Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly

Consider an oligopolistic industry where firms have access to the same technology but are asymmetrically informed about the environment. Even though it is commonplace to think that in this context superior information leads to higher profits, we find that under Cournot competition this is not generally the case: It holds when firms' technology exhibits constant returns to scale, but it does not necessarily hold otherwise. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.     

Tradeable Emission Permits Regulations in the Presence of Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets: Welfare Implications

In the present paper, we analyse the interaction of a competitive market for emission permits with an oligopolistic product market. It is well known that a competitive permits market achieves the cost minimizing distribution of abatement effort among the polluting firms for a given reduction in emissions. However, when the product market is oligopolistic, it may redistribute production inefficiently among firms. It has been suggested that this inefficiency can outweigh the gains obtained from using emission permits instead of command and control. Although this argument is clearly correct under full information, it is shown in the present paper that it reverses under incomplete information. In particular, it is shown that when tradeable emission permits are specified according to the standard textbook example, they yield higher social welfare than the command and control regulation.     

基于技术外溢性的寡头垄断企业研发投资的动态博弈分析

在现代经济社会条件下,企业通过合作研发可以使研发的外部效应内部化,激励企业进行更多的研发活动。同样,合作企业可以共享信息和研究成果,提高研发效率。本文将结合企业研发投资过程中的实际情况,在假定技术不完全独占即存在技术溢出的情况下,通过构建一个两阶段寡头博弈模型对寡头垄断企业R＆D进行研究,比较寡头垄断企业在合作研发与非合作研发两种情况下研发投入、产出、社会福利的变化,从中探求合作研究的原因。     

Welfare Effects of Foreign Direct Investment: Cost Saving vs. Signaling

We compare the effects of two types of foreign direct investment (FDI) (viz., FDI for trade cost saving and FDI for signaling foreign cost of production) on consumer surplus, profit of the host-country firm and host-country welfare. We show that the effects are dramatically different. If the reason for FDI is to save trade cost, FDI (compared to export) always makes the consumers better off and the host-country producer worse off, while the effect on host-country welfare is ambiguous. However, if the FDI is to signal the foreign cost of production, FDI (compared to export) always makes the host-country producer better off and increases host-country welfare, while it makes the consumers almost always worse off.     

Partial Privatization in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly

A model of differentiated mixed oligopoly is developed to systematically discuss the welfare consequences of partial privatization of a public firm. We analytically derive the optimal degree of partial privatization not only in the short run with restricted entry but also in the long run with free entry. It is shown that the short-run optimal policy is non-monotonic in the degree of love of variety, while the optimal degree of privatization is monotonically increasing in the consumer's preference for variety in the long run.      

通货膨胀与社会福利损失

通货膨胀到底对经济有多大的影响?这是经济学家和各级政府所关心的问题.本文按照Lucas(2000)的方法,在Gong和Zou(2001)给出的带有人们对社会地位的追求和消费品及投资品的Cash-in-Advance约束的模型的基础上分析了通货膨胀对社会福利的影响,给出了通货膨胀的福利损失的估计.     

Ambiguous Social Welfare Effects of Price Regulation Under Imperfect Competition

Conventional wisdom is that a binding price ceiling increases output and so increases social welfare if imposed on an imperfectly competitive market. However, this paper shows that a price ceiling can be harmful to social welfare even though it increases industry output and consumer surplus. This model can be applied to the pharmaceutical industry under price control in many countries, e.g., U.K., Canada, Germany and Japan.     

Demand-Creating R&D in a Symmetric Oligopoly

Spillovers with demand-creating research and development (R&D) activities are investigated by revisiting a widely employed market share rivalry demand structure. Positive technological spillovers may inflict positive or negative side effects on rivals and this has important implications for the effects on innovative efforts of loose or tight R&D cooperation in symmetric oligopolies. A comparison with the effects that apply with linear demand structures and implications for empirical research are also touched upon.     

风险厌恶与国有寡占市场的资源配置效率——以我国成品油市场为例

作为传统寡占理论与我国国情相结合的产物,国有寡占市场受到越来越多的关注。本文以风险厌恶倾向为切入点,从缺少职业经理人市场、优越的生存环境和目标多重性三方面分析了国有寡占企业风险厌恶倾向的成因,并构建理论模型分析这种风险厌恶倾向对国有寡占市场资源配置效率的影响。结果表明,风险厌恶倾向使国有寡占企业面对成本风险时,价格和产量相对利润最大化值分别升高和降低,面对需求风险时,价格和产量同时低于利润最大化值,两种情况都使国有寡占市场资源配置效率降低,而固定成本的升高会进一步加大资源配置效率的损失。本文最后以我国石化行业成品油市场为案例,验证理论模型的结论,并提出了政策建议。     

河北省建立农村社会保障制度成本效益分析

在现代化进程中，农村社会保障始终处于整个社会保障体系的边缘，农民长期游离于社会保障网络之外。改革的实践和理论都未能突破城市和农村两个独立的圈子，这造成了农村社会保障制度建设严重滞后的状况。建立农村社会保障制度必然要付出巨大的成本，包括推行成本和社会保障费用支出成本。但建立农村社会保障制度带来的社会效益也是非常明显，是难以用数据来衡量的。     

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Competitors: the Linear Demand Case

We introduce foreign private firms into the model of Pal (1998) and investigate the impact of the introduction of foreign private firms on the endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly in the linear demand case. We find that the public firm chooses to be a follower of all domestic private firms and that the public firm chooses not to be a leader of all foreign private firms, which is in contrast to Matsumura (2003).     

寡占市场下的广告成因探究

依照微观经济学和产业组织理论,高度集中产业市场中的寡头厂商往往会在价格变量上形成暗中或默契的价格串谋,使产业市场处在一种“准完全垄断”的状态。广告是企业主要的非价格竞争变量之一,重复博弈的结果使得寡头厂商能够走出囚徒困境(放弃产品的广告宣传),而垄断利润的存在导致第三方潜在进入的威胁,在位寡头厂商必然会联合起来进行抵制,通过广告串谋提高市场进入壁垒。     

中国商业银行市场势力、效率及其福利效应

文章对中国商业银行1998-2007年的市场势力与效率之间的关系及其福利效应进行了初步研究。结果表明,运用随机前沿成本函数所估计的贷款边际成本大于存款边际成本,四大国有银行的市场势力勒纳指数明显大于股份制商业银行,国有银行行政性市场势力不容忽视。在此基础上,文章估计了基于市场势力的社会福利效应,因银行成本无效率带来的福利损失远大于因市场势力而引致的社会福利损失。检验安逸生活假设表明,贷款市场拒绝安逸生活假设,而存款市场接受安逸生活假设。贷款市场势力对银行业发展具有一定的负面作用,而银行生产率的提高促进了银行业的持续发展。     

出口补贴与反补贴对国民福利影响的经济分析

2008年,在全球性金融危机以后,各国政府为增加就业,先后颁布了很多新的出口刺激计划,补贴与反补贴有所增加。分析了补贴与反补贴对国民经济福利的影响,主要的结论是补贴措施与反补贴措施都会导致国民经济总福利的下降,也从集体行动的角度分析了导致福利水平下降的贸易政策为什么会在民主国家实施的问题。     

我国两税合并的社会经济福利效应分析

2007年年初国务院批准了合并内、外资企业的所得税,税率为25%,并从2008年1月1日起实施。外资企业在经历了20年的税收优惠政策之后,开始承担与国内企业相同的所得税税率。统一企业所得税率在自由竞争的经济环境中有增加社会福利的效应。但由于我国仍处在经济转型过程中,内资企业和外资企业在管理体制和运行机制上有很大的不同。因此,统一税率对我国总的社会福利的影响可能与西方发达国家的影响有所不同。文章通过对我国内外资企业生产方程的不同设定来反映内外资企业的不同特点并考察统一税率对我国劳动力配置、资本需求及社会整体福利可能带来的影响。用2004-2006年的统计数据进行了模拟计算,结果表明,两税合并短期内使我国社会整体福利略有下降,在考虑国有企业冗员的情况下,两税合并使社会福利在三种情形下分别下降0.18%、0.17%和0.13%;而考虑国有企业经理负责制时,两税合并使社会福利分别下降0.25%、0.21%和0.15%。但从长期看,两税合并最终会使我国的社会福利有所增加。     

Revenue Recycling and the Welfare Effects of Road Pricing

This paper explores the interactions between taxes on work-related traffic congestion and pre-existing distortionary taxes in the labor market. A congestion tax raises the overall costs of commuting to work and discourages labor force participation. The resulting welfare loss in the labor market can easily exceed the Pigouvian welfare gain from internalizing the congestion externality. However, if congestion tax revenues are used to reduce labor taxes, the net impact on labor supply is positive, and this can raise the overall welfare gain from the congestion tax by around 100 percent. Nonetheless the optimal congestion tax still equals the Pigouvian tax.
JEL classification R 41; H 21; H 23     

Welfare and Distribution Effects of Water Pricing Policies

In this paper, distribution and welfare effects of changes in block price systems are evaluated. A method is discussed to determine, for a Marshallian demand function, equivalent variation in case of a block price system. The method is applied to compare, for the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo, alternative pricing policies on the basis of their demand, welfare and distribution effects of changing water prices. Results show that there is a trade off between average welfare and income distribution. A pro-poor price system may result in lower average welfare than a flat price system, but in higher individual welfare for the poor. Moreover, there is a trade off between revenues for the water company and income distribution. Even though pro-poor price systems may not be as good for average welfare as flat price systems, their direct effects on poverty are important. Introducing pro-poor price systems, however, may have financial consequences for the water companies.     

增值税扩围改革的价格影响与福利效应

"十二五"规划建议明确将"扩大增值税征收范围,相应调减营业税等税收"作为下一步税制改革的重要内容。文章通过建立价格模型分析了不同的扩围方案对减少重复征税和降低产品税负的影响,并利用住户调查数据、投入产出方法和实际税收数据测算了增值税扩围改革的福利效应。研究发现,将增值税扩大到生产性服务业将改善居民福利,但具有累退性;全面扩围的福利改善作用小于生产性扩围,但具有累进性。     

双重古诺竞争下的FDI关联溢出效应

扩展了以往理论研究的基本假设,在古诺竞争框架下分析FDI进入东道国上下游双边市场时的关联溢出效应。结果显示:当FDI仅进入东道国的下游市场时,FDI产生的竞争效应会增加下游市场的总产出,从而增大对上游市场中东道国本土供应商的后向关联程度,且其增大程度与技术差距正相关;在FDI同时进入东道国上下游双边市场的情况下,上游市场的FDI会对东道国本土供应商产生挤出效应,且两者的技术差距越大,挤出效应越明显,同时会对下游市场中的东道国本土生产者产生明显的前向关联,上游市场总产出的增加使得中间产品的均衡价格下降,直接减少了下游本土生产者的边际生产成本,从而增加了其产出和利润,部分抵消了下游市场的FDI的挤出效应。     

Relative Emission Standard versus Tax under Oligopoly: The Role of Free Entry

We compare the effects of an emission tax, and those of a relative emission standard, on welfare and pollution levels under oligopolistic market structures. We consider the cases where the number of firms is fixed and where there is free entry and exit of firms. When the number of firms is fixed, (i) a relative emission standard is welfare-superior to an emission-equivalent emission tax, and (ii) an emission tax is emission-superior to a welfare-equivalent relative emission standard. Under free entry and exit, the results are just the opposite when the inverse demand function is concave.