Arbitrage-free credit pricing using default probabilities and risk sensitivities

The relation between physical probabilities (rating) and risk-neutral probabilities (pricing) is derived in a large market with a quasi-factor structure. Factor sensitivities and default probabilities are obtainable for all kinds of credits on historical rating data. Since factor prices can be backed out from market data, the model allows the pricing of non-marketable credits and structured products thereof. The model explains various empirical observations: credit spreads of equally rated borrowers differ, spreads are wider than implied by expected losses, and expected returns on CDOs must be greater than their rating matched, single-obligor securities due to the inherent systematic risk.     

Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate loans

Between 2001 and 2007, annual institutional funding in highly leveraged loans went up from $32 billion to $426 billion, accounting for nearly 70% of the jump in total syndicated loan issuance over the same period. Did the inflow of institutional funding in the syndicated loan market lead to mispricing of credit? To understand this relation, we look at the institutional demand pressure defined as the number of days a loan remains in syndication. Using market-level and cross-sectional variation in time-on-the-market, we find that a shorter syndication period is associated with a lower final interest rate. The relation is robust to the use of institutional fund flow as an instrument. Furthermore, we find significant price differences between institutional investors’ tranches and banks’ tranches of the same loans, even though they share the same underlying fundamentals. Increasing demand pressure causes the interest rate on institutional tranches to fall below the interest rate on bank tranches. Overall, a one-standard-deviation reduction in average time-on-the-market decreases the interest rate for institutional loans by over 30 basis points per annum. While this effect is significantly larger for loan tranches bought by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), it is not fully explained by their role.     

Valuation of synthetic CDOs

In this paper, we consider the valuation of a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO), a pool of underlying credit risky securities, “partitioned” into several tranches, each of which absorbs losses in accordance with its size and seniority. We derive a closed-form solution for credit spreads of the tranches of homogeneous pools and find an approximation for the credit spreads of inhomogeneous pools. The method leads to an accurate estimation of the credit spreads of synthetic CDOs and can be used in risk management applications.     

Did Subjectivity Play a Role in CDO Credit Ratings?

Analyzing 916 collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), we find that a top credit rating agency frequently made positive adjustments beyond its main model that amounted to increasingly larger AAA tranche sizes. These adjustments are difficult to explain by likely determinants, but exhibit a clear pattern: CDOs with smaller model‐implied AAA sizes receive larger adjustments. CDOs with larger adjustments experience more severe subsequent downgrading. Additionally, prior to April 2007, 91.2% of AAA‐rated CDOs only comply with the credit rating agency's own AA default rate standard. Accounting for adjustments and the criterion deviation indicates that on average AAA tranches were structured to BBB support levels.     

Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias

We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution. Self‐attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long‐term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high‐order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three‐year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low‐order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high‐order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self‐selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.     

Modeling of CPDOs – Identifying optimal and implied leverage

When the subprime crisis started to emerge, collateralized products based on credit default swap (CDS) exposures combined with security features seemed to be a more rational alternative to classic asset backed securities. Constant Proportion Collateralized Debt Obligations (CPDOs) are a mixture of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and CPPIs with inverse mechanism. This new asset aims at meeting the investors’ demand for credit derivatives with security enhancements, but to our knowledge quantitative approaches for pricing other than simulation algorithms do not exist yet. CPDOs became famous notably by Standard & Poor’s rating model error which illustrated that closed-form analytical pricing is necessary in order to evaluate and understand complex derivatives. This article aims to shed a light on CPDOs’ specific structural enhancements and mechanisms. We quantify inherent risks and provide a dynamic closed-form pricing formula.     

Project Finance Collateralised Debt Obligations: an Empirical Analysis of Spread Determinants

Credit rating is the most important variable in determining tranche spread at issue on collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) issues backed by project finance (PF) loans. Factors that are important for pricing in the case of corporate bonds, such as market liquidity and weighted average maturity, are also relevant for determining spreads for these securities. Furthermore, the nature of the underlying assets has a substantial impact on CDO pricing: Primary market spread is significantly higher when the underlying PF loans bear a higher level of market risk and when the proportion of projects still under construction in the securitised portfolio is larger.     

Correlation expansions for CDO pricing

This paper develops numerical approximations for pricing collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and other portfolio credit derivatives in the multifactor Normal Copula model. A key aspect of pricing portfolio credit derivatives is capturing dependence between the defaults of the elements of the portfolio. But, compared with an independent-obligor model, pricing in a model with correlated defaults is more challenging. Our approach strikes a balance by reducing the problem of pricing in a model with correlated defaults to calculations involving only independent defaults. We develop approximations based on power series expansions in a parameter that scales the underlying correlations. These expansions express a CDO tranche price in a multifactor model as a series of prices in independent-obligor models, which are easy to compute. The approach builds on a classical approximation for multivariate Gaussian probabilities; we introduce an alternative representation that greatly reduces the number of terms required to evaluate the coefficients in the expansion. We also apply this method to the underlying problem of computing joint probabilities of multivariate normal random variables for which the correlation matrix has a factor structure.     

CDOs and the financial crisis: Credit ratings and fair premia

We study risk and return characteristics of CDOs using the market standard models. We find that fair spreads on CDO tranches are much higher than fair spreads on similarly-rated corporate bonds. Our results imply that credit ratings are not sufficient for pricing, which is surprising given their central role in structured finance markets. This illustrates limitations of the rating methodologies that are solely based on real-world default probabilities or expected losses and do not capture risk premia. We also demonstrate that CDO tranches have large exposure to systematic risk and thus their ratings and prices are likely to decline substantially when credit conditions deteriorate.     

The Front Men of Wall Street: The Role of CDO Collateral Managers in the CDO Boom and Bust

I study the incentives of the collateral managers who selected securities for ABS CDOs—securitizations that figured prominently in the financial crisis. Specialized managers without other businesses that could suffer negative reputational consequences invested in low‐quality securities underwritten by the CDO's arranger. These securities performed significantly worse than observationally similar securities. Managers investing in these securities were rewarded with additional collateral management assignments. Diversified managers who did assemble CDOs suffered negative reputational consequences during the crisis: institutional investors withdrew from their mutual funds. Overall, the results are consistent with a quid pro quo between collateral managers and CDO underwriters.     

DO INSTITUTIONS PREFER HIGH‐VALUE ACQUIRERS? AN ANALYSIS OF TRADING IN STOCK‐FINANCED ACQUISITIONS

If owners of target shares in a stock‐for‐stock merger perceive the acquirer as overvalued, they should sell their holdings more aggressively to profit before such overvaluation dissipates. We study institutional owners of targets and find that slightly more than half liquidate their shares in stock mergers, consistent with high institutional‐share turnover rates found in the prior literature. However, share retention is higher when valuation measures suggest greater acquirer overvaluation, regardless of whether institutional owners generally prefer growth or value stock. Institutions that prefer large‐cap, growth stock are most enthusiastic about bids from large, high‐valuation acquirers, and substantially increase their stakes in such deals.     

Corporate life cycle and M&A activity

We investigate the impact of corporate life cycle on takeover activity from the perspective of acquiring firms. Using the earned/contributed capital mix as the proxy for firm life cycle, we find a highly significant and positive relation between firm life cycle and the likelihood of becoming a bidder. This finding is, however, driven by the mature rather than the old acquirers in the sample. Further we find that, whilst firm life cycle has a positive effect on the probability that a deal will be negotiated, it is negatively related to tender offers. In addition, the likelihood of making both cash and mixed deals are positively related to the corporate life cycle. Finally, we find that life cycle has a negative impact on the abnormal returns generated on the announcement of a deal although it is unable to distinguish between the returns received by firms at different stages in their life cycle.     

Buy high,sell low: How listed firms price asset transfers in related party transactions

We examine a sample of 254 related party and arms’ length acquisitions and sales of assets in Hong Kong during 1998–2000. Our analysis shows that publicly listed firms enter deals with related parties at unfavourable prices compared to similar arms’ length deals. Firms acquire assets from related parties by paying a higher price compared to similar arms’ length deals. In contrast, when they sell assets to related parties, they receive a lower price than in similar arms’ length deals. With the exception of audit committees, corporate governance characteristics have limited impact on transaction prices. Firms with audit committees on their boards pay lower prices to related parties for acquisitions and receive higher prices from related parties from divestments.     

Learning from repetitive acquisitions: Evidence from the time between deals

Knowledge gleaned from previous acquisitions may confer valuation expertise and other benefits. But numerous acquisitions also entail costs, due to problems of incorporating diverse units into an ever larger firm. Such benefits and costs are not directly observable from outside the firm. This article proposes a simple model to infer their relative importance, using the time between successive deals. The data requirements are minimal and allow the use of all mergers and acquisitions during 1992–2009 (more than 300,000 deals). The results provide evidence of learning gains through repetitive acquisitions, especially under CEO continuity and when successive deals are more similar.     

Affiliated mutual funds and the allocation of initial public offerings

We examine how investment banks use initial public offerings (IPOs) in relation to their affiliated mutual funds. The dumping ground hypothesis predicts that the lead underwriter allocates cold IPOs to its affiliated funds so that more deals can be completed when demand for these IPOs is weak. Affiliated funds could also receive more cold IPOs because the lead underwriter uses allocations of hot IPOs to unaffiliated funds to gain trading commission business. The nepotism hypothesis predicts that the lead underwriter allocates hot IPOs to its affiliated funds to boost their performance and thus attract more money. We find little evidence supporting the dumping ground hypothesis, although some evidence supports the nepotism hypothesis, especially during the internet bubble period of 1999–2000.     

Minority shareholders’ wealth effects and stock market development: Evidence from increase-in-ownership M&As

This paper examines, using a global M&A data set, the relationship between the target firm’s minority shareholders’ returns and a country’s stock market development in deals in which large shareholders increase their ownership stakes. For the purpose of this study, we use two measures of stock market development: (1) turnover over GDP, and (2) turnover over market capitalization. We provide evidence supporting the view that minority shareholders in target firms gain significantly more in countries with high stock market development than their counterparts in less-developed markets. Our results are robust to several firm and deal characteristics and provide evidence to policy makers that the degree of stock market development is a key determinant in improving minority shareholders’ welfare.     

Serial acquirer bidding: An empirical test of the learning hypothesis

Recent academic studies indicate that acquirers' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) decline from deal to deal in acquisition programs. Does this pattern suggest hubristic CEO behaviors are significant enough to influence average CAR patterns during acquisition programs? An alternative explanation is CEO learning. This study therefore tests for learning using successive acquisitions of large U.S. public targets undertaken by U.S. acquirers. A dynamic framework reveals that both rational and hubristic CEOs take on average investor reactions to their previous deals into account and adjust their bidding behavior accordingly. These results are consistent with a learning hypothesis.     

Auctioned IPOs: The US evidence

Between 1999 and 2007, WR Hambrecht completed 19 initial public offerings (IPOs) in the US using an auction mechanism. We analyze investor behavior and mechanism performance in these auctioned IPOs using detailed bidding data. The existence of some bids posted at high prices suggests that some investors (mostly retail) try to free-ride on the mechanism. But institutional demand in these auctions is very elastic, suggesting that institutional investors reveal information in the bidding process. Investor participation is largely predictable based on deal size, and demand is dominated by institutions. Flipping is at most as prevalent in auctions as in bookbuilt deals. But, unlike in bookbuilding, investors in auctions do not flip their shares more in “hot” deals. Finally, we find that institutional investors, who provide more information, are rewarded by obtaining a larger share of the deals that have higher 10-day underpricing. Our results therefore suggest that auctioned IPOs can be an effective alternative to traditional bookbuilding.     

Did investors outsource their risk analysis to rating agencies? Evidence from ABS-CDOs

Based on a sample of 3254 floating rate tranches from 617 ABS-CDOs (collateralized debt obligations backed by asset-backed securities), this paper tests the “rating overdependence” hypothesis – i.e., that ratings of structured products are a sufficient statistic (in terms of predicting future credit performance) for yield spreads at origination. The paper’s findings are fourfold. First, yield spreads at issuance predict future performance of ABS-CDO tranches even after controlling for the information contained in ratings. Second, the ability of yield spreads to predict future performance, however, is driven exclusively by ratings below AAA (and, to a lesser extent, also by the lowest priority AAA tranches), whereas spreads of super senior AAA tranches show no information content. Third, the predictive ability of yield spreads is lower for tranches from later vintages and for tranches from deals with more complex collateral pools. Fourth, the conditional correlation between ratings and spreads, in turn, is increasing in time and higher for tranches from complex deals. In sum, the evidence indicates that investors in (especially AAA) tranches from later and more complex deals have avoided performing costly due diligence on the securities they bought.     

Managerial rights,use of investment banks,and the wealth effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders

We examine the relation between managerial rights in acquiring firms and the decision to use an investment bank in merger and acquisition deals, and explore whether this relation impacts the wealth effects for acquiring firms’ shareholders. We find that acquiring firms whose managers have relatively strong rights are more likely to use investment banks to facilitate deals and are more likely to use reputable banks. The wealth effects to acquiring firms are inversely related to the use of investment banks when managerial rights are relatively strong. However, the wealth loss is mitigated when acquiring firms use reputable investment banks.