ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION

We introduce asymmetric information about consumers’ transportation costs (i.e., the degree of product differentiation) in the model of Hotelling. When transportation costs are high, both firms have lower profits with asymmetric information than with perfect information. Contrarily, if transportation costs are low, both firms may prefer the asymmetric information scenario (the informed firm always prefers the informational advantage, while the uninformed firm may or may not prefer to remain uninformed). Information exchange is ex‐ante advantageous for both firms, but ex‐post damaging if transportation costs turn out to be low. If the information is unverifiable, the informed firm does not represent a reliable source of information, since it always prefers to announce that transportation costs are high and there is no contract that induces truthful revelation.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION FLOWS IN CUSTOMER MARKETS

In customer markets an information asymmetry exists between a firm's current customers and prospective customers. When a firm changes its price, current customers are instantly aware of the price change, while potential customers are informed slowly of the change. The paper explicitly models this information imperfection and the associated asymmetry in firms' customer flows. The main result of the paper is that, because of the information asymmetry, there will be a range of marginal cost and demand over which the firm has no incentive to change price. It is also shown that prices will be more upwardly flexible than downwardly flexible. The size of the range, and the extent of downward price inflexibility, depends on the rate at which information is transmitted to customers.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND MODELS OF CREDIT RATIONING

This paper outlines the development and exposits some of the central ideas and implications of asymmetric information in the credit market.     

MARRIAGE,DIVORCE, AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

We use data on people's valuations of options outside marriage and beliefs about spouses' options. The data demonstrate that, in some couples, one spouse would be happier and the other spouse unhappier outside of some marriages, suggesting that bargaining takes place and that spouses have private information. We estimate a bargaining model with interdependent utility that quantifies the resulting inefficiencies. Our results show that people forgo some utility in order to make their spouses better off and, in doing so, offset much of the inefficiency generated by their imperfect knowledge. Thus, we find evidence of asymmetric information and interdependent utility in marriage.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE LACK OF PORTFOLIO DIVERSIFICATION*

There is pervasive evidence that individuals invest primarily in local stocks and thus hold poorly diversified portfolios. The present article develops a theoretical model in which the presence of informational asymmetries introduces home equity bias. The main departure from previous theoretical work is the assumption that local investors outperform nonlocal investors in identifying the correct ranking of local investment opportunities, instead of possessing superior information about the aggregate performance of the local stock market. The second key assumption is based on the evidence that short‐selling is a costly activity.     

中国股票市场对政策信息的不平衡性反应研究

本文将影响股票市场的政策信息区分为"好消息"和"坏消息"。通过 EGARCH 模型研究中国股票市场对"好消息"与"坏消息"的不平衡性反应,指出"好消息"对我国股票市场的影响大于"坏消息"的影响,这与国外股票市场的情况正好相反。根据这一结果本文创建了"信息效应曲线",具体分析我国股票市场对"好消息"与"坏消息"的不平衡性反应的特征,提出现有交易机制下的股价波动模式。     

LOBBYING AND ELECTIONS

I analyse the interaction between post‐election lobbying and the voting decisions of forward‐looking voters. The existing literature has shown that in models with citizen candidates from a dispersed distribution of preferences, lobbying has no influence on implemented policy. In my model with ideological parties, lobbying is shown to have an effect on policy. In terms of welfare, I show that the median voter and the majority of voters can be better off with lobbying.     

EFFECTS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITHIN A FIRM ON OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET OUTCOMES

I analyze the implications of the Laffont–Tirole type agency problems on oligopolistic market outcomes. In the model, a firm's marginal cost is decreasing in managerial effort and is subject to an additive shock. Both managerial effort and the realization of the shock are a manager's private information. A firm first offers a menu of contract to its manager, and then competes in the product market. As in the model of single principal and single agent, the incentive contracts implement efforts that are distorted downward relative to full information. In this model, with multiple agency relationships, an additional source for upward distortion of effort emerges as a result of the interaction in the product market. The results are robust to whether firms compete in price or quantity.     

LEARNING-BY-DOING AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN A MODEL OF MONOPOLY REGULATION*

This paper combines learning-by-doing and asymmetric information in a model of monopoly regulation with and without foreign competition. The principal source of the information asymmetry is unobservable firm effort in the learning process, although unobservable costs are also considered. The major result is that a post-learning all-or-nothing output-contingent lump-sum subsidy can achieve the regulator's complete information welfare maximum. With foreign competition this model can best be thought of as one involving infant industry regulation.     

DYNAMIC TRADING IN A DURABLE GOOD MARKET WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION*

We analyze a dynamic version of the Akerlof–Wilson “lemons” market in a competitive durable good setting. There is a fixed set of sellers with private information about the quality of their wares. The price mechanism sorts sellers of different qualities into different time periods—prices and average quality of goods traded increase over time. Goods of all qualities are traded in finite time. Market failure arises because of the waiting involved—particularly for sellers of better quality. The equilibrium path may exhibit intermediate breaks in trading.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IMPACTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE AUSTRALIAN TREASURY-BOND FUTURES MARKET

Abstract.  The effect of information flows on the return volatility of Australian 3-year Treasury bond futures is examined using linear and non-linear GARCH models. Results show significant asymmetric information effects, where bad news has a greater impact on volatility than good news and a non-linear Threshold ARCH(1,1) in mean model provides the most accurate estimation of return volatility. Diagnostic tests confirm this finding and out of sample forecasting error statistics verify that the Threshold ARCH(1,1) in mean model yields the lowest forecasting error. The Threshold ARCH(1,1)-M model is best at capturing the asymmetric information impact on the Australian three-year T-Bond futures return volatility.     

产出不确定,信息不对称与双重危机发生机制

本文构造了一个具有银行部门和消费—生产者微观基础的一般均衡模型,分析了新兴市场国家双重危机的发生机制。本文发现,下列条件可以引发双重金融危机:(1)一部分外国存款人在中期获得了关于东道国未来产出或币值的糟糕信号;(2)本国居民对未来产出或币值的不利信号反应过度而不再追加投资;(3)居民由于"动物情绪"不再追加投资。     

ELECTORAL CYCLES THROUGH LOBBYING

In this paper, we build a framework where the interplay between the lobby power of special interest groups and the voting power of the majority of the population leads to political business cycles. We apply our setup to explain electoral cycles in government expenditure composition, aggregate expenditures, and real exchange rates.     

VOTING AND SOCIAL PRESSURE UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION

We develop a model in which costly voting in a large, two‐party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self‐interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.     

产出损失和政策效应分化下的G20合作

在对金融危机造成的实体经济产出损失进行测算的基础上,本文着重从经济基础层面对当前G20合作的现实困境加以解释.笔者认为,金融危机对全球经济的冲击形成了G20深化合作的内在动力,但与此同时,冲击的不对称性以及政策效应的分化特征也造成了当前G20进一步深化合作的现实困难.此外,在发展中国家的内部分化特征更为显著的背景下,金融危机后全球经济格局中发达国家主导的局面不会发生根本变化,而围绕市场开放和外部经济失衡调整的利益纷争也必然会有所加剧.     

信息流和"不对称信息"是金融与服务中心发展的决定因素:中国案例

本文从“不对称信息”和“信息腹地”理论出发，以中国为例，讨论了影响现代金融中心发展的决定因素。本文还以国内外企业总部在国内四城市的分布调查企业总部选址成因，从而分析“不对称信息”在总部选址决定中的区域效应。     

INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL AUTHORITIES UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities under incomplete information. The inflation goal of the central bank is assumed to be unknown to the fiscal authority and the public. The central bank signals the goal by choosing the first‐period monetary policy before the fiscal authority joins the policy‐making game. If the central bank would like the fiscal authority and the public to believe that it is wet (dry), the central bank would distort the money supply upward (downward) in order to reveal its actual type.     

LOBBYING COMPETITION OVER TRADE POLICY*

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well‐known Grossman–Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified to account for the cross‐sectoral use of inputs (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon, with around 50% of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Our empirical results validate the theoretical predictions. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the “welfare‐mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.     

LOBBYING CONTESTS WITH ENDOGENOUS POLICY PROPOSALS

Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an influence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discriminating contest. With endogenous policy proposals, there is a subgame-perfect equilibrium where the proposals of the lobbyists coincide and maximize joint welfare; moreover, this equilibrium is the only one that survives repeated elimination of dominated strategies. Hence there is no rent dissipation at all. A politician trying to maximize lobbying expenditures would prefer an imperfectly discriminating contest.