农业保险的证券化制度研究

农业保险作为农村经济社会发展的"稳定器",在保障农业安全上有重要作用.但农业保险制度的缺失及资金的短缺使农业保险在我国的运营举步维艰.农业保险证券化研究,包括农业保险的证券化SPV制度,农业保险证券化风险评估制度以及收益差别制度等,是探索发展我国农业保险的新路径.     

我国保险风险证券化是否可期

提出了运用保险风险证券化来有效地转移保险业的经营风险,并详细论述了保险风险证券化的运作方式及其在中国的发展前景,并提出一些有益的启示和政策建议。     

关于中国农业保险发展问题及再保险解决方案的研究

农业保险已被发达国家的经验证明具有分散风险、补偿损失、提高农业综合生产能力的作用,是一种有效规避风险和分摊风险的机制。作者根据农业风险的特殊性,针对农业风险管理的技术难点,结合对农业再保险市场的介绍,分析了再保险市场的分类和选择,国际再保险市场以及我国再保险市场的作法,对农业再保险市场提供的保障机制进行了有益的实证研究。     

对人身险再保险在寿险公司风险管理中应用的探讨

随着人身保险业务的不断发展,寿险公司面临非正常死亡风险、长寿风险、利差风险和特别承保风险.人身险再保险是寿险公司转移风险、防止责任累积过大的风险管理工具之一,主要分为比例再保险、非比例再保险和财务再保险三种类型.寿险公司应通过科学确定自留额、选择合适的分保方式、谨慎采用财务再保险来安排人身险分保.     

On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence From the Global Reinsurance Market

In this article, we view the demand for reinsurance as a “special case” of the corporate demand for insurance. We analyze the extent to which reinsurance purchases by the global property–liability insurance industry vary across countries and assess the relative importance of country‐level factors compared with firm‐level factors. Using a data set consisting of 21,814 firm‐year observations from 33 (developed and developing) countries during the period 2000–2012, we find that after controlling for firm‐level factors, country‐level factors have economically as well as statistically significant effects on the demand for reinsurance.     

Reinsurance and Capital Structure: Evidence From the United Kingdom Non‐Life Insurance Industry

Using a data set consisting of statutory returns of U.K. non‐life insurers from 1985 to 2002, I find that insurers with higher leverage tend to purchase more reinsurance, and insurers with higher reinsurance dependence tend to have a higher level of debt. My results are consistent with the expected bankruptcy costs argument, agency costs theory, risk‐bearing hypothesis, and renting capital hypothesis. I also find that the impact of leverage on reinsurance will be weaker for insurers that use more derivatives than those that use less. Moreover, high levels of derivative use increase the leverage gains attributable to reinsurance.     

Reducing Risk Through Pooling and Selective Reinsurance Using Simulated Annealing: An Example from Crop Insurance

Agricultural insurance is often faced with the challenge of systemic risk, arising from weather risks that tend to be correlated within a specific region in extreme situations, resulting in large crop losses within the region. However, across many regions, especially if regions are considerable distances apart, weather may be quite different and losses may be much less correlated. The objective of this paper is to improve the diversification of a crop insurance portfolio, through developing a new alternative risk management approach (Model 3) that pools crop risks across all provinces in a country to form a Canada-wide joint insurance pool. This is in contrast to the current approach used in Canada, where crop risks are pooled only within an individual province. Then using a simulated annealing optimization approach, the most suitable combination of the 150 crop types in the portfolio is identified for either retaining in the joint insurance pool or for ceding to reinsurers, such that the variance of the loss coverage ratio of the portfolio is minimized. This model overcomes the problem of insufficient diversification that makes pooling of systemic weather risk challenging. It achieves diversification at a lower cost by using a more efficient combination of pooling and selective reinsurance, resulting in overall higher surplus, higher survival probability, and lower deficit at ruin.     

Mean-Variance Optimal Reinsurance Arrangements

Reinsurance reduces the risk but it also reduces the potential profit. The aim of the paper is to derive optimal, from the cedent's point of view, reinsurance arrangements balancing the risk measured by variance and expected profits under various mean-variance premium principles of the reinsurer. We find that quota share, excess of loss or combinations of excess of loss with quota share are the optimal rules according to a fixed expected gain of the cedent     

保险风险证券化的国际经验及比较优势分析

保险风险证券化的发展已有约二十年的历史,整体上看规模虽然不大,但呈现了快速发展的势头,并已成为对巨灾风险管理的有益的补充,本文在结合国际经验的基础上,从理论层面对保险风险证券化的成因、内生优势、成功条件等进行了分析,并得出了相关结论。     

Catastrophe Bonds,Reinsurance, and the Optimal Collateralization of Risk Transfer

Catastrophe bonds feature full collateralization of the underlying risk transfer and thus abandon the reinsurance principle of economizing on collateral through diversification of risk transfer. Our analysis demonstrates that this feature places limits on catastrophe bond penetration, even if the structure possesses frictional cost advantages over reinsurance. However, we also show that catastrophe bonds have important uses when buyers and reinsurers cannot contract over the division of assets in the event of insolvency and, more generally, cannot write contracts with a full menu of state‐contingent payments. In this environment, segregation of collateral—in the form of multiple reinsurance companies, as well as catastrophe bond vehicles—can ameliorate inefficiencies due to reinsurance contracting constraints by improving welfare for those exposed to default risk. Numerical simulation illustrates how catastrophe bonds improve efficiency in market niches with correlated risks, or with uneven exposure of buyers to reinsurer default.     

U.S. Reinsurance Prices, Financial Quality, and Global Capacity

The puzzle of underwriting cycles and insurance crises in property‐liability insurance has led to numerous economic hypotheses and analyses, yet no single theory seems capable of explaining all of its aspects. Reinsurance is hypothesized to be a potential factor in observed cycles in the primary market; despite this, few underwriting cycle studies focus on reinsurance. The purpose of this research is to investigate determinants of reinsurance prices in the U.S. Nonproportional reinsurance is highlighted, since it is designed to cover the tail of the loss distribution and is considered to be relatively riskier than proportional reinsurance as a result. Separate samples of professional U.S. reinsurers for property and for casualty are studied, based upon the reinsurers' writings of property versus casualty nonproportional reinsurance. The sample period is 1991–1995. The results support both the capacity constraint hypothesis and the risky debt hypothesis, and this is the first research to support both. A major innovation in this study is the use of capacity variables that are broken down by major region of the world.     

Securitization and Bank Performance

Using predominantly precrisis U.S. commercial bank data, this paper employs a propensity score matching approach to analyze whether individual banks did improve their performance through securitization. On average, our results show that securitizing banks tend to be more profitable institutions, with higher credit risk exposure. Despite a more diversified funding structure, they face higher funding costs. We also find that securitizing banks tend to hold larger and less diversified loan portfolios, have less liquidity, and hold less capital. However, our analysis does not provide evidence to suggest that securitization had an impact upon bank performance.     

Corporate Taxes and Securitization

Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less‐efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan‐selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax‐induced loan‐selling will rise if banks’ required equity capital increases.     

Adverse Selection in Reinsurance Markets

This paper looks for evidence of adverse selection in the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. We test the implications of a model in which informational asymmetry—and therefore, its negative consequences—decline over time. Our tests involve a data panel consisting of U.S. property-liability insurance firms that reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners during the period 1993–2012. We find that the amount of reinsurance, insurer profitability, and insurer credit quality all increase with the tenure of the insurer–reinsurer relationship.     

The Uses and Abuses of Finite Risk Reinsurance

Finite risk reinsurance has become the subject of investigations, litigation, and possibly new regulation. This article provides an overview of finite risk solutions and products, describing their main features and their legitimate role in helping (mainly) industrial companies manage timing, funding, and insurance risks.
Finite risk solutions generally take the form of structured insurance products designed to help companies manage risks often regarded as exotic or "tail" risks, such as environmental or asbestos liability. Although such products are underwritten by insurance or reinsurance companies, they typically involve limited risk transfer (hence the name "finite risk") while providing the insured companies with a means of pre-funding their expected losses, or what is often called "pre-loss financing." Of course, companies could choose to self-insure such risks by establishing a reserve for future losses. But finite risk provides a more credible and transparent alternative—one that reassures investors both by capping the liability and eliminating the possibility for manipulation of reserves.
Abuses of finite risk products usually concern the degree to which transactions are accounted for, disclosed, and represented to investors as achieving "significant risk transfer" when there is little or no such transfer. In the authors' words, "Users of finite should ask themselves whether the transaction helps the financial statements clearly represent the true economic income and risks of the business and, if not, then consider not doing the deal."     

Reinsurance contract design with adverse selection

ABSTRACT

In light of the richness of their structures in connection with practical implementation, we follow the seminal works in economics to use the principal–agent (multidimensional screening) models to study a monopolistic reinsurance market with adverse selection; instead of adopting the classical expected utility paradigm, the novelty of our present work is to model the risk assessment of each insurer (agent) by his value-at-risk at his own chosen risk tolerance level consistent with Solvency II. Under information asymmetry, the reinsurer (principal) aims to maximize his average profit by designing an optimal policy provision (menu) of ‘shirt-fit’ reinsurance contracts for every insurer from one of the two groups with hidden characteristics. Our results show that a quota-share component, on the top of simple stop-loss, is very crucial for mitigating asymmetric information from the insurers to the reinsurer.