Bringing Silicon Valley inside

In 1998, Silicon Valley companies produced 41 IPOs, which by January 1999 had a combined market capitalization of $27 billion--that works out to $54,000 in new wealth creation per worker in a single year. Multiply the number of employees in your company by $54,000. Did your business create that much new wealth last year? Half that amount? It's not a group of geniuses generating such riches. It's a business model. In Silicon Valley, ideas, capital, and talent circulate freely, gathering into whatever combinations are most likely to generate innovation and wealth. Unlike most traditional companies, which spend their energy in resource allocation--a system designed to avoid failure--the Valley operates through resource attraction--a system that nurtures innovation. In a traditional company, people with innovative ideas must go hat in hand to the guardians of the old ideas for funding and for staff. But in Silicon Valley, a slew of venture capitalists vie to attract the best new ideas, infusing relatively small amounts of capital into a portfolio of ventures. And talent is free to go to the companies offering the most exhilarating work and the greatest potential rewards. It should actually be easier for large, traditional companies to set up similar markets for capital, ideas, and talent internally. After all, big companies often already have extensive capital, marketing, and distribution resources, and a first crack at the talent in their own ranks. And some of them are doing it. The choice is yours--you can do your best to make sure you never put a dollar of capital at risk, or you can tap into the kind of wealth that's being created every day in Silicon Valley.     

How venture capital works

The popular mythology surrounding the U.S. venture-capital industry derives from a previous era. Venture capitalists who nurtured the computer industry in its infancy were legendary both for their risk taking and for their hands-on operating experience. But today things are different, and separating the myths from the realities is crucial to understanding this important piece of the U.S. economy. Today's venture capitalists are more like conservative bankers than the risk takers of days past. They have carved out a specialized niche in the capital markets, filling a void that other institutions cannot serve. They are the linch-pins in an efficient system for meeting the needs of institutional investors looking for high returns, of entrepreneurs seeking funding, and of investment bankers looking for companies to sell. Venture capitalists must earn a consistently superior return on investments in inherently risky businesses. The myth is that they do so by investing in good ideas and good plans. In reality, they invest in good industries--that is, industries that are more competitively forgiving than the market as a whole. And they structure their deals in a way that minimizes their risk and maximizes their returns. Although many entrepreneurs expect venture capitalists to provide them with sage guidance as well as capital, that expectation is unrealistic. Given a typical portfolio of ten companies and a 2,000-hour work year, a venture capital partner spends on average less than two hours per week on any given company. In addition to analyzing the current venture-capital system, the author offers practical advice to entrepreneurs thinking about venture funding.     

DOES VENTURE CAPITAL REQUIRE AN ACTIVE STOCK MARKET?

The United States has both an active venture capital industry and well-developed stock markets. Japan and Germany have neither. The authors argue that this is no accident— that venture capital flourishes especially, and perhaps only , when venture capitalists can exit from successful portfolio companies through initial public offerings (IPOs), which in turn require an active stock market.
Understanding the link between the stock market and the venture capital market requires understanding the contractual arrangements between entrepreneurs and venture capital providers, particularly (1) the importance of exit by venture capitalists and (2) the implicit contract over control between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs created by the possibility of exit through an IPO. This possibility gives entrepreneurs a valuable option that, in the event they are successful, allows them to reacquire control of their enterprises from venture capitalists.     

Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Genesis of New Ventures, 1986 to 1999

We examine two views of the creation of venture‐backed start‐ups, or “entrepreneurial spawning.” In one, young firms prepare employees for entrepreneurship, educating them about the process, and exposing them to relevant networks. In the other, individuals become entrepreneurs when large bureaucratic employers do not fund their ideas. Controlling for firm size, patents, and industry, the most prolific spawners are originally venture‐backed companies located in Silicon Valley and Massachusetts. Undiversified firms spawn more firms. Silicon Valley, Massachusetts, and originally venture‐backed firms typically spawn firms only peripherally related to their core businesses. Overall, entrepreneurial learning and networks appear important in creating venture‐backed firms.     

人力资本财务激励与约束创新研究——基于美国风险投资的分析

对人力资本实施有效的财务激励和约束是风险投资运作过程中一项关键性制度创新.人力资本财务激励与约束的对象主要包括风险资本家人力资本和企业家人力资本,涵盖风险资本从筹资、投资到退出三个循环阶段.不同循环阶段的人力资本财务激励和约束都涉及到控制权收益、货币收益与声誉资本,但在具体的激励与约束方式上又存在着差异.     

Bootstrap finance: the art of start-ups

Entrepreneurship is more popular than ever: courses are full, policymakers emphasize new ventures, managers yearn to go off on their own. Would-be founders often misplace their energies, however. Believing in a "big money" model of entrepreneurship, they spend a lot of time trying to attract investors instead of using wits and hustle to get their ideas off the ground. A study of 100 of the 1989 Inc. "500" list of fastest growing U.S. start-ups attests to the value of bootstrapping. In fact, what it takes to start a business often conflicts with what venture capitalists require. Investors prefer solid plans, well-defined markets, and track records. Entrepreneurs are heavy on energy and enthusiasm but may be short on credentials. They thrive in rapidly changing environments where uncertain prospects may scare off established companies. Rolling with the punches is often more important than formal plans. Striving to adhere to investors' criteria can diminish the flexibility--the try-it, fix-it approach--an entrepreneur needs to make a new venture work. Seven principles are basic for successful start-ups: get operational fast; look for quick break-even, cash-generating projects; offer high-value products or services that can sustain direct personal selling; don't try to hire the crack team; keep growth in check; focus on cash; and cultivate banks early. Growth and change are the start-up's natural environment. But change is also the reward for success: just as ventures grow, their founders usually have to take a fresh look at everything again: roles, organization, even the very policies that got the business up and running.     

Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start-Up Firms: Empirical Evidence

This paper examines the impact venture capital can have on the development of new firms. Using a hand-collected data set on Silicon Valley start-ups, we find that venture capital is related to a variety of professionalization measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a marketing VP. Venture-capital-backed companies are also more likely and faster to replace the founder with an outside CEO, both in situations that appear adversarial and those mutually agreed to. The evidence suggests that venture capitalists play roles over and beyond those of traditional financial intermediaries.     

University of Texas Roundtable on Recent Trends in U.S. Venture Capital

At a recent private equity conference hosted by the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas in Austin, four venture capitalists representing the East and West Coasts provided testimony to the spread of the VC industry far beyond Silicon Valley to places like New York, London, and Berlin—as well as Austin itself. The result, in the words of one panelist, has been “a shift from Silicon Valley as the epicenter of so much innovation and growth to something more like a globally distributed network of capital, talent, and opportunity.” Along with this geographic expansion of the industry, perhaps the most notable change is the tendency of today's VCs to delay the IPOs of their portfolio companies and, by keeping them private longer, capture more of their growth in value. Whereas 20 years ago 90% or more of the value appreciation came after the IPO of a highly successful company (think about Micro‐Soft or Amazon.com ), a much larger share of the overall value creation now appears to be taking place before the IPO, thanks to the growing use of a funding vehicle known as private initial public offerings, or PIPOs. The use of PIPOs has enabled VC‐backed companies to attract large amounts of capital from large institutional investors like Fidelity—which in the past would not have invested in the company until the IPO—while retaining what the panelists view as significant advantages of private ownership and governance.     

What Matters in Venture Capital? Evidence from Entrepreneurs’ Stated Preferences

We study how entrepreneurs evaluate the ability of different US venture capitalists (VCs) to add value to start-up companies. Analyzing a large data set of entrepreneurs’ stated preferences regarding VCs, we demonstrate that entrepreneurs view independent partnership VCs more favorably than other VC types (e.g., corporate, financial, and government sponsored VCs). Although entrepreneurs are able to correctly identify VCs with better track records, they do not believe them to be more desirable investors. We also find that an entrepreneur's rankings are affected by their overall exposure to VCs, emphasizing the role of experiential learning in the venture capital market.     

Convertible securities and optimal exit decisions in venture capital finance

We study the interaction between exit decisions and contract design in venture capital finance. One of the main characteristics of venture capital funds is that they need to divest their holdings in the portfolio firms after a limited period of time. However, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs often have diverging interests with respect to different exit solutions (e.g., IPOs or trade sales). We show that with convertible securities, the ex-ante agreed optimal exit policy can be implemented. Thereby, we give an explanation for the widespread use of convertible securities in venture capital finance.     

Banks versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and Expropriation

Why do some start‐up firms raise funds from banks and others from venture capitalists? To address this question, I study a model in which the venture capitalist can evaluate the entrepreneur's project more accurately than the bank but can also threaten to steal it from the entrepreneur. Consistent with evidence regarding venture capital finance, the model implies that the characteristics of a firm financing through venture capitalists are relatively little collateral, high growth, high risk, and high profitability. The model also suggests that tighter protection of intellectual property rights encourages entrepreneurs to finance through venture capitalists.     

基于信号模型及天使投资人参与下的风险投资

在风险投资过程中,由于信息的不对称,一方面风险投资家要找到优质项目往往需要付出高额成本;另一方面众多优质项目亟须风险投资家的青睐。针对该问题,本文在传统的风险投资家(venture capitalists,以下简称VC)与企业家所构成的风险投资博弈模型的基础之上引入了天使投资人(Angel),充当筛选优质项目以及信息传递者的角色,并且在多阶段风险投资过程中引入了二次信号模型,揭示项目进展情况。研究发现:天使投资人的存在及信号模型的引入对风险资本形成了很好的保护机制,并且提高了风险资本对于优质项目的配置效率,有利于风险投资多方达到共赢。     

Venture capital budgeting — Carry and correlation

We analyze venture capital budgeting in a model with agency conflicts among entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and investors. Our three-player setting is crucial for the analysis of compensation to venture capitalists. We focus on the venture capitalist's decision to invest in correlated enterprises, and we emphasize the importance of information and the venture capitalist's role in resolving adverse selection on the entrepreneurial side. The importance of information increases the minimum carried interest offered to the venture capitalist, whereas correlated projects decrease it. The carried interest is determined by the size and level of correlation in his portfolio. Our analysis provides predictions in line with a number of empirical observations, e.g. that venture capitalists typically receive a carried interest which is “sticky” around a 20% level.     

Public Policy for Venture Capital

This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.     

The Equilibrium Size and Value-Added of Venture Capital

I model positive sorting of entrepreneurs across the high and low value-added segments of the venture capital market. Aiming to attract high-quality entrepreneurs, inefficiently many venture capitalists (VCs) commit to provide high value-added by forming small portfolios. This draws the marginal entrepreneur away from the low value-added segment, reducing match quality in the high value-added segment too. There is underinvestment. Multiple equilibria may emerge, and they differ in aggregate investment. The model rationalizes evidence on VC returns and value-added along fundraising “waves” and when the cost of entrepreneurship falls, and generates untested predictions on the size and value-added of venture capital.     

Does Reputation Limit Opportunistic Behavior in the VC Industry? Evidence from Litigation against VCs

We examine the role of reputation in limiting opportunistic behavior by venture capitalists towards four types of counterparties: entrepreneurs, investors, other VCs, and buyers of VC‐backed startups. Using a hand‐collected database of lawsuits, we document that more reputable VCs (i.e., VCs that are older, have more deals and funds under management, and syndicate with larger networks of VCs) are less likely to be litigated. We also find that litigated VCs suffer declines in future business relative to matched peers. These declines are larger for more reputable VCs, and for VCs that are defendants to multiple lawsuits or sued by entrepreneurs.     

How to write a great business plan

Every seasoned investor knows that detailed financial projections for a new company are an act of imagination. Nevertheless, most business plans pour far too much ink on the numbers - and far too little on the information that really matters. Why? William Sahlman suggests that a great business plan is one that focuses on a series of questions. These questions relate to the four factors critical to the success of every new venture: the people, the opportunity, the context, and the possibilities for both risk and reward. The questions about people revolve around three issues: What do they know? Whom do they know? and How well are they known? As for opportunity, the plan should focus on two questions: Is the market for the venture's product or service large or rapidly growing (or preferably both)? and Is the industry structurally attractive? Then, in addition to demonstrating an understanding of the context in which their venture will operate, entrepreneurs should make clear how they will respond when that context inevitably changes. Finally, the plan should look unflinchingly at the risks the new venture faces, giving would-be backers a realistic idea of what magnitude of reward they can expect and when they can expect it. A great business plan is not easy to compose, Sahlman acknowledges, largely because most entrepreneurs are wild-eyed optimists. But one that asks the right questions is a powerful tool. A better deal, not to mention a better shot at success, awaits entrepreneurs who use it.     

基于声誉机制的风险投资与风险企业博弈分析

在资本市场中，风险投资活动以风险投资家和风险企业的合作为基础。同时，风险投资与风险企业也存在着信息不对称，双方在相互寻找和选择的过程中进行着博弈。研究如何建立风险投资与风险企业之间的合作机制，抑制博弈过程中可能会出现的机会主义行为，将对风险投资活动起到重要的指导作用。     

Entrepreneurs' financing choice between independent and bank-affiliated venture capital firms

This paper analyzes how the affiliation of a venture capital firm affects the deal terms for innovative entrepreneurial ventures. We develop a theory to explain the advantages of independent and bank-affiliated venture capital funds for entrepreneurs. We assume that independent venture capital firms provide better support quality while bank-affiliated firms are less financially constrained. The entrepreneur selects the optimal contract by trading-off these characteristics. The model allows several empirically testable predictions concerning the nature of projects financed by either type of venture capital firm. Entrepreneurs should seek capital from independent or affiliated venture capitalists contingent on the degree of sophistication of their project, their liquidation value, the importance of expected management support, and the remaining time to fundraising.     

Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital

We examine whether strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists (VCs) in local markets help restrict entry by outside VCs, thus improving incumbents' bargaining power over entrepreneurs. More densely networked markets experience less entry, with a one‐standard deviation increase in network ties among incumbents reducing entry by approximately one‐third. Entrants with established ties to target‐market incumbents appear able to overcome this barrier to entry; in turn, incumbents react strategically to an increased threat of entry by freezing out any incumbents who facilitate entry into their market. Incumbents appear to benefit from reduced entry by paying lower prices for their deals.