重大错报风险导向审计模式探讨

2006年2月15日,财政部颁发了新的注册会计师审计准则,新审计准则在审计理念上的最大突破是所采用的风险导向审计模式发生了重大转变,由传统风险导向审计模式转变为重大错报风险导向审计模式(也称为改良的风险导向模式).     

免疫系统理论下的风险导向审计研究

＂免疫系统＂理论是新时期对政府审计的科学认识。本文以＂免疫系统＂理论为基础,从风险导向审计演进历程入手,分析了经营风险导向审计和现代风险导向审计两种代表性模式的基本特征,在此基础上探讨了＂免疫系统＂理论下的审计风险模型和基本审计程序,以初步认识风险导向审计在政府审计应用中的基本思路。     

略论我国公共财政的绩效预算模式

本文首先界定了公共财政的绩效预算的概念;其次总结了绩效预算模式的特点,即以结果为导向、效率优先、与中长期预算相结合、鼓励管理者的创新和节约、更加注重民主化等;最后论述了我国公共财政的绩效预算模式在理念、管理制度体系、立法、评价结果应用及与配套改革统筹协调等几个方面的改革趋势.     

现代风险导向审计在内部审计中的应用

风险导向内部审计是审计理念和审计模式的新发展,它是以降低企业审计风险和生产经营风险为目的,对风险进行全面管理的一种有效手段.文章介绍了风险导向审计的涵义及作用,探讨了风险导向审计的应用.     

现代风险导向审计在我国的应用分析

一、引言审计从产生至今,始终在为满足社会的需求而努力,审计模式从账项基础审计、制度基础审计发展到风险导向审计。所谓风险导向审计,是指以审计风险的分析、评估为基础,规划审计工作,确定审查的重点和抽查规模,以获取充分、适当的审计证据,查明会计资料及其有关经济活动是否真实公允的审计程序模式。风险导向审计以审计风险的分析评估作为制定审计计划、执行审计程序、发表审计意见的基础,根据量化的风险水平确定实施审计的范围、重点,进而制订审计计划,从而全面地把握审计重点,提高审计效率与质量。     

风险导向审计模式的发展及在我国的应用

风险导向审计作为一种新的审计理念和方法已经在理论和实务中体现了它的科学性和有效性。本文分析了传统风险导向审计模式与现代风险导向审计模式的发展和区别,并对现阶段我国实行现代风险导向审计进行了适用性分析。     

政府投资项目绩效审计的开展

公共财政体制要求强化对公共资金流转过程与使用效果的监督与评价,与市场经济体制相适应的公共财政框架的建立和完善也必然要求开展绩效审计。政府投资建设项目是当前公共财政支出中的重要组成内容,政府投资建设项目绩效审计是公共财政支出绩效审计的重点。对政府投资建设项目进行绩效审计,要围绕"揭露问题、规范管理、促进改革、完善法制、制约权力、提高效益"的目标,从揭露问题入手,提出改进的建议和措施,提高有限建设资金的使用效率和效果。紧密联系实际,明确现阶段绩效审计的目标绩效审计的目标,是寻求提高绩效的途径,并鼓励和帮助被审计单位采取必要的措施,以改进系统及控制措施。现阶段审计机关开展效绩审计,应以揭露反映体制转轨时期影响经济活动效益     

浅析风险导向审计

风险导向审计是一种新型多雏全新审计模式,在发达国家企业的审计实践中得到普遍应用.文章介绍了风险导向审计的涵义,探讨了风险导向审计的应用,提出了风险导向审计相关的实施程序.     

审计风险与风险导向审计

风险导向审计是指注册会计师通过对被审计单位进行风险职业判断,评价被审计单位风险控制．确定剩余风险．执行追加审计程序．将剩余风险降低到可接受水平。它具有以下特点：审计目标是证实财务报表的公允性,同时考虑审计风险．将审计风险降低至可接受水平。以评价审计风险为导向性目标并指导审计的全过程．审计风险模式不等于风险导向审计．只有在其运用于审计全过程时．才是风险导向审计．     

风险导向内部审计与管理导向内部审计的对比分析

审计模式是审计理论与审计实务的重要战略,随着审计的快速发展,财务审计、业务审计、管理导向内部审计和风险导向内部审计相继出现。风险导向内部审计与管理导向内部审计两者名称差别较小,都有涉及内部审计,但究其含义、特点等方面,则存在诸多差异。文章简要叙述风险导向内部审计与管理导向内部审计,并将两者进行对比分析,以供相关人士参考。     

试析新审计准则体系的审计模式

风险导向审计模式经历了多年发展,其理论基础、技术方法日益完善。我国新颁布的审计准则体系就建立在风险导向审计模式之上,这有助于我国审计业的发展,拉近我国注册会计师行业标准与国际审计准则的距离。     

风险导向审计在公共工程绩效审计中的应用

近年来,我国投入大量资金建设社会公共工程,以期保证国计民生和提高人民群众生活水平。加强对公共工程的绩效审计是加强公共事业监督的重要举措。尝试从公共工程的特点出发,阐述将现代风险导向审计方法引入公共工程绩效审计的思路。     

管理舞弊与风险导向审计模式

管理舞弊引发的审计失败对传统风险导向审计模式提出了严重挑战,危及到审计职业的生存与发展。审计界虽然通过修订审计准则对其进行了改良,但改良后的风险导向审计模式仍然存在不可忽视的缺陷。为此,本文提出,风险导向审计应当继续更新审计理念,即引入舞弊推定和心证,以切实提高审计师揭露管理舞弊的能力。     

Auditor Reporting and Regulatory Sanctions in the Broker‐Dealer Industry: From Self‐Regulation to PCAOB Oversight

The financial security of the investing public relies on high‐quality service by broker‐dealers (BDs), investors' gateway to the financial markets. The SEC has long required auditors to attest to BDs' internal controls and compliance with regulations (including those privately owned). Following the unraveling of the Madoff Ponzi scheme in 2008, the SEC required auditors of all BDs to register with the PCAOB, and Congressional initiatives signaled imminent transition from private (AICPA) to public (PCAOB) oversight. We investigate whether audit quality increased following this transition by measuring whether auditors report material internal control and compliance problems for BD clients where a deficiency presumably existed (i.e., BDs sanctioned by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority for transgressions against stakeholders). Overall, we do not find increased reporting quality following the regulatory shift but do observe variation by auditor group and BD ownership. While reporting quality for global network firms (GNFs) increases slightly, lower reporting quality observed prior to the regulatory shift for specialist audit firms (having large BD portfolios but small overall size) is exacerbated afterward. This finding complements results of PCAOB inspections and other research identifying audit quality problems among small, industry‐specialized firms in non‐public client settings. Focusing on deficiencies likely more difficult to detect, we find lower reporting quality for private relative to publicly affiliated BDs prior to PCAOB oversight, and lower reporting quality for very small audit firms relative to GNFs following the regulatory shift.     

Audit Strategies and Multiple Fraud Opportunities of Misreporting and Defalcation*

We examine how an auditor assesses the risk of fraud and formulates an audit plan when the auditee has the opportunity to commit various types of fraud. Unlike previous studies, the audi‐tee can misappropriate assets (defalcation), misreport financial information (fraudulent financial reporting), or misreport financial information in combination with defalcation. Our results identify four possible equilibria whose characteristics depend on the auditee's relative rewards and penalties from the various types of fraud, the cost of audit effort, and expectations about the auditee‐firm's performance. When the cost of audit effort is sufficiently small, fraud risk assessment depends on the auditee's rewards and penalties associated with each type of fraud, but not on the auditor's beliefs about firm performance. The auditor develops an audit plan that focuses on the type of fraud the auditee is most motivated to commit, and in turn, the audit plan deters all other types of fraud.     

Do Mutual Fund Investors Care About Auditor Quality?

We study the influence of perceived auditor quality on investment decisions by bond mutual fund investors. Audits of bond mutual funds require significant auditor expertise. Fund managers estimate daily the fair market values of holdings that are often opaque and illiquid. Managers can use their discretion to manipulate their fund's performance results. While it is known that investment flows into funds that report good past performance, little evidence exists about whether investors' confidence in the reliability of fund financial reports is influenced by auditor quality. Using hand‐collected data from SEC filings, we find that the positive association between reported performance and investment flows is stronger for funds with auditors who are industry specialists and are longer‐tenured, as well as for funds that pay higher audit fees. We do not find that auditor office size strengthens the association. We also find that the presence of industry‐specialist auditors, long‐tenured auditors, and higher audit fees lead to additional disclosure in the form of emphasis‐of‐matter. This study contributes to the streams of research investigating perceived audit quality, fund investment decisions, and auditing for financial services.     

CEO Power,Internal Control Quality,and Audit Committee Effectiveness in Substance Versus in Form

During the past decade, new regulations have been adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. Prior research has generally provided evidence in support of these regulations and suggests that a more independent and expert audit committee is more effective. We posit that CEO power reduces or even eliminates the improvements in audit committee effectiveness resulting from independent and financially expert committee members. Thus, CEO power may result in an audit committee that appears effective in form but is not in substance. We construct a composite index for CEO power by combining ten CEO characteristics and employ the incidence of internal control weaknesses as a proxy for audit committee monitoring quality. Since all the firms in our sample have completely independent audit committees, we use financial expertise to examine the impact of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness. We find that, when CEO power is low, audit committee financial expertise is negatively associated with the incidence of internal control weaknesses. However, as CEO power increases, this association monotonically weakens. When CEO power reaches a sufficiently high level, this association is no longer negative. The moderating effect of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness is more prominent when the CEO extracts more rents from the firm through insider trading. Our results are not driven by the CEO's involvement in director selection. Our paper suggests that more expert audit committees in form do not automatically translate into more effective monitoring. Rather, the substantive monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is contingent on CEO power.     

Discussion of “Does the Identity of Engagement Partner Matter? An Analysis of Audit Partner Reporting Decisions”

The authors of this provocative study apply commonly used audit quality surrogate measures to a large and unique set of financial and other data on statutory audits of small private companies in Sweden. The paper has received unparalleled attention by the financial press and the PCAOB for its presumed support for regulatory intervention in standards for U.S. public company audits. In this Discussant Comment, I review the paper's content, analyze its predictive validity, and discuss its multiple implications plus, following Conference instructions, I provide constructive suggestions for improvements. Based on predictive validity analysis, I conclude that engagement partner assignment strategy is an important and acknowledged omitted variable that affects the study's internal validity via both the independent variable (partner's prior performance measure) and the dependent variable (borrower's cost of debt capital). The omission also affects construct validities and, if audit firms are applying a plausible assignment strategy, then interpretation of the study's main results would be reversed. Finally, the lack of a standards intervention noted by the authors and the extreme size and other differences between audits of Swedish private companies and U.S. public companies impair external validity and generalization to the U.S. intervention. As to improvements, I suggest that the authors (i) ask Swedish lenders to validate their presumed use of partner performance ratings in determining a borrower's interest rate, and (ii) ask Swedish Big 4 audit firms to provide a few internal partner performance ratings for comparison with the external performance measures used in the study. This two‐pronged, multimethod approach might confirm or deny critical assumptions underlying the present study and may substantively inform standards setters, evidence‐based standards, and fellow researchers about the validity of commonly applied surrogates for audit quality and the study's stated conclusion.     

Research on Chinese Expenditure Achievements Appraisal System

It is a new task to supervise public finance under the existing financial budget regulatory system and create more economy benefits with limited financial capacity. Establishing Expenditure Achievements Appraisal System from unit, finance and audit are not only the significant measures to tighten up the scientific expenditure supervision, but also needs for transforming financial control function and improving financial budget management. The paper makes a discussion on the establishment of Expenditure Achievements Appraisal System.     

Business Strategy,Financial Reporting Irregularities,and Audit Effort

This study examines whether clients' business strategies are a factor in determining the occurrence of financial reporting irregularities and the level of audit effort. We use the organizational strategy theory of Miles and Snow to develop a comprehensive measure of business strategy using publicly available data. We find that Miles and Snow's Prospector strategy is more likely to be involved in financial reporting irregularities and generally requires greater audit effort. The business strategy measure also appears to capture client business risk and provides incremental explanatory power beyond the individual measures of client complexity or risk used in traditional audit fee models. We contribute to the literature by constructing a replicable business strategy measure and identifying organizational business strategy as an important ex ante determinant of financial reporting irregularities and levels of audit effort. Our results suggest that investigating how audits can be improved to reduce financial reporting irregularities among Prospector clients is an important area for audit practice and future research.