ENDOGENOUS EXPORT SUBSIDIES AND WELFARE UNDER DOMESTIC COST HETEROGENEITY

We present a model of international market share rivalry where the domestic export subsidy is determined by lobbying. Greater domestic cost heterogeneity leads to a higher subsidy level and a larger domestic market share. However, the relationship between cost heterogeneity and welfare is ambiguous. Starting from a near-symmetric situation, an increase in heterogeneity reduces domestic welfare if the number of domestic firms exceeds some critical value. When starting farther from symmetry, the welfare effect is reversed. Our findings are in contrast with the results from the existing literature where lobbying is ignored.     

VOLUNTARY IMPORT EXPANSION AND DIRECT INVESTMENT*

This paper analyses the welfare effects of a market‐share Voluntary Import Expansion (VIE) in the presence of foreign direct investment utilizing a duality approach. Introducing the cost burden of VIE explicitly, this paper considers the conditions under which a market‐share VIE is voluntary to the importing country. It is shown that the voluntary nature of VIE depends upon the capital import, cost burden and price difference effects and that a VIE is truly voluntary if it is accompanied by direct investment. We also show the existence of a complementary relationship between VIE and direct investment in attaining a particular level of welfare.     

Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?

We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater (resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large).     

理解企业多元化经营的新视角:控股股东的影响

多元化经营在现实企业中普遍存在,这也吸引了大量研究探寻企业多元化经营的动机。已有文献主要关注企业本身多元化经营,忽略了控股股东因素,从而存在一定的认知偏差。不同于已有文献,基于手工搜集数据,本文首次考察了控股股东多元化经营与上市公司多元化经营之间的关系及其影响因素。研究发现,首先,控股股东多元化经营与上市公司多元化经营之间存在着一定的替代关系,说明控股股东将上市公司多元化经营作为其整体多元化经营战略的一部分;其次,从影响机制上看,控股股东持有上市公司的权益在其总资产中份额越高、其他大股东持股比例越高、上市公司所处地区市场化程度越高,控股股东多元化经营与上市公司多元化经营之间的替代关系会越弱,说明那些有助于减轻控股股东对上市公司进行干预的因素将会弱化这种关系。本文为理解企业多元化经营行为以及企业与其控股股东的关系提供了新的视角。     

THE CLOSED-LOOP EFFECTS OF MARKET INTEGRATION IN A DYNAMIC DUOPOLY

This paper develops a dynamic game model of reciprocal dumping to reconsider welfare effects of market integration, i.e. reductions in transport costs. We show that welfare under trade is unambiguously less than welfare under autarky for any level of transport costs, which is impossible in static models where trade is profitable if the transport cost is low enough. This is because the negative effect through closed-loop property of feedback strategies dominates the positive effects.     

Does uncertainty justify intensity emission caps?

Environmental policies often set “relative” or “intensity” emission caps, i.e. emission limits proportional to the polluting firm's output. One of the arguments put forth in favour of relative caps is based on the uncertainty on business-as-usual output: if the firm's production level is higher than expected, so will be business-as-usual emissions, hence reaching a given level of emissions will be more costly than expected. As a consequence, it is argued, a higher emission level should be allowed if the production level is more important than expected. We assess this argument with a stochastic analytical model featuring two random variables: the business-as-usual emission level, proportional to output, and the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. We compare the relative cap to an absolute cap and to a price instrument, in terms of welfare impact. It turns out that in most plausible cases, either a price instrument or an absolute cap yields a higher expected welfare than a relative cap. Quantitatively, the difference in expected welfare is typically very small between the absolute and the relative cap but may be significant between the relative cap and the price instrument.     

How does a mixed ownership firm license a patent?

This paper demonstrates that a cost disadvantaged innovator increasingly relies on licensing with a fixed fee as its public ownership share grows. Moreover, when the innovation is drastic, a cost disadvantaged innovator frequently licenses by fixed fee when it has a public share even as a fully private firm will never use a fixed fee. As the fixed fee improves welfare, these results suggest that the licensing method of a partial public firm helps correct the market failure of imperfect competition.     

Welfare‐reducing Domestic Cost Reduction*

We show that cost reduction by a domestic firm may reduce domestic welfare if it changes a foreign firm’s production strategy from foreign direct investment to export. Domestic cost reduction can be welfare reducing when the domestic market is sufficiently small and domestic firm’s marginal cost of production is higher than the foreign firm’s marginal cost of production under foreign direct investment, which is a usual feature of trade between developed and developing countries. So, developing countries with small domestic markets need competent competition policies when encouraging domestic innovation and also trying to attract foreign direct investment.     

Using Stock Price Information to Regulate Firms

This paper examines the role of the information contained in stock prices in the regulation of privatized firms. Stock prices contain noisy but unbiased information about firm's future prospects that regulators can use to decide on some regulatory policies. The main argument developed is that the observation of stock price movements reduces the incentives of regulators to develop their own monitoring technologies and can allow them to commit to relatively light-handed regulations. This protects firm's investments in cost reduction activities and can increase ex ante welfare.     

The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes

This paper computes the change in welfare associated with the introduction of incentives. We calculate by how much the welfare gains of increased output due to incentives outweigh workers' disutility from increased effort. We accomplish this by studying the use of incentives by a firm in the check-clearing industry. Using this firm's production records, we model and estimate the worker's dynamic effort decision problem. We find that the firm's incentive scheme has a large effect on productivity, raising it by 12% over the sample period for the average worker. Using our parameter estimates, we show that the cost of increased effort due to incentives is equal to the dollar value of a 5% rise in productivity. Welfare is measured as the output produced minus the cost of effort; hence, the net increase in the average worker's welfare due to the introduction of the firm's bonus plan is 7%. Under a first-best scheme, we find that the net increase in welfare is 9%.     

Intellectual property rights, technology transfer and exports in developing countries

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer through licensing as its mode of supplying the Southern market, based on local IPR policy. Given this decision, the North and South firms engage in Cournot competition in both markets. We find that stronger IPR would enhance technology transfer through licensing and reduce the South firm's marginal production cost, thereby increasing its exports. Welfare in the South would rise (fall) if that country has high (low) absorptive capacity. Excessively strong IPR diminish competition and welfare, however. Adding foreign direct investment as an additional channel of technology transfer sustains these basic messages.     

The core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility

Summary. This paper studies the core in an oligopoly market with indivisibility. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions for core existence in a general m-buyer n-seller market with indivisibility. When costs are dominated by opportunity costs (i.e., a firm's variable costs are sufficiently small), the core condition can be characterized by the primitive market parameters. In a 3-2 market with opportunity cost, the core is non-empty if and only if the larger seller's opportunity cost is either sufficiently large or sufficiently small. Received: June 9, 1999; revised version: October 22, 1999     

Sectoral labor adjustment and monetary policy in a small open economy

This paper studies the welfare implications of sectoral labor adjustment cost in a two-sector small open economy model with sticky prices. We find that, when the economy faces external shocks, if monetary policy can stabilize the real economy, then sectoral labor market adjustment cost will lead to welfare loss. However, if monetary policy such as fixed exchange rates cannot stabilize real variables, then some degree of labor market friction will improve welfare instead and the gain will be significant. As a result, the welfare gap between flexible exchange rates and fixed exchange rates decreases with sectoral labor market friction. This is because the friction can offset some of the nominal rigidity and become a substitute for monetary policy to stabilize the real economy.     

Locational choice of AFDC recipients within California: a conditional logit analysis

This paper examines factors that influence migration of AFDC recipients within California. A county level conditional logit model is used to analyze the impact of cost adjusted benefits on intrastate moves during recipients’ first year of welfare participation. Costs of living, particularly housing costs, differ considerably across counties of California, yet the welfare benefit is set at the state level. This creates the potential for variation in the purchasing power of the welfare benefit if a family chooses to move. Variation in cost of living is shown to have a significant effect on migration patterns of AFDC recipients. Estimates suggest that a $150 decrease in fair market rent results in 15% more migration to the county. Recipients’ migration is more responsive to cost of living than migration of the general population.     

Minimum Quality Standards, Entry, and the Timing of the Quality Decision

This paper examines the effects of the imposition of minimum quality standards (MQS) on a vertically differentiated natural duopoly with free entry. It is shown that the welfare effects of MQS are crucially dependent upon the timing of the quality choice with respect to the decision to enter the market. If irreversible decision to enter is taken without pre-commitment to a specific quality level then a welfare improving MQS always exists. If, however, a firm's product quality must be decided prior to entry then a MQS is either redundant or counterproductive, since it can induce a monopoly.     

Attracting the Rival’s Customers in a Model with Switching Costs

We consider the option of a firm’s honouring the rival’s coupons in a duopoly model in which products are differentiated by both characteristics and a switching cost. A firm may honour its rival’s coupons to increase its market share only if its previous market share is less than one‐half but not too low and, as a result, the market share is increased but only up to one‐half. JEL Classification Number: D13.     

Regulating oligopolistic industries: A generalized incentive scheme

This paper deals with the design of regulatory mechanisms for oligopolistic industries. The proposed incentive scheme consists of two parts: a subsidy depending upon a firm's contribution to an equilibrium price reduction, and a tax equal to the profit of the previous period. This mechanism is as effective in regulating oligopolies as the well-known incremental surplus subsidy scheme in a monopoly framework. The proposed scheme provides appropriate incentives to enforce competitive behavior in a Cournot oligopoly. The scheme is welfare improving even if firms collude.     

银行监管中的最优市场约束研究

基于社会利润最大化的视角,本文研究了银行监管中的最优市场约束问题.研究发现:在银行监管中实施最优的市场约束不仅可以提高银行监管帕累托效率,而且可以给社会带来最大的利润;最优市场约束水平受到银行"额外价值",无市场约束时贷款失败的概率、贷款成功的收益、市场约束的成本弹性等因素的影响,且与这些因素呈正相关;最优市场约束水平对银行"额外价值"、贷款成功的收益这两个因素的变化敏感性较强,对无市场约束时贷款失败的概率的变化敏感性较弱,对市场约束的成本弹性的敏感性呈现出由强变弱的趋势.     

The welfare effects of entry: the role of the input market

In a successive Cournot oligopoly, we show the welfare effects of entry in the final goods market with no scale economies but with cost difference between the firms. If the input market is very concentrated, entry in the final goods market increases welfare. If the input market is not very concentrated, entry in the final goods market may reduce welfare if the entrant is moderately cost inefficient. Hence, entry in the final goods market is more desirable if (1) the input market is very concentrated or (2) the cost difference between the incumbents and the entrant is either very small or very large. It follows from our analysis that entry increases the profits of the incumbent final goods producers if their marginal costs are sufficiently lower than the entrant’s marginal cost.     

The relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly: The role of price-cap regulation

This paper examines the role of price-cap regulation in influencing the relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly. Based on a simple model of mark-up pricing, a combination of analytical and numerical analysis is used to show how cost increases among the firm's products can cause a divergence of prices from the Ramsey structure if the cost increases are non-uniform or if the demand elasticities for the products are non-uniform. However, in the absence of additional cost changes, profit-maximising prices which are subject to a price-cap constraint converge to the Ramsey structure if the previous period's quantities are used as weights in the firm's price-cap constraint. Consequently, given this formulation of the firm's price-cap constraint, only in situations of recurring cost changes are prices likely to show on-going divergence from the Ramsey structure.This paper reports on research funded by the Australian Electricity Supply Industry Research Board. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous versions.