Can pure play internet banking survive the credit crisis?

This paper positions the pure-play internet banking model (PPI) as a hybrid business model that combines features of both relationship and transaction banking. Although in terms of customer orientation PPI banks may partly resemble relationship banks, they lack their comparative advantage in generating borrower-specific information. Instead, the characteristic features of PPI banks are low costs and easy scalability. While the latter may enable PPI banks to quickly capture market share, it may also generate overexposure in risky markets. We present a case study on ING Direct, one of the leading global PPI banks and address the sustainability of the PPI business model by comparing the ING Direct foreign operations. The findings for ING Direct are validated using data for E-Trade Bank. We conclude that managing growth appears to be the prime challenge to PPI banks.     

Did the crisis induce credit rationing for French SMEs?

This paper focuses on the access of independent French SMEs to bank lending and analyzes whether the observed evolution of credit to SMEs over the recent period was “demand driven” as a result of the decrease in firms’ activity and investment projects or was “supply driven” with an increase in credit “rationing” stemming from a more cautious behavior of banks. Based on a sample of around 60,000 SMEs, we come to the conclusion that, despite the stronger standards used by banks when granting credit, French SMEs do not appear to have been strongly affected by credit rationing since 2008. This result goes against the common view that SMEs suffered from a strong credit restriction during the crisis but is perfectly in line with the results of several surveys about the access to finance of SMEs recently conducted in France.     

Can mispricing explain the value premium?

Empirical research finds that stocks with low market-to-book (MTB) ratios outperform stocks with high MTB ratios. Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan separate the MTB ratio into mispricing and growth options components. We report that the mispricing component, but not the growth options component, predicts abnormal returns for up to 5 years. We also find that the mispricing component, but not the growth options component, provides incremental information relative to existing asset pricing models. Moreover, after controlling for mispricing, value no longer beats growth. Overall, our evidence is consistent with a behavioral explanation of the value premium.     

Did the securitization market freeze affect bank lending during the financial crisis? Evidence from a credit register

Using data from the Italian Credit Register we identify the adverse effect of the freeze of the securitization market on bank lending during the crisis of 2007–2008. Applying a differences-in-differences estimation to data on firms that borrow from multiple banks, we single out credit supply by including firm fixed effects. Our results show that the degree to which banks tightened credit supply to nonfinancial firms is positively related to the share of loans they securitized before the crisis. The tightening translated into lower credit growth, higher interest rates, lower probability of accepting loan applications and higher probability of relationship termination. Firms were unable to fully compensate the negative credit supply shock, which suggests that the securitization freeze played a role in reducing aggregate credit availability.     

Did the rating standard for banks change after the crisis?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Did rating agencies tighten their rating standard after the overwhelming critique on their generous ratings before 2008? This study aims to examine...     

Did the banking sector foresee the financial crisis? Evidence from risk factor disclosures

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Beginning in December 2005, the SEC required registrants to discuss “the most significant factors that make the company risky” under the...     

Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and pre-and post-crisis years as benchmark periods. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns and a higher market-to-book ratio during the crisis. This positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. However, the positive effect does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. Finally, we also find that ownership stability was associated with a higher level of investments, illustrating that stable ownership affects real corporate decisions.

     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

Is the presidential premium spurious?

A hotly debated question in finance is whether the higher stock returns under Democratic presidencies relative to Republican presidencies represent abnormal return, risk premium, or mere statistical fluke. This paper investigates whether this presidential premium is due to spurious-regression bias, data mining, or economic policy uncertainty. Decomposing the presidential premium into expected and unexpected components, we find that over two-thirds of the premium is unexpected, which is inconsistent with the spurious regression bias explanation. The presidential premium is not explained by data mining given that it persists in the post-publication period, and remains robust even if we purge returns of their covariation with economic policy uncertainty.     

Does the equity premium puzzle persist during financial crisis? The case of the French equity market

This paper examines the effects of the financial crisis that began in 2008 on the equity premium of 6 French sector indices. Since the systematic risk coefficient beta remains the most common explanatory element of risk premium in most asset pricing models, we investigate the impact of the crisis on the time-varying beta of the six sector indices cited. We selected daily data from January 2003 to December 2012 and we applied the bivariate MA-GARCH model (BEKK) to estimate time-varying betas for the sector indices. The crisis was marked by increased volatility of the sector indices and the market. This rise in volatility led to an increase in the systematic risk coefficient during the crisis and first post-crisis period for all the major indices. The results are intuitive and corroborate findings in the empirical literature. The increase of the time-varying beta is considered by investors as an additional risk. Therefore, as expected, investors tend to increase their equity premiums to b ear the impact of financial crisis.     

Did going public impair Moody׳s credit ratings?

We investigate a prominent allegation in congressional hearings that Moody?s loosened its rating standards to chase revenue after it went public in 2000. Consistent with this allegation, Moody?s ratings for both corporate bonds and structured finance products are significantly more favorable to issuers, relative to S&P?s, after Moody?s IPO. Moreover, Moody?s ratings are more favorable for clients subject to greater conflict of interest. There is little evidence that Moody?s higher ratings, post-IPO, are more informative, measured as expected default frequencies (EDFs) or as the probability of default. Our findings inform the debate on whether financial gatekeepers should be publicly traded.     

Are outside directors with greater board tenure valuable? Evidence from the last credit crisis

Analyses of bank performance around the 2007–2008 financial crisis indicate that outside directors with financial experience acquired through longer board service at their own banks are more effective than those with financial experience acquired elsewhere. Institutions with more long-tenured independent directors (i) earn higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the collapse of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, (ii) limit their risk exposure before the crisis, (iii) exhibit better stock return and accounting performance during the crisis, (iv) are less likely to be bailed out by the U.S. government’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), and (v) receive proportionally less financial assistance from TARP.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Did the financial crisis affect the market valuation of large systemic U.S. banks?

We examine the impact of the financial crisis on the stock market valuation of large and systemic U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs). Using the Bertsatos and Sakellaris (2016) model of fundamental valuation of bank equity, we provide evidence that the financial crisis has not altered investors’ attitudes towards bank characteristics. In particular, before, during, and after the crisis, investors in large and systemic U.S. BHCs seemed to penalize leverage, albeit temporarily. Both before and after the crisis, they reward size in the short run. This pattern is appearing only briefly during the crisis. We also show that bank opacity plays no role in market valuation either in the short run or in the long run. Last but not least, we find evidence that stress testing has been informative to the market and that those BHCs that failed at the post-crisis stress tests were not subsequently valued differently by the market.     

Did crisis alter trading of two major oil futures markets?

The paper analyzes how traders in two major oil futures markets: New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and Intercontinental Exchange, reacted to the 2008 financial crisis, particularly whether they shifted their trading pattern and whether the relative information role of the two markets changed. Using trade-by-trade data, the paper analyzes several trading characteristics including trading volume, trade size, volatility, bid–ask spread, and relative information share. On average, NYMEX is characterized by greater volume, trade size and slightly greater spread. Before the crisis, NYMEX leads the process of price discovery, and volatility and trade size are significant factors explaining this leadership. However, following the financial crisis of 2008, the leadership role of NYMEX declines and trade size and volatility are no longer significant factors. Contrary to results of most equity market research, bid–ask spread is not a significant factor in information share and causality tests indicate that causality runs from spread to information share before the crisis but the opposite holds during the crisis period.     

Will you survive the services revolution?

Of late, offshoring and outsourcing have become political hot buttons. These o words have been conflated to mean that high-paying, white-collar jobs have been handed to well-trained but less expensive workers in India and other locales. The brouhaha over the loss of service jobs, which currently account for over 80% of private-sector employment in the United States, is not merely an American phenomenon. The fact is that service-sector jobs in all developed countries are at risk. Regardless of what the politicians now say, worry focused on offshoring and outsourcing misses the point, the author argues. We are in the middle of a fundamental change, which is that services are being industrialized. Three factors in particular are combining with outsourcing and offshoring to drive that transformation: The first is increasing global competition, where just as with manufactured goods in the recent past, foreign companies are offering more services in the United States, taking market share from U.S. companies. The second is automation: New hardware and software systems that take care of back-room and front-office tasks such as counter operations, security, billing, and order taking are allowing firms to dispense with clerical, accounting, and other staff positions. The third is self-service. Why use a travel agent when you can book your own flight, hotel, and rental car online? As these forces combine to sweep across the service sector, executives of all stripes must start thinking about arming and defending themselves, just as their manufacturing cousins did a generation ago. This will demand proactive and far-reaching changes, including focusing specifically on customer preference, quality, and technological interfaces; rewiring strategy to find new value from existing and unfamiliar sources; de-integrating and radically reassembling operational processes; and restructuring the organization to accommodate new kinds of work and skills.     

The economic crisis: Did supervision architecture and governance matter?

Since the mid-1990s worldwide efforts were undertaken to improve the effectiveness of financial supervision, through modifications in the architecture and governance. Did these improvements mitigate the 2008–2009 Crisis? This paper brings the first systematic analysis of the role of three main efforts: consolidation in supervision, decreasing central bank involvement and improving supervisory governance. The analysis employs a new and complex database on supervisory architecture and governance for 102 countries and uses two new indicators to evaluate the supervisory regime: the Financial Supervision Herfindahl Hirschman (FSHH) and the Central Bank Supervisor Share (CBSS) Indexes. The empirical tests allow us to disentangle the relative effects of the supervisory regimes on macroeconomic resilience. We conclude that two supervisory features—supervisory consolidation and supervisory governance—were negatively correlated with resilience, while central bank involvement in supervision did not have any significant impact. Our results show that the conditions under which micro-features of the supervisory design produce automatically macro-optimal outcomes are far from identified, and consequently contradict what was the generally accepted view before the crisis.     

Does the forward premium puzzle disappear over the horizon?

This paper provides the first comprehensive study of the horizon effect in tests of the forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis. It estimates Fama regressions employing 1-month through to 10-year horizon data for the five most heavily traded US dollar currency pairs pre-crisis 1980–2006. In contrast with extant studies, it fully deals with the econometric problems of long horizon regressions by means of a novel heteroskedastic- and autocorrelation-consistent bootstrap. The regression results confirm a clear horizon effect in that the slope coefficient approaches unity as the forward contract maturity is extended. The puzzle disappears at the 3-year horizon and beyond for all currencies.     

Does the ECB act as a lender of last resort during the subprime lending crisis?: Evidence from monetary policy reaction models

We investigate whether the ECB aligns its monetary policy with financial crisis risk in EMU member countries. We find that since the outbreak of the subprime crisis the ECB has significantly increased net lending and reduced interest rates when banking and sovereign debt crisis risk in vulnerable EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) increases, while no significant effect is identified for the pre-crisis period and relatively tranquil EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands). These findings suggest that the ECB acts as a Lender of Last Resort for vulnerable EMU countries.     

Did family firms perform better during the financial crisis? New insights from the S&P 500 firms

This paper provides new evidence on whether family firms performed better during the global financial crisis (2008–2010). Using the dataset of the S&P 500 nonfinancial firms during the period 2006–2010, we find that family firms outperformed nonfamily firms during the crisis. Among family firms, the ones that contributed to the outperformance were those where the founder was still present. We also find that during the global financial crisis, founder firms invested significantly less and had better access to the credit market than nonfamily firms. Our analysis suggests that the superior performance of founder firms is largely caused by their having less incentive to overinvest in order to boost short-term earnings during the crisis.