Bank Debt versus Bond Debt: Evidence from Secondary Market Prices

This paper uses a new data set of daily secondary market prices of loans to analyze the specialness of banks as monitors. Consistent with a monitoring advantage of loans over bonds, we find the secondary loan market to be informationally more efficient than the secondary bond market prior to a loan default. Specifically, we find that secondary market loan returns Granger cause secondary market bond returns prior to a loan default. In contrast, secondary market bond returns do not Granger cause secondary market loan returns prior to a loan default.     

Announcement effects of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans: An empirical analysis for the Dutch market

This study investigates the announcement effects of offerings of convertible bond loans and warrant-bond loans using data for the Dutch market. The event study analysis shows that announcement effects of convertible bonds are associated with positive but insignificant abnormal returns and that announcements of warrant-bonds are associated with significant positive abnormal returns. These findings are similar to the results for Japanese hybrid debt, as reported by Kang et al. (1995) (Kang, J.K., Kim, Y.C., Park, K.J., Stulz, R.M., 1995. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, pp. 257–270) and Kang and Stulz (1996) (Kang, J.K., Stulz, R.M., 1996. Review of Financial Studies, pp. 109–139), but they contrast with studies for the United States that generally find significant negative abnormal returns for convertible bond loans and insignificant negative abnormal returns for warrant-bond loans. Our results cannot be attributed to differences in the corporate governance structures of the Netherlands and the United States. We find that the positive abnormal returns for the warrant-bond loans are caused by the packaging of the announcements with other (good) firm-specific news.     

The effect of the Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) on corporate short-term borrowing costs

In this article, I study the effect of the Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) on corporate short-term borrowing costs. Although MMLF loans accept a broader range of collateral acquired from money market funds (MMFs) than Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) loans, their higher loan rates could make the intervention less effective. I find the average yield has decreased by 20–24 basis points. The yield-decreasing effects of the MMLF are stronger for securities issued by eligible non-US firms, non-asset-backed commercial paper securities that are newly accepted as collateral under the MMLF, and securities held by affiliated MMFs. However, I do not find an additional yield-decreasing effect of the MMLF on lower rated securities or nonfinancial sector securities. After the implementation of the MMLF, domestic MMFs seem to increase the weight of nonfinancial sector securities, which helps them achieve a higher return.     

Institutional stock trading on loan market information

One of the most important developments in the corporate loan market over the past decade has been the growing participation of institutional investors. As lenders, institutional investors routinely receive private information about borrowers. However, most of these investors also trade in public securities. This leads to a controversial question: Do institutional investors use private information acquired in the loan market to trade in public securities? This paper examines the stock trading of institutional investors whose portfolios also hold loans. Using the Securities and Exchange Commission filings of loan amendments, we identify institutional investors with access to private information disclosed during loan amendments. We then look at abnormal returns on subsequent stock trades. We find that institutional participants in loan renegotiations subsequently trade in the stock of the same company and outperform trades by other managers and trades in other stocks by approximately 5.4% in annualized terms.     

Disagreement and asset prices

How do differences of opinion affect asset prices? Do investors earn a risk premium when disagreement arises in the market? Despite their fundamental importance, these questions are among the most controversial issues in finance. In this paper, we use a novel data set that allows us to directly measure the level of disagreement among Wall Street mortgage dealers about prepayment speeds. We examine how disagreement evolves over time and study its effects on expected returns, return volatility, and trading volume in the mortgage-backed security market. We find that increased disagreement is associated with higher expected returns, higher return volatility, and larger trading volume. These results imply that there is a positive risk premium for disagreement in asset prices. We also show that volatility in and of itself does not lead to higher trading volume. Instead, only when disagreement arises in the market is higher uncertainty associated with more trading. Finally, we are able to distinguish empirically between two competing hypotheses regarding how information in markets gets incorporated into asset prices. We find that sophisticated investors appear to update their beliefs through a rational expectations mechanism when disagreement arises.     

The Risk‐Return Relation in International Stock Markets

We investigate the risk‐return relation in international stock markets using realized variance constructed from MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) daily stock price indices. In contrast with the capital asset pricing model, realized variance by itself provides negligible information about future excess stock market returns; however, we uncover a positive and significant risk‐return tradeoff in many countries after controlling for the (U.S.) consumption‐wealth ratio. U.S. realized variance is also significantly related to future international stock market returns; more importantly, it always subsumes the information content of its local counterparts. Our results indicate that stock market variance is an important determinant of the equity premium.     

The effects of big-bank presence on the profit efficiency of small banks in rural markets

Because big banks could impact competition in rural markets, we investigate the effects of big-bank presence on the performance of rural, small banks. When competing against a big bank, rural one-county banks operate at lower levels of proit efficiency, but with higher ROA and increased levels of interest and fee income from loans. Lower profit efficiency and higher returns in the rural markets suggest that big banks possess market power in rural markets and that they can extract rents to earn higher returns with lower than average profit efficiency. Therefore, small banks in rural markets should not fear large competitors. Conversely, customers who rely on loans from rural, small banks are negatively impacted by higher rates and fees on loans when a big bank is present in the market.     

Japan’s banking crisis: An event-study perspective

We calculate abnormal stock returns for Japanese non-financial companies around major events associated with the banking crisis (1995–2000), and find that not all companies were equally sensitive to the malaise of the banking sector: the most affected were small, leveraged, low-tech companies with low credit ratings and low market to book ratios. This is consistent with “credit crunch” theories (companies with limited access to financial markets are sensitive to changes in bank lending) and with claims that innovation is rarely financed by bank debt. We do not find much evidence on the alleged misallocation of loans to support ailing bank clients.     

Nonlinear mean reversion in stock prices

This paper provides new evidence on the time-series predictability of stock market returns by introducing a test of nonlinear mean reversion. The performance of extreme daily returns is evaluated in terms of their power to predict short- and long-horizon returns on various stock market indices and size portfolios. The paper shows that the speed of mean reversion is significantly higher during the large falls of the market. The parameter estimates indicate a negative and significant relation between the monthly portfolio returns and the extreme daily returns observed over the past one to eight months. Specifically, in a quarter in which the minimum daily return is −2% the expected excess return is 37 basis points higher than in a month in which the minimum return is only −1%. This result holds for the value-weighted and equal-weighted stock market indices and for each of the size decile portfolios. The findings are also robust to different sample periods, different indices, and investment horizons.     

Estimating JP Morgan Chase's Profits From the Madoff Deposits

JP Morgan Chase had deposits from Bernard L. Madoff's investors totaling $5.5 billion at one point in 2008. The Chase account was supposedly where most of the funds in his Ponzi scheme were deposited. Any large deposit can be a considerable source of profit to a bank. Assuming that the deposits returned the bank's net interest margin and grew at a random geometric rate, this article estimates that JP Morgan Chase generated $435 million in after‐tax profits from this very large account over the course of 16 years. With JP Morgan Chase the target of pending lawsuits relating to the Madoff fraud, this article's methodology and results may be of interest to litigants, prosecutors, journalists, and academics.     

Long-run returns following open market share repurchases

Past studies find abnormal returns to buying after repurchase program announcements. We analyze the profitability of trading after both program announcements and individual repurchase trade publication using different trading strategies – market and limit orders. The analysis of trades is possible because of a unique Canadian data set. The highest abnormal returns are earned by companies on their own repurchase trades which benefits the non-tendering shareholders. For the public investor, we find no strategies that, in practice, would earn abnormal returns to buying after program announcements. However, there is qualified evidence of abnormal returns to a limit order strategy following publication of individual repurchase trades.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

Do Capital Structure Adjustments by Takeover Targets Influence Acquisition Gains?

We link debt issuances by target companies around takeover announcements to enhanced target bargaining power in negotiations with bidders over merger synergy gains in completed takeovers. Announcements of debt issuances by targets—especially new bank loans—are associated with more positive target equity returns relative to those made by nontargets, particularly for debt issuances immediately surrounding the takeover announcement. At least some of these gains to targets come at the expense of bidder shareholders, as bidder equity abnormal returns at target debt issuance are negative. We further show that targets issuing debt are primarily those with relatively low acquisition abnormal returns, consistent with initially poor target bargaining power. Subsequent debt issuances by targets increase the likelihood of positive adjustments to acquisition premiums offered by acquirers.     

Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate loans

Between 2001 and 2007, annual institutional funding in highly leveraged loans went up from $32 billion to $426 billion, accounting for nearly 70% of the jump in total syndicated loan issuance over the same period. Did the inflow of institutional funding in the syndicated loan market lead to mispricing of credit? To understand this relation, we look at the institutional demand pressure defined as the number of days a loan remains in syndication. Using market-level and cross-sectional variation in time-on-the-market, we find that a shorter syndication period is associated with a lower final interest rate. The relation is robust to the use of institutional fund flow as an instrument. Furthermore, we find significant price differences between institutional investors’ tranches and banks’ tranches of the same loans, even though they share the same underlying fundamentals. Increasing demand pressure causes the interest rate on institutional tranches to fall below the interest rate on bank tranches. Overall, a one-standard-deviation reduction in average time-on-the-market decreases the interest rate for institutional loans by over 30 basis points per annum. While this effect is significantly larger for loan tranches bought by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), it is not fully explained by their role.     

Search and herding effects in peer-to-peer lending: evidence from prosper.com

I examine loan data from Prosper.com—a website which allows borrowers to post loans and for lenders to bid on those loans. The Prosper market somewhat resembles the theoretical model of search, herding, and crowding in a large market described in Berkovich and Tayon (Phd. dissertation—Essays on search and herding. University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, 2009). That model predicts that assets with high and low prices have high variance in the difference between price and true value. These extreme price regions of the asset-space are where private information provides excess returns. In the Prosper market, I find some evidence for the model since loans with low ex post returns show higher variance of the difference between price and ex post return. I also find that high-priced loans provide excess returns even after accounting for risk-aversion.     

Asymmetric information,adverse selection,and the pricing of CMBS

We demonstrate that asymmetric information between sellers (loan originators) and purchasers (investors and securities issuers) of commercial mortgages gives rise to a standard lemons problem, whereby portfolio lenders use private information to liquidate lower quality loans in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) markets. Conduit lenders, who originate loans for direct sale into securitization markets, mitigate problems of asymmetric information and adverse selection in loan sales. Our theory provides an explanation for the pricing puzzle observed in CMBS markets, whereby conduit CMBS loans are priced higher than portfolio loans, despite widespread belief that conduit loans are originated at lower quality. Consistent with theoretical predictions of a lemons discount, our empirical analysis of 141 CMBS deals and 16,760 CMBS loans shows that, after controlling for observable determinants of loan pricing, conduit loans enjoyed a 34 basis points pricing advantage over portfolio loans in the CMBS market.     

Diversification Benefits of iShares and Closed-End Country Funds

We study the performance and diversification of iShares and their rival closed‐end country funds from April 1996 to December 1999. International iShares are country‐specific series of securities that track the price and yield of a specific Morgan Stanley Capital Internation (MSCI) country index and, presumably, should provide diversification benefits. Our single‐index model demonstrates that iShares replicate the home index, showing some potential for diversification. However, our two‐factor model, which isolates the “true” diversification virtues, documents that both iShares and closed‐end country fund market prices maintain considerable exposure to the U.S. market. Furthermore, the net asset value returns of the closed‐end funds demonstrate a strong home country exposure, suggesting there is no substitute for direct foreign investment.     

Paulson's gift

We calculate the costs and benefits of the largest ever US government intervention in the financial sector announced during the 2008 Columbus-day weekend. We estimate that this intervention increased the value of banks’ financial claims by $130 billion (bn) at a taxpayers’ cost of $21–$44 billion with a net benefit between $86 and $109 bn. By looking at the limited cross section, we infer that this net benefit arises from a reduction in the probability of bankruptcy, which we estimate would destroy 22% of the enterprise value. The big winners of the plan were the bondholders of the three former investment banks and Citigroup, while the losers were JP Morgan shareholders and the US taxpayers.     

Cost of monitoring and risk taking in the money market funds industry

Increasing the cost associated with gathering information can hamper the monitoring activity of the market even when information remains public. Using the 2015 US money market funds (MMFs) reform as a quasi-natural experiment, I find a positive effect of removing information requirements over credit ratings on the allocation by MMFs toward securities rated as second tier. The effect is driven by monitored MMFs catering to retail investors and by monitored MMFs that do not voluntarily report credit ratings after the reform. The verfied increase in the relative demand by MMFs for second tier securities is associated with a decrease in the spread paid at issuance by second tier commercial paper.     

The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation

We study the effects of securitization on renegotiation of distressed residential mortgages over the current financial crisis. Unlike prior studies, we employ unique data that directly observe lender renegotiation actions and cover more than 60% of the U.S. mortgage market. Exploiting within-servicer variation in these data, we find that bank-held loans are 26–36% more likely to be renegotiated than comparable securitized mortgages (4.2–5.7% in absolute terms). Also, modifications of bank-held loans are more efficient: conditional on a modification, bank-held loans have 9% lower post-modification default rates (3.5% in absolute terms). Our findings support the view that frictions introduced by securitization create a significant challenge to effective renegotiation of residential loans. We also provide evidence supporting the affordability focus of recent policy actions, such as the Home Affordability Modification Program.