Corporate insurance with optimal financial contracting

Summary. This paper attemps to rationalize the use of insurance covenants in financial contracts, and shows how external financing generates a demand for insurance by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. In our model, the entrepreneur needs external financing for a risky project that can be affected by an accident during its realization. Accident losses and final returns are private information to the firm, but they can be evaluated by two costly auditing technologies. We derive the optimal financial contract: it is a bundle of a standard debt contract and an insurance contract with franchise, trading off bankruptcy costs vs auditing costs. We then analyze how this optimal contract can be achieved by decentralized trading on competitive markets when insurance and credit activities are exogenously separated. With additive risks, the insurance contract involves full coverage above a straight deductible. We interpret this result by showing how our results imply induced risk aversion for risk-neutral firms. Received: December 14, 1998; revised version: August 11, 1999     

Financial Innovation and Delegation of Control

The literature on security design has traditionally assumed that control of investment and production rests with the entrepreneur even after flotation. In this article I relax this assumption, which is both unnecessarily strict and unrealistic. The contribution is twofold. First, I show that when control is delegated during flotation, financial innovation is a trade off between agency costs (arising from principal agent relationships) and targeting costs (arising from the inability to split the cash flow). Second, I show that unlevered equity or the use of debt which can be issued without defaulting in equilibrium, are optimal means of financing.     

Analysing the effect of excess cash accumulation on financial decisions

In this current moment of crisis it is very important for firms to hold a suitable amount of cash. But it is also very important to analyse how this amount of cash affects firm value. Here an in-depth study is made of the determination of firm value centring our attention on the problem of excess cash accumulation. This article adds important value to the existing literature since, employing the panel data methodology in the sample of Spanish nonfinancial firms, it identifies whether excess cash holding affects firm value in general, and investment, financing and dividend decisions in particular. The results show how asymmetric information among the economic agents of the firm affects the cash reserves. In particular, shareholders could penalize the investment made by these firms and consider the positive effect that the debt in particular and the dividend policies exert on the firm. Moreover, the results reveal the importance of financial flexibility as opposed to the arguments provided by agency theory.     

Regulating a risk-averse firm under incomplete information

We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse firm when the firm is imperfectly informed about its efficiency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The firm’s risk aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undereffort by an inefficient firm as in Laffont and Tirole (J Polit Econ 94(3):614–641, 1986) and the effort distortion increases as the firm becomes more risk-averse. Further, the regulator benefits from sequential contracting with the firm where the firm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires information, albeit the benefit diminishes as the firm becomes more risk-averse.      

Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs

Preshipment inspection (PSI) programmes are implemented in many developing countries to assist governments in the collection of revenue at their borders. These programs consist of the delegation of the inspection of imports to a private firm. To study these PSI programmes, we develop a hierarchical agency model in which the government authority can rely on two supervisors, namely the private inspection firm and the customs administration, to control importers' declarations. The government's optimal contract is fully characterized. We devote some attention to the inspection policy and its comparative statics properties. In particular, we identify the situations in which PSI programmes are revenue enhancing. We also discuss the reconciliation policy, i.e. what to do in case of conflicting inspection reports by the inspection firm and the customs administration. In the optimal mechanism, mutual supervision between the inspection firm and the customs administration is used to provide adequate incentives to all parties.     

EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS*

We characterize incentive‐efficient merger outcomes when payments can be made both in cash and stock. Each firm has private information about both its stand‐alone value and a component of the (possibly negative) potential synergies. We study two cases: when transfers can, and cannot, be made contingent on the value of any new firm. When they can, we show that redistributing shares of any nonmerging firm generates information rents and provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of efficient merger rules. When they cannot, private information undermines efficiency more when it concerns stand‐alone values than synergies. Here, acquisitions emerge as optimal mechanisms.     

Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self‐Employment Income Taxes

I investigate the optimal auditing scheme for a revenue‐maximizing tax collection agency that observes not only reported profits, but also a single factor of production at each firm. Each firm is owned by a single entrepreneur whose managerial ability is random. The optimal auditing scheme is discontinuous and nonmonotone in ability. In intermediate audit costs, less productive entrepreneurs face auditing probabilities that increase in ability, whereas the ablest ones are not audited. Finally, the effective tax rate is higher in the middle of the managerial ability distribution; thus, the overall regressive (or progressive) bias that arises from evasion is unknown.     

基于契约经济学的公司激励契约的完备性分析

委托-代理理论对于建立完备契约,防治机会主义行为具有重要意义.通过比较分析三种参数化的委托-代理模型得出如下结论:在当前制度和市场环境下,委托人若以企业的净资产现金利润率为基础评价代理人的经营业绩,并以适当的标准强制发放现金股利,则代理契约的完备程度将增加,控股股东掠夺小股东和职业经理侵害外部股东利益等代理问题也将得到有效解决.     

A theory of firm decline

We study the problem of an investor that buys an equity stake in an entrepreneurial venture, under the assumption that the former cannot monitor the latter's operations. The dynamics implied by the optimal incentive scheme is rich and quite different from that induced by other models of repeated moral hazard. In particular, our framework generates a rationale for firm decline. As young firms accumulate capital, the claims of both investor (outside equity) and entrepreneur (inside equity) increase. At some juncture, however, even as the latter continues to grow, invested capital and firm value start declining and so does the value of outside equity. The reason is that incentive provision is costlier the wealthier the entrepreneur (the greater is inside equity). In turn, this leads to a decline in the constrained-efficient level of effort and therefore to a drop in the return to investment.     

Optimal Loan Loss Provisions and Welfare

We study the welfare implications of optimal loan loss provisions in a New Keynesian model featuring endogenous default risk and inflationary credit spreads. A unique link between provisions, credit spreads and inflation can be employed to enhance macroeconomic stability. Optimal provisions are most effective when dealing with cost-push financial shocks inherent in volatile spreads and the zero bound problem of monetary policy. Relaxing provisioning requirements following a recessionary financial disturbance consistently achieves the first-best outcome while nullifying the value of monetary policy under commitment. In contrast, deflationary demand shocks warrant an optimal rise in provisions, which inflate prices yet mildly contract output.     

我国创业企业研发投资经济绩效的实证研究——基于创业板上市企业的经验数据

以2009—2011年我国深圳创业板上市企业为研究对象,从会计业绩和市场业绩等角度,实证考察了其R&D投资的经济绩效。结果显示:创业企业的R&D投资整体上并未呈现出积极的经济效果;R&D投资的经济效果具有明显的行业特征,制造业创业企业的R&D投资对其经济绩效具有一定的积极影响,但该影响具有滞后性;信息技术业创业企业的R&D投资对其当期和滞后一期的经济绩效均未产生积极影响,表明信息技术业创业企业的R&D投资存在一定程度的非效率行为。     

债务期限结构影响公司价值吗?

使用OLS多元回归分析方法研究了中国上市公司的债务期限结构对其市场价值的影响。结果表明,上市公司的长期债务比例越高,公司的市场价值越低。在自由现金流量较高的上市公司样本中,长期债务比例与公司价值间的负相关关系的显著水平和系数绝对值都明显大于在自由现金流量较低的上市公司样本中的情况。这表明,使用更多的短期债务有利于降低公司的代理成本,从而提高公司的市场价值。     

Short or long-term contract? Firm’s optimal choice

This article studies the behaviour of a firm searching to fill a vacancy. The main assumption is that the firm can offer two different kinds of contracts to the workers, either a short-term contract or a long-term one. The short-term contract acts as a probationary stage in which the firm can learn about the worker. After this stage, the firm can propose a long-term contract to the worker or it can decide to look for another worker. We show that, if the short-term wage is fixed endogenously, it can be optimal for firms to start a working relationship with a short-term contract, but that this policy decreases unemployment and welfare. On the contrary, if the wage is fixed exogenously, this policy could be optimal also from a welfare point of view.     

Regulatory Enforcement with Discretionary Fining and Litigation

In this paper, we focus on the determination of the optimal fine set by a regulator when a firm can litigate to avoid paying the fine and the monitoring agency has discretionary power to negotiate with the firm the size of the fine. The regulator needs to balance the positive effect of the fine's size on the degree of non–compliance and the possibility of litigation if the fine is too high. We find that the optimal fine is not necessarily set at its maximum level.     

Dynamic Moral Hazard and Executive Stock Options

This paper shows that the optimal executive compensation scheme in a dynamic moral hazard environment is convex in the firm value. This implies that the optimal contract should include stock options. This is because the private benefit of shirking is increasing in firm value and the manager's utility is concave. Therefore, in contrast to the previous literature that takes stock options in the incentive contract exogenously, we rationalize the optimality of their use endogenously. Moreover, we show that the optimal amount of stock options (restricted stocks) increases with agency cost and the executive's reservation utility, decreases with the degree of risk aversion of the manager, and increases (decreases) with the firm size.     

STRATEGIC TRADE AND DELEGATED COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY CHOICE: IS EXPORT POLICY NEEDED?

This paper introduces the relative‐performance contract into a vertically differentiated product market and examines how the optimal trade policy and quality choice respond to the incentive mechanism. We find that the high quality firm makes better use of the delegation than the low quality firm in a cross‐border decentralized model. The main difference between the present paper and the strategic trade theory literature is that in this paper the optimal policy is free trade, which does not depend on whether firms compete by prices or quantities, and on whether the goods are substitutes or full complements.     

Market volatility and the dynamic hedging of multi-commodity price risk

Commodity cash and futures prices experienced a severe boom-and-bust cycle between 2006 and 2009. Increases in commodity price volatility have raised concerns about the usefulness of commodity futures and options as risk management tools. Dynamic hedging strategies have the potential to improve risk management when conditional (co)variances depart significantly from their unconditional, long-run counterparts and may be useful to decision-makers despite their greater complexity and higher transaction costs. We propose a Nonparametric Copula-based Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (NPC-GARCH) approach to estimate time-varying hedge ratios, and evaluate the benefits of dynamic hedging during four sub-periods between 2000 and 2011 using a stylized Texas cattle feedlot management problem. The NPC-GARCH approach allows for a flexible, nonlinear and asymmetric dependence structure between cash and futures prices for different commodities. We find that NPC-GARCH dynamic hedging performs better than either static, GARCH-Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) or GARCH-Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (BEKK) hedging in terms of lower tail risk (expected shortfall), but that there is no significant difference between hedging approaches in terms of portfolio variance reduction.     

Firm Value,Corporate Cash Holdings and Financial Constraint: A Study from a Developing Market

This paper investigates the nonlinear relationship between firm value and corporate cash holdings in a sample of non‐financial Vietnamese firms from 2008 to 2013. We focus on both static and dynamic regressions to test for a nonlinear relationship. Our results reveal an ‘inverse U‐shape’ relationship between firm value and cash holdings, which is in line with trade‐off theory. Specially, we further test whether the optimal cash level changes under different financial conditions. In turn, this paper shows evidence of a nonlinear relationship between firm value and cash holdings under different financial circumstances and that each type of firm will adjust its optimal cash level based on business conditions.     

Optimal Hedging Under Forward-Looking Behaviour*

The study focuses on the production and hedging behaviour of forward-looking risk-averse competitive firms. It is shown that there is separation between production and hedging. Optimal productin for a forward-looking firm is identical to that of an otherwise equivalent myopic firm. However, the optimal forward-looking hedge differs from the optimal myopic hedge. If forward prices are unbiased, full hedging is suboptimal when the firm is forward looking and output and material input prices are contemporaneously related. Furthermore, under certain conditions, the optimal forward-looking hedge under unbiased forward prices is strictly smaller than the full hedge.     

派现行为下的控股股东利益转移问题研究

本文运用深市上市公司的数据,对我国上市公司派现与控股股东利益转移行为之间的关系进行了实证分析.结果表明,控股股东将现金股利作为利益转移的方式之一,控股股东控股优势越大,公司派现意愿越强,派现水平也越高;派现意愿与公司上市年限负相关,而与上年配股情况正相关;此外,债务和股权制衡能够在一定程度上制约这种利用派现政策实施的利益转移行为.