货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起

本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

欧洲中央银行货币政策透明度研究

大多数国家的央行开始摈弃隐秘性传统,其货币政策逐渐走向开放和透明。如何最充分、准确、及时地向公众披露与解释货币政策目标、策略和决策已成为多数国家货币政策操作所面临的首要问题,本文首先对欧洲中央银行在实践中所采用的主要沟通策略和工具进行归纳和介绍,然后将欧洲中央银行与世界其他主要中央银行的信息公开程度进行横向比较,最后就关于提高欧洲中央银行货币政策透明度的相关建议和争议进行评述。     

货币政策透明度指数:理论方法与实证检验

文章通过建立货币政策透明度指数,并利用我国金融市场的利率数据进行检验,认为我国中央银行在基准利率调整和准备金率改变等重大政策决策上,货币当局更倾向于采用模糊的政策操作方式,由此可能会导致市场预期的混乱,并最终对政策实施效果产生负面影响。因此,我国有必要借鉴西方国家的政策操作经验,进一步有选择地增加货币政策操作的透明度,并借以最终建立一个简单透明、效率更高的政策调控框架。     

Monetary institutions, budget deficits and inflation : Empirical results for eight countries

This study examines the implications of central bank independence using a three-equation model of monetary base growth, budget deficits and inflation that is estimated over an eight-country sample — of which Switzerland, the United States and West Germany are the countries considered to possess relatively autonomous central banks. A main finding is that central bank policy appears to be directed more toward price stability and less toward accommodation of government budget deficits in countries with a central bank that is independent of government. There is also some suggestion that the inflationary consequences of monetary expansion may be lessened under a more decentralised institutional setting.     

Fixed exchange rates,independent central banks and price stability in postcommunist countries: Conservatism and credibility

Central bank independence (CBI) and fixed exchange rates are used by governments to achieve stable prices. This article analyzes the mechanisms through which the two monetary institutions could work: Indirectly via a disciplinary effect on money growth rates or via an additional credibility effect on inflation expectations and the cost of capital. I further explain how both discipline and credibility are affected by the distinct flaws of independent central banks and fixed exchange rates: central banks lack transparency and fixed exchange rates take many shapes and are routinely devalued. The argument is tested with quarterly data from postcommunist countries for years 1991 to 2007. The findings show a strong disciplinary effect of monetary institutions on rates of M2 change and an effect on inflation controlling for money growth, but credibility does not extend to lower real short‐term market interest rates. Political institutions do condition the effect of central bank independence, while the types of fixed exchange rates affect money growth rates and inflation to different degrees.     

货币政策对金融生态的影响机理及实证检验——基于上市商业银行面板数据的分析

传统的货币理论忽视了货币政策对银行风险承担及金融生态的影响,文章从商业银行的微观视角出发研究了货币政策对金融生态的影响机理。理论层面,金融生态与货币政策制度供给、传导机制和有效性相互关联,货币政策则通过资产价格或估值机制、收入及现金流机制、追求收益机制、杠杆调整机制、道德风险机制和风险转移机制影响商业银行的风险承担;实证层面,构建了货币政策影响商业银行信贷投放和风险承担的数理模型,选取国有和股份制两类共12家上市商业银行2008-2013年的面板数据进行固定效应模型实证检验。结果表明,宽松货币政策导致商业银行的信贷投放规模增加、风险承担意愿增强,有利于优化金融生态,反之则反是;国有商业银行对货币政策变化更敏感,而股份制商业银行对金融生态更敏感。因此,在我国宏观经济管理中,需要货币政策与宏观审慎政策相互协调配合。     

Sovereign credit ratings and central banks: Why do analysts pay attention to institutions?

This paper studies the effect of the governance of modern central banks on the ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies Standard and Poor's and Moody's. Until recently, the rating process was not public. Even still, the factors or precise methodologies used by the agencies remain uncertain and analyst judgment remains important. We argue that, given uncertainty over the future paths of countries, the quality of the central bank governance serves as a useful heuristic for a stable and favorable country trajectory. In particular, the central bank's independence signals that the government is committed to general macroeconomic stability, including debt repayment. Additionally, central bank transparency clarifies who is the principal of the bank and provides information about how the central bank understands the economy and monetary policy. Finally, tensions between the central bank and the government, as reflected by irregular turnover of central bank governors, raise doubts about countries’ future prospects. Empirically, we use a variety of models, including mediation analysis, to ensure that the effect we identify stems from the central bank governance itself, as a heuristic for the future paths of countries, and not the central bank's direct contribution to the macroeconomy, as reflected in the available data.     

The interaction between macroprudential policy and monetary policy: Overview

This paper presents the main findings of an International Banking Research Network initiative examining the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy in determining international bank lending. We give an overview on the data, empirical specifications and results of the seven papers from the initiative. The papers are from a range of core and smaller advanced economies, and emerging markets . The main findings are as follows. First, there is evidence that macroprudential policy in recipient countries can partly offset the spillover effects of monetary policy conducted in core countries. Meanwhile, domestic macroprudential policy in core countries can also affect the cross‐border transmission of domestic monetary policy via lending abroad, by limiting the increase in lending by less strongly capitalized banks. Second, the findings highlight that studying heterogeneities across banks provides complementary insights to studies using more aggregate data and focusing on average effects. In particular, we find that individual bank characteristics such as bank size or GSIB status play a first‐order role in the transmission of these policies. Finally, the impacts differ considerably across prudential policy instruments, which also suggests the importance of more granular analysis.     

BANK EFFICIENCY AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY POLICY

Advances in information technology and bank consolidation have altered the way banks operate by necessitating that banks control costs and provide services efficiently to remain competitive. Given the unique role bank operations play in the transmission of monetary policy, a key unresolved question is whether bank efficiency alters monetary policy outcomes. Using a stochastic frontier approach to measure cost‐efficiency and panel data of U.S. bank balance sheets, we show that banks with greater cost‐efficiency are more sensitive to monetary shocks. (JEL E52, E44, E51)     

Inflation in Open Economies with Complete Markets

This paper uses an overlapping generations model to analyze monetary policy in a two-country model with asymmetric shocks. Agents insure against risk through the exchange of a complete set of real securities. Each central bank is able to commit to the contingent monetary policy rule that maximizes domestic welfare. In an attempt to improve their country’s terms of trade of securities, central banks choose to commit to costly inflation in favorable states of nature. In equilibrium the effects on the terms of trade wash out, leaving both countries worse off. Countries facing asymmetric shocks may therefore gain from monetary cooperation.     

金融危机、货币政策与信贷供给*——基于公司层面银行信贷数据的经验研究

不同的银行特征会对金融危机和货币政策传导的银行信贷渠道产生异质性影响。本文运用2001-2015年公司层面银行信贷数据实证检验了我国货币政策传导的银行信贷渠道,随后进一步研究金融危机对不同特征银行信贷供给的影响差异。经验研究发现：我国货币政策银行信贷渠道主要通过非国有控股银行传导,并引起不同资产负债表特征银行信贷供给的异质性反应。银行规模越大、流动性越强、资本充足率越高,银行信贷供给对货币政策越不敏感。金融危机期间,银行信贷渠道的传导效率显著降低,高资本充足水平的银行和国有控股银行受金融危机的冲击较小,并且宽松的货币政策对国有控股银行信贷供给调控的效率更高。     

价格型货币政策操作框架：利率走廊的 条件、机制与实现*

随着商业银行产权市场化水平的提高,以及金融创新的不断涌现,数量型货币政策操作框架的有效性开始下降。本文通过对商业银行行为的分析,基于其极大化经营利润的诉求,论证了利率走廊系统的运行条件及机制。研究认为,完善的制度安排、商业银行的市场主体地位、充分竞争的市场、高效的实时清算系统等是利率走廊系统发挥作用的基础条件;在利率走廊系统运行过程中,当货币市场被注入过多流动性时,其可能转化成地板系统;价格型货币政策操作框架能够实现分别进行资金价格调控与资金数量调控,从而使货币政策操作的针对性与有效性得到提高。由此论文从利率走廊系统的构建、中央银行的职责、商业银行的行为等方面,提出我国货币政策操作框架从数量型调控向价格型调控转型的路径。     

Is inflation targeting a good remedy to control inflation?

Since the 1990s inflation targeting (IT) has been adopted by several central banks as a strategy for monetary policy. It is expected that the adoption of this monetary regime can reduce inflation and inflation volatility. This article is concerned with these issues and makes use of the Propensity Score Matching methodology on a sample of 180 countries for the period from 1990 to 2007. For analysis, the sample is split into two sets of countries (advanced and developing). The findings suggest that the adoption of IT is an ideal monetary regime for developing economies and, in addition to reducing inflation volatility, can drive inflation down to internationally acceptable levels. Regarding advanced economies, the adoption of IT does not appear to represent an advantageous strategy. In brief, the empirical results indicate that the adoption of IT is useful for countries that must enhance their credibility for the management of monetary policy.     

The Role of Banks in Monetary Policy Transmission: Empirical Evidence from Russia

This paper focuses on the role of the banking sector in monetary policy transmission in an emerging economy with a rapidly developing financial system. Specifically, we examine whether the central bank's monetary policy stance affects banks' lending behavior. Based on a comprehensive quarterly dataset on all Russian banks from 1Q1999 to 1Q2007, we find evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel in Russia. Contrary to several studies on developed economies, the level of a bank's capitalization matters for the transmission process. Better capitalized banks are less likely to adjust their lending practices following a change in the monetary policy stance.     

Financial frictions and optimal stabilization policy in a monetary union

Financial frictions differ across countries and thus cause international differences in the transmission of shocks. This paper shows how the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy depends on these country-specific financial frictions. To this end, we build a two-country DSGE-model of a monetary union. Financial frictions are captured by the cost channel approach. We show that the traditional solution to the assignment problem – the common central bank stabilizes the inflation rate at the union level and the national fiscal authorities stabilize the national economies – does not hold in a world with financial frictions. The cost channel decreases the efficiency of monetary policy and increases the need for fiscal stabilization even at the union level. Moreover, the more heterogeneous the union, the more important is fiscal policy in stabilizing shocks. Finally, we evaluate the scenarios in terms of welfare of the representative household.     

The effect of US stress tests on monetary policy spillovers to emerging markets

This paper explores the transmission of US monetary policy through US banks to emerging market economies (EMEs) and the role that stress tests play in this transmission. Data on US banks’ monthly commercial and industrial loan originations shows that: (a) US bank lending to EMEs was sensitive to domestic monetary policy changes during the zero‐lower bound period. (b) Effects of monetary easing were heterogeneous across banks and depended on banks’ stress test results, a proxy for their capital strength. Only banks that comfortably passed the stress tests issued more loans to EME borrowers. (c) Effects of monetary tightening were more similar across banks. (d) Banks shifted their lending to safer borrowers within EMEs in response to monetary easing, leaving the risk of their overall loan books unchanged. These results support the hypothesis that bank capital affects the transmission of easier monetary policy, including across borders. We conjecture that bank lending to EMEs during the zero‐lower bound period would have been even higher had the United States not introduced stress tests for their banks.     

The bank lending channel of monetary policy in EU countries during the global financial crisis

The study examines the existence of the bank lending channel of monetary policy in European Union (EU) countries. The paper advances current research on the monetary transmission mechanism in the following ways: Firstly, we analyze the differences between ‘old’ Economic Monetary Union (EMU) and ‘new’ EU countries. Secondly, we examine the key bank characteristics and monetary policy indicators that may have an impact on the bank lending channel. We assume that short-term market interest rates and monetary aggregate M2 affect banks' activities. We apply the generalized method of moments (GMM) with pooled data from 1999 to 2012. We show that in the pre-crisis period the effect of changing the short-term market interest rates on the bank lending channel of monetary policy is more pronounced among ‘old’ EMU countries, whereas the effect of M2 is significant during the period of the global financial crisis (GFC) among ‘old’ EMU countries. Last but not least the important finding is that banks in ‘new’ EU countries react differently to monetary shocks.     

中央银行的宏观监管职能:经济效果与影响因素分析

文章以跨国数据为基础,对中央银行是否应分离银行监管职能这一问题进行了系统的实证分析。结果表明,在中央银行未分离或未完全分离银行监管职能的国家,其金融稳定性通常更高,经济增速更快,而且未出现明显的"通货膨胀倾向"。这意味着金融监管的独立性并不是简单地将监管职能从中央银行分离的问题,中央银行的独立性也并不必然排斥其继续实施金融监管职能。通过将货币政策和金融监管的兼容性置于政治经济学框架下加以解读,文章发现真正影响金融监管实际独立性的并非监管主体的设置问题,而是更广泛地依赖于不同的政治制度条件。上述结论表明,如何在既定的政治制度和政策框架下切实加强货币政策和金融监管的协调与配合才是问题的核心和关键。     

Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking

According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward–looking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy–distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low–inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; F 58