Regulatory learning in failed thrift auctions

We use a sample of failed thrift auctions to examine if regulators learn from early transactions and improve their performance in later transactions. Our findings suggest that experience at failure resolution does not by itself lead to improved regulatory performance. Evidence of regulatory learning is restricted to dealings with repeat acquirers; in cases where an acquiring firm makes abnormal gains, regulators are able to restructure the auction process and eliminate such gains in subsequent acquisitions made by the same acquirers.     

Institutional investors and bank governance: An international analysis of bank earnings management

Despite the growing importance of institutional investors in global capital markets and the link between bank earnings management and financial crash risk, little is known about the role of institutional investors in mitigating bank earnings management. We conduct the first international analysis of this issue using a broad sample of banks and institutional investors. We find a negative relation between institutional ownership and bank earnings management, after controlling for the stringency of a country's bank regulations and other relevant bank and country characteristics. Additionally, institutional ownership is more negatively related to earnings management in countries with more-stringent bank disclosure requirements or when ownership is held by domestic rather than foreign institutional investors. Institutional ownership is also more negatively related to earnings management in countries in which insiders extract more private benefits or when ownership is held by institutional blockholders. Our findings have important policy implications regarding institutional investors' engagement with banks.     

An empirical analysis of bank interest rate swaps

Considering the characteristics of banks that do and do not report interest rate swaps, the long-term interest rate exposure of a bank and the likelihood and extent of swap market participation are found to be positively related. Key to the finding is the inclusion of variables related to the provision of swap market intermediary services, which significantly explain both the likelihood of swap market participation and the notional value of outstanding swaps. The results suggest that the likelihood and extent of swap market participation by low-capitalized banks is less than for other banks.     

Bidder behavior in central bank repo auctions: Evidence from the Bundesbank

For many central banks, repo auctions are the most important monetary policy instrument. This paper employs a unique data set of individual bids submitted in the repo auctions of the Bundesbank to analyze the determinants of banks’ bidding behavior and the empirical performance of repo auctions. We conduct a panel analysis to estimate how banks bidding is affected by various auction as well as bidder-specific factors including interest rate expectations, interest rate uncertainty, maturing allotment, reserve fulfillment and a bank’s size.     

美国联邦存款保险公司：问题银行处置的经验与启示

本轮国际金融危机爆发后,美国大量中小金融机构倒闭,但并未严重冲击美国经济,也未引发社会恐慌,这主要归功于美国联邦存款保险公司（FDIC）灵活高效的处置手段,也再次彰显了有效存款保险制度的重要性。危机中,FDIC创新其问题银行的处置方式和手段。危机后美国金融监管改革立法进一步强化了FDIC的监管职能,这些对于中国推出存款保险制度部具有借鉴意义。     

Nonlinear dynamics in discretionary accruals: An analysis of bank loan-loss provisions

Several studies have analyzed discretionary accruals to address earnings-smoothing behaviors in the banking industry. We argue that the characteristic link between accruals and earnings may be nonlinear, since both the incentives to manipulate income and the practical way to do so depend partially on the relative size of earnings. Given a sample of 15,268 US banks over the period 1996–2011, the main results in this paper suggest that, depending on the size of earnings, bank managers tend to engage in earnings-decreasing strategies when earnings are negative (“big-bath”), use earnings-increasing strategies when earnings are positive, and use provisions as a smoothing device when earnings are positive and substantial (“cookie-jar” accounting). This evidence, which cannot be explained by the earnings-smoothing hypothesis, is consistent with the compensation theory. Neglecting nonlinear patterns in the econometric modeling of these accruals may lead to misleading conclusions regarding the characteristic strategies used in earnings management.     

Commercial bank refinancing and economic stability : An analysis of european features

This paper investigates the effect of two types of central bank advances, viz, Lombarding and Rediscounting, on the economy. We conclude that the root of the distinction is the differential collateralization of these two forms of advances. The results suggest that while both methods of refinancing reduce interest-rate movement, Rediscounting dampens the impact of base money and real-sector disturbances. Debt-equity shifts have greater price effects with Rediscounting than with Lombarding. The paper also investigates the effects of a pegged-rate pricing policy. It is shown that a pegged-rate policy is an intermediary between fixed and market rate regimes.     

Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies

While the too-big-to-fail guarantee is explicitly a part of bank regulation in many countries, this paper shows that bank closure policies also suffer from an implicit “too-many-to-fail” problem: when the number of bank failures is large, the regulator finds it ex-post optimal to bail out some or all failed banks, whereas when the number of bank failures is small, failed banks can be acquired by the surviving banks. This gives banks incentives to herd and increases the risk that many banks may fail together. The ex-post optimal regulation may thus be time-inconsistent or sub-optimal from an ex-ante standpoint. In contrast to the too-big-to-fail problem which mainly affects large banks, we show that the too-many-to-fail problem affects small banks more by giving them stronger incentives to herd.     

净额支付清算系统中银行危机的传染过程与应对策略

随着各国商业银行通过银行间支付清算系统交易额的迅速增加,银行危机通过支付清算系统进行传染越来越受到世界各国政府的重视。本文研究了少数甚至是单个银行发生危机通过净额结算支付清算系统扩散而引起系统危机的过程和条件,分析了系统所能吸收的由银行危机而导致的最大违约资金量。最后,在本文分析的基础上,提出了我国政府为及时、有效地控制银行危机的传染过程应采取的对策和措施。     

央票发行对债券收益率影响的实证分析

文章通过对于央票招标日各期限央票、国债、金融债二级市场收益率变动特点的描述性统计,以及央票发行量对债券收益率影响的计量分析,实证考察了央票发行对债券市场收益率的影响效应。结果显示,央票招标日债券市场收益率波动性小于日常水平,且二级市场收益率与央票发行利率差值保持在合理波动范围内,体现了货币政策稳定利率的意图。     

The demand for stocks: an analysis of IPO auctions

We analyze a unique dataset that includes the full demand schedulesof 27 Israeli IPOs that were conducted as nondiscriminatory(uniform price) auctions. To the best of our knowledge, thisis the first time the whole demand schedule for any asset isdescribed. The demand schedules are relatively flat around theauction clearing price: The average elasticity is 27. The elasticityis low when the return distribution contains a large uniquecomponent. We also find a significant average abnormal returnof 4.5% on the first trading day and a positive correlationbetween the abnormal return and the elasticity of demand.     

Bouncing out of the banking system: An empirical analysis of involuntary bank account closures

Using a new database, we document the determinants of involuntary consumer bank account closures. During 2001–2005, approximately 30 million debit accounts were involuntarily closed for excessive overdrafting. We focus on multiple factors to explain this phenomenon: household economics and financial decision-making ability, social capital, bank policies, and the alternative financial services sector. Involuntary closures are more frequent in US counties with a larger fraction of single mothers, lower education levels, lower wealth, and higher unemployment. Closures are higher in communities with high property crime rates and low electoral participation. Bank policies have an independent relation to closures, with counties having more competitive banking markets and more multi-market banks experiencing higher closure rates; bank structure also seems to affect the speed at which banks adjust their policies to changes in household income. Finally, using both national data and a state-level shift in regulation, we find evidence that access to payday lending leads to higher rates of involuntary account closure.     

Statement no.76 the FDIC improvement Act of 1991

Statement no.76 the FDIC improvement Act of 1991December 16, 1991     

An analysis of bank risk and deposit rate ceilings: Evidence from the capital markets

The effect of deposit rate regulation on bank solvency is an important and unresolved issue that has received only limited attention. In this paper, capital market data is used to assess changes in both systematic and non-systematic risk of a portfolio of bank stocks at the time of deposit rate deregulation. The evidence indicates that neither measure of capital market risk is significantly affected, leading to the conclusion that bank solvency risk will not be increased by the deregulation of interest rates on deposits.     

Technical analysis and central bank intervention

This paper extends genetic programming techniques to show that US foreign exchange intervention information improves technical trading rules' profitability for two of four exchange rates over part of the out-of-sample period. Rules trade contrary to intervention and are unusually profitable on days prior to intervention, indicating that intervention is intended to halt predictable trends. Intervention seems to be more successful in checking such trends in the out-of-sample (1981–98) period than in the in-sample (1975–80) period. Any improvement in performance results from more precise estimation of the relationship between current and past exchange rates, rather than from information about contemporaneous intervention.     

Properties of scoring auctions

This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of nonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers' private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behavior and expected utility equivalence). In addition, we show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products, including menu auctions, beauty contests, and price‐only auctions with minimum quality thresholds.     

Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions: the case of water auctions

We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, different bidders win the units with positive probability, paying prices similar in magnitude. We recover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive but consistent with noncooperative behavior. Demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features.     

Credit allocation when borrowers are economically linked: An empirical analysis of bank loans to corporate customers

Using detailed loan level data, we examine bank lending to corporate customers relying on principal suppliers. Customers experience larger loan spreads, higher intensity of covenants and greater likelihood of requiring collateral when they depend more on the principal supplier for inputs. The positive association between the customer’s loan spread and its dependence on the principal supplier is less pronounced when the bank has a prior loan outstanding with the principal supplier, and when the bank has higher market share in the industry. Longer relationships between the customer and its principal supplier, and between the bank and the principal supplier, mitigate lending constraints. The evidence is consistent with corporate suppliers serving as an informational bridge between the lender and the customer.