FOREIGN TAKEOVERS AND NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This study is unique in several respects. First, it reviews the characteristics of the top 10 industries targeted for foreign direct investment (FDI) activity in the United States between 1979 and 1987. It analyzes both overall FDI activity and new plant and expansion FDI activity. The study summarizes and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of FDI in the United States by all countries, by the United Kingdom, by the European Community, by Japan, and by Canada.
Large and growing product markets in an expanding economy have attracted FDI in the United States. Exchange rate movements have prompted opportunistic decisions to invest in U.S. production facilities. Investors' superior management skills appear to have prompted takeovers, while efforts to realize technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have fostered plant and expansion investments.
Evidence exists that a desire to circumvent current—but not potential—trade restrictions has motivated foreign direct investment. FDI activities are not associated with concentrated or heavily unionized industries. Highly protected industries have attracted heavier equity FDI by Japan and heavier new plant FDI by all sources and Canada. No evidence exists that FDI in the United States by Japan or anyone else is targeted to undercut union-dominated firms or to arrest the spread of protectionist trade policies.     

FOREIGN TAKEOVERS AND NEW INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This study is unique in several respects. First, it reviews the characteristics of the top 10 industries targeted for foreign direct investment (FDI) activity in the United States between 1979 and 1987. It analyzes both overall FDI activity and new plant and expansion FDI activity. The study summarizes and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the determinants of FDI in the United States by all countries, by the United Kingdom, by the European Community, by Japan, and by Canada.
Large and growing product markets in an expanding economy have attracted FDI in the United States. Exchange rate movements have prompted opportunistic decisions to invest in U.S. production facilities. Investors' superior management skills appear to have prompted takeovers, while efforts to realize technological advantages of new physical capital and of relatively large operating plants have fostered plant and expansion investments.
Evidence exists that a desire to circumvent current—but not potential—trade restrictions has motivated foreign direct investment. FDI activities are not associated with concentrated or heavily unionized industries. Highly protected industries have attracted heavier equity FDI by Japan and heavier new plant FDI by all sources and Canada. No evidence exists that FDI in the United States by Japan or anyone else is targeted to undercut union-dominated firms or to arrest the spread of protectionist trade policies.     

PROBLEMS OF MEASURING CAPITAL IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The general problems of distinguishing between theoretical concepts and practical measures concerning capital are considered and the difference between various stock and flow measures of capital and their respective uses is defined. The qualifications and limitations to these measures in the interpretation of output changes are also discussed. Attention is concentrated on the initial, basic problem of how to measure gross capital stock and the special difficulties involved in using the perpetual inventory simulation method and census procedures in less developed countries to derive such estimates are broadly defined. Some of the special problems encountered in an attempt to undertake an inventory of industrial capital assets in Lesotho are also referred to and the paper concludes by expressing the view that there are at present far more important issues demanding higher statistical priority in less developed countries than the evaluation of capital stocks.     

ON TRENDS IN THE GAP BETWEEN RICH AND POOR IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: WHY WE KNOW SO LITTLE

This paper considers the problems involved in measuring trends over time in inequality in less developed countries. After considering some of the conceptual problems involved in choosing a measure of economic welfare, the period it should cover, and the statistical units to which it should be applied, the paper goes on to draw up a list of minimum data requirements for reaching reliable conclusions about such trends. It concludes that in many countries the available information falls well short of the minimum list, and it explores various sources of indirect evidence on trends in distribution. The central argument is that the available data permit no easy tests for trends in the level of economic inequality in less developed countries. At present, the best bet is to complement evidence on income distribution with available data on consumption distribution and on wage trends and production aggregates by occupational and sectoral groups. Inconsistencies will highlight problem areas, and their reconciliation should provide a firmer foundation on which to draw conclusions about distributional trends.     

THE STANDARD OF LIVING IN THE UNITED STATES

A common approach to the evaluation of the standard of living is based on a function of real income. In the United States this often takes the form of CPI-deflated mean household income. Material well-being is more appropriately evaluated using a consumption-based index. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Surveys we find that real mean income provides an inaccurate representation of the level and trend of the standard of living relative to real per equivalent total expenditure in the postwar United States. The differences between real income and real total expenditure per household equivalent member are found at all levels of aggregation.     

ESCAPING POVERTY THROUGH WORK: THE PROBLEM OF LOW EARNINGS CAPACITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1973–88

This paper documents the changes in earnings capacity poverty that occurred between 1973 and 1088. Families are "Earnings Capacity Poor" if they are unable to generate enough income to lift them out of poverty, even if all working-age adults in the family work full-time, year-round. Data from the March 1974 and March 1989 Current Population Surveys indicate that earnings capacity poverty increased more rapidly than official poverty. Much of this increase can be attributed to the rise in earnings capacity poverty among whites, intact families, and family heads with more than a high school diploma. Most alarming, the percentage of children in earnings capacity poor families is considerably higher than it is among persons over eighteen; in 1988, nearly 15 percent of children under six lived in families that could not have escaped poverty even if the adults in their family were working and earning at their full capacity levels.     

FINANCIAL INNOVATION, INFLATION AND THE STABIHTY OF THE DEMAND FOR BROAD MONEY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

This note presents an estimate of a demand function for broad money (£M3) for the UK, 1964ii–1985iv. It shows no sign of structural instability due to Competition and Credit Control, and forecasts well for twenty quarters post-sample (1981i-1985iv). A key innovation is the allowance made for financial innovation by including the interest rate available on new, high-interest chequing accounts in the equation.     

欠发达农区产业集群的网络组织结构及其区域效应分析

基于河南农区三个不同网络类型集群129家企业的调查,运用社会网络分析法,通过对比三个集群中的衍生网络、情感网络、咨询网络以及合作网络的网络特性,鉴别出欠发达农区集群网络中的核心节点、重要关系及不同网络组织类型的区域效应.研究发现:先导企业是集群衍生的孵化器,亲属或厂属关系是区域产业繁衍的关键渠道;大企业是技术创新和扩散的中心,供需关系和技术工人流动是区域学习的重要路径;中等企业是情谊联系的活跃点,长期合作关系能培养区域信任;中介组织与服务机构、"生产组织者"是企业间合作的"桥梁",上下游的经济联系对区域合作影响巨大.从集群的网络组织类型来看,混合性的转包网络和互补性的垂直网络比竞争性的水平网络对区域内的网络学习、信任培养、合作行动以及区域发展能带来更好的效果.     

TRUE HOUSEHOLD EQUIVALENCE SCALES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR IN THE UNITED STATES

In this paper we deal with the question of which measures of economic well-being are adequate to identify those groups of households in the U.S. whose economic conditions justify public concern and assistance. We derive a utility based measure of economic well-being from the estimation of a complete set of consumer demand equations. The demand system is Lluch's Extended Linear Expenditure System (Lluch, 1973). Household characteristics are incorporated using the scaling method proposed by Barten (1966). Using the welfare indicator derived, we study the composition of the poorest part of the population, using data from the 1972–73 Consumer Expenditure Survey. We compare our results with those obtained using various other welfare indicators, including the official U.S. poverty line. We show that using different family composition adjustments significantly and systematically affects just who are considered to be at the bottom of the welfare distribution. We finally suggest that program designers therefore can improve their target efficiency by carefully selecting from among the acceptable indices of welfare when defining program eligibility.     

THE DEMAND FOR BEVERAGES AND INTERBEVERAGE SUBSTITUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

The analysis in this paper is directed at measuring the substitution between seven beverages consumed in the United States with the objective of shedding some light on just what is the relevant market for antitrust purposes. With regard to the overall beverage market considerations, there is a clear indication that consumers do substitute between different types of beverages. What must be subjectively resolved, however, is whether the extent of the indicated substitution is of significant enough magnitude to infer that two different beverages are in the same product market.     

TRENDS IN THE CONCENTRATION OF PERSONAL WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1958 TO 1976

The trend in the concentration of U.S. wealth from 1958 through 1976 is examined in some detail and summary data are used to extend the period over which the trend is observed back to 1922. The data suggests a long-run secular decline in the concentration of U.S. wealth with a rather sharp decline in 1976, the last year for which measurements were made. Although the secular decline in wealth concentration is supported by numerous observations across 50 years, the precipitous decline measured between 1972 and 1976 should be interpreted with caution because it undoubtedly reflects the substantial downward revaluation which occurred in the stock market from 1972 (most recent previous observation) to 1976. This is not to argue that wealth holders at the top of the distribution were not made significantly less affluent by the revaluation, but that the 1976 observation includes a large cyclical component. Future observations which include the subsequent upward revaluation in the stock market are expected to show levels of concentration comparable to or only slightly below those for 1958 through 1972.     

THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD DISPOSABLE WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES

In this study, new estimates are presented of the size distribution of household wealth in the U.S. in 1969. Compared to previous studies, its major advance is the inclusion of all marketable or discretionary household assets and liabilities and their alignment with national balance sheet totals. Household disposable wealth (HDW) is defined as the sum of all marketable or fungible assets held by households less liabilities. The Gini coefficient for HDW is 0.72, the share held by the richest one percent of households is 31 percent, and the share held by the top five percent is 49 percent. There is, however, a large variation in the concentration of different household assets. The Gini coefficient is 0.30 for household durables and inventories, 0.69 for equity in owner-occupied housing, 0.94 for bonds and securities, and 0.98 for corporate stock. HDW is then divided into two mutually exclusive components. The first, called "life-cycle wealth," is defined as the sum of equity in owner-occupied housing, durables, household inventory, demand deposits and currency, and the cash value of life insurance and pensions less consumer debt. This form of wealth tends to be accumulated over the life-cycle for either consumption, liquidity, or retirement purposes. The second, called "capital wealth," is the sum of time and savings deposits, bonds and securities, corporate stock, business and investment real estate equity, and trust fund equity. Life-cycle wealth is substantially less concentrated than capital wealth. The Gini coefficient for it is 0.59, while that for capital wealth is 0.88. Moreover, among the lower wealth groups, over 80 percent of household wealth takes the form of life-cycle wealth, whereas among the top wealth groups the proportion is under 20 percent. The results suggest substantially different savings motivations between the two groups.