Executive Option Repricing, Incentives, and Retention

While many firms grant executive stock options that can be repriced, other firms systematically restrict or prohibit repricing. This article investigates the determinants of firms' repricing policies and the consequences of such policies for executive turnover and retention. Firms that have better internal governance, that use more powerful stock-based incentives, or that face less shareholder scrutiny are more likely to maintain repricing flexibility. Firms that restrict repricing are more vulnerable to voluntary executive turnover following stock price declines. When share price declines are severe, restricting firms appear to award unusually large numbers of new options.     

The Quality Option and Timing Option in Futures Contracts

Often futures contracts contain quality options whereby the short position has the choice of delivering one of an acceptable set of assets. We explore the implications of the quality option on the futures price. We develop a method for pricing the quality option for the general case of n deliverable assets and provide numerical illustrations of its significance. Even when the asset prices are very highly correlated, this option can have nontrivial value, especially when there is a large number of deliverable assets. We analyze the impact of the timing option and its interaction with the quality option. A procedure is developed for valuing the timing option in the presence of the quality option, and some numerical estimates are obtained.     

基于期权博弈的投资时机选择

在不确定性和竞争性的策略互动环境中,根据投资时机相对性和绝对性的不同要求可以将期权博弈模型划分为绝对时机选择和相对时机选择两个类型。我们首先综述投资时机选择的期权博弈理论文献;然后以"随机最优停止问题"为研究基点,分别探讨投资时机选择的完全信息与不完全信息期权博弈模型;最后论述基于"追随-抢先模型"的投资时机选择期权博弈评价。     

中国上市公司融资选择的市场时机效应——基于股票换手率和股票收益的实证检验

自从市场时机资本结构理论提出以来，国内外学者从理论的解释能力和实用性等方面对这一新兴融资决策理论进行了大量研究，并得出许多有意义的结论。然而目前的实证检验主要基于市值账面比（M／B）指标作为市场时机代理变量，这一指标引起学者们很大争议，研究结论缺乏可靠性。本文根据我国资本市场实际特征选择股票换手率作为市场时机代理变量，实证检验了市场时机与外部融资方式选择的关系，同时引入股票收益变量检验市场时机对资本结构动态变动的综合影响。研究结论显示，换手率在企业权益融资中具有重要作用，换手率较高时企业选择发行更多的股权融资，股票换手率和股票收益均对资本结构变动具有显著的负向影响。这表明我国上市公司确实存在着融资选择的市场时机效应。     

Repricing and Executive Turnover

We examine whether the threat of executive turnover faced by a firm affects its decision to reprice stock options held by its executives. We estimate a model of voluntary turnover among top executives and show that the predicted turnover from this model is positively related to the probability of repricing. The relationship is robust to the inclusion of several known determinants of repricing. Our results are consistent with a model in which a tight labor market makes executives hard to replace, forcing firms to reprice stock options when they go underwater.     

Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Executive Stock Option Repricing: A Study of US Casino Executives

I examine the relation between managerial incentives from holdings of company stock and options and stock option repricing. Because options provide incentives to increase both risk and stock price, firms must realize that as options go underwater, executives might face incentives to invest in risky, negative NPV projects. Repricing may alleviate such incentives. I examine repricing activity by firms in the US gaming industry and find that risk-taking incentives from options are positively related to the incidence of executive option repricing. The results support the hypothesis that repricing assists firms in alleviating excessive risk-taking incentives of senior management.     

Repricing of executive stock options

The main purpose of this paper is to extend the model of Acharya et al. (J Financ Econ 57:65–101, 2000) to examine the ex-ante optimality of repricing of executive stock options while considering dilution effects and the tax effects of new accounting rules associated with repricing. Although there has been a body of empirical literature on repricing, the optimality of repricing after considering the economic impact of changing accounting rules has not been addressed in an ex-ante contracting setting. We find that traditional repricing loses its ex-ante dominance over the do-nothing strategy after we incorporate the tax effects of new accounting rules. The theoretical predictions of our paper shed light on this controversial practice and lay a foundation for evaluating repricing alternatives.     

The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating

I identify three option exercise strategies executives engage in, including (i) exercising with cash and immediately selling the shares, (ii) exercising with cash and holding the shares, and (iii) delivering some shares to the company to cover the exercise costs and holding the remaining shares. Stock price patterns suggest executives manipulate option exercises. They use private information to increase the profitability of all three strategies, and likely backdated some exercise dates in the pre‐Sarbanes‐Oxley period to enhance the profitability of the latter two strategies, where the executive's company is the only counterparty. Backdating is associated with reporting of internal control weaknesses.     

Repricing and employee stock option valuation

A repricing occurs when the issuing firm resets the strike price of an employee stock option (ESO). ESO repricings occur most frequently following a significant decline in the underlying stock price. Typically, the strike price is reset to the new stock price. We develop a new model for valuing ESOs with a repricing feature. Our valuation model is developed within a utility-maximizing framework that accounts for potentially multiple repricings, employee risk aversion, employee non-option wealth, the non-tradeability of ESOs, and the early exercise feature of ESOs. Simulations suggest that these factors can significantly affect ESO value.     

Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements

This article analyzes the timing of CEO stock option awards, as a method of investigating corporate managers' influence over the terms of their own compensation. In a sample of 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, I find that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in company stock prices. Patterns of companies' quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an interpretation that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before favorable corporate news. I evaluate and reject several alternative explanations of the results, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates.     

The Price Effect of Option Introduction

This paper examines the price effect of option introduction from 1974 to 1980. The introduction of individual options causes a permanent price increase in the underlying security, beginning approximately three days before introduction. The price effect appears to be associated with introduction, and not announcement, throughout the sample period. Excess returns volatility declines with option introduction. Systematic risk is unchanged. There is a positive relation between the price increase and a measure of activity in the options market.     

The American Put Option Valued Analytically

An analytic solution to the American put problem is derived herein. The hedge ratio and other derivatives of the solution are presented. The formula derived implies an exact duplicating portfolio for the American put consisting of discount bonds and stock sold short. The formula is extended to consider put options on stocks paying cash dividends. A polynomial expression is developed for evaluating these formulae. Values and hedge ratios for puts on both dividend and nondividend paying stocks are calculated, tabulated, and compared with values derived by numerical integration and binomial approximation. As with European options, evaluating an analytic formula is more efficient than approximating the stock price process or the partial differential equation by binomial or finite difference methods. Finally, applications of this American put solution are discussed.     

The Value of the Rent Control Option

In this paper, we combine direct arbitrage arguments and an option-pricing approach to develop a method of pricing the option for rent control. For a lump-sum payment of key money, a tenant acquires the right to rent a real estate unit for an exogenously determined controlled rent, as opposed to paying the free-market rent. The tenant may continue exercising this right as long as he or she lives. Alternatively, the tenant may sell the right to occupy the controlled rent unit and receive a fraction of the key money paid by the subsequent tenant. We value the equilibrium key money, in a representative agents partial equilibrium, while endogenously determining the expected tenure duration in a controlled rent unit. We propose a procedure for valuing rent control options different from the representative agents. Our analysis shows that under real-world levels of conditional life expectancy, the level of the fraction of the key money retained by a departing tenant has an insignificant effect on the expected tenure duration in a controlled rent unit and on the level of key money.     

股票期权的实践与探讨

作为分配制度变革的股票期权计划，在发达国家运用已有近30年的历史，成为企业一种有效的激励机制。随着我国企业改革的深化与市场经济的确立，急需探索一条科学有效的激励机制。在我国现行的法律体系下，股票期权计划这种长期激励机制吸引了越来越多的注意力。本对我国在推行股票期权计划的实践中所产生的一些问题作了初步的探讨。     

The Economic Value of Volatility Timing

Numerous studies report that standard volatility models have low explanatory power, leading some researchers to question whether these models have economic value. We examine this question by using conditional mean-variance analysis to assess the value of volatility timing to short-horizon investors. We find that the volatility timing strategies outperform the unconditionally efficient static portfolios that have the same target expected return and volatility. This finding is robust to estimation risk and transaction costs.     

Insider Trading and Option Grant Timing in Response to Fire Sales (and Purchases) of Stocks by Mutual Funds

Mutual funds experiencing large outflows (inflows) tend to decrease (expand) their positions, creating downward (upward) price pressure in the stocks held in common by them ( Coval and Stafford [2007] ). This study shows that corporate insiders exploit the resulting mispricing by buying (selling) their company's stock if it is subject to such fire sales (purchases) by funds. We also show that the likelihood of option grants is greater for stocks that are subject to mutual fund fire sales. Finally, we show that both the insider trading and the option granting activities help speed up the correction of the flow‐driven mispricing. Overall, this study illustrates that insiders enhance personal benefits by trading on their personal account and influencing the timing of option grants in response to mispricing due to flow‐driven fund trading. Moreover, these activities help improve the informational efficiency of stock price.     

The Informational Role of Stock and Option Volume

This article analyzes the intraday interdependence of orderflows and price movements for actively traded NYSE stocks andtheir Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)-traded options.Stock net trade volume (buyer-initiated volume minus seller-initiatedvolume) has strong predictive ability for stock and option quoterevisions, but option net trade volume has no incremental predictiveability. This suggests that informed investors initiate tradesin the stock market but not in the option market. On the otherhand, both stock and option quote revisions have predictiveability for each other. Thus, while information in the stockmarket is contained in both quote revisions and trades, informationin the option market is contained only in quote revisions.     

The Variance Gamma Process and Option Pricing

A three parameter stochastic process, termed the variance gamma process, that generalizes Brownian motion is developed as a model for the dynamics of log stock prices. The process is obtained by evaluating Brownian motion with drift at a random time given by a gamma process. The two additional parameters are the drift of the Brownian motion and the volatility of the time change. These additional parameters provide control over the skewness and kurtosis of the return distribution. Closed forms are obtained for the return density and the prices of European options. The statistical and risk neutral densities are estimated for data on the S & P500 Index and the prices of options on this Index. It is observed that the statistical density is symmetric with some kurtosis, while the risk neutral density is negatively skewed with a larger kurtosis. The additional parameters also correct for pricing biases of the Black Scholes model that is a parametric special case of the option pricing model developed here.     

The Option and Decision to Repurchase Stock

Open‐market repurchase programs provide firms with the flexibility to manage the cash and risk aspects of their operations. We examine at which stage cash and risk matter in the typical stages of a repurchase program: announcement, implementation, and withdrawal. Cash and risk considerations appear to matter only at the implementation stage, and partially negate the traditional signaling effect around program announcement.     

实物期权与金融期权比较研究

实物期权与金融期权相比在标的资产的性质、执行价格、有效时间、定价方法、关联性等方面存在差异。