Subjective states: A more robust model

We study the demand for flexibility and what it reveals about subjective uncertainty. As in Kreps [D. Kreps, 1979. A representation theorem for ‘preference for flexibility’. Econometrica 47, 565–577], Nehring [K. Nehring, 1996. Preference for flexibility and freedom of choice in a Savage framework. UC Davis Working Paper; K. Nehring, 1999. Preference for flexibility in a Savage framework. Econometrica 67, 101–119] and Dekel et al. [E. Dekel, B. Lipman, A. Rustichini, 2001. Representing preferences with a unique subjective state space. Econometrica 69, 891–934], the latter is represented by a subjective state space consisting of possible future preferences over actions to be chosen ex post. One contribution is to provide axiomatic foundations for a range of alternative hypotheses about the nature of these ex post preferences. Secondly, we establish a sense in which the subjective state space is uniquely pinned down by the ex ante ranking of (random) menus. Finally, we demonstrate the tractability of our representation by showing that it can model the two comparative notions “2 desires more flexibility than 1” and “2 is more averse to flexibility-risk than is 1.”     

Driving forces of chemical risks for the European biodiversity

In the framework of the EU-funded research project ALARM (Assessing LArge-scale environmental Risks with tested Methods), an original method combining the DPSIR (driving forces–pressures–state–impacts–responses) framework and an analysis based on the distinction between the four spheres of sustainability (environmental, economic, social and political) has been developed. This paper presents the application of this method, called “the tetrahedral DPSIR” for the identification and analysis of driving forces of environmental chemicals risks for biodiversity, in Europe. The purpose of this methodology is to help reduce the pressures on biodiversity through modifying the driving forces behind them by offering scientific advice to policy makers. We frame our analysis in the context of the current policy, namely the implementation of REACH (Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of CHemicals).     

A model of adjuncts in higher education

We examine the phenomenon of the expanded use of non-tenure-track positions (“adjuncts”) and construct a supply-side Harris–Todaro model. Low adjunct wages are attributable to a “Hope Rent” from the gap between private opportunities and tenure-track utility.     

Government spending, capital accumulation and the optimal policy rule: The role of public service capital

In this paper, we modify the Djajić [Djajić, S., 1987. “Government Spending and the Optimal Rates of Consumption and Capital Accumulation,” Canadian Journal of Economics 20, 544–554.] model in such a way that government consumption expenditure provides utility to households via the total stock of government services rather than the government consumption flow alone. By using such a framework, we show that the optimality condition for the public service capital stock is the marginal rate of substitution between public service capital and consumption that equals the intertemporal marginal rate of transformation between the two goods. In addition, we show that the relationship between private consumption and public service capital in a household's utility plays an important role in determining the transitional behavior of relevant variables. We also examine the second-best government consumption expenditure policy. By contrast, in the standard flow specification, e.g., Turnovsky and Brock [Turnovsky, S.J. and Brock, W.A., 1980. “Time Consistency and Optimal Government Policies in Perfect Foresight Equilibrium,” Journal of Public Economics 13, 183–212.], Ihori [Ihori, T., 1990. “Government Spending and Private Consumption,” Canadian Journal of Economics 23, 60–69.], and Turnovsky and Fisher [Turnovsky, S.J. and Fisher, W.H., 1995. “The Composition of Government Expenditure and its Consequences for Macroeconomic Performance,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19, 747–786.], the second-best government consumption expenditure is decided on the basis that the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the discounted sum of the marginal utility of the government's flow spending.     

Monetary transmission mechanism in Turkey under free float using a small-scale macroeconomic model

This study analyzes the monetary transmission mechanism in the Turkish economy following the switch to free float under informal inflation targeting scheme in the aftermath of the February 2001 crisis. A small-scale macroeconomic model is simulated using equations for output gap, exchange rate, sub-items of inflation, short-term policy rate, government borrowing rate, “Embi+ Turkey” and inflation expectations. The preliminary results indicate that, despite some slight departures, both static and dynamic simulations capture the dynamics of the fundamental economic variables. The results also show that at a time of weak domestic demand, output gap has been seemingly less significant in determining inflation. Furthermore, risk premium as measured by “Embi+ Turkey” has a high explanatory power in shaping government borrowing rate and exchange rate. Finally, forward-looking component of inflation has been effective in determining non-administered prices.     

Bargaining with a possibly committed seller

We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul [2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment.     

Abreu–Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence

Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms can be applied to a broad class of games to induce any desired outcome as the unique rationalizable outcome. We conduct experiments investigating the performance of such mechanisms in two simple coordination games. In these games one pure-strategy equilibrium is “focal”; we assess the efficacy of Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms for implementing the other pure-strategy equilibrium outcome. Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms induce some choices consistent with the desired outcome, but more choices reflect the focal outcome. Moreover, “strengthening” the mechanism has a perverse effect when the desired outcome is a Pareto-dominated risk-dominated equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C7.     

“Very Nice” trivial equilibria in strategic market games

Following Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or “legitimately” inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162–169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1–20], and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not “very nice,” in the sense that it is not “legitimately” trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Dubey and Shubik's assumptions, a Shapley NE may fail to exist.     

Production functions and distributions of unit factor productivities: Uncovering the link

We derive a reversible “endogenous technology choice transform,” according to which firm-level production functions and distributions of unit factor productivities are two sides of the same coin. The Cobb–Douglas function relates to Pareto distributions, and the CES to Weibull distributions.     

Agriculture and aggregation

We study the shape of the aggregate production function in the presence of land-intensive agriculture. The traditional Cobb–Douglas formulation is corrected to include a “diversification component.” The implied TFP differences across countries are larger than what Solow residuals suggest.     

Eliciting Preferences to Assign Positions and Compensation

We describe strategy-proof rules for economies where an agent is assigned a position (e.g., a job) plus some of a divisible good. For the 2-agent–2-position case we derive a robust characterization. For the multi-agent–position case, many “arbitrary” such rules exist, so we consider additional requirements. By also requiring coalitional strategy-proofness or nonbossiness, the range of a solution is restricted to the point that such rules are not more complex than those for the Shapley–Scarf housing model (no divisible good). Third, we show that essentially only constant solutions are immune to manipulations involving “bribes.” Finally, we demonstrate a conflict between efficiency and strategy-proofness. The results extend to models (without externalities) in which agents share positions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D70.     

Further evidence on the PPP analysis of the Australian dollar: Non-linearities, fractional integration and structural changes

The aim of this paper is to analyse the empirical fulfilment of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) theory for the Australian dollar. In order to do so we have applied recently developed unit root tests that account for asymmetric adjustment towards the equilibrium [Kapetanios, G., Shin, Y., Snell, A., 2003. “Testing for a unit root in the nonlinear STAR framework”, Journal of Econometrics, 112, 359–379] and fractional integration in the context of structural changes [Robinson, P.M., 1994. “Efficient tests of nonstationary hypotheses”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 89, 1420–1437; Gil-Alana, L.A., 2008. “Fractional integration and structural breaks at unknown periods of time”, Journal of Time Series Analysis, 29, 163–185]. Although our results point to the rejection of the PPP hypothesis, we find that the degree of persistence of shocks to the Australian dollar decreases after the 1985 currency crisis.     

Altruism,Warm Glow and the Willingness-to-Donate for Green Electricity: An Artefactual Field Experiment

The ongoing liberalization of electricity markets in most western countries forms the background of our artefactual field experiment. Using a Cheap talk design [R.G. Cummings and L.O. Taylor. American Economic Review 89 (1999) 649–665] with supplementary monetary incentives, we test for presence of “warm glow” motivations [J. Andreoni. Journal of Political Economy 97 (1989) 1447–1458; Economic Journal 100 (1990) 464–477] in the willingness-to-donate for electricity generated from renewables. Our data from 200 participants supports impure altruism, that is, individuals benefit from both contributing to environmental quality and its current level when opting in favor of green electricity. Furthermore, we find evidence of crowding-out as well as crowding-in effects. Depending on the knowledge of people about electricity markets and the types of electricity contracts offered, “all-or-none” contracts are most likely to bring about crowding-out effects.     

Run equilibria in the Green–Lin model of financial intermediation

We study the Green–Lin model of financial intermediation [E.J. Green, P. Lin, Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation, J. Econ. Theory 109 (2003) 1–23] under a more general specification of the distribution of types across agents. We derive the efficient allocation in closed form. We show that, in some cases, the intermediary cannot uniquely implement the efficient allocation using a direct revelation mechanism. In these cases, the mechanism also admits an equilibrium in which some (but not all) agents “run” on the intermediary and withdraw their funds regardless of their true liquidity needs. In other words, self-fulfilling runs can arise in a generalized Green–Lin model and these runs are necessarily partial, with only some agents participating.     

Comment on “A note on the Hotelling principle of minimum differentiation: Imitation and crowd”

We argue that the minimum differentiation firm location equilibrium and the pure strategy pricing equilibrium in Di Cintio’s [Di Cintio, M., 2007. A note on the Hotelling principle of minimum differentiation: Imitation and crowd. Research in Economics 61 (3), 122–129] “Note” need not exist under the conditions claimed.     

Democracy and growth in Africa: Implications of increasing electoral competitiveness

Estimating a 1975–2004 decadal panel data in an augmented production-function framework, the paper finds that indexes of electoral competitiveness exhibit U-shape relationships with GDP growth, implying quite different “intermediate” and “advanced”-level effects of reforms in Africa.     

Topological games at Princeton, a mathematical memoir

The games of the title are “Nash” (or Hex), “Milnor” (or Y), “Shapley” (or Projective Plane) and “Gale” (or Bridg-It) all of which were discovered (or re-discovered) in Princeton in 1948–1949. After giving the basic topological connections, I will discuss more recent ramifications related to computational complexity theory. A recurrent theme will be non-constructive proofs, or how we can know something can be done without having the slightest idea of how to do it.     

On the value of human resources

One challenge for planners is to discover conditions under which a society has a positive and growing “net worth” in terms of its human resources and to bring about and maintain those conditions. We discuss the utility and validity of the concept of people as “assets” or “liabilities”, the structure and cultural contexts for a proposed model of the dynamics of value that account for opportunity costs; and links between information technologies and human resources management, including planned development of these resources.     

House Allocation with Transfers

We consider the Shapley–Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget-balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley–Scarf economy associated with the prices. The special case in which all prices are zero is the core mechanism studied by Shapley and Scarf. Our mechanisms are compelling alternatives to the Groves mechanisms, which satisfy neither budget balance nor our condition of collusion-proofness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71, D78, D89.