DEALER PRICING OF CONSUMER CREDIT*

Price discrimination incentives may induce dealers to bear the financial cost of their customers' credit purchases. We focus on how financial market imperfections make it possible to segment the customer population. When borrowing and lending rates differ from each other and from the rate of interest on a durable good purchase, the structure of those rates influences customers' choices to purchase on credit or cash terms, and the scope for dealers' price discrimination. Empirical analysis of a set of installment‐credit, personal‐loan, and regional interest rate data offers considerable support to the assumptions and implications of our theoretical framework.     

中国地区腐败对民营企业国有化的影响

本文使用1998-2007年中国工业企业数据库与省级腐败数据,通过一个简单的模型,证明了在腐败的制度环境下,国有股权可以帮助民营企业避免政府侵害,因此腐败越严重、民营企业越倾向于国有化;并且,盈利能力强的企业更容易受到腐败的侵害。本文发现无论是狭义国有化还是广义国有化都与企业所在地区的腐败率以及企业资产回报率显著正相关;此外,资产回报率越高的企业因腐败而国有化的概率越高。因此,“国有化”可能是中国民营企业面对政府侵害的应对措施。这对我们理解转型国家中民营企业的生存环境与政企关系具有重要意义。     

ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS

This article studies the welfare effects of credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, credit arrangements can be welfare reducing, because high consumption by credit users drives up the price level, reducing consumption by money users who are subject to a binding liquidity constraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Both price discrimination and nonlinear pricing are essential features of an optimal mechanism.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND MODELS OF CREDIT RATIONING

This paper outlines the development and exposits some of the central ideas and implications of asymmetric information in the credit market.     

信贷约束与农户非正规金融选择

本文考察来自正规金融机构的信贷约束对农户选择非正规金融的影响。基于农户调研,本文首先辨别农户受到的各种信贷约束,并将其与农户融资成本相结合,构建农户融资的理论模型。实证研究采用双变量Probit模型比较各种信贷约束对选择非正规金融的影响。研究发现：供给型和需求型信贷约束都显著地促进农户选择非正规金融。需求型信贷约束中,风险约束较大程度地促进农户通过非正规金融渠道融资。研究结论对制定农村金融政策将提供重要参考。     

中国信贷歧视的福利成本*

国有企业与民营企业之间的信贷歧视是中国经济转型过程中所特有的现象。本文构建了一个具有信贷歧视的动态随机一般均衡模型,以计算中国信贷歧视的福利成本。计算结果表明,信贷歧视大约会使整体社会的福利损失增加62%,其原因在于信贷歧视加剧了民营企业的产出波动并进而放大了通胀波动。本文进一步对比了不同货币政策下的福利损失,发现信贷歧视均会产生福利成本。据此,本文认为信贷歧视必须予以破除,从而消除信贷歧视带来的福利成本。     

A QUEST FOR UNFETTERED CREDIT: HOW MONETARY POLICY DRIVES CREDIT RISK TRANSFER OF STRUCTURED FINANCE PRODUCTS

This study examines the effects of monetary policy contractions on bank loans to households and firms and instruments in three different credit risk transfer (CRT) capital markets over two separate time periods (1995–2006 and 2007–2015). The findings show that in both periods, banks decrease business lending but increase lending to consumers through a combination of mortgage, auto, credit card, and student loans from more liquidity produced by consumer‐related CRT activity. Additional results reveal relative CRT movements toward securitized mortgages from bank mortgage debt over both periods and toward securitized and insured business loans from bank business debt in the latter period, which suggest vulnerabilities among interconnected credit markets. (JEL E44, E51, G21, G23)     

信用货币本位的选择及其模型的再造

现代货币本位模型突破了传统"货币计价物"的"物"的外观,转向信息经济分析和制度演化的成本经济分析,从货币本位对信息搜寻成本的最小化以及货币的社会价值基础入手讨论货币本位的选择原理。货币本位的演化有一个从不发达经济的货币本位到发达经济货币本位的过程,因而,货币本位的选择是影响经济发达程度的重要制度因素。     

地方政府的介入与农信社信贷资源错配

随着农信社管理权重新划归地方政府,农信社的信贷行为出现了更为明显的"脱农变异"取向,而地方政府试图对农信社肆意改造和干预背后所暗含的内在隐忧也不容忽视。本文通过构建地方政府介入后的农信社信贷资源决策模型发现,当地方政府介入后,农信社的信贷资金供给会出现明显的"错配"现象,而"错配"的程度随着地方保护主义的强化而加重。通过引入外部金融监管机制,可以在一定程度上遏制地方政府的保护主义行为,减轻信贷资源"错配"程度。     

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF TRADE*

This paper is an investigation of the role of international credit as a factor influencing the donor Countries' exports. Based on standard techniques of microeconomic theory, our model examines this relationship under different market structures in the industrialized donor country (North). Under monopoly and perfect competition, the availability of credit increases the North's exports; under oligopoly, within a class of parametric configurations, this relationship is reversed. We also find that, under certain conditions, if a developing country (South) takes recourse to international credit to finance its imports, it would end up worse off, that is the availability of international credit can be welfare-decreasing for the borrowing nation.