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1.
In this paper, we survey the case for central bank independence (CBI). We conclude that CBI is neither necessary nor sufficient for monetary stability. CBI is just one potentially useful monetary policy design instrument among several, and CBI should not be treated as an exogenous variable. Instead, the question that should be addressed is why societies decide to make their central banks independent? The reasons why CBI is chosen are related to legal, political, and economic systems. A number of empirical studies find correlations between CBI and low inflation rates. Endogeneity of CBI suggests, however, that the correlation has no implications for causality.  相似文献   

2.
Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward–looking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy–distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low–inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; F 58  相似文献   

3.
The literature argues that the benefits of an independent central bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary objectives. Few of the attempts to measure these correlations actually allow for a changing fiscal role. Yet, when an independent authority handles monetary policy, fiscal and wage/social protection policies remain instruments in the hands of elected governments. We find that, so long as the two authorities pursue their goals independently of each other, a conflict arises that becomes stronger as preferences diverge. We also find that the establishment of a conservative central bank encourages more divergent preferences among the public (as reflected in the government that is elected). The election of more interventionist governments then makes it harder for either authority to reach its own preferred objectives, unless cooperation is possible.  相似文献   

4.
This paper derives and evaluates empirical implications which separate the naive voters view [Nordhaus, W.D., 1975. The political business cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42, 169–190.] from the rational-voters view [Barro R., Gordon, D., 1983. Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 101–121.] under rational expectations. The observational equivalence of the two approaches obtained under a natural rate vanishes as output persistence is introduced. An analysis of inflation in the G-7 countries reveals election patterns supporting the joint hypothesis that demand shocks persist and that monetary policy courts retrospective voters. Patterns turn weaker as central banks become more independent, but do not disappear. Reducing inflationary bias not only requires more central bank independence, but as well less persistence.  相似文献   

5.
We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.  相似文献   

6.
Combining responses from a survey of firms operating in 35 developing and transition economies with data on the degree of foreign bank presence across these countries, we investigate whether higher foreign bank participation improves the accessibility of external financing for firms. The results suggest that all enterprises, including small and medium-sized ones, report facing lower financing obstacles in countries having higher levels of foreign bank presence. The results are robust to the inclusion of many controls and to econometric adjustments for the potential endogeneity of foreign bank presence and for the likely correlation of responses across firms within countries. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 774–795.  相似文献   

7.
8.
货币政策有效性与货币政策透明制度的兴起   总被引:30,自引:1,他引:30  
徐亚平 《经济研究》2006,41(8):24-34
本文着重探讨货币政策透明性与货币政策有效性之间的关系,目的在于说明货币政策透明制度能够兴起的一个关键因素在于货币政策的透明性有利于提高货币政策的有效性。在标准的“时间不一致性”理论里面,货币政策是否透明对货币政策的效应是没有影响的,因为在这类理论里面,经济主体能够使用所有可获得的信息形成与经济系统相一致的、无偏的估计。但问题的关键在于,这种假设的基本前提在实践中并不完全成立。当考虑到经济主体对经济运行结果和经济运行过程的不完全认知时,货币政策透明性对于促进经济主体的学习过程,稳定和引导公众的通胀预期,进而提高货币政策的有效性就起着至关重要的作用。  相似文献   

9.
The initial focus in this article is the problem of mismatch between policy goals and statistical analysis, based on how data is transformed and processed. This intrinsically raises ontological issues regarding the nature of an economy within which policy is made and to which statistical analysis is applied. These are of general significance to post Keynesians irrespective of the position they take on the specifics of the ergodicity debate. However, they involve some issues that overlap with some aspects of that debate. The problem as posed in this article is specific and involves a practical contradiction regarding central bank policy and the problem of unit roots. The authors then consider some additional ways in which one can go beyond common practice based on the example of Forward Guidance in the United Kingdom and a more institutional approach to post Keynesian analysis.  相似文献   

10.
We use a non-Bayesian approach to uncertainty, where “ambiguity” is taken into account, in order to analyze the issue of central bank transparency, and we underline that the use of such an approach may greatly change the results. We reconsider a specific argument against transparency found in the literature. We show that, in the presence of ambiguity, the argument can become a case in favor of transparency, which seems more in accordance with some stylized facts. Reduced Knightian uncertainty associated with increased transparency can contribute to making transparency beneficial.  相似文献   

11.
12.
The zero lower bound (ZLB) may restrict the responsiveness of exchange rates to news. A proxy for central bank communication is added as a determinant in a model of exchange rate movements. Two reserve currencies, the British pound and euro, and two currencies of small open economies, the Canadian dollar and Swedish krona, are examined. Reserve currencies are more vulnerable to the ZLB constraint, while the currencies of small open economies become more responsive to foreign central bank announcements. Certain unconventional monetary policy announcements were found to significantly impact exchange rates at the ZLB.  相似文献   

13.
This paper seeks to adjust Taylor rule to mimic an environment that has central bank inability (losses). Moreover, the current paper is aiming at investigating the effect of the new features of Taylor rule within a context of a New-Keynesian model on a developing economy. The current paper concludes that we can utilize Taylor rule within a New-Keynesian model to introduce the influence of the central bank inability on the economy. Central bank inability decreases both expected future real interest rate and expected future real output. On the contrary, it increases expected future nominal interest rate and expected future inflation rate. Moreover, we prove that the effect of central bank inability has larger effect on the expected inflation rate more than the influence of targeted inflation rate.  相似文献   

14.
  总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
Transparency has become one of the main features of monetarypolicymaking during the last decade. This article establishesstylized facts and provides a systematic overview of the practiceof monetary policy transparency around the world. It shows muchdiversity in information disclosure, even for central bankswith the same monetary policy framework, including inflationtargeting. Nevertheless, the study finds significant differencesin transparency across monetary policy frameworks. The empiricalfindings are explained using key insights distilled from thetheoretical literature. Thus, this article aims to bridge thegap between the theory and practice of monetary policy transparency.(JEL codes: E58, D82)  相似文献   

15.
    
This paper challenges the time-inconsistency case for centralbank independence. It argues that the time-inconsistency literaturenot only seriously confuses the substance of the rules vs discretiondebate, but also posits an implausible view of monetary policy.Most worryingly, the inflationary bias featured prominentlyin the time-inconsistency literature has encouraged the developmentof a dangerously one-sided approach to central bank independencewhich entirely ignores the potential risks involved in maximisingcentral bankers' latitude for discretion. The analysis showsthat a more balanced and symmetric approach to central bankindependence is urgently needed. The views of Maynard Keynesand Milton Friedman are shown to shed some illuminating anddisconcerting light on a fashionable free-lunch promise thatis based on rather shallow theoretical foundations and empiricalevidence.  相似文献   

16.
In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.  相似文献   

17.
    
The article presents a novel methodology for measuring the clarity of central bank communication using content analysis, illustrating the methodology with the case of the European Central Bank (ECB). The analysis identifies the ECB's written communication as clear in about 85–95% of instances, which is comparable with, or better than, similar results available for other central banks. We also find that the additional information on risk to inflation and especially projection risk assessment contained in the ECB's Monthly Bulletins helps to improve communication clarity compared to ECB's press releases. In contrast, the bulletin's communication on monetary developments has a negative, albeit small, impact on clarity.  相似文献   

18.
Boris Hofmann 《Empirica》2006,33(4):209-229
This paper analyses the pass-through of money market rates to short-term and long-term business lending rates in the four largest euro area countries. The main findings of the paper are (1) that since the start of EMU loan rates appear to have become more responsive to money market rate changes in France, Italy and Spain, but not in Germany, and (2) that German loan rates are significantly more sluggish than loan rates in the other three large euro area countries. I also test for non-linear pass-through based on an asymmetric error-correction model but do not find much evidence of non-linearity in euro area interest rate pass-through.The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank.  相似文献   

19.
An implication of two-country international real business cycle models is that total factor productivity should be an exogenous stochastic process. Economic theories which feature labor hoarding, variable capacity utilization, and increasing returns predict that measured productivity shifts are not exogenous; instead, expansionary aggregate demand shocks should lead to an increase in measured productivity. For each of the G-7 countries, this paper measures quarterly aggregate total factor productivity for the domestic country and its rest-of-world (G-6) counterpart. In each case the domestic productivity measures are not strictly exogenous: expansionary U.S. monetary policy shocks, as well as other G-6 monetary policy shocks, lead to productivity expansions. The evidence indicates that international business cycle models are misspecified unless they feature endogenous productivity mechanisms.Received: June 2001, Accepted: December 2001, JEL Classification: E5, F4Correspondence to: Charles L. EvansFor their helpful comments, we thank Mario Crucini, Patricia Reynolds, and Steve Strongin. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.  相似文献   

20.
周念利 《经济经纬》2008,37(2):140-143
大多数国家的央行开始摈弃隐秘性传统,其货币政策逐渐走向开放和透明。如何最充分、准确、及时地向公众披露与解释货币政策目标、策略和决策已成为多数国家货币政策操作所面临的首要问题,本文首先对欧洲中央银行在实践中所采用的主要沟通策略和工具进行归纳和介绍,然后将欧洲中央银行与世界其他主要中央银行的信息公开程度进行横向比较,最后就关于提高欧洲中央银行货币政策透明度的相关建议和争议进行评述。  相似文献   

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