Who gets credit after bankruptcy and why? An information channel

Conventional wisdom holds that individuals find it difficult to obtain new credit post-bankruptcy. Using credit bureau data, we test this hypothesis and show that more than 90% of bankrupt individuals receive credit shortly after filing. Individuals with good credit history prior to filing have reduced credit availability after bankruptcy while those with ex-ante low credit quality receive more credit. We show that credit supplied to low quality individuals is severely curtailed during the financial crisis. We also find that the default probability on new debt increases after bankruptcy, especially among individuals with high ex-ante credit score. These findings are consistent with an information channel, in which bankruptcy reveals new information about a borrower’s credit quality.     

Can corporate governance save distressed firms from bankruptcy? An empirical analysis

We examine financially distressed firms and document how governance characteristics affect (1) a firm’s ability to avoid bankruptcy and (2) the power of financial/accounting information to predict bankruptcy. Overall, our findings indicate that a distressed firm’s governance characteristics significantly affect its probability of bankruptcy. We find that smaller and more independent boards with a higher ratio of non-inside directors and with larger ownership stakes of inside directors are more effective at avoiding bankruptcy once distress is indicated. These results are consistent with the belief that these types of governance structures induce more effective monitoring. The results are also consistent with the view that the inclusion of governance characteristics enhances the power of financial accounting models in predicting bankruptcy.

A re-evaluation of auditors’ opinions versus statistical models in bankruptcy prediction

Existent empirical evidence on the relative performance of auditors’ going concern opinions versus statistical models in predicting bankruptcy is mixed. This study attempts to add new reliable evidence on this important issue by conducting the comparison based upon an improved statistical model. The improved statistical model incorporates some new developments advocated by recent bankruptcy prediction research (e.g., Shumway, 2001). First, the following non-traditional variables are added: a composite measure of financial distress, industry failure rate, abnormal stock returns, and market capitalization. Secondly, a hazard model is employed. The prediction ability of the hazard model with incorporation of non-financial-ratio variables is superior to that of auditors’ going concern opinions in the holdout sample. This suggests that a well-developed statistical model could serve as a decision aid for auditors to better make going-concern judgments. Further analyses reveal some evidence that industry failure rate does not have a significant impact upon auditors’ going concern judgments as it should be; auditors could improve their going concern judgments by considering industry-level information in addition to firm-specific information. Finally, we find that auditors’ opinions do have incremental contribution beyond stock-market information and industry failure rate in predicting bankruptcy.

Do differences in financial reporting attributes impair the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy?

This study explores the effect of cross-sectional and time-series differences in financial reporting attributes on the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy. We identify proxies for discretion over financial reporting, the importance of intangible assets, the comprehensiveness of the accounting model and recognition of losses. Each of our proxies for financial reporting attributes is associated with financial ratios that are less informative in predicting bankruptcy. Furthermore, our time-series tests reveal a decline in the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy and document that this decline is associated with our measures of financial reporting attributes.     

What is behind the magic of O-Score? An alternative interpretation of Dichev’s (1998) bankruptcy risk anomaly

Using Ohlson’s (J Account Res 18(1):109–131, 1980) measure of bankruptcy risk (O-Score), Dichev (J Fin 53(3):1131–1147, 1998) documents a bankruptcy risk anomaly in which firms with high bankruptcy risk earn lower than average returns. This study first demonstrates that the negative association between bankruptcy risk and returns does not generalize to an alternative measure of bankruptcy risk. Then, by examining the nine individual components of O-Score, I find that funds from operations (FFO) is the only component that is associated with returns. Furthermore, I show that the return-predictive power of FFO is due to cash flows from operations. Taken as a whole, this study provides evidence that Dichev’s bankruptcy risk anomaly is a manifestation of investors’ under (over)-pricing of cash flows (accrual) component of earnings, i.e., the accrual anomaly documented by Sloan (Account Rev 71(3):289–316, 1996).     

Company duplication – plain fraud or a ‘poor man's’ bankruptcy? A case study in the financial distress of small businesses

Two possible solutions to corporate financial distress are traditionally considered: commencing a formal bankruptcy proceeding or arranging an out‐of‐court capital restructuring. Corporate bankruptcy scholarship has largely ignored a third solution occasionally undertaken by small businesses, that is, resorting to self‐help measures. The purpose of this paper is to start filling the gap using a unique case study. The paper describes and analyses an existing phenomenon among small firms in Israel experiencing financial distress – company duplication. A typical scenario unfolds as follows. An entrepreneur who controls the financially distressed Company A registers a new Company B in an attempt to avoid a complete shutdown of her creditors' disturbed business. The assets of Company A are transferred to Company B in what appears to be fraudulent conveyance. Company B serves as a vehicle through which the original business is kept running. If necessary, the entrepreneur will also register Company C and repeat the process. Israeli law regulates company duplication in an ambivalent manner. On the one hand, conventional wisdom considers company duplication to be tantamount to fraud against Company A's unaware creditors. Accordingly, company duplication has been recently denounced by the Israeli Supreme Court as an illegitimate way of conducting business. The Court held that notwithstanding the principle of limited liability, an entrepreneur resorting to company duplication is personally liable to pay any debt of Company A that was not serviced by it. On the other hand, company duplicators do not face criminal charges. To the extent that company duplication is practiced by insolvent entrepreneurs, deterrence is therefore suboptimal, as insolvent duplicators are not sanctioned at all. Against this backdrop, this paper advances two normative arguments. First, a more sympathetic explanation should be considered to account for company duplication. An entrepreneur resorting to company duplication might actually be arranging for a ‘home‐made’ bankruptcy proceeding (i.e. buying time which could help the business establish its viability and regenerate). According to this narrative, the duplication mimics the role of a formal bankruptcy stay on unsecured creditors' collection efforts, thus suggesting that company duplication serves as ‘a poor man's’ bankruptcy proceeding. Second, this new explanation of company duplication, combined with the current level of suboptimal deterrence, mandates a re‐evaluation of this business pattern to assess its relative efficacy. I argue that at least in the Israeli context because of its special features, company duplication should be tolerated with regard to small businesses, assuming that the entrepreneur is not defrauding creditors or attempting to rescue a business that has failed due to economic rather than merely financial factors. To that end, company duplicators should be held personally liable to debts of the duplicated companies and be pursued with criminal sanctions only selectively, as explained in the paper. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.