Reining in auditors: On the dynamics of power surrounding an “innovation” in the regulatory space

In the aftermath of Enron and the collapse of Arthur Andersen, new “independent” institutions were created to oversee financial auditing. Based on a modified version of Lukes’ multidimensional model of power, we first investigate how the creation of the Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) has affected the dynamics of power among the main players enlisted in Canada’s regulation of public accounting. Our findings strengthen the view that a “form of allegiance” was, at the time of data collection, developing between CPAB and the largest Canadian accounting firms. Through a second analytical movement, we extend the boundaries of our argument, showing that patterns of resistance against the logic of arm’s length regulation operate in a variety of audit regulatory sites. Our conclusion points, in particular, to the spatial gap - and incidentally the limitations - of any attempt to control and supervise a globalized industry from a national or regional perspective.     

Do banks effectively manage their risks? The role of risk governance in the MENA region

This study aims to investigate (1) the effects of the creation of a board-level risk committee (RC) and the designation of a chief risk officer (CRO) on the risk-taking practices undertaken by financial institutions and (2) whether these mechanisms improve the risk management effectiveness of both conventional banks (CBs) and Islamic banks (IBs). We contribute to the scarce literature on the relationship between risk governance and risk-taking behaviour and investigate IBs in this context. Using a sample of 573 observations representing 65 banks (28 CBs and 37 IBs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region from 2005 to 2015, we find a negative association between the risk governance indices and their risk perspectives across both types of banks for the post-crisis period. Interestingly, we find that the existence of risk governance mechanisms in IBs is associated with higher risk taking for the pre-crisis period, i.e., before the recent amendments to the risk governance principles in the MENA region. This result implies that IBs can respond to regulatory reforms in the post-crisis period by curbing excessive risk taking. We offer further evidence that the risk governance effect on overall risk taking stems only from the stand-alone board-level RC and not from the role of the CRO. We note that the CBs’ performance is more associated with risk taking for banks with stronger board-level RCs. The board-level RCs improve the effectiveness of risk management within CBs but do not influence the risk management effectiveness of IBs.