From 2000 Bush–Gore to 2006 Italian elections: voting at fifty-fifty and the contrarian effect

A sociophysical model for opinion dynamics is shown to embody a series of recent western hung national votes all set at the unexpected and very improbable edge of a fifty-fifty score. It started with the Bush–Gore 2000 American presidential election, followed by the 2002 Stoiber–Schröder, then the 2005 Schröder–Merkel German elections, and finally the 2006 Prodi-Berlusconi Italian elections. In each case, the country was facing drastic choices, the running competing parties were advocating very different programs and millions of voters were involved. Moreover, polls were given a substantial margin for the predicted winner. While all these events were perceived as accidental and isolated, our model suggests that indeed they are deterministic and obey to one single universal phenomena associated to the effect of contrarian behavior on the dynamics of opinion forming. The not hung Bush–Kerry 2004 presidential election is shown to belong to the same universal frame. To conclude, the existence of contrarians hints at the repetition of hung elections in the near future.     

On the performance of voting systems in spatial voting simulations

We study the performance of voting systems in terms of minimizing the overall social disutility of making a collective choice in an univariate voting space with ideological voting and perfect information. In order to obtain a distribution of the performance indicator for each of the 12 systems chosen for this study—Baldwin’s Method, Black’s Method, The Borda Count, Bucklin’s Grand Junction System, Coombs’ Method, Dodgson’s System, Instant Run-Off Voting, Plurality, Simpson’s MinMax, Tideman’s Ranked Pairs, Schulze’s Beatpath Method, and Two-Round Majority—we simulate elections using an Agent-Based Computational approach under several different distributions for voters and candidates positioning, with up to 15 available candidates. At each iteration, voters generate complete and strict ordinal utility functions over the set of available candidates, based on which each voting system computes a winner. We define the performance of a system in terms of its capability of choosing among the available candidates the one that minimizes aggregate voter disutility. As expected, the results show an overall dominance of Condorcet completion methods over the traditional and more widely used voting systems, regardless of the distributions of voter and candidate positions.     

Forecasting elections in Turkey

This paper proposes a model for forecasting elections in Turkey. In doing so, this study is based on three theoretical premises: first, that the voters reward or punish parties according to their performances relative to the macroeconomic conditions; second, that the popularity of the political parties in Turkey are closely connected to their performances in local elections; and third, that the centre-periphery distinction affects the fortunes of the political parties in Turkey. The contribution of this analysis is the introduction of an explicit model on which can forecast the impact of economic and political variables on the elections in Turkey by using reliable, public and macro level data. Our findings show that the dynamics of the evaluation of political parties in Turkey follow a similar pattern to those of contemporary democracies, being driven by both economic and political factors.

“…why did AKP win? There cannot be a scientific and sociological explanation of this.”Özdemir ?nce, 17 August 2007, Hürriyet, emphasis added.

     

Voting power in municipal annexation elections

In many American states, municipal annexation and consolidation require concurrent majority votes of all affected jurisdictions. The effectiveness and fairness of this voting procedure have been criticized on the grounds that a small minority of voters can frustrate the preferences of the overall majority. This paper investigates the extent to which the relative ability of voters in large and small jurisdictions to influence voting outcomes in procedures requiring concurrent majorities is influenced by jurisdictional size. The Banzhaf index, which counts the number of case4s in which a given voter could reverse the overall group decision by changing positions on an issue, is applied to this problem of concurrent voting majorities. Mathematical analysis indicates that the ratio of power between voters in small and large jurisdictions approximately equals the inverse of the square root of the ratio of their population size.     

Maximin choice of voting rules for committees

In the context of a probabilistic voting model with dichotomous choice, we investigate the consequences of choosing among voting rules according to the maximin criterion. A voting rule is the minimum number of voters who vote favorably on a change from the status quo required for it to be adopted. We characterize the voting rules that satisfy the maximin criterion as a function of the distribution of voters’ probabilities to favor change from the status quo. We prove that there are at most two maximin voting rules, at least one is Pareto efficient and is often different to the simple majority rule. If a committee is formed only by “conservative voters” (i.e. voters who are more likely to prefer the status quo to change) then the maximin criterion recommends voting rules that require no more voters supporting change than the simple majority rule. If there are only “radical voters”, then this criterion recommends voting rules that require no less than half of the total number of votes.Received: June 2003, Accepted: September 2004, JEL Classification: D71Salvador Barberá, Carmen Beviá, Mirko Cardinale, Wioletta Dziuda, Joan Esteban, Mahmut Erdem, Bernard Grofman, Matthew Jackson, Kai Konrad, Raul Lopez, Jordi Massó, Hugh Mullan, Shmuel Nitzan, Ana Pires do Prado, Elisabeth Schulte, Arnold Urken and two anonymous referees provided helpful comments. Finally, I also acknowledge financial support from Capes, Brazilian Ministry of Education and Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (Project BEC2002-02130).     

On probability models in voting theory

This paper illustrates the use of probability models to study properties of voting rules. In particular, a simple occupancy distribution and its limiting Dlrichlet form are introduced, corresponding to simplifying assumptions about voters' preferences. We use as illustrations the occurrence probability of the Condorcet Paradox, a vintage problem in social choice theory, along with the related concept of Condorcet efficiency, a measure of goodness for voting rules. Further examples include properties of a lottery rule and the vulnerability of certain voting rules to strategic manipulation. Prospects for future work are indicated.     

Looking for a Few Good Men

Abstract . The extent to which differences exist across race/ethnicity, sex and service group in rates of retention and promotion of military officers is examined. Three separate statistical models capture differences in the possible effects of race/ethnicity on variation in retention and promotion rates. Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) was used to estimate the models employing cohort data from the period 1979–1988. All analyses were performed separately for men and women. The models exhibited greater explanatory power for men than for women. The empirical results were used to develop predictions of the numbers of individuals that will be retained from each cohort during the next decade. Predicted distributions of officers across grades were also generated for each cohort. Results indicate that while retention rates for minorities appear high, little change in the demographic composition of higher grades is likely if current recruitment, and promotion practices continue. Thus, programs designed to increase the numbers of women and ethnic minorities in the officer corps should focus on recruitment rather than retention. Lastly, recommendations for future research to expand and support these preliminary analyses are presented.     

DPWeVote: differentially private weighted voting protocol for cloud-based decision-making

ABSTRACT

With the advent of Industry 4.0, cloud computing techniques have been increasingly adopted by industry practitioners to achieve better workflows. One important application is cloud-based decision-making, in which multiple enterprise partners need to arrive an agreed decision. Such cooperative decision-making problem is sometimes formed as a weighted voting game, in which enterprise partners express ‘YES/NO’ opinions. Nevertheless, existing cryptographic approaches to Cloud-Based Weighted Voting Game have restricted collusion tolerance and heavily rely on trusted servers, which are not always available. In this work, we consider the more realistic scenarios of having semi-honest cloud server/partners and assuming maximal collusion tolerance. To resolve the privacy issues in such scenarios, the DPWeVote protocol is proposed which incorporates Randomized Response technique and consists the following three phases: the Randomized Weights Collection phase, the Randomized Opinions Collection phase, and the Voting Results Release phase. Experiments on synthetic data have demonstrated that the proposed DPWeVote protocol managed to retain an acceptable utility for decision-making while preserving privacy in semi-honest environment.     

Randomized decision rules in voting games: a model for strict proportional power

The concept of strict proportional power is introduced, as a means of formalizing a desire to avoid discrepancy between the seat distribution in a voting body and the actual voting power in that body, as measured by power indices in common use. Proportionality is obtained through use of a randomized decision rule (majority rule). Some technical problems which arise are discussed in terms of simplex geometry. Practical implications and problems in connection with randomized decision rules are indicated.     

Fiscal performance and elections in the context of a transition economy

It is widely accepted that, in democratic societies, incumbent governments may use various means, such as discretionary spending, to increase their chances of re-election. In the context of potential budget constraints (e.g., large debt), the incumbent might consider alternative means. Tax collection performance could be one such means that is prone to incumbents’ electoral manipulation, particularly in transition countries with a weak institutional framework. Investigating Albania, we show that fiscal performance, measured by monthly tax revenues, is poor before elections, especially in elections that result in political change. Before all elections, we observe a reduction in tax collection ranging from 3.2 percentage points in the twelve months before elections to 4.0 percentage points in the six months before elections. This implies a drop of more than half in fiscal performance compared with its long-term “natural” or average rate. Moreover, the deterioration in performance is considerably larger, by two- to threefold, before “change elections” (i.e. elections that result in a change of the governing party). After these elections, fiscal performance improves. The key to reducing deterioration in fiscal performance associated with elections is to establish rules and institutional oversight (independent or bipartisan) that reduce the discretion of tax authorities.     

A name classification method using the I Ching name configurations for Taiwan local elections

Quality & Quantity - The purpose of this study is to apply the methodology of the I Ching divination to examine whether names of government leaders and parliamentary representatives exist in...     

Union security rights at the polls: A call for modeling right-to-work voting

From 1944 to 1986, 19 states held 27 referendums on right-to-work legislation, with 22.5 million people voting on the proposals. Despite its prominence as a public issue, most research on right-to-work laws focuses on their industrial relations impacts, and not on employees’ individual rights to refrain from joining unions or those same employees’ responsibilities to support their bargaining unit representative. Nor has there been any research on what citizen groups determine those rights and responsibilities in a right-to-work referendum. This study explores a potential operational model of anti-right-to-work voting with a multiple regression analysis of Missouri’s 1978 right-to-work election results, and hopes to serve as a stimulus to additional research on these particular dimensions of the right-to-work issue.     

The efficacy and efforts of interest groups in post elections policy formation

This paper presents a new model of interest groups and policy formation in the legislature. In our setting, the already given party ideological predispositions and power distribution determine the expected policy outcome. Our analysis applies to the case of un-enforced or enforced party discipline as well as to two-party and multi-party (proportional representation) electoral systems. The interest groups’ objective is to influence the outcome in their favor by engaging in a contest that determines the final decision in the legislature. Our first result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideologically closer party and, in general, the coalition/opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced party or coalition/opposition discipline. Such dominance is defined in terms of ideological inclination weighted by power. Our second result clarifies how the success of an interest group hinges on the dominance of its ideology in the ruling coalition (party) in a majoritarian system with enforced coalition (party) discipline. We then clarify under what condition an interest group prefers to direct its lobbying efforts to two parties or the two coalition and opposition blocks of parties under un-enforced discipline rather than to the members of the ruling coalition (party) under enforced discipline. The lobbying efforts under un-enforced and enforced party discipline are also compared. Finally, we clarify the effect of ideological predispositions and power on the efforts of the interest groups.     

Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists

Stochastic models of elections typically indicate that all parties, in equilibrium, will adopt positions at the electoral center. Empirical analyses discussed in this paper suggest that convergence of this kind is rarely observed. Here we examine a stochastic electoral model where parties differ in their valences – the electorally perceived, non-policy “quality” of the party leader. It is assumed that valence may either be exogenous, in the sense of being an intrinsic characteristic of the leader, or may be due to the contributions of party activists, who donate time and money and thus enhance electoral support for the party. Theorem 1 shows that vote maximization depends on balancing these two opposed effects. Theorem 2 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence to the electoral mean when activist valence is zero. The paper then examines empirical electoral models for the Netherlands circa 1980 and Britain in 1979, 1992 and 1997 and shows that party divergence from the electoral mean cannot be accounted for by exogenous valence alone. The balance condition suggests that the success of the Labour party in the election of 1997 can be attributed to a combination of high exogenous valence and pro-Europe activist support.     

A comparison of measures to validate scales in voting advice applications

Quality & Quantity - Voting advice applications (VAAs) are online tools providing voting advice to their users. This voting advice is based on the match between the answers of the user and the...     

Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections

This paper establishes the relatively weak conditions under which causal inferences from a regression–discontinuity (RD) analysis can be as credible as those from a randomized experiment, and hence under which the validity of the RD design can be tested by examining whether or not there is a discontinuity in any pre-determined (or “baseline”) variables at the RD threshold. Specifically, consider a standard treatment evaluation problem in which treatment is assigned to an individual if and only if V>_v0$V>v_0$, but where _v0$v_0$ is a known threshold, and V is observable. V can depend on the individual's characteristics and choices, but there is also a random chance element: for each individual, there exists a well-defined probability distribution for V  . The density function—allowed to differ arbitrarily across the population—is assumed to be continuous. It is formally established that treatment status here is as good as randomized in a local neighborhood of V=_v0$V=v_0$. These ideas are illustrated in an analysis of U.S. House elections, where the inherent uncertainty in the final vote count is plausible, which would imply that the party that wins is essentially randomized among elections decided by a narrow margin. The evidence is consistent with this prediction, which is then used to generate “near-experimental” causal estimates of the electoral advantage to incumbency.     

创新人格教育理论发展空间的再寻找

创新教育已经成为当前我国教育改革的基本理念,创新人格培养是其中很重要的一个环节。然而,当下的创新人格教育理论似乎难以解答当前在教育实践中碰到的许多问题,培养学生的创新人格也逐渐的沦为形式化。因此,本文在反思现阶段大学生人格危机问题的基础上,就创新人格教育理论的发展空间进行了三方面的路径的融合,国际视野的"重构"之路;本土文化的"考古学"之路;教育实践的"应变性"之路。本文就丰富和发展中国现有的创新教育理论,引领创新人格培养走出教育实践的困境具有重要的理论与现实意义。     

Preferences,choices, tournaments: Alternative foundations for the evaluation of voting schemes

The standard assumption underlying most of the negative results of the social choice theory is that the individuals have complete and transitive preference relations over the candidates. As an alternative to this assumption we consider the possibility that individuals can be characterized as possessing preference tournaments (i.e. asymmetric and complete relations) over the candidate set. We discuss the implications of the latter assumption to the negative results of social choice theory. Finally some solution concepts applicable in the individual preference tournament framework are outlined.