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1.
Recent evidence shows central banks suffering from losses in some developing countries. This is a surprise to economists and policymakers. At the same time, these banks are asked to conduct monetary policy within a more transparent framework. Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the following question: Would more transparency in developing countries suffering from central bank losses be beneficial?This paper shows that the cost constraints of conducting monetary policy, central bank losses, in both transparency and opacity alike is significant and affects positively the error of the private sector in expected inflation rate and the output gap. In a country suffering from central bank losses, the expected benefits of transparency and the existence of cost constraint move in two opposite directions. As a result, it is unwise for developing countries suffering from central bank losses to focus on transparency. Priority should be given to fixing monetary policy and to developing financial markets.  相似文献   

2.
Monetary Policy with Uncertain Parameters   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
This paper shows that—in contrast to the received wisdom—uncertainty about the parameters in a dynamic macroeconomic model may lead to more aggressive monetary policy. In particular, when there is uncertainty about the persistence of inflation, it may be optimal for the central bank to respond to shocks more aggressively in order to reduce uncertainty about the future development of inflation. Uncertainty about other parameters, on the other hand, dampens the policy response.
JEL classification : E 43; E 52  相似文献   

3.
The literature on transparency and central bank communication and the literature on disagreement about expectations are evolving; however, both have been evolving separately. Despite the advances in the literature, several key issues remain open and there are gaps to be filled. Therefore, this study analyses the effects of monetary policy signalling and clarity of central bank communication on disagreement about inflation expectations. It also investigates whether greater transparency coincides with lower levels of disagreement in inflation expectations in Brazil. The findings suggest that transparency is important to reduce disagreement about inflation expectations. Moreover, our estimates indicate that central bank communication and clarity affect disagreement about inflation expectations in Brazil.  相似文献   

4.
What does Monetary Policy Reveal about a Central Bank's Preferences?   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
The design of monetary policy depends on the targeting strategy adopted by the central bank. This strategy describes a set of policy preferences, which are actually the structural parameters to analyse monetary policy making. Accordingly, we develop a calibration method to estimate a central bank's preferences from the estimates of an optimal Taylor–type rule. The empirical analysis on US data shows that output stabilization has not been an independent argument in the Fed's objective function during the Greenspan's era. This suggests that the output gap has entered the policy rule only as leading indicator for future inflation, therefore being only instrumental (to stabilize inflation) rather than important per se .
(J.E.L.: C61, E52, E58).  相似文献   

5.
贾德奎 《财经研究》2006,32(11):66-75
文章通过建立货币政策透明度指数,并利用我国金融市场的利率数据进行检验,认为我国中央银行在基准利率调整和准备金率改变等重大政策决策上,货币当局更倾向于采用模糊的政策操作方式,由此可能会导致市场预期的混乱,并最终对政策实施效果产生负面影响。因此,我国有必要借鉴西方国家的政策操作经验,进一步有选择地增加货币政策操作的透明度,并借以最终建立一个简单透明、效率更高的政策调控框架。  相似文献   

6.
Abstract. We show that, in a two‐stage model of monetary policy with stochastic policy targets and asymmetric information, the transparency regime chosen by the central bank does never coincide with the regime preferred by society. Independent of society's endogenous choice of delegation, the central bank reveals its inflation target and conceals its output target. In contrast, society would prefer either transparency or opacity of both targets. As a conclusion, the choice of the transparency regime should be part of the optimal delegation solution.  相似文献   

7.
In this paper we analyze whether inflation targeting is feasible in Poland. There are at least three prerequisites for successful inflation targeting: 1) central bank independence, 2) a high degree of central bank accountability, transparency, and communication to the public, and 3) a predictable and stable relationship between inflation and the instruments of monetary policy. While the first two prerequisites are relatively easy to analyze, the third criterion requires formal statistical analysis, which we undertake in this paper. The first two prerequisites for targeting are found to be met in Poland, and the empirical analysis shows some evidence of significant relationships between inflation and monetary instruments in Poland. Hence inflation targeting appears feasible in Poland.  相似文献   

8.
非均衡博弈、央行的微观独立性与最优金融稳定政策   总被引:9,自引:1,他引:9  
本文从当前金融稳定理论发展和中国金融稳定操作现实出发,构建了中央银行-金融机构-居民部门的非均衡博弈模型,试图寻找最优金融稳定规则。本文的基本结论如下:第一,在当前的金融稳定政策框架下,中央银行的货币与稳定政策组合存在多重均衡的可能;第二,基于中央银行和金融机构对于流动性的信息的不对称,金融机构具有隐藏信息和游说央行的负面激励;第三,中央银行出于对未来支付体系稳定的考虑,在与金融机构的博弈中处于被动地位,金融稳定和货币政策均因此而丧失独立性;第四,居民不具备真正的博弈参与权,而只是博弈结果的承担者,其结果是承担真实或隐性的通货膨胀税;第五,根据以上博弈分析,建立最优金融稳定政策必须在微观机制和宏观机制上实施重新设计,包括金融稳定政策的“最后”性、中央银行的监督权赋予和保持距离型制度安排、金融稳定内含于货币政策,以及稳定与改革的分离和成本的重新界定。  相似文献   

9.
In this paper, we examine the inflation persistence puzzle by applying the robust control approach of Hansen and Sargent (2008). In line with the literature suggesting that inflation persistence may be affected by the monetary policy design and its institutional characteristics, we find that inflation persistence is positively related to the central bank's preference for model robustness. In effect, model uncertainty and robust decision making may be considered as a mechanism generating inflation persistence, for a given non-zero degree of autocorrelation in supply-side shocks. Further, the policy implication is that the central bank's monetary policy under model uncertainty renders, in terms of the sacrifice ratio, the output-cost of inflation stabilization more important.  相似文献   

10.
It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.  相似文献   

11.
In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.  相似文献   

12.
In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.  相似文献   

13.
Luigi  Bonatti 《Economic Notes》2007,36(3):247-258
Previous papers modelling the interaction between the central bank and a single monopoly union demonstrated that greater monetary policy uncertainty reduces the union's nominal wage. This paper shows that this result does not hold in general, since it depends on peculiar specifications of the union's objective function. In particular, I show that greater monetary policy uncertainty raises the nominal wage whenever union members tend to be more sensitive to the risk of getting low real wages than to the risk of remaining unemployed. This conclusion appears consistent with the evidence showing that greater monetary authority's transparency reduces average inflation .  相似文献   

14.
In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.  相似文献   

15.
This study examines the implications of central bank independence using a three-equation model of monetary base growth, budget deficits and inflation that is estimated over an eight-country sample — of which Switzerland, the United States and West Germany are the countries considered to possess relatively autonomous central banks. A main finding is that central bank policy appears to be directed more toward price stability and less toward accommodation of government budget deficits in countries with a central bank that is independent of government. There is also some suggestion that the inflationary consequences of monetary expansion may be lessened under a more decentralised institutional setting.  相似文献   

16.
This paper considers a sticky-price model with heterogeneous households and financial frictions. Financial frictions lead to imperfect risk-sharing among households with idiosyncratic labor incomes. I study implications of imperfect risk-sharing for optimal monetary policy by documenting its impacts on the monetary transmission mechanism, the inflation–output tradeoff faced by the central bank, the policy objective function, and the resulting targeting rule. The main finding is that while the central bank continues to have the conventional dual mandate — the output gap and inflation stabilization — it should place a greater weight on the later as the degree of financial frictions increases because price stability provides the additional benefit of reducing undesired consumption dispersion.  相似文献   

17.
In most of the literature on transparency it has been standard to assume that central banks release truthful information when communicating with the public. However, the monetary policymaker may act strategically and misrepresent private information intending to reduce economic volatility by manipulating inflation expectations. We set up a simple model which includes misrepresentation as a possible action for the central bank and derive some testable implications. The empirical evidence from the analysis of inflation forecasts of six central banks (Brazil, Canada, England, Iceland, New Zealand, and Sweden) is consistent with the existence of strategic forecasting. (JEL E52, E58)  相似文献   

18.
货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起   总被引:31,自引:1,他引:30  
徐亚平 《经济研究》2006,41(8):24-34
本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。  相似文献   

19.
Summary. The extreme severity of the second Hungarian hyperinflation is argued to be related to the unusual way in which the inflation was eventually stabilized. The historical features of this episode are represented in a general equilibrium model, which incorporates a transition from one monetary regime to another. During the inflation the government finances a fixed deficit with seigniorage revenue. After the stabilization the government budget is balanced and the central bank engages in a program of subsidized lending to the private sector. Stabilization is achieved by targeting a low inflation rate path through adjustments in the quantity of central bank lending. I show that under this stabilization policy (1) the dynamic equilibrium path of the economy is indeterminate and (2) arbitrarily high pre-stabilization inflation rates are possible. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998  相似文献   

20.
Central banks have made great efforts to increase transparency and accountability to the public. Since then, studies seek empirical evidences about the effects of monetary policy communication over agent’s expectations. The recent literature on central bank communication draws attention to the importance of clarity of central bank communication. However, researches on this theme are still scarce, and there are few empirical studies with conclusive findings. Our study seeks empirical evidences on the relation between clarity of central bank communication and credibility of monetary policy. Estimates through different methods aim to identify whether clarity of central bank communication improves credibility. The study is the first to provide empirical evidence that a clearer communication can improve credibility. We also consider the differences between the two governors who ruled the Central Bank of Brazil in the period under analysis. The results indicate that a clear communication can improve credibility, but it depends on the commitment of the central banker with the goal of inflation control. Furthermore, estimates based on quantile regression indicate that the benefit brought by the clarity to the credibility depends on the commitment of the monetary authority with the goal guiding inflation expectations.  相似文献   

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