An Empirical Model of Optimal Capital Structure1

The authors provide a reasonably user‐friendly and intuitive model for arriving at a company's optimal, or value‐maximizing, leverage ratio that is based on the estimation of company‐specific cost and benefit functions for debt financing. The benefit functions are downward‐sloping, reflecting the drop in the incremental value of debt with increases in the amount used. The cost functions are upward‐sloping, reflecting the increase in costs associated with increases in leverage. The cost functions vary among companies in ways that reflect differences in corporate characteristics such as size, profitability, dividend policy, book‐to‐market ratio, and asset collateral and redeployability. The authors use these cost and benefit functions to produce an estimate of a company's optimal amount of debt. Just as equilibrium in economics textbooks occurs where supply equals demand, optimal capital structure occurs at the point where the marginal benefit of debt equals the marginal cost. The article illustrates optimal debt choices for companies such as Barnes & Noble, Coca‐Cola, Six Flags, and Performance Food Group. The authors also estimate the net benefit of debt usage (in terms of the increase in firm or enterprise value) for companies that are optimally levered, as well as the net cost of being underleveraged for companies with too little debt, and the cost of overleveraging for companies with too much. One critical insight of the model is that the costs associated with overleveraging appear to be significantly higher, at least for some companies, than the costs of being underleveraged.     

Optimal Capital Structure and Industry Dynamics

This paper provides a competitive equilibrium model of capital structure and industry dynamics. In the model, firms make financing, investment, entry, and exit decisions subject to idiosyncratic technology shocks. The capital structure choice reflects the tradeoff between the tax benefits of debt and the associated bankruptcy and agency costs. The interaction between financing and production decisions influences the stationary distribution of firms and their survival probabilities. The analysis demonstrates that the equilibrium output price has an important feedback effect. This effect has a number of testable implications. For example, high growth industries have relatively lower leverage and turnover rates.     

Capital Gains Taxes and Equity Trading: Empirical Evidence

Individual investors have an incentive to defer selling appreciated stock until it qualifies for tax‐favored, long‐term capital gains treatment. Shackelford and Verrecchia [2002] show that these incentives can affect equity trading around public disclosures. This article provides some empirical support for their theory with evidence of price increases and equity constrictions around announcements of quarterly earnings and additions to the S&P 500 index. We find share returns rise and trading volume falls with the incremental taxes saved by deferring the sale of appreciated property. The price increases, however, are temporary, reversing in subsequent trading days. The results are consistent with buyers believing the compensation to sell before long‐term qualification (through higher prices) is less costly than holding an inappropriately weighted portfolio. This finding—that personal capital gains taxes affect equity trading—adds to a growing literature that challenges longstanding assumptions that firm value is independent of shareholders and their taxes.     

Local Taxes and Capital Structure Choice

This paper investigates the question of taxation and capital structure choice in Germany. Germany represents an excellent case study for investigating the question of whether and to what extent taxes influence the debt-equity decision of firms, because the relative tax burdens on debt and equity vary greatly across communities. German communities levy local taxes on profits and long-term debt payments in addition to personal and corporate taxes on the federal level. A stylized model is presented incorporating these taxes. The model shows that local taxes create substantial incentives for firms to use debt financing. Furthermore, the paper empirically investigates the effect of local business taxes on the share of debt used to finance incremental investments by German firms. I find that local taxes significantly influence the capital structure choice of firms, controlling for a large number of other factors. In an extensive sensitivity analysis the tax effect are found to be robust across several different specifications.     

Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation

We show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy. Net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations, when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit. The effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower's alternative sources of finance are costly. In addition, despite the less favorable terms offered by existing creditors, borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation.     

An Empirical Test of Ross's Cash Flow Beta Theory of Capital Structure

This paper empirically investigates Ross's cash flow beta theory of capital structure. Ross hypothesizes that, for firms of similar cash flow variance, there will be an inverse relationship between financial leverage and cash flow beta. This paper provides empirical support for Ross's theory, though the extent of the support depends upon the sample period and the leverage specification.     

Influence Costs and Capital Structure

This paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making. This creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management's discretionary decisions. As a result, divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm, or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm. This incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs, for example in the event of a divestiture. Since the firm's capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions, it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers' incentives to influence top management's decisions. The control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions. Hence, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. The findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations. We identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure: the top management's prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division; the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers; and the difference in the valuation of the division's assets in the current firm and under alternative uses.     

Optimal Consumption and Investment with Capital Gains Taxes

This article characterizes optimal dynamic consumption and portfoliodecisions in the presence of capital gains taxes and short-salerestrictions. The optimal decisions are a function of the investor'sage, initial portfolio holdings, and tax basis. Our resultscapture the trade-off between the diversification benefits andtax costs of trading over an investor's lifetime. The incentiveto rediversify the portfolio is inversely related to the sizeof the embedded gain and investor's age. Contrary to standardfinancial advice, the optimal equity holding increases wellinto an investor's lifetime in our model due to the forgivenessof capital gains taxes at death.     

Optimal Capital Income Taxes and Capital Controls in Small Open Economies

This paper studies the optimal taxation of capital income in a simplemodel of a small open economy where domestic residents can evade taxeson their foreign investment income. The national government can onlytax domestic capital income and can impose capital controls, whichhowever absorb real resources. The design of optimal policy in thismodel depends on the revenue needs of the government. For relativelylow levels of government expenditures, it turns out that the countrydoes not levy capital income taxes but may restrict capital exports.Otherwise, the country taxes domestic capital income and sets capitalcontrols such that capital exports are driven to zero, at an optimum.In contrast to other models with capital controls it turns out thatthis policy can lead to underinvestment in domestic capital.JEL Classification Number: E 62, F 41, H 21     

Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure

The joint determination of capital structure and investment risk is examined. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantages of debt less default costs (Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)), and the agency costs resulting from asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Agency costs restrict leverage and debt maturity and increase yield spreads, but their importance is small for the range of environments considered. Risk management is also examined. Hedging permits greater leverage. Even when a firm cannot precommit to hedging, it will still do so. Surprisingly, hedging benefits often are greater when agency costs are low.     

An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-Interest on Corporate Capital Structure

This paper provides a test of whether capital structure decisions are at least in part motivated by managerial self-interest. It is shown that the debt ratio is negatively related to management's shareholding, reflecting the greater nondiversifiable risk of debt to management than to public investors for maintaining a low debt ratio. Unless there is a nonmanagerial principal stockholder, no substantial increase of debt can be realized, which may suggest that the existence of large nonmanagerial stockholders might make the interests of managers and public investors coincide.     

Firing Costs and Capital Structure Decisions

I exploit the adoption of state‐level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.     

Securitization and Capital Structure in Nonfinancial Firms: An Empirical Investigation

Contrary to recent accounts of off‐balance‐sheet securitization by financial firms, we show that asset securitization by nonfinancial firms provides a valuable form of financing for shareholders without harming debtholders. Using data from firms’ SEC filings, we find that securitization is attractive to firms in the middle of the credit quality distribution, which are the firms with the most to gain. Upon initiation, firms experience positive abnormal stock returns and zero abnormal bond returns, and largely use the securitization proceeds to repay existing debt. Securitization minimizes financing costs by reducing expected bankruptcy costs and providing access to segmented credit markets.     

Equity Markets, Transactions Costs, and Capital Accumulation: An Illustration

Poorly developed equity markets inhibit the transfer of capitalownership. Moreover, the costs of transacting in equity marketsaffect not just the level of investment, but the kinds of investmentsthat are undertaken. Once equity markets allow the ownershipof capital to be transferred economically, reductions in coststend to favor the use of longer-maturity investments. When thereis a relationship between the maturity of an investment andits productivity, transactions cost reductions are conduciveto observing certain kinds of increases in productive efficiency.This article analyzes savings, investment, and consumption decisionsby using an overlapping generations model with two-period-livedagents. The analysis allows for several technologies for convertingcurrent output into future capital that vary by productivityand maturity, and it makes ownership of capital costly to transfer.A reduction in transactions costs will typically alter the compositionof savings and investment, and have potentially complicatedconsequences for capital accumulation and steady-state output.     

Taxes and the Capital Structure of Partnerships,REIT's,and Related Entities

Academic finance has explored the effect of taxes on corporate capital structure in great detail. By contrast, the effect of taxes on the capital structure of partnerships, REIT's, and related entities has received little attention. The present paper shows that, under general conditions, the values of partnerships and REIT's are invariant to leverage, contradicting the sparse literature in the area. A proof similar to that of Modigliani-Miller is employed. The effect of real world imperfections is also examined.     

Securityholder Taxes, Corporate Capital Structures and the Priority Structure of Debt

This paper shows that the firm has an incentive to issue multiple classes of debt that are differentiated by seniority to enhance securityholder tax-timing option values. The analysis establishes that there is at least one mix of senior and junior debt that maximizes the tax option gain from having multiple priority classes of debt. An analytic example provides specifications for the optimal amount of leverage and the optimal mix of senior and junior debt. Relative to the case of only one class of debt, a multiple debt priority structure increases the optimal amount of corporate leverage.     

Investment Adjustment Costs: An Empirical Assessment

We evaluate the empirical evidence for costs that penalize changes in investment using U.S. industry data. In aggregate models, such investment adjustment costs have been introduced to help account for a variety of business cycle and asset market phenomena. So far no attempt has been made to estimate these costs directly at a disaggregated level. We consider an industry model with investment adjustment costs and estimate its parameters using generalized methods of moments. The findings indicate small costs associated with changing the flow of investment at the industry level. The weighted average of the industry elasticities with respect to the shadow price of capital, which depends inversely on the adjustment cost parameter, is eight times larger than the largest estimate reported in Levin et al. (2006) . We examine a variety of factors that may account for this discrepancy, but a substantial part of it remains unexplained. Our results therefore suggest that more caution is needed when giving policy advice that hinges on a structural interpretation of large investment adjustment costs.