Galton's Error and the under-representation of systematic risk

Science progresses by improving its measurement apparatus. This holds true in finance too. The new methodology of “complete identification”, using simple algebraic geometry, throws new light on Galton's Error in finance and economics and the resulting misinformation of investors. Mutual funds conventionally advertise their relative systematic market risk, or “betas”, to potential investors based on incomplete measurement by unidirectional bivariate projections: they commit Galton's Error by under-representing their systematic risk. Consequently, far too many mutual funds are marketed as “defensive” and too few as “aggressive”. Using the new methodology it is found that, out of a total of 3217 mutual funds, 2047 funds (63.7%) claimed to be defensive based on the current industry standard methodology, but only 608 (18.9%) actually are. This under-representation of systematic risk leads to inefficiencies in the capital allocation process, since biased betas lead to mispricing of mutual funds. Complete bivariate projections produce a correct representation of the epistemic uncertainty inherent in the bivariate measurement of relative market risk and provide a new CAPM taxonomy. Our conclusions have also serious consequences for the proper “bench-marking” and recent regulatory proposals for the mutual funds industry. Extension of the new methodology to multivariate systematic risk measurement by Asset Pricing Theory (APT) is suggested.     

Financial instruments with sports betting components: Marketing gimmick or a domain for behavioral finance?

We examine theoretically and experimentally a certain class of new financial instruments which are designed as lotteries on the outcome of prominent sports events like the Soccer World Cup 2006. From a theoretical point of view, sports betting products may be superior to a fixed rate investment because of heterogeneous expectations, risk-loving behavior of investors or additional non-monetary utility components. In comparison to the direct placement of bets at bookmakers’, sports betting products may be preferable in cases of hedonic framing. Our experimental section, however, reveals the limited practical relevance of these theoretical arguments for “average” decision makers. Despite this, financial instruments with sports betting components offer a certain profit potential due to the diversity of preferences across individuals. Summarizing, the issuance of sports betting products may actually be mainly driven by marketing aspects, nevertheless sports betting products may be considered to be “viable” niche products with low cost of capital for banks.     

Board structure and the informativeness of risk disclosure: Evidence from MENA emerging markets

We examine whether board characteristics affect firms' decision to voluntarily disclose informative information about their risk profiles. We base our study on data from 320 listed firms in nine MENA emerging markets (789 observations) over the period from 2007 to 2009. Our study offers significant contributions to the growing risk disclosure literature. It provides new empirical evidence that information driven by some board characteristics affects the perceived relevance of narrative risk information. Our findings suggest that the composition of the board and its size enhance the informativeness of risk disclosure as it allows investors to better predict future earnings growth. A further finding is that a CEO/Chairperson duality does not impact the way investors trust risk disclosures.     

Liquidity protection versus moral hazard: the role of the IMF

A game between the IMF, a country and atomistic private investors is motivated by recent crises including that in Argentina. The one stage game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Considering an equilibrium in mixed strategies, conditions are derived on whether the IMF should exist. A “cooperative first best” may be supported in a repeated game by a “minimum punishment strategy” but breaks down as the probability of insolvency rises. Countries are likely to deviate in bad times placing the IMF in an “impossible position”. The international financial architecture (IFA) remains incomplete.     

Information Uncertainty and Expected Returns

This study examines the role of information uncertainty (IU) in predicting cross-sectional stock returns. We define IU in terms of “value ambiguity,” or the precision with which firm value can be estimated by knowledgeable investors at reasonable cost. Using several different proxies for IU, we show that (1) on average, high-IU firms earn lower future returns (the “mean” effect), and (2) price and earnings momentum effects are much stronger among high-IU firms (the “interaction” effect). These findings are consistent with analytical models in which high IU exacerbates investor overconfidence and limits rational arbitrage.This revised version was published online in August 2005 with a corrected cover date.     

Learning about beta: Time-varying factor loadings, expected returns, and the conditional CAPM

We amend the conditional CAPM to allow for unobservable long-run changes in risk factor loadings. In this environment, investors rationally “learn” the long-run level of factor loadings from the observation of realized returns. As a consequence of this assumption, we model conditional betas using the Kalman filter. Because of its focus on low-frequency variation in betas, our approach circumvents recent criticisms of the conditional CAPM. When tested on portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market, our learning-augmented conditional CAPM passes the specification tests.     

Flying under the radar: The effects of short-sale disclosure rules on investor behavior and stock prices

We study how disclosure requirements for large short positions affect investor behavior and security prices. Short positions accumulate just below the applicable disclosure threshold as certain investors never disclose any of their positions. Further tests suggest that this secrecy is part of investors’ general policy of avoiding disclosure to protect their unique, profitable investment strategies against reverse engineering by competitors. No evidence supports the notion that short sellers avoid disclosure because of potential adverse effects on securities' lending fees, risk of recall, or short squeezes. Finally, the evasive behavior by short sellers in response to transparency regulations hampers price discovery.     

Front-Running by Mutual Fund Managers: A Mixed Bag

This paper evaluates the welfare implications of front-running by mutual fund managers. It extends the model of Kyle (1985) to a situation in which the insider with fundamentals-information competes against an insider with trade-information and in which noise trading is endogenized. Noise traders are small investors trading through mutual funds to hedge non-tradable or illiquid assets. The insider with trade-information is one of the fund managers. We find that her front-running activity reduces the liquidity costs of her customers, but it also reduces their hedging benefits. As a result, the customers of the front-running manager may be worse off and place smaller orders. The opposite is true, however, for those investors who are not subject to front-running. In aggregate, front-running has either no or positive consequences for welfare.     

Setting a fox to keep the geese — Does the comply-or-explain principle work?

The German Corporate Governance Code works according to the comply-or-explain principle. One of its recommendations was to publish the remuneration of the members of the executive board on an individual basis. We examine the characteristics of the firms that complied with the code requirement. Our results indicate that firms that paid higher average remunerations to their management board members were less likely to comply, whereas firms with higher Tobin's Q were more likely to comply. We also document a non-monotonic relation between ownership concentration and the probability of compliance that is consistent with standard corporate governance arguments.Due to the fact that the number of firms complying with the disclosure requirement was low, a new law was passed that mandates disclosure unless the shareholders' meeting (with a 75% majority) decides otherwise. We find that this “loophole” in the new legislation is exploited by smaller firms, firms with comparatively high levels of executive remuneration, and firms with concentrated ownership. We discuss the implications of our results for the effectiveness of the comply-or-explain regulation.     

An “American Dream” theory of corporate executive Fraud

In this paper, we first describe a “Broken Trust” theory that was introduced by Albrecht el al. [Albrecht, W. S., Albrecht, C. C., & Albrecht, C. O. (2004). Fraud and corporate executives: Agency, Stewardship and Broken Trust. Journal of Forensic Accounting, 5, 109–130] to explain corporate executive Fraud. The Broken Trust theory is primarily based on an “Agency” theory from economic literature and a “Stewardship” theory from psychology literature. We next describe an “American Dream” theory from sociology literature to complement Albrecht el al.'s (2004) Broken Trust theory. Like the Broken Trust theory, the American Dream theory relates to a “Fraud Triangle” concept to explain corporate executive Fraud. Finally, we provide some anecdotal evidence from recent high profile corporate executive Fraud to explore the American Dream theory. We conclude our thoughts on corporate executive Fraud from a teaching perspective.     

Earnings management and initial public offerings: The case of the depository industry

In a typical IPO, insiders are “net sellers” of IPO shares; however, in a demutualizing thrift, insiders are “net buyers” of IPO shares. Using a sample of mutual depository IPOs, we find evidence consistent with earnings management prior to the conversion of mutual thrifts. We find on average that mutuals report lower ROA and increased loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves in the period prior to the demutualization. Using a two-stage approach, we also find that the level of discretionary loan loss provisions and discretionary reserves are positively related to both the level of insider participation in the IPO and the first-day returns to investors. Our results are consistent with management of mutual thrifts benefiting at the conversion from reduced pre-IPO earnings and book equity resulting from earnings management.     

Financial accounting: In communicating reality, we construct reality

At first I saw Don Juan simply as a rather peculiar man who knew a great deal…but the people…believed that he had some sort of “secret knowledge”, that he was a “brujo”. The Spanish word brujo means, in English…sorcerer. It connotes essentially a person who has extraordinary…powers.I had known Don Juan for a whole year before he took me into his confidence. One day he explained that he possessed a certain knowledge that he had learned from a teacher, a “benefactor” as he called him, who had directed him in a kind of apprenticeship. Don Juan had, in turn, chosen me to serve as his apprentice, but he warned me that I would have to make a very deep commitment and that the training was long and arduous…My field notes disclose the subjective version of what I perceived while undergoing the experience. That version is presented here…My field notes also reveal the content of Don Juan's system of beliefs. I have condensed long pages of questions and answers between Don Juan and myself in order to avoid reproducing the repetitiveness of conversation…(The Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge, Carlos Castaneda, 1970, pp. 14, 24, 25).     

Accounting information,disclosure, and expected utility: Do investors really abhor uncertainty?

Investors are said to “abhor uncertainty,” but if there were no uncertainty they could earn only the risk‐free rate. A fundamental result in the analytical accounting literature shows that investors buying into a CARA‐normal CAPM market pay lower asset prices, gain higher ex‐ante expected returns, and obtain higher expected utility, when the market payoff has higher variance. New investors obtain similar “welfare” gains from risk under a log/power utility CAPM. These results do not imply that investors “abhor information.” To realize investors' ex‐ante expectations, the subjective probability distributions representing market expectations must be accurate. Greater payoff risk can add to investors' expected utility, but higher ex‐post(realized) utility comes from better information and more accurate ex‐ante expectations. An important implication for accounting is that greater disclosure can have the simultaneous effects of (i) exposing more fully or perceptibly firms' payoff uncertainty, thereby increasing new investors' expected utility, and (ii) improving market estimates of firms' payoff parameters (means, variances, covariances), thereby giving investors a better chance of realizing their expectations. Paradoxically, better information can be valuable to new investors by exposing more fully and more accurately the risk in firms' business operations and results–new investors maximizing expected utility want both more risk and better information.     

Extreme observations and risk assessment in the equity markets of MENA region: Tail measures and Value-at-Risk

The standard “delta-normal” Value-at-Risk methodology requires that the underlying returns generating distribution for the security in question is normally distributed, with moments which can be estimated using historical data and are time-invariant. However, the stylized fact that returns are fat-tailed is likely to lead to under-prediction of both the size of extreme market movements and the frequency with which they occur. In this paper, we use the extreme value theory to analyze four emerging markets belonging to the MENA region (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey). We focus on the tails of the unconditional distribution of returns in each market and provide estimates of their tail index behavior. In the process, we find that the returns have significantly fatter tails than the normal distribution and therefore introduce the extreme value theory. We then estimate the maximum daily loss by computing the Value-at-Risk (VaR) in each market. Consistent with the results from other developing countries [see Gencay, R. and Selcuk, F., (2004). Extreme value theory and Value-at-Risk: relative performance in emerging markets. International Journal of Forecasting, 20, 287–303; Mendes, B., (2000). Computing robust risk measures in emerging equity markets using extreme value theory. Emerging Markets Quarterly, 4, 25–41; Silva, A. and Mendes, B., (2003). Value-at-Risk and extreme returns in Asian stock markets. International Journal of Business, 8, 17–40], generally, we find that the VaR estimates based on the tail index are higher than those based on a normal distribution for all markets, and therefore a proper risk assessment should not neglect the tail behavior in these markets, since that may lead to an improper evaluation of market risk. Our results should be useful to investors, bankers, and fund managers, whose success depends on the ability to forecast stock price movements in these markets and therefore build their portfolios based on these forecasts.     

Disclosing to Informed Traders

We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.     

Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration

Mandatory disclosure is a regulatory tool intended to allow market participants to assess operational risk. We examine the value of disclosure through the controversial SEC requirement, since overturned, which required major hedge funds to register as investment advisors and file Form ADV disclosures. Leverage and ownership structures suggest that lenders and equity investors were already aware of operational risk. However, operational risk does not mediate flow‐performance relationships. Investors either lack this information or regard it as immaterial. These findings suggest that regulators should account for the endogenous production of information and the marginal benefit of disclosure to different investment clienteles.     

The effect of market segmentation on stock prices: The China syndrome

China has an A-share market that is open only to local investors and a B-share market that is open only to foreign investors. Contrary to what has been observed in other markets with a similar segmented structure, the China B shares trade at a discount relative to the A shares. We show that the phenomenon can still be explained by basic economic principles. Specifically, the existence of the H-share and the “red-chip” markets in Hong Kong provide good substitutes for the B-share market. We find that when more H shares and red chips are listed in Hong Kong, the B-share discount becomes larger. This is consistent with the model of differential demand elasticity proposed by Stulz and Wasserfallen (Stulz, R., Wasserfallen, W., 1995. Review of Financial Studies 8, 1019–1057).     

Credit Default Swaps and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure

We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders.     

A theory of risk disclosure

In this paper, we consider the price effects of risk disclosure. We develop a model in which investors are uncertain about the variance of a firm’s cash flows and the firm releases an imperfect signal regarding this variance. In our model, uncertainty over the riskiness of a firm’s cash flows leads to a variance uncertainty premium in its price. We demonstrate that risk disclosure decreases the firm’s cost of capital by reducing this premium and that the market response to risk disclosure is small when the expected level of risk is high. Moreover, we find that firms acquire and disclose more risk information when their cash flow risk is greater than expected. Finally, we demonstrate that in a multi-asset setting, only risk disclosure concerning systematic risks will impact the cost of capital.     

Accounting and prudential regulation: from uncomfortable bedfellows to perfect partners?

Recent initiatives to improve the public information about individual firms have brought to the fore significant differences in perspective between accountants and prudential regulators. We examine the reasons for these differences and propose ways in which they could be reconciled within a broader framework aimed at identifying the type of information conducive to the proper functioning and stability of the financial system. We argue that such information should concern three characteristics: estimates of current financial condition; estimates of risk profile; and measures of the uncertainty surrounding those estimates. So far, efforts have mainly focused on the first characteristic, with the second having drawn attention only recently and the third having been largely neglected. We propose a strategy to reconcile different perspectives based on two principles: first, in the long-term, the “decoupling” of the objective of accurate financial reporting by the firm from that of instilling the desired degree of prudence in its behaviour; second, a “parallel transition” process towards that objective so that at all points the prudential measures can neutralise any undesirable implications of changes in financial reporting standards on financial stability.