Stress testing credit risk: The Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.     

Money and liquidity in financial markets

We argue that there is a connection between the interbank market for liquidity and the broader financial markets, which has its basis in demand for liquidity by banks. Tightness in the market for liquidity leads banks to engage in what we term “liquidity pull-back,” which involves selling financial assets either by banks directly or by levered investors. Empirical tests on the stock market are supportive. Tighter interbank markets are associated with relatively more volume in more liquid stocks; selling pressure, especially in more liquid stocks; and transitory negative returns. We control for market-wide uncertainty and in the process also contribute to the literature on portfolio rebalancing. Our general point is that money matters in financial markets.     

Bank market power,asset liquidity and funding liquidity: International evidence

Our investigation of the association between bank market power and liquidity in 101 countries reveals that a bank's initial gains of market power lead to increases in bank liquidity, but does so at a diminishing rate. Beyond an empirically determined threshold, further increases in market power are inversely associated with bank liquidity. From a cross-sectional viewpoint, banks that lack market power hold more liquid assets and are net lenders in the interbank market. In contrast, dominant banks hold less liquid assets and are net interbank borrowers. For a given level of market power, ceteris paribus, developed nation banks hold less asset liquidity and obtain more interbank funding liquidity than their developing country peers. These results remain equally relevant during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis (GFC).     

Information,sell-side research,and market making

The interaction between an investment bank's research and market making arms may have important implications for the trading of a firm's stock. We investigate the impact that research has on the liquidity provided by the bank's market maker. Utilizing a large sample of Nasdaq firms, we show that market makers whose banks also provide research coverage provide more liquidity and contribute more to price discovery than do market makers without such research coverage. Finally, we show that such “affiliated” market makers are less affected by uncertainty following earnings announcements. Our results provide new evidence on the sources of liquidity improvements for Nasdaq firms, and suggest that the information produced by banks in the sell-side research process is beneficial to their market makers.     

The Basel III Net Stable Funding Ratio and bank net interest margins

The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is a new Basel III liquidity requirement designed to limit funding risk arising from maturity mismatches between bank assets and liabilities. This study explains the NSFR and estimates this ratio for banks in 15 countries. Banks below the ratio need to increase stable sources of funding and to reduce assets requiring funding. The most cost-effective strategies to meet the NSFR are to increase holdings of higher-rated securities and to extend the maturity of wholesale funding. These changes reduce net interest margins by 70–88 basis points on average, or around 40% of their year-end 2009 values. Universal banks with diversified funding sources and high trading assets are penalized most by the NSFR.     

Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.     

The performance of banks around the receipt and repayment of TARP funds: Over-achievers versus under-achievers

In this paper, we look at how the pre-crisis health of banks is related to the probability of receiving and repaying TARP capital. We find that financial performance characteristics that are related to the probability of receiving TARP funds differ for the healthiest (“over-achiever”) versus the least healthy (“under-achiever”) banks. We find that TARP under-achievers have some, but not consistent, weaknesses in income production. These banks also are experiencing liquidity issues as customers, shut out of public debt markets, get bank loans through drawdowns of loan commitments. Unlike TARP under-achievers, TARP over-achievers’ loans are performing well. Yet, liquidity issues (from low levels of liquid assets and core deposits and drawdowns of loan commitments) hurt the abilities of these banks to continue their lending. Differences between under-achiever and over-achiever banks are also found for repayment and deadbeat TARP banks.     

Liquidity Requirements,Free-Riding,and the Implications for Financial Stability Evidence from the Early 1900s

Maintaining sufficient liquidity in the financial system is vital for its stability. However, since returns on liquid assets are typically low, individual financial institutions may seek to hold fewer such assets, especially if they believe they can rely on other institutions for liquidity support. We examine whether state banks in the early 1900s took advantage of relatively high cash balances maintained by national banks, due to reserve requirements, to hold less cash themselves. We find that state banks did hold less cash in places where both state legal requirements were lower and national banks were more prevalent.     

Banks, Payments, and Coordination

Banks are modeled as Bryant/Diamond-Dybvig "insurers" against the risk of early consumption. Consumption claims must be verified by clearing and settlement. A clearinghouse does this efficiently as long as banks are sufficiently liquid. If liquidity requirements cannot be enforced against all banks then the threat of panics is necessary to induce banks to hold sufficient liquidity. If the clearinghouse can issue emergency currency, then banks can coexist with less liquid institutions. However, if banks′ return to holding reserves is low during "normal times," then there must be times when the return to liquidity is abnormally high. We associate these episodes with the panics of the National Banking Era. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 042, 311, 314.     

Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

Banks have a unique ability to hedge against market‐wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, banks can insure firms against systematic declines in liquidity at lower cost than other institutions. We provide evidence that when liquidity dries up and commercial paper spreads widen, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from commercial paper backup lines without running down their holdings of liquid assets. We also provide evidence that implicit government support for banks during crises explains these funding flows.     

Private Money and Banking Regulation

We show that a competitive banking system is inconsistent with an optimum quantity of private money. Because bankers cannot commit to their promises and the composition of their assets is not publicly observable, a positive franchise value is required to induce the full convertibility of bank liabilities. Under perfect competition, a positive franchise value can be obtained only if the return on bank liabilities is sufficiently low, which imposes a cost on those who hold these liabilities for transaction purposes. If the banking system is monopolistic, then an efficient allocation is incentive feasible. In this case, the members of the banking system obtain a higher return on assets, making it feasible to pay a sufficiently high return on bank liabilities. Finally, we argue that the regulation of the banking system is required to obtain efficiency.     

Maxing out: Stocks as lotteries and the cross-section of expected returns

Motivated by existing evidence of a preference among investors for assets with lottery-like payoffs and that many investors are poorly diversified, we investigate the significance of extreme positive returns in the cross-sectional pricing of stocks. Portfolio-level analyses and firm-level cross-sectional regressions indicate a negative and significant relation between the maximum daily return over the past one month (MAX) and expected stock returns. Average raw and risk-adjusted return differences between stocks in the lowest and highest MAX deciles exceed 1% per month. These results are robust to controls for size, book-to-market, momentum, short-term reversals, liquidity, and skewness. Of particular interest, including MAX reverses the puzzling negative relation between returns and idiosyncratic volatility recently shown in 2 and 3.     

Liquidity shocks,size and the relative performance of hedge fund strategies

We examine whether the increase in the flow of capital to hedge funds over the period 1994–2005 had a negative impact on performance. More specifically, we study the relative performance of small versus large funds for each of the hedge fund strategies. Our results indicate that on an absolute return basis, small funds outperform large funds. On a risk-adjusted return basis, however, we find that large funds outperform small funds, and that large funds are also shown to hold less liquid assets and take on less systematic and idiosyncratic risk than small funds. Further, funds that experience positive liquidity shocks generally outperform those that experience negative liquidity shocks. We also find evidence that hedge fund managers that are aggressive in dealing with liquidity shocks perform better than hedge fund managers that are conservative in dealing with liquidity shocks.     

Commitment, banks and markets

We examine how banks and financial markets interact with one another to provide liquidity to investors. The critical assumption is that financial markets are characterized by limited enforcement of contracts, and in the event of default only a fraction of borrowers’ assets can be seized. Limited enforcement reduces the fraction of assets that can be used as collateral and thus individuals subject to liquidity shocks face borrowing constraints. We show how banks endogenously overcome these borrowing constraints by pooling resources across several depositors, and increase the liquidity provided by financial markets.     

Liquidity and transparency in bank risk management

Banks may be unable to refinance short-term liabilities in case of solvency concerns. To manage this risk, banks can accumulate a buffer of liquid assets, or strengthen transparency to communicate solvency. While a liquidity buffer provides complete insurance against small shocks, transparency covers also large shocks but imperfectly. Due to leverage, an unregulated bank may choose insufficient liquidity buffers and transparency. The regulatory response is constrained: while liquidity buffers can be imposed, transparency is not verifiable. Moreover, liquidity requirements can compromise banks’ transparency choices, and increase refinancing risk. To be effective, liquidity requirements should be complemented by measures that increase bank incentives to adopt transparency.     

Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing

When liquidity plays an important role as in financial crises, asset prices may reflect the amount of liquidity available rather than the asset's future earning power. Using market prices to assess financial institutions’ solvency in such circumstances is not desirable. We show that a shock in the insurance sector can cause the current market value of banks’ assets to fall below their liabilities so they are insolvent. In contrast, if values based on historic cost are used, banks can continue and meet all their future liabilities. We discuss the implications for the debate on mark-to-market versus historic cost accounting.     

中国银行流动性过剩的成因辨析:一个新的视角

本文将银行的流动性资产分为自愿性(预防性)流动资产和非自愿性流动资产两部分.通过建立银行预防性流动资产需求模型,运用向量误差修正模型(VEC)和方差分解方法实证分析我国银行流动性过剩的原因.实证结果表明:银行间同业拆借利率、汇率波动率、存款波动率和银行存款增加是银行流动性过剩的主要原因,银行的自愿性流动资产过剩和非自愿性流动性过剩并存,银行大量的流动性资产部分是为了规避融资成本、汇率风险和存款波动等风险而持有的.     

Liquidity commonality in commodities

We examine liquidity commonality in commodity futures markets. Using data from 16 agricultural, energy, industrial metal, precious metal, and livestock commodities, we show there is a strong systematic liquidity factor in commodities. Liquidity commonality was present in 1997–2003 when commodity prices were relatively stable and during the recent boom. There is some support for both “supply-side” and “demand-side” explanations for this commonality. We find no evidence of a consistent link between stock and commodity liquidity in general. Energy commodities appear to provide a better hedge against equity market liquidity risk than the other commodity families.     

What drives the liquidity of sovereign bonds when markets are under stress? An assessment of the new Basel 3 rules on bank liquid assets

The new rules on bank liquidity set by the Basel Committee require banks to hold high-quality liquid assets (HQLAs) against future cash outflows in periods of market stress. Domestic government bonds are considered to be HQLAs. To assess the appropriateness of this rule, we investigate the liquidity of European government bonds in ordinary times and in periods of market turmoil. We find that the effect of adverse market conditions on liquidity strongly depends on individual bond’s characteristics. Our evidence argues for rules on HQLAs that should constrain the eligibility of government bonds depending on their characteristics (primarily, duration and rating).     

Trading activity and bid–ask spreads of individual equity options

We empirically examine the impact of trading activities on the liquidity of individual equity options measured by the proportional bid–ask spread. There are three main findings. First, the option return volatility, defined as the option price elasticity times the stock return volatility, has a much higher power in explaining the spread variations than the commonly considered liquidity determinants such as the stock return volatility and option trading volume. Second, after controlling for all the liquidity determinants, we find a maturity-substitution effect due to expiration cycles. When medium-term options (60–90 days maturity) are not available, traders use short-term options as substitutes whose higher volume leads to a smaller bid–ask spread or better liquidity. Third, we also find a moneyness-substitution effect induced by the stock return volatility. When the stock return volatility goes up, trading shifts from in-the-money options to out-of-the-money options, causing the latter’s spread to narrow.