Evidence of Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market: Dichotomous Versus Multinomial Measurement of Insurance Coverage

In the empirical analysis of information asymmetry in automobile insurance markets, prior research used a dichotomous measurement approach that induces excessive bundling in coverage measurements and sample selection biases. To improve on the conditional correlation method for testing information asymmetry, we propose a multinomial measurement approach that constructs coverage categories at ordered multinomial levels. With this approach, we find robust evidence of information asymmetry in both coverage area and coverage amount choices, which we could not find with the dichotomous measurement approach. It thus demonstrates the sensitivity of the empirical findings to the method used to measure insurance coverage.     

The Asymmetric Information Problem in Taiwan's Cancer Insurance Market

This paper investigates the problem of asymmetric information in Taiwan’s cancer insurance market. Through the survey data, we find evidence of adverse selection existing in this market. Furthermore, we collect additional information on the individual, and find that the individual’s family cancer history contains additional valuable information. It can not only more accurately predict the probability of contracting cancer, as well as predict the willingness to purchase extended cancer insurance, but it can also help to mitigate the severity of adverse selection in the insurance market.     

Asymmetric Information Problems in Taiwan's Automobile Insurance Market: The Effect of Policy Design on Loss Characteristics

This article investigates asymmetric information problems for the automobile insurance market in Taiwan. Using panel data for the comprehensive automobile insurance coverage from 1995 to 1999, this article analyzes how types of coverage, deductible amounts, and experience ratings have affected the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in Taiwan's automobile insurance market. The empirical results provide partial evidence to demonstrate that the loss frequency and loss ratio were reduced by the addition of self-selection mechanisms in policies with different levels of coverage. In addition, the deductible amounts, experience ratings, and better control of underwriting and claims processing were shown possibly to have decreased potential losses from adverse selection and moral hazard problems.     

On the Role of Patience in an Insurance Market With Asymmetric Information

We analyze a two-period competitive insurance market that is characterized by the simultaneous presence of moral hazard and adverse selection with regard to consumer time preferences. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which patient consumers use high effort and buy an insurance contract with high coverage, whereas impatient consumers use low effort and buy a contract with low coverage or even remain uninsured. This finding may help to explain why the opposite of adverse selection with regard to risk types can sometimes be observed empirically.     

Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: A Multivariate Ordered Regression Approach

The positive correlation (PC) test is the standard procedure used in the empirical literature to detect the existence of asymmetric information in insurance markets. This article describes a new tool to implement an extension of the PC test based on a new family of regression models, the multivariate ordered logit, designed to study how the joint distribution of two or more ordered response variables depends on exogenous covariates. We present an application of our proposed extension of the PC test to the Medigap health insurance market in the United States. Results reveal that the risk–coverage association is not homogeneous across coverage and risk categories, and depends on individual socioeconomic and risk preference characteristics.     

The Impact of Rate Regulation on Claims: Evidence From Massachusetts Automobile Insurance

The article tests the hypothesis that insurance price subsidies created by rate regulation lead to higher insurance cost growth. The article makes use of data from the Massachusetts private passenger automobile insurance market, where cross‐subsidies were explicitly built into the rate structure through rules that limit rate differentials and differences in rate increases across driver rating categories. Two approaches are taken to study the potential loss cost reaction to the Massachusetts cross‐subsidies. The first approach compares Massachusetts with all other states while controlling for demographic, regulatory, and liability coverage levels. Loss cost levels that were about 29 percent above the expected level are found for Massachusetts during years 1978–1998, when premiums charged were those fixed by the state and included explicit subsidies for high‐risk drivers. A second approach considers changing cost levels across Massachusetts by studying loss cost changes by town and relating those changes to subsidy providers and subsidy receivers. Subsidy data based on accident year data for 1993–2004 show a significant and positive (relative) growth in loss costs and an increasing proportion of high‐risk drivers for towns that were subsidy receivers, in line with the theory of underlying incentives for adverse selection and moral hazard.     

博弈论视角下我国商业医疗保险市场的信息不对称分析

本文首先建立单阶段静态博弈模型,分析保险公司与医院合作的可能性,说明只有作为委托人的保险公司向医院支付一定补偿金额,医院才有动机控制患者的医疗费用,从而间接实现保险公司的利润目标;其次建立多阶段动态博弈模型进一步分析,指出双方足够的耐心与理性是长期稳定合作的条件。在我国,医疗卫生体制制约了保险公司与医院的耐心与理性,理顺医疗服务体系有助于商业医疗保险健康发展。保险公司尽管可以分别采取措施控制医方和患方的风险,但控制医患合谋的道德风险更加困难。保险公司必须加强自身的诚信建设。     

Asymmetric Information in the Subprime Mortgage Market

Because of impersonal securitization in the secondary market, the ultimate investors in a mortgage have only a limited amount of information about the borrower??s characteristics. This creates an asymmetric information problem because of hidden knowledge on the part of the primary lenders, who naturally have much better access to this information. This is aggravated by the free rider problem when there are multiple investors. We discuss to what extent the secondary market then seeks to sort the loans to ameliorate this problem and what role reputations play. More importantly, however, the actions of the primary lender in terms of which kinds of loans they choose to approve are partly hidden, and this typical principal-agent situation importantly aggravates the incentive problem. To judge the nature and magnitude of this moral hazard dilemma, we use data to compare how well investors in the secondary mortgage market can predict default given the information they typically have access to as compared to the ability of primary lenders to similarly predict default given the larger set of information they typically will have access to. Finally, the implications of these results are indicated, particularly in light of the recent mortgage crisis.     

升息预期下的保险经营策略

随着全球经济转暖和通货膨胀压力的不断增大,世界各主要经济体相继进入了新一轮的加息周期。中国作为世界第六大经济体,在经历了连续多次的降息之后,也从2004年10月29日开始上调利率。在世界经济发展趋势的影响下,很多人认为中国经济运行已经开始进入了一个升息通道,对未来几年调高利率的预期不可避免。保险业作为金融业的重要组成部分,其自身的经营与发展和利率波动密切相关。     

非对称信息条件下的政府规制

在政府规制实践中，规制者和被规制者双方处于信息不对称状态，本文运用委托-代理模型的基本思想，分析了LM机制和伯圣科-萨平顿规制合同等模型的内在机理。指出政府可以通过这些激励机制来打破被规制者对信息的垄断，从而提高规制效率，实现社会福利最大化。在此基础上，对我国转型经济中政府规制体制改革的路径进行了探索，提出在非对称信息条件下我国政府规制应引入激励性规制制度。     

Interbank Market Integration under Asymmetric Information

Cross-country bank lending appears to be subject to market imperfectionsleading to persistent interest rate differentials. In a modelwhere banks need to cope with liquidity shocks by borrowingor by liquidating assets, we study the scope for internationalinterbank market integration with unsecured lending when cross-countryinformation is noisy. We find that an equilibrium with integratedmarkets need not always exist, and that it may coexist withone characterized by segmentation. A repo market reduces interestrate spreads and improves upon the segmentation equilibrium.However, it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium.     

市场约束条件下的保险公司偿付能力监管

针对保险公司风险形态的变化,发达经济体经历了从静态偿付能力监管到动态偿付能力监管的变革过程.在制度逐步完备的情况下,这些国家仍然出现了很多偿付能力监管失灵的情形,大量保险公司因此破产.本文对动态偿付能力约束条件与偿付能力理论假设进行了研究,并结合实证分析,指出了现有偿付能力监管制度的缺陷,提出了完善制度设计、建立中国保险业动态偿付能力监管体系的建议.     

On the Rate Structure of the American Life Insurance Market

This article re-examines the conclusion of previous studies that price dispersion is extreme in the American whole life insurance market. We take an axiomatic approach to the problem of measuring “price” dispersion in the market for the multiparameter whole life contracts, studying the distribution across contract offers of a price index which is uniquely determined by two conditions. In contrast to the accepted wisdom, we find that the derived measure of price dispersion is only 3.6% and that much of this dispersion can be accounted for by measurement error.