Banks’ capital buffer,risk and performance in the Canadian banking system: Impact of business cycles and regulatory changes

Using quarterly financial statements and stock market data from 1982 to 2010 for the six largest Canadian chartered banks, this paper documents positive co-movement between Canadian banks’ capital buffer and business cycles. The adoption of Basel Accords and the balance sheet leverage cap imposed by Canadian banking regulations did not change this cyclical behavior of Canadian bank capital. We find Canadian banks to be well-capitalized and that they hold a larger capital buffer in expansion than in recession, which may explain how they weathered the recent subprime financial crisis so well. This evidence that Canadian banks ride the business and regulatory periods underscores the appropriateness of a both micro- and a macro-prudential “through-the-cycle” approach to capital adequacy as advocated in the proposed Basel III framework to strengthen the resilience of the banking sector.     

Greenspan's Retrospective of Financial Crisis and Stochastic Optimal Control

Alan Greenspan argues that the crisis was unpredictable and inevitable, given the ‘excessive’ leverage of the financial intermediaries. I focus upon the housing sector, which has been at the origin of the financial crisis because the value of the financial derivatives ultimately depended upon the ability of the mortgagors to repay their debts. The uncertainty concerns the capital gains – housing price appreciation – and the rate of interest. I explain why the application of stochastic optimal control (SOC) is an effective approach to determine the optimal degree of leverage, the optimum and excessive risk and the probability of a debt crisis. I show that the theoretically derived early warning signal of a crisis is the excess debt ratio, equal to the difference between the actual and optimal ratio. The excess debt of households starting from 2004‐05 indicated that a housing crisis was most likely.     

The role of on- and off-balance-sheet leverage of banks in the late 2000s crisis

Extensive regulatory changes and technological advances have transformed banking systems to a great extent. Banks have reacted to the challenges posed by the new operating environment by creating new products and expanding their activities to some uncharted business areas. In this paper, we study how modern banking which gave birth to the off-balance-sheet leverage activities affected the risk profile of U.S. banks as well as the level of systemic risk before and after the onset of the late 2000s financial crisis. Towards this, we separate on- from off-balance-sheet leverage and capture the latter with different, yet complementary, measures which do not exist in the current literature. Special attention is paid on the deleveraging process that occurred in the banking market after the crisis erupted, which is an additional innovative feature of this study. Our findings reveal that leverage, both explicit and hidden off-the-balance-sheet, increases the individual risk of banking firms making them vulnerable to financial shocks. Reverse leverage, on the other hand, is beneficial for individual banks’ health, but is found to be harmful for financial stability. We also demonstrate that the banks which concentrate on traditional lines of business typically carry less risk compared to those involved with modern financial instruments.     

危机后影子银行的国际监管改革及对我国的启示

本轮金融危机的爆发表明,影子银行天生具有的表外性、高杠杆性和证券化运行机理,一旦疏于监管就极易引发系统性风险和法律风险。危机后国际金融监管组织和美英欧等各大经济体纷纷出台强化影子银行监管的金融监管改革法案。我国应结合自身情况,探索和构建适合我国金融业发展实际的影子银行监管制度。     

Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so‐called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non‐bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.     

Costs of financial instability, household-sector balance sheets and consumption

Extant work on costs of financial instability focuses on fiscal costs and declines in aggregate GDP following banking crises. We estimate effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 19 OECD countries, showing consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis, and effects are not captured solely by the impact of crises on standard consumption determinants, income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising leverage, despite financial liberalisation easing liquidity constraints. High leverage implies that banking crises taking place now could have greater incidence than in the past.     

A compound option approach to model the interrelation between banking crises and country defaults: The case of Hungary 2008

We analyze the Hungarian financial crisis of 2008 in a stochastic framework that advances structural credit risk models for country defaults: by applying compound option theory we consider payments for bailing-out the banking sector together with debt service payments in a joint crisis model. We estimate the model parameters by applying the time series maximum-likelihood approach of Duan (1994) on yield spreads of Hungarian Bonds. We find that difficulties in acquiring funds for debt servicing in combination with high outstanding debt triggered the crisis, rather than problems in the domestic banking sector. The estimated crisis probabilities dramatically rise during 2008.     

影子银行：体系、内生性风险及国际监管取向

摘要：全球金融危机后,国际社会从一个新的视角——影子银行体系来分析现代金融体系,并重构现代国际金融监管制度。影子银行体系的有效监管必须具有翔实的微观基础,比如体系边界、风险特征及表现形式等。国际上对影子银行体系并无公认的定义。影子银行具有证券化程度高、信息不透明、杠杆率较高等特征,这直接引致其存在诸多内生性金融风险,国际社会倾向于采用“类银行化”的监管路径对影子银行进行金融监管。国际社会采取的一系列法律、政策措施对我国影子银行监管具有一定的启示。     

Bank risk,competition and bank connectedness with firms: A literature review

The outbreak of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and of the European sovereign debt crisis again raised questions about the vulnerability and the behaviour of banking institutions. The unconventional monetary policies that followed have flattened the yield curve and created a low interest rates environment. This can give rise to risk-taking behaviour from banks and can therefore undermine the stability of the banking system with negative impact of the credit supply, corporate investment and real economy. This article proposes a literature review on the main determinants of bank lending and risk-taking decisions, going through the competition in the banking market, the bank connectedness with firms and the role of monetary and banking authorities. The systemic risk concept is also discussed as well as its drivers and potential measures that should be monitored by prudential authorities in order to preserve financial stability.     

Bailout uncertainty in a microfounded general equilibrium model of the financial system

This paper develops a micro-founded general equilibrium model of the financial system composed of ultimate borrowers, ultimate lenders and financial intermediaries. The model is used to investigate the impact of uncertainty about the likelihood of governmental bailouts on leverage, interest rates, the volume of defaults and the real economy. The distinction between risk and uncertainty is implemented by applying the multiple priors framework to beliefs about the probability of bailout.Results of the analysis include: (i) An unanticipated increase in bailout uncertainty raises interest rates, the volume of defaults in both the real and financial sectors and may lead to a total drying up of credit markets. (ii) Lower exante bailout uncertainty is conducive to higher leverage, which in turn raises moral hazard and makes the economy more vulnerable to expost increases in bailout uncertainty. (iii) Bailout uncertainty affects the likelihood of bubbles, the amplitude of booms and busts as well as the banking and the credit spreads. (iv) Higher bailout uncertainty is associated with higher returns’ variability in diversified portfolios and higher systemic risks, (v) Pre-crisis expansionary monetary policy reinforces those effects by inducing higher aggregate leverage levels. (vi) The larger the change in bailout uncertainty and the change in aversion to this uncertainty, the stronger the pre-crisis buildup and the deeper the ensuing crisis.A central policy implication of the analysis is that the vaguest is bailout policy prior to a crisis, the lower is the magnitude of investments destroyed or missed due to errors in evaluating bailout and other intervention policies. On the other hand, the clearer is bailout policy upon the eruption of a crisis, the smaller the contraction of credit and the destruction of investment activity.     

储蓄率与杠杆率:一个U型关系

近年来,中国呈现典型的“高储蓄—高杠杆”特征,高储蓄率也被认为是中国杠杆率偏高的主要原因之一。能否通过降低储蓄率的方式来去杠杆成为了广泛讨论的问题。为此,本文构建了一个含有融资约束的动态宏观模型,研究了储蓄率对杠杆率的影响机理。并且,基于41个代表性经济体1966-2017年的面板数据,对储蓄率与杠杆率之间的关系进行了实证分析,主要有两点研究发现:(1)虽然高储蓄率会导致高杠杆率,但是储蓄率与杠杆率不是简单的正相关关系,而是呈现显著的U型关系。结合测算的U型曲线拐点值与中国实际情况,预计储蓄率下降在降低杠杆率方面的作用效果有限。(2)高杠杆下,较高的储蓄率可以有效降低发生金融危机的概率,而储蓄率下降则会加大发生金融危机的概率。基于此,本文认为中国不能通过降低储蓄率的方式来降低杠杆率,反而需要对近年来储蓄率下滑的现象予以高度重视,从而更好地守住不发生系统性金融风险的底线。     

What Is Systemic Risk?

The traditional view of risk in a financial system is that it is the summation of individual risks within the system. However, the financial crisis that started in 2007 has driven home that this view of risk is inadequate. It is the interactions of financial institutions and markets that determine the systemic risks that drive financial crises. We identify four types of systemic risk. These are (i) panics—banking crises due to multiple equilibria; (ii) banking crises due to asset price falls; (iii) contagion; and (iv) foreign exchange mismatches in the banking system.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

丹麦银行业稳定方案经验借鉴

丹麦银行业是一个资产业务以贷款为主、高度集中且竞争激烈的行业,由于大量中小型银行由农村信用社转制而来,2008年爆发的国际金融危机对其融资问题造成一定的冲击,为稳定国内金融市场,丹麦政府出台了银行业稳定方案。实践表明,该方案的实施在不使用政府资金的前提下,有效解决了银行业的融资问题,保障了金融体系的稳定运行,同时给丹麦政府带来了不菲收益。文章介绍了丹麦银行业稳定方案的主要政策措施,并总结其成功经验。     

Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries

The Central European banking industry is dominated by foreign-owned banks. During the recent crisis, for the first time since the transition, foreign parent companies were frequently in a worse financial condition than their subsidiaries. This situation created a unique opportunity to study new aspects of market discipline exercised by non-financial depositors. Using a comprehensive data set, we find that the recent crisis did not change the sensitivity of deposit growth rates to accounting risk measures. We establish that depositors’ actions were more strongly influenced by negative press rumors concerning parent companies than by fundamentals. The impact of rumors was especially perceptible when rumors turned out ex post to be founded. Additionally, we document that public aid announcements were primarily interpreted by depositors as confirmation of a parent company’s financial distress. Our results indicate that depositors react rationally to sources of information other than financial statements; this discovery has policy implications, as depositor discipline is usually the only viable and universal source of market discipline for banks in emerging economies.     

A Conference on Postcrisis Banking

This article provides an introduction to the special issue. We focus on four themes that are important for policymakers and researchers alike in view of the experiences of the global financial crisis of 2007–09 and the ensuing sovereign debt crisis in the euro area: the relevance of the banking sector for the real economy, the future structure and regulation of the banking sector, the efficacy of past and current regulatory reforms, and the impact of cross‐border banking on economic stability and financial development.     

Incentives to innovate and financial crises

In this paper I develop a model of a competitive financial system with unrestricted but costly entry and an endogenously determined number of competing financial institutions (“banks” for short). Banks can make standard loans on which plentiful historical data are available and unanimous agreement exists on default probabilities. Or banks can innovate and make new loans on which limited historical data are available, leading to possible disagreement over default probabilities. In equilibrium, banks make zero profits on standard loans and positive profits on innovative loans, which engenders innovation incentives for banks. But innovation brings with it the risk that investors could disagree with the bank that the loan is worthy of continued funding and hence could withdraw funding at an interim stage, precipitating a financial crisis. The degree of innovation in the financial system is determined by this trade-off. Welfare implications of financial innovation and mechanisms to reduce the probability of crises are discussed.     

Islamic and conventional banks' soundness during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

The recent global financial crisis has induced a series of failure of many conventional banks and led to an increased interest in the Islamic banking business model. This paper attempts to answer empirically the following question: What was the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on the soundness of Islamic banks and their conventional peers? Using the Z-score as an indicator of bank stability, our regression analysis (covering a matched sample of 34 Islamic Banks (IBs) and 34 conventional banks (CBs) from 16 countries) shows that there is no significant difference in terms of the effect of the financial crisis on the soundness of IBs and CBs. This finding reveals that IBs are diverging from their theoretical business model which would have allowed them to keep the same level of soundness even during the crisis.     

The future and dynamics of global systemically important banks

The purpose of this paper is to analyse some of the issues associated with supervision and regulation of global systemically important banks, G-SIB. The paper highlights the importance of managing liquidity risk and creating a global financial system that can minimise regulatory arbitrage by large financial institutions. The paper argues that, unlike some industries such as the airline industry in which risk has been contained and yet the size and capacity of aircrafts have increased, in the banking system, less progress has been made to contain financial risk and allow large banks to expand their global activities. The paper argues that G-SIB are able to continue remaining large provided that a globally integrated financial system ensures effective global supervision of these large banks. The paper compares the US banking crises in the 19th century and the subsequent emergence of the US Federal Reserve System to the possibility of establishing a world central bank and a global supervisory board. Such new global institutions will have the capacity to reduce regulatory arbitrage, increase effective supervision, reduce systemic and liquidity risk and create a more stable global financial system.