while simultaneously decreasing the cost for economically motivated offenders to take advantage of.     

Did you really take a hit? Understanding how video games playing affects individuals

This study addresses the important and recurring question of whether playing video games is detrimental to the socio-economic development of a person. It does this by using novel data from the Taking Part Survey in England to establish whether games playing is associated with particular socio-economic characteristics and/or other forms of cultural participation. The results do not indicate any obviously negative effects of video games playing: rather, those who play are typically better educated and no less wealthier, and games players are also more likely than non-games players to participate in other forms of culture, particularly active forms of participation. These findings are reinforced when comparing the characteristics of individuals who did and did not play video games when younger.     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

Racial stereotypes and robbery

Robbery is a serious, widespread and sometimes violent crime resulting each year in costs to victims of several billion dollars. Data on the incidence of robbery reveals certain striking racial disparities. African-Americans are more likely to be victims, arrestees and prisoners than are members of other demographic groups, and while black-on-white robberies are very common, white-on-black robberies are extremely rare. The disparities for robbery are also much greater than those for other crimes of acquisition. We develop a model of robbery that attempts to address these and other stylized facts. Robberies are typically interactions between strangers that involve a sequence of rapid decisions with severely limited information. Potential offenders must assess the likelihood of victim resistance, and victims must assess the likelihood that resistance will be met with violence. Racial disparities in the distribution of income can cause such probability assessments to be race-contingent, affecting crime rates as well as rates of resistance and violence. We argue that this model helps account for several empirical regularities that appear puzzling from the perspective of alternative theories of crime.     

Adam Smith: From Propriety and Sentiments to Property and Wealth

“Why return to Adam Smith?” Because we learn that he had fresh-for-today insights, derived from a modeling perspective that was never part of economic analysis. Smith wrote two classics: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759; hereafter Sentiments); and An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776; hereafter Wealth). In Sentiments it is argued that human sociability in close-knit groups is governed by the “propriety and fitness” of conduct based on sympathy. This non-utilitarian model provides new insights into the results of 2-person experimental “trust” and other games that defied the predictions of traditional game theory in the 1980s and 90s, and offers testable new predictions. Moreover, Smith shows how the civil order of “property” grew naturally out of the rules of propriety. Property together with what I call Smith's Discovery Axiom then enabled his break-through in Wealth that defined the liberal intellectual and practical foundation of two centuries of Western economic growth.     

Casinos and campus crime

This work examines the hypothesized positive relationship between casinos and local crime rates. Analysis of reported crime data for 173 residential colleges and universities in four Midwestern states suggests that robberies and motor vehicle thefts, but not burglaries, are significantly higher in number for campuses located within 10 miles of a casino.     

Imitation and selective matching in reputational games

This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-run players have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game, but not in the trust game.     

Lexicographic composition of simple games

Certain voting bodies can be modeled as a simple game where a coalition's winning depends on whether it wins, blocks or loses in two smaller simple games. There are essentially five such ways to combine two proper games into a proper game. The most decisive is the lexicographic rule, where a coalition must either win in G₁, or block in G₁ and win in G₂. When two isomorphic games are combined lexicographically, a given role for a player confers equal or more power when held in the first game than the second, if power is assessed by any semi-value. A game is lexicographically separable when the players of the two components partition the whole set. Games with veto players are not separable, and games of two or more players with identical roles are separable only if decisive. Some separable games are egalitarian in that they give players identical roles.     

Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution

This paper presents an experimental study oftwo different pollution compliance games:collective vis-à-vis random fining as ameans to regulate non-pointpollution. Using samples from both Costa Ricancoffee mill managers and Costa Rican students,we find that the two games perform equivalentlybut, although they lead to efficient outcomesthrough Nash play in the majority of cases, theobserved frequency of Nash play is lower thantheoretically predicted. Moreover, we rejectthe hypothesis that managers and studentsbehave equally. Off the equilibrium, managerstend to over-abate, whereas students tend tounder-abate. This result suggests theimportance of considering subject pooldifferences in the evaluation of environmentalpolicies by means of experiments, particularlyif those policies involve certain forms ofmanagement decisions.     

Cooperation,stability and social welfare under majority rule

We resolve collective irrationality in the stability set, a solution concept for voting games proposed by Rubinstein (J Econ Theory 23:150–159, 1980) to resolve the well-known paradox of voting in the core. A lack of cooperation within winning coalitions prevents their members from eliminating an alternative globally less preferred to another one when they observe the rational behavior defining the stability set. Allowing for the possibility of accompanying a coalitional vote with a binding solidarity agreement is a natural response to this cooperation failure. This leads to a new standard of behavior and a new solution concept called stability set with binding solidarity agreement or S _c -stability set. It is shown that the S _c -stability set and a newly defined version of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for simple games are not comparable with respect to set inclusion. The S _c -stability set includes the core, is included in the stability set and contains only Pareto-optimal alternatives. When individual preferences are complete linear orders, the S _c -stability set is always non-empty.      

Conventions and Local Interaction Structures: Experimental Evidence

We present a series of experimental coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant Nash equilibrium. We examine how much local interaction structures affect players' strategy choices. Our three major observations are the following: First, local interaction with open neighborhoods along a circle leads to less coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium than interaction in closed neighborhoods. Second, when players are allocated around a circle, the neighborhood size has, in the long run, no effect on the players' strategy choices. Third, with the same neighborhood size, players allocated on a lattice tend less than players allocated around a circle to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium. This is true even though the players are given exactly the same instructions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.     

Batch queues with choice of arrivals: Equilibrium analysis and experimental study

We study the decisions agents make in two queueing games with endogenously determined arrivals and batch service. In both games, agents are asked to independently decide when to join a queue, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. The symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of two games in discrete time where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed are tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information). With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play. Individual behavior can be accounted for by relatively simple heuristics.     

Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information

We consider infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information. A game is a K-coordination game if each player can decrease other players' payoffs by at most K times his own cost of punishment. The number K represents the degree of commonality of payoffs among the players. The smaller K is, the more interest the players share. A K-coordination game tapers off if the greatest payoff variation conditional on the first t periods of an efficient history converges to 0 at a rate faster than K^−t as t→∞. We show that every subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is efficient in any tapering-off game with perfect information. Applications include asynchronously repeated games, repeated games of extensive form games, asymptotically finite horizon games, and asymptotically pure coordination games.     

ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF LABOR MARKET AND DETERRENCE VARIABLES ON CRIME RATES IN MEXICO

Many studies examine the relationship between crime rates and various economic and/or sociodemographic variables in high income countries, but similar efforts for middle and low income countries are less common. Utilizing an 8‐year panel data sample for all 32 states in Mexico, this study assesses the impact of Mexican labor market and deterrence variables on various Mexican crime rates. The principal results indicate that: (1) State gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has ambiguous effect on crime rates under different conditions. Both wages and unemployment rates are negatively linked with crime rates. (2) Although the Mexican judicial and public security systems are widely believed to be ineffective, increased federal police forces and incarceration rates are associated with lower crime rates, but higher public security expenditure per capita is associated with higher crime rates. (3) The impacts from labor market and deterrence variables presented in (1) and (2) continue to hold under the Fox administration as well as for non‐border states. Their respective impacts diminish, however, under the Calderon administration as well as for border states because of the small number of observations. Overall, the results indicate that increasing average wages, federal police forces, and incarceration rates would have significant impacts on reducing crime rates in Mexican states. (JEL O54, K42)     

Self-Reporting and Ex Post Asymmetric Information

We consider a model of optimal law enforcement where sanctions are reduced for self-reporting individuals. Violators get private signals about their individual probabilities of apprehension after they committed a crime. Since violators will self-report if and only if the signal is above a specific threshold, the possibility of self-reporting has an option value that leads to a higher crime rate if the authority's effort remains unchanged. We demonstrate that self-reporting nevertheless increases social welfare even under the restriction that the crime rate must not be higher than without self-reporting. Received June 15, 2001; revised version received December 19, 2001     

Violent crime and female victimization: evidence from metropolitan regions in South Korea

In the economics of crime literature, victimization by crime has received less attention than the supply side of crime. This article investigates the relationship between violent crime and female victimization. We show that violent crime increases with both the overall female exposure and female proportion in the victim-target group. Potential interactions between these female characteristics and income inequality are also shown to influence the incidence of violent crime. Empirically, we introduce proxies for female characteristics that better reflect our hypotheses – for example, young unmarried female-headed households (for exposure to crime) and new job gains among females (for economic status). Using a panel of South Korean metropolitan regions, 2000–2011, we find that a certain limited change in these female characteristics could account for as much as 16% of violent crime.     

The Statistical Mechanics of Best-Response Strategy Revision

This paper compares local and global strategic interaction when players update using the (myopic) best-response rule. I show that randomizing the order in which players update their strategic choice suffices to achieve coordination on the risk-dominant strategy in symmetric 2 × 2 coordination games. The "persistant randomness" which is necessary to achieve similar coordination with global interaction is replaced under local interaction by spatial variation in the initial condition. An extension of the risk-dominance idea gives the same convergence result for K × K games with strategic complementarities. Similar results for K × K pure coordination games and potential games are also presented. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C78.     

On the Relevance of John Rawls's Theory of Justice to Welfare Economics

Mainstream microeconomic theory makes some use of John Rawls's Theory of Justicein discussing welfare economics and social welfare functionals. While various elements of his approach are usually mentioned, his basic point is generally taken to be his difference principle (maximizing the welfare of the worst off individual) applied as a decision principle for evaluating the equity of resource allocation.

To take the difference principle as the essence of Rawls's work is an error. The present paper reviews the basic argument of the Theory of Justice

compares it with the use that economists make of it, and concludes that in a number of quite specific ways Rawls's ideas are misrepresented and misused by mainstream microeconomists.     

Asymmetric evolutionary games with non-linear pure strategy payoffs

In this paper, I extend the analytical framework of evolutionary game theory to games with two distinct types of players where the type-specific payoff functions are nonlinear on the right—bi-player-type nonlinear (BNL) evolutionary games. That is, asymmetric games where the payoffs for pairwise interactions are influenced by the ambient frequencies of the pertinent strategies of both types of players.While this paper is motivated by my interest in inter- and intra-gender conflicts of interest in sexual reproduction, BNL games also arise just as naturally in most two-species interactions. Thus, the methodology may provide a novel approach to investigating such classical ecological phenomena as prey–predator/host–parasite interactions and interspecies competition for resources.Finally, given the growing tendency to utilize evolutionary games in economic modeling, a case can be made for the current paper being of interest to traditional game-theoretic modelers in connection with situations such as buyer/seller or employer/employee interaction.