Human capital and optimal positive taxation of capital income

This paper analyzes optimal linear and non-linear taxes on capital and labor incomes in a life-cycle model of human capital investment, financial savings, and labor supply with heterogenous individuals. A dual income tax with a positive marginal tax rate on not only labor income but also capital income is optimal. The positive tax on capital income serves to alleviate the distortions of the labor tax on human capital accumulation. The optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is lower than that on labor income if savings are elastic compared to investment in human capital, substitution between verifiable and non-verifiable inputs in human capital formation is difficult, and most investments in human capital are verifiable so that education subsidies can directly reduce the tax wedge on learning. Numerical calculations suggest that the optimal marginal tax rate on capital income is substantial.     

Portfolio Choice and Life Insurance: The CRRA Case

We solve a portfolio choice problem that includes life insurance and labor income under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. We focus on the correlation between the dynamics of human capital and financial capital and model the utility of the family as opposed to separating consumption and bequest. We simplify the underlying Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation using a similarity reduction technique that leads to an efficient numerical solution. Households for whom shocks to human capital are negatively correlated with shocks to financial capital should own more life insurance with greater equity/stock exposure. Life insurance hedges human capital and is insensitive to the family's risk aversion, consistent with practitioner guidance.     

Second-best income taxation and education policy with endogenous human capital and borrowing constraints

We formulate a two-period life cycle model of saving, labor supply, and human capital investment when individuals differ in their ability and initial wealth. Borrowing constraints result in sub-optimal choices for consumption and investments in human capital. We analyze optimal linear income taxes and education subsidies. The optimal income tax is shown to be positive—even in the absence of any redistributional concerns. A redistributive income tax relaxes borrowing constraints by redistributing resources from the unconstrained to the borrowing constrained stages of the life cycle. The income tax thus alleviates preexisting non-tax distortions in the capital market. Human capital is subsidized on a net basis in the absence of redistributional concerns. Education subsidies help to relax credit constraints and to reduce distortions from explicit and implicit taxes on human capital formation. When redistributional concerns are present, education is subsidized more if this helps to alleviate distortions on labor supply, but is subsidized less if education subsidies have a very regressive incidence. Simulations demonstrate that optimal income taxes are substantially higher when credit constraints are present. Education is generally subsidized on a net basis, and the more so if credit constraints are more severe.     

Insurance-adjusted valuation,decision making,and capital return

Although the insurance industry has a significant economic role, few theoretical studies link insurance with the overlapping generations economy. This study suggests a new overlapping generations model that includes insurance in the agents' economic decisions under the uncertainty of financial losses. In this insurance model, we derive risk-averse workers' optimal insurance purchases and consumption based on the insurance-adjusted valuations, which are the present value of the income streams minus insurance premiums paid in the future. The theoretical equilibrium model predicts capital returns, wealth, labor supply, etc. Our findings show that higher workforce and technological progress increase private insurance demand and reduce the capital-output ratio, and higher losses as a fraction of output increase social insurance demand and reduce the capital-output ratio via numerical comparative statics.     

Dynamic portfolio choice with deferred annuities

We derive the optimal life-cycle portfolio choice and consumption pattern for households facing uncertain labor income, risky capital market, and mortality risk. In addition to stocks and bonds, the households have access to deferred annuities. Deferred payout life annuities are financial contracts providing life-long income to the annuitant after a specified period of time conditional on survival. We find that deferred annuities play an important role in household portfolios and generate significant welfare gains. Households with high benefits from state pensions, moderate risk aversion and moderate labor income risk purchase deferred annuities from age 40 and gradually increase their portfolio share. At retirement, deferred annuities account for 78% of total financial wealth. Households with low state pensions and high labor income risk purchase more annuities and earlier. Uncertainty with respect to future mortality rates has the same effect, i.e. household hedge against longevity risks using deferred annuities.     

Labor Income Risk and Car Insurance in the UK

Microeconomic theory shows that only under certain conditions higher background risk increases the propensity to insure against independent marketable risks. We provide empirical evidence for the case of labor income risk and car insurance in the UK. The main result is that households with higher labor income risk spend more on insurance. This finding is consistent with microeconomic theory if the utility function is of the HARA type. Moreover, we find that households spend more on insurance if they participate in the stock market.     

How important is intra-household risk sharing for savings and labor supply?

While it is recognized that the family is a risk-sharing institution, little is known about the quantitative effects of this source of insurance on savings and labor supply. In this paper, we present a model where workers (females and males) are subject to idiosyncratic employment risk and where capital markets are incomplete. A household is formed by a female and a male, who decide on consumption, savings and labor supplies. In a calibrated version of our model we find that intra-household risk sharing has its largest impact among wealth-poor households. While the wealth-rich use mainly savings to smooth consumption across unemployment spells, wealth-poor households rely on spousal labor supply. For instance, for low-wealth households, average hours worked by wives of unemployed husbands are 8% higher than those worked by wives of employed husbands. This response in wives’ hours makes up 9% of lost family income. We also study consumption losses upon an unemployment spell, precautionary savings and the crowding out effects of the public unemployment insurance program on the extent of risk sharing within the household.     

Human Capital Spending,Inequality, and Growth in Middle-Income Asia

Asia’s rapid population aging fortifies the case for strengthening human capital investments. Further, the experience of the newly industrialized economies suggests that human capital investments will be a vital ingredient of the transition from middle income to high income. Those investments can also affect equity and public finances. In this article, we use data from the National Transfer Accounts to empirically analyze the effect of human capital investment in Asian countries on economic growth, inequality, and fiscal balance. Our empirical evidence suggests that human capital investments have a positive effect on labor productivity and, hence, output. The positive effect is stronger for poorer households and, hence, beneficial for equity. We also find that such investments can generate sufficient tax revenues to improve the fiscal balance. Overall, our evidence points to a positive effect of human capital on growth, equity, and fiscal balance in Asia.     

Incentives,wages, and promotions: theory and evidence

I study an incentive problem that has been largely ignored in the agency literature: incentives for repeated (human capital) investment. The optimal contract is very simple but still provides rich implications for incentive and wage structures in large organizations. The empirical evidence is presented using personnel records of health insurance claim processors in a large U.S. insurance company. These processors are white‐collar, nonmanagerial, female, service industry workers—a rapidly growing but rarely studied labor group. The empirical findings are consistent with the main features of the optimal contract.     

Racial Differences in the Demand for Life Insurance

The objective of this article is to measure racial differences in the proportion of human capital that households protect with life insurance. Using the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances data, racial differences in two stages of the process are tested, where it is assumed that households must decide both whether or not to purchase life insurance and how much of their human capital to insure (if they decide to purchase). Among married and cohabitating households, we find that, controlling for demographics and other factors, there is little difference in life insurance ownership between black and white households but that white households insure a larger proportion of their human capital than black households.     

Modelling optimal asset allocation when households experience health shocks

Health status is an important factor in household portfolio decision-making. We develop a theoretical framework to model how households make optimal asset allocation decisions in response to health risks. Our two- and three-asset models both suggest that the maximum utility is derived when households allocate a majority of their assets to human capital. When households experience acute illness shocks, their welfare and portfolio values reduce, and they need to increase their investment in human capital. When an expensive health catastrophe befalls member(s) of households, the optimal decision for asset-rich households is to undertake medical treatment, whereas for asset-poor households it is to forgo treatment. Asset-poor households in particular require public financial assistance to enable them to invest in human capital.     

Understanding the Shift in Demand for Cash Value Life Insurance

Ownership of cash value life insurance in the United States has fallen in recent decades. Changes in age cohorts, family composition, and tax laws may have contributed to this decline. We identify factors that influence the demand for cash value life insurance and test whether they alone can explain the sharp decline in ownership. Demographic and tax code changes do not explain the decrease in permanent insurance. There is a consistent downward trend in demand from 1992 to 2010—particularly among middle‐age and younger households. The fewer households who own cash value policies are on average wealthier and more financially sophisticated, suggesting that permanent life insurance is increasingly being used as a tax shield rather than as a hedge against a loss in human capital.     

Hedging labor income risk

We use a detailed panel data set of Swedish households to investigate the relation between their labor income risk and financial investment decisions. In particular, we relate changes in wage volatility to changes in the portfolio holdings for households that switched industries between 1999 and 2002. We find that households do adjust their portfolio holdings when switching jobs, which is consistent with the idea that households hedge their human capital risk in the stock market. The results are statistically and economically significant. A household going from an industry with low wage volatility to one with high volatility ceteris paribus decreases its portfolio share of risky assets by up to 35%, or $15,575.     

Optimal redistributive tax and education policies in general equilibrium

This paper studies optimal linear and non-linear income taxes and education subsidies in two-type models with endogenous human capital formation, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous wage rates. Assuming constant human capital elasticities, human capital investment should be efficient under optimal linear policies, whether general equilibrium effects are present or not. Hence, education subsidies should not be used for distributional reasons. Due to general equilibrium effects, optimal linear income taxes may even become negative. Optimal non-linear policies exploit general equilibrium effects for redistribution. The high-skilled type optimally has a negative marginal income tax rate and a positive marginal education subsidy. The low-skilled type optimally faces a positive marginal income tax rate and a marginal tax on education. Simulations demonstrate that general equilibrium effects have only a modest effect on optimal non-linear policies.     

On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code

This paper computes the optimal progressivity of the income tax code in a dynamic general equilibrium model with household heterogeneity in which uninsurable labor productivity risk gives rise to a nontrivial income and wealth distribution. A progressive tax system serves as a partial substitute for missing insurance markets and enhances an equal distribution of economic welfare. These beneficial effects of a progressive tax system have to be traded off against the efficiency loss arising from distorting endogenous labor supply and capital accumulation decisions.Using a utilitarian steady state social welfare criterion we find that the optimal US income tax is well approximated by a flat tax rate of 17.2% and a fixed deduction of about $9,400. The steady state welfare gains from a fundamental tax reform towards this tax system are equivalent to 1.7% higher consumption in each state of the world. An explicit computation of the transition path induced by a reform of the current towards the optimal tax system indicates that a majority of the population currently alive (roughly 62%) would experience welfare gains, suggesting that such fundamental income tax reform is not only desirable, but may also be politically feasible.     

中国失业保险制度改革方向:纳入社会救助——基于历史背景与功能定位的分析

失业保险在建立和长期发展过程中,具有缓和劳资矛盾、天然双向平滑经济波动、提供失业保障和平滑个人收入的基本功能。但随着各国劳动保护及福利制度的发展,失业保险在政治和经济方面的功能减弱,且其失业收入损失补偿功能常常引发失业陷阱,于是各国进行了以促进积极就业为导向的改革。中国失业保险制度曾经为经济体制转型起到了“减震器”的作用。随着劳动保护和社会保障制度的发展和政府就业政策的完善,在二元就业结构、户籍制度、公共部门人力资源管理制度及政府承担就业促进任务的影响下,我国失业保险的政治、经济、失业人口收入补偿、就业促进功能未能有效发挥。在比较了若干改革方案后,本文认为,取消失业保险并将其功能并入社会救助体系是新时代背景下我国失业保险制度的最优改革路径。     

Redistribution as Social Insurance and Capital Market Integration

In this paper we claim that enhanced economic integration can call for an increase in redistribution among workers. When individuals are risk averse and no human capital insurance is available, the share of workers who choose to invest in specific human capital will be inefficiently low. Redistribution among workers plays the role of the missing insurance market by making the investment in the specific skills more attractive. Capital market integration has two different effects. On the one hand it makes labour income taxation more distortionary, therefore reducing the optimal tax rate on labour. On the other hand, it increases the variance of specific labour wage and widens the scope for risk protection of specific human capital through the redistribution implemented by a labour income tax. We show that the insurance effect of redistribution can be stronger than the distortionary effect, so that the optimal tax rate on labour income can increase when capital markets become more integrated.     

Uncertainty and the neutrality of government financing policy

Some ideas from the theory of finance are applied to consider whether debt-financed tax cuts affect desired consumption. It is shown that government financing policy is a matter of indifference to infinitely-lived households, if a perfect substitute for public debt exists. The analysis allows for uncertainty about future taxes, and for missing markets in some kinds of assets. Income redistribution risk, and the public insurance aspects of an income tax scheme, qualify this neutrality result, but in general the net effect is ambiguous. The real resource costs of financial transacting, as well as government superiority in the intermediation process, may be one rationale for activist debt-management policy. A better understanding of functioning capital markets is essential to evaluate these arguments.     

The role of life insurance in an emerging economy: Human capital protection,assets allocation and social interaction

In this paper, we provide micro-econometric evidence on the determinants of life insurance demand in China, the largest emerging market in the world. We employ the China Household Income Project (CHIP) dataset for the year 2002 in the analysis. The timing is ideal, because of the nature of the less well developed capital markets and social security systems in China in 2002, which sets a suitable stage to study the insurance demand behavior of emerging markets. The results indicate that both the human capital protection motive and the asset allocation motive are important in explaining the purchase of life insurance in China. In addition, we present three empirical regularities: (1) the positive correlation between the returns to human capital and the returns to market portfolio decrease the demand for life insurance; (2) both the current wealth and future income of a household exert curvilinear impacts on life insurance demand; (3) the breadth of a households social connections has substantial impacts on life insurance demand.     

Income Taxation and Finite Horizons in a Human Capital Model

We address the issue ofcapital vs. labor income taxation in an overlapping generationsmodel with a positive externality in the human capital production.We compare the performance of the economy in the steady stateunder different tax policies. Three results are obtained. First,the size of the tax revenue required strongly affects the optimal(welfare maximizing) capital-labor income tax portfolio. Inparticular, a zero physical capital income tax rate need notbe optimal. Second, the way in which the finite life cycle issplit between the working and the retirement period also matters.And third, the size of the externality in the human capital productionalso affects the optimal income tax rate mix.