Obstacles to a global banking system: “Old Europe” versus “New Europe”

“Old Europe” – the developed nations of continental Europe – averages only about 15% foreign bank ownership, whereas “New Europe” – the transition nations of Eastern Europe – averages about 70%. Similar findings hold elsewhere in the world – developed nations tend to have much lower foreign bank ownership shares than developing nations. We examine the causes of the differences within Europe with an eye toward more general conclusions. Our findings suggest that the low foreign bank shares in “Old Europe” – and perhaps developed nations more generally – may primarily result from net comparative disadvantages for foreign banks and relatively high implicit government entry barriers. The high foreign penetration in “New Europe” – and perhaps developing nations more generally – may be due to net comparative advantages for foreign banks and low government entry barriers, particularly in nations that reduced their state bank ownership.     

Foreign Banks in Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence

We study how foreign bank penetration affects financial sector development in poor countries. A theoretical model shows that when domestic banks are better than foreign banks at monitoring soft information customers, foreign bank entry may hurt these customers and worsen welfare. The model also predicts that credit to the private sector should be lower in countries with more foreign bank penetration, and that foreign banks should have a less risky loan portfolio. In the empirical section, we test these predictions for a sample of lower income countries and find support for the theoretical model.     

Do Public Banks Compete with Private Banks? Evidence from Concentrated Local Markets in Brazil

We measure the competitive effect of public banks in concentrated local markets in Brazil using branch location patterns. We employ variation in market size, number, and identity of competitors to determine how the conduct of private banks is affected by the entry of a public bank. We find that the market size needed to sustain a private bank branch is 35% larger if a private competitor is present and is not significantly affected by the presence of a public bank. These results suggest that the presence of a public bank does not affect conduct of private banks.     

Does the stock market value bank diversification?

This paper investigates whether or not functionally diversified banks have a comparative advantage in terms of long-term performance/risk profile compared to their specialized competitors. To that end, this study uses market-based measures of return potential and bank risk. We calculate the franchise value over time of European banks as a measure of their long-run performance potential. In addition, we measure risk as both the systematic and the idiosyncratic risk components derived from a bank stock return model. Finally, we analyze the return/risk trade-off implied in different functional diversification strategies using a panel data analysis over the period 1989–2004. A higher share of non-interest income in total income affects banks’ franchise values positively. Diversification of revenue streams from distinct financial activities increases the systematic risk of banks while the effect on the idiosyncratic risk component is non-linear and predominantly downward-sloping. These findings have conflicting implications for different stakeholders, such as investors, bank shareholders, bank managers and bank supervisors.     

Eliminating entry barriers for the provision of banking services: Evidence from ‘banking correspondents’ in Brazil

This paper shows that the contractual arrangement of ‘banking correspondents’ has eliminated entry barriers for the provision of banking services in Brazil. With the bank correspondents, banks are allowed to reach the almost 2200 municipalities without bank branches in 2000, connecting 45 million people to the financial sector. The evidence is based on the estimation of an entry model of financial providers in Brazilian municipalities. I estimate a zero population entry threshold for banking correspondents for the period from 2002 to 2007. The estimated population entry thresholds for bank branches in the same period are relatively stable at approximately 8000–9000 people. The population entry thresholds for the second to fifth players for banking correspondents are also consistently lower than those for bank branches.     

The impacts of Net Stable Funding Ratio requirement on Banks’ choices of debt maturity

In this paper, we study the impacts of the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) requirement on banks’ choices of debt maturity and asset structures, with consequences for banks’ profitability and social welfare. We develop a model in which the manager of a bank determines both debt maturity structure (short-term vs. long-term debt) and asset composition (cash vs. risky assets). To address the incongruence of goals between the bank manager and the bank stakeholders, in our model we assume that the manager receives only a proportion of the bank’s profit in her pay schedule. We demonstrate that the optimal choices of the manager regarding debt maturity and asset structure lead to socially inefficient (second-best) outcomes because the manager internalizes only part of the social benefit. We then study the implications of the NSFR requirement on the manager’s choices and demonstrate that the NSFR requirement can enhance social welfare and reach an efficient (first-best) outcome, if a sufficiently low weight of short-term debt as available stable funding is required by regulation. Further, we find that under the same conditions the NSFR requirement reduces banks’ use of short-term financing and thus increases the probability of banks’ survival and profits from the ex ante point of view, while it decreases banks’ profits from the ex post point of view, since it reduces the threshold for banks’ survival. Our main results have some interesting empirical implications: under certain conditions, the NSFR requirement may reduce both bank failures and banks’ observed profits.     

Schumpeterian competition and efficiency among commercial banks

In this paper, we aim to fill the gap in the banking literature by quantifying the impact that the Schumpeterian competition mode – i.e. competition through the launch of new products (or new varieties of products) – has on the cost and profit efficiency of a sample of commercial banks based in the United Kingdom. We estimate both a cost and an alternative profit frontier on an unbalanced panel of UK commercial banks over the period 2001–2012. The intensity of competition through product innovation is proxied by the trademark intensity (i.e. the ratio between the number of trademarks registered in a given year by all the commercial banks – net of the trademarks registered by the bank under observation – and the employment in the sector) in the commercial banking sector. Our results show that the (lagged) trademark intensity in the commercial banking sector does affect negatively the mean cost and profit efficiency in the sector but there is evidence that as trademark intensity increases in the sector, commercial banks react by improving their cost and profit efficiency.     

Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations

The 2007–2009 financial crisis saw a vast expansion in deposit insurance guarantees around the world and yet our understanding of the design and consequences of deposit insurance schemes is in its infancy. We provide a new rationale for the provision of deposit insurance. In our model the banking sector exhibits both adverse selection and moral hazard, which implies that the social benefits of bank monitoring must for incentive reasons be shared between depositors and banks. Consequently, socially too few deposits are made in equilibrium. Deposit insurance – or, equivalently, bank recapitalization – corrects this market failure. We find that deposit insurance should be funded not by banks or depositors but out of general taxation. The optimal level of deposit insurance varies inversely with the quality of the banking system. Hence, when the soundness of the financial sector is uncertain, governments should consider supporting deposit insurance schemes and undertaking subsidized recapitalizations.     

What explains the low profitability of Chinese banks?

This paper analyzes empirically what explains the low profitability of Chinese banks for the period 1997–2004. We find that better capitalized banks tend to be more profitable. The same is true for banks with a relatively larger share of deposits and for more X-efficient banks. In addition, a less concentrated banking system increases bank profitability, which basically reflects that the four state-owned commercial banks – China’s largest banks – have been the main drag for system’s profitability. We find the same negative influence for China’s development banks (so-called Policy Banks), which are fully state-owned. Instead, more market-oriented banks, such as joint-stock commercial banks, tend to be more profitable, which again points to the influence of government intervention in explaining bank performance in China. These findings should not come as a surprise for a banking system which has long been functioning as a mechanism for transferring huge savings to meet public policy goals.     

Contagious Bank Runs: Evidence from the 1929–1933 Period

This paper empirically examines contagion effects of bank failures by analyzing the behavior of deposit flows in a sample of failed and healthy banks over the 1929–1933 period. We find evidence of contagion for 1930–1932, while none seems to have existed in 1929 or 1933. In addition, the pace of contagion accelerated over 1930–1932. We find that even during 1930–1932, failing-bank deposit outflows exceeded those at a matched control sample of nonfailing banks. This finding is consistent with the presence of a significant number of informed depositors who distinguished among ex ante failing and nonfailing banks.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: G21.     

Bouncing out of the banking system: An empirical analysis of involuntary bank account closures

Using a new database, we document the determinants of involuntary consumer bank account closures. During 2001–2005, approximately 30 million debit accounts were involuntarily closed for excessive overdrafting. We focus on multiple factors to explain this phenomenon: household economics and financial decision-making ability, social capital, bank policies, and the alternative financial services sector. Involuntary closures are more frequent in US counties with a larger fraction of single mothers, lower education levels, lower wealth, and higher unemployment. Closures are higher in communities with high property crime rates and low electoral participation. Bank policies have an independent relation to closures, with counties having more competitive banking markets and more multi-market banks experiencing higher closure rates; bank structure also seems to affect the speed at which banks adjust their policies to changes in household income. Finally, using both national data and a state-level shift in regulation, we find evidence that access to payday lending leads to higher rates of involuntary account closure.     

Does board structure in banks really affect their performance?

We study whether board structure (board size, independence and gender diversity) in banks relates to performance. Using a broad panel of large US bank holding companies over the period 1997–2011, we find that both board size and independent directors decrease bank performance. Although gender diversity improves bank performance in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period (1997–2002), the positive effect of gender diminishes in both the post-SOX (2003–2006) and the crisis periods (2007–2011). Finally, we show that board structure is particularly relevant for banks with low market power, if they are immune to the threat of external takeover and/or they are small. Our two-step system generalised method of moments estimation accounts for endogeneity concerns (simultaneity, reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity). The findings are robust to a wide range of other sensitivity checks including alternative proxies for bank performance.     

Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs

Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that while demand–deposit contracts let banks provide liquidity, they expose them to panic‐based bank runs. However, their model does not provide tools to derive the probability of the bank‐run equilibrium, and thus cannot determine whether banks increase welfare overall. We study a modified model in which the fundamentals determine which equilibrium occurs. This lets us compute the ex ante probability of panic‐based bank runs and relate it to the contract. We find conditions under which banks increase welfare overall and construct a demand–deposit contract that trades off the benefits from liquidity against the costs of runs.     

Valuation and systemic risk consequences of bank opacity

We examine the effects of opacity on bank valuation and synchronicity in bank equity returns over the years 2000–2006 prior to the 2007 financial crisis. As expected, investments in opaque assets are more profitable than investments in transparent assets, and taking profitability into account, have larger valuation discounts relative to transparent assets. The valuation discounts on opaque asset investments decline over the 2000–2006 period only to be followed by a sharp reversal in 2007. The decline is coincident with a rise in bank equity share prices, decrease in transparent asset holdings by banks, and greater return synchronicity – evidence consistent with a feedback effect.     

Competition and innovation: Evidence from financial services

This paper presents new evidence on the relationship between competition and innovation by extending previous literature from manufacturing to financial services. We introduce a new measure of overall innovation by estimating and enveloping annual minimum cost frontiers to create a global frontier. The distance to the global frontier constitutes each bank’s technology gap, which decreases if the bank manages to innovate. Our innovation measure enables us to derive and estimate the model of Aghion et al. (2005b) at the firm level for the US banking industry. Based on individual bank Call Report data for the period 1984–2004, consistent with theoretical and empirical work by Aghion et al., we find evidence of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation that is robust over several different specifications. Further evidence on major structural changes in the US banking industry indicates that banks moved beyond their optimal innovation level and that interstate banking deregulation resulted in lower bank innovation. Policy implications to financial reform and prudential regulation are discussed also.     

The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.     

The Effects of Dynamic Changes in Bank Competition on the Supply of Small Business Credit

We study the effects of structural changes in banking markets on the supply of credit to small businesses. Specifically, we examine whether bank mergers and acquisitions (M & As) and entry have ``external' effects on small business loans by other banks in the same local markets. The results suggest modest positive external effects from these dynamic changes in competition, except that large banks may reduce small business lending in reaction to entry. We confirm bank size and age as important determinants of this lending, and show that the measured age effect does not appear to be driven by local market M & A activity.     

An empirical study of bank efficiency in China after WTO accession

This paper documents the technical efficiency of Chinese banks over 1999–2010. With stochastic frontier analysis, we find that Chinese banks are about 18% more efficient in generating lending assets than profits. We also observe an upward trend of bank efficiency after China's entry to WTO in 2001. The improvement of bank efficiency is most prominent for the largest banks with substantial state ownership. We also find that majority state-owned banks are least efficient; well capitalized banks are less efficient; bank efficiency decreases with bank size at the lower end, but banks gain efficiency and realize economies of scale when bank size grows large enough; more fee-generating business reduces efficiency; better management improves efficiency.     

International diversification gains and home bias in banking

This paper studies international diversification in banking, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers the operations of 38 global banks and their subsidiaries overseas during 1995–2004. The paper finds that banks with a larger share of assets allocated to subsidiaries in emerging market countries were able to attain higher risk-adjusted returns. These gains were somewhat reduced by the concentration of bank subsidiaries in specific geographical regions, which is typical of the observed international expansion strategies. The paper also finds a substantial home bias in the international allocation of bank assets relative to the results of a mean–variance portfolio optimization model.     

Brazilian retail banking and the 2008 financial crisis: Were the government-controlled banks that important?

We revisit the interest rate pass-through effect using weekly retail banking data from May 2006 to March 2010. Our choice of data avoids caveats of previous studies concerning excessive data aggregation and the estimation of how fast changes in benchmark interest rates impact those charged on short-term loans in Brazil. Our analysis focuses on four large retail banks – two of them privately owned and run, two of them government-controlled – before and after September 2008. They account for 60% of the total credit supplied by retail banks. Results indicate that government control over two of the largest banks, supposedly an asset for crisis management, may have had higher welfare costs than assumed. We find no evidence of asymmetry in adjustments of retail rates charged by private and government-controlled banks.