Market and welfare implications of the reservation price strategy for forest harvest decisions

Previous studies have reported significant gains from adopting the adaptive harvest strategy under conditions of timber price uncertainty. For the final harvest decision in even-aged stand management, the adaptive strategy typically means that a stand is harvested when the timber price is sufficiently high, whereas low prices are avoided by postponing the harvest. Such a harvest behavior may have significant impacts on the future price process, which in turn affects the landowner's profits. Moreover, it would certainly affect the timber-based industry and consumers. This paper assesses these impacts in a hypothetical timber market, using the Faustmann rule (FR) as a benchmark. The results show that changing from the FR to the reservation price strategy (RPS) reduces the supply of timber, thereby pushes up the price level. The RPS significantly reduces the short-run random variation of timber price. In the long run, both the mean and the variance of the timber price tend to stabilize. Depending on the anticipated price variation underlying the RPS, the expected timber price may be close to, or much higher than, the benchmark level, and the variance of price can be very large or very small. The welfare effect of the RPS is small if the anticipated variance of timber price used to optimize the RPS is small. If the anticipated variance of price is large, then the RSP leads to significant increase in the landowners’ profits and at the same time reduces the consumer surplus by a much larger amount.     

Investment in site-specific crop management under uncertainty: implications for nitrogen pollution control and environmental policy

This paper applies an option‐pricing model to analyze the impact of uncertainty about output prices and expectations of declining fixed costs on the optimal timing of investment in site‐specific crop management (SSCM). It also analyzes the extent to which the level of spatial variability in soil conditions can mitigate the value of waiting to invest in SSCM and influence the optimal timing of adoption and create a preference for custom hiring rather than owner purchase of equipment. Numerical simulations show that while the net present value (NPV) rule predicts that immediate adoption is profitable under most of the soil conditions considered here, recognition of the option value of investment indicates that it is preferable to delay investment in SSCM for at least 3 years unless average soil quality is high and the variability in soil quality and fertility is high. The use of the option value approach reveals that the value of waiting to invest in SSCM raises the cost‐share subsidy rates required to induce immediate adoption above the levels indicated by the NPV rule.