Foreign bank penetration and the lending channel in emerging economies: Evidence from bank-level panel data

This paper examines the main implications of recently increasing foreign bank penetration on bank lending as a channel of monetary policy transmission in emerging economies. Using a dynamic panel model of loan growth, we investigate the loan granting behavior of 1273 banks in the emerging economies of Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe during the period from 1996 to 2003. Applying the pooled OLS, system GMM, and panel VAR estimators, we find consistent evidence that foreign banks are less responsive to monetary shocks in host countries, as they adjust their outstanding loan portfolios and interest rates to a lesser extent than domestic private banks, independent of their liquidity, capitalization, size, efficiency, and credit risk, and although there exists a bank lending channel in the emerging economies, it is declining in strength due to the increased level of foreign bank penetration. We also explore possible driving factors for the different responses of foreign and domestic banks to monetary policy shocks by investigating foreign banks’ different behavior during banking crises and tranquil periods, the effects of mode of entry to host countries, the home-country effects, and the response of foreign banks from OECD countries vs. all foreign countries including non-OECD countries. We suggest the access of foreign banks to funding from parent banks through internal capital markets as the most convincing explanation.     

Sovereign risk and the bank lending channel in Europe

The main purpose of this article is to analyze how sovereign risk influences the loan supply reaction of banks to monetary policy through the bank lending channel. Additionally, we aim to test whether this reaction differs in easy and tight monetary regimes. Using a sample of 3125 banks from the euro zone between 1999 and 2012, we find that sovereign risk plays an important role in determining loan supply from banks during tight monetary regimes. Banks in higher sovereign risk countries reduce lending more during tight regimes. However, we find little evidence to support any relationship between sovereign risk and loan supply reaction to monetary policy expansions. These results are very interesting for the way monetary policy is conducted in Europe. Banking union, banking system strength, and the budget control of governments would be necessary measures to reduce the heterogeneous transmission of the monetary policy in the euro zone.     

A computational approach to the optimal structure of bank input prices

Most bank deposits contain an embedded option which permits the depositor to withdraw funds at will. Demand deposits generally allow costless withdrawal, while time deposits often require payment of an early withdrawal penalty. Managing the risk that depositors will exercise their withdrawal option is an important aspect of input pricing. This paper acknowledges the threat of deposit withdrawal and then solves for the optimal structure of bank deposit rates.     

Credit risk transfer in U.S. commercial banks: What changed during the 2007–2009 crisis?

Following the debate on the role of credit risk transfer (CRT) in exacerbating the 2007–2009 crisis, this paper investigates the usage and effects of loan sales, securitization, and credit derivatives in U.S. commercial banks over the last decade, with special emphasis on the financial crisis. We find that in times of severe funding constraints, the need to raise financial resources becomes the principal incentive behind CRT. We document some beneficial effects of CRT on the economy, since the funds released through CRT are subsequently invested by banks to sustain credit supply, also in recession. However, we report higher overall riskiness in banks that engage intensively in loans sales and securitization, which translates into higher default rates during the crisis. Interestingly, the benefits and drawbacks of CRT are much stronger for loan sales and securitization than for credit derivatives.     

Identifying the balance sheet and the lending channels of monetary transmission: A loan-level analysis

We make a novel attempt at comparing the strength of the lending and balance sheet channels of monetary transmission. To make this comparison, we use loan-level data to determine how borrower balance sheets and bank liquidity are related to bank lending decisions and how monetary policy can affect these relationships. The key innovation in this paper is the use of loan-level data. This enables us to measure the independent effects of the two channels and directly account for borrower balance sheets and lender liquidity instead of using proxies. Our results show that the balance sheet channel is the main mechanism through which monetary policy shocks are transmitted to the economy and that the lending channel does not play a significant role.     

Neglected risks,financial innovation,and financial fragility

We present a standard model of financial innovation, in which intermediaries engineer securities with cash flows that investors seek, but modify two assumptions. First, investors (and possibly intermediaries) neglect certain unlikely risks. Second, investors demand securities with safe cash flows. Financial intermediaries cater to these preferences and beliefs by engineering securities perceived to be safe but exposed to neglected risks. Because the risks are neglected, security issuance is excessive. As investors eventually recognize these risks, they fly back to the safety of traditional securities and markets become fragile, even without leverage, precisely because the volume of new claims is excessive.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Financial constraints of private firms and bank lending behavior

We investigate whether and how financial constraints of private firms depend on bank lending behavior. Bank lending behavior, especially its scale, scope and timing, is largely driven by bank business models which differ between privately owned and state-owned banks. Using a unique dataset on private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) we find that an increase in relative borrowings from local state-owned banks significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints, while there is no such effect for privately owned banks. Improved credit availability and private information production are the main channels that explain our result. We also show that the lending behavior of local state-owned banks can be sustainable because it is less cyclical and neither leads to more risk taking nor underperformance.     

The impact of bank ownership concentration on impaired loans and capital adequacy

This paper examines the impact of bank ownership concentration on two indicators of bank riskiness, namely banks’ non-performing loans and capital adequacy. Using balance sheet information for around 500 commercial banks from more than 50 countries averaged over 2005–2007, we find that concentrated ownership (proxied by different levels of shareholding) significantly reduces a bank’s non-performing loans ratio, conditional on supervisory control and shareholders protection rights. Furthermore, ownership concentration affects the capital adequacy ratio positively conditional on shareholder protection. At low levels of shareholder protection rights and supervisory control, ownership concentration reduces bank riskiness.     

Predatory lending and the subprime crisis

We measure the effect of a 2006 antipredatory pilot program in Chicago on mortgage default rates to test whether predatory lending was a key element in fueling the subprime crisis. Under the program, risky borrowers or risky mortgage contracts or both triggered review sessions by housing counselors who shared their findings with the state regulator. The pilot program cut market activity in half, largely through the exit of lenders specializing in risky loans and through a decline in the share of subprime borrowers. Our results suggest that predatory lending practices contributed to high mortgage default rates among subprime borrowers, raising them by about a third.     

Media ownership,concentration and corruption in bank lending

Building on the pioneering study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006), this study examines the effects of media ownership and concentration on corruption in bank lending using a unique World Bank data set covering more than 5,000 firms across 59 countries. We find strong evidence that state ownership of media is associated with higher levels of bank corruption. We also find that media concentration increases corruption both directly and indirectly through its interaction with media state ownership. In addition, we find that media state ownership and media concentration both accentuate the positive link between official supervisory power and lending corruption and attenuate the negative link between the regulations that empower private monitoring and corruption in lending. Media state ownership or media concentration also accentuates the positive link between banking concentration and corruption in lending. Furthermore, the links between media structure and corruption are more pronounced when the borrowing firm is privately owned.     

Multinational banking and the international transmission of financial shocks: Evidence from foreign bank subsidiaries

Using bank-level data on 368 foreign subsidiaries of 68 multinational banks in 47 emerging economies during 1994–2008, we present consistent evidence that internal capital markets in multinational banking contribute to the transmission of financial shocks from parent banks to foreign subsidiaries. We find that internal capital markets transmit favorable and adverse shocks by affecting subsidiaries’ reliance on their own internal funds for lending. We also find that the transmission of financial shocks varies across types of shocks; is strongest among subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe, followed by Asia and Latin America; is global rather than regional; and becomes more conspicuous in recent years. We also explore various conditions under which the international transmission of financial shocks via internal capital markets in multinational banking is stronger, including the subsidiaries’ reliance on funds from their parent bank, the subsidiaries’ entry mode, and the capital account openness and banking market structure in host countries.     

The international transmission of bank capital requirements: Evidence from the UK

We use data on UK banks? minimum capital requirements to study the impact of changes to bank-specific capital requirements on cross-border bank loan supply from 1999Q1 to 2006Q4. By examining a sample in which each recipient country has multiple relationships with UK-resident banks, we are able to control for demand effects. We find a negative and statistically significant effect of changes to banks? capital requirements on cross-border lending: a 100 basis point increase in the requirement is associated with a reduction in the growth rate of cross-border credit of 5.5 percentage points. We also find that banks tend to favor their most important country relationships, so that the negative cross-border credit supply response in “core” countries is significantly less than in others. Banks tend to cut back cross-border credit to other banks (including foreign affiliates) more than to firms and households, consistent with shorter maturity, wholesale lending which is easier to roll off and may be associated with weaker borrowing relationships.     

Switching costs and relationship profits in bank lending

This paper studies how the cost of switching banks affects the profits available from relationship based lending when the relationship produces inside information. Lower switching cost compounds the adverse selection problem, discouraging outsider banks to depress loan rates. The adverse selection effect eases off along with higher switching cost, leading to more aggressive bidding and thereby reduction in insider profits. Above a certain threshold, however, the adverse selection effect vanishes completely and the insider profits turn increasing in the switching cost. The model predicts that the availability of relationship credit is non-monotonously related to the magnitude of the switching cost.     

Creditor rights,information sharing,and bank risk taking

Looking at a sample of nearly 2,400 banks in 69 countries, we find that stronger creditor rights tend to promote greater bank risk taking. Consistent with this finding, we also show that stronger creditor rights increase the likelihood of financial crisis. On the plus side, we find that stronger creditor rights are associated with higher growth. In contrast, we find that the benefits of information sharing among creditors appear to be universally positive. Greater information sharing leads to higher bank profitability, lower bank risk, a reduced likelihood of financial crisis, and higher economic growth.     

Asymmetric information and price competition in small business lending

This paper examines the relationship between bank lending rates and their cost of funds in New Zealand. Our results show that on average mortgage rates respond more quickly to changes in the cost of funds than base business lending rates. We also find an asymmetry in the initial (short-run) response of banks to changes in funding costs; in particular, our results show banks adjust mortgage rates downwards faster than upwards. The speed to which lending rates revert back to their equilibrium relationship with funding costs varies across the lending markets. We find the adjustment speed is faster when mortgage rates are below equilibrium, whereas it is slower when business lending rates are above long-run levels in relation to funding costs. Our analysis suggests that banks prefer the plain-vanilla type of lending such as mortgages in comparison to small business lending consistent with asymmetric information associated with business loans.     

Global retail lending in the aftermath of the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between supply and demand effects

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects.     

A note on foreign bank ownership and monitoring: An international comparison

This paper empirically analyzes the relation between foreign bank ownership and the three pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord (i.e., capital regulatory oversight, supervisory oversight, and market discipline). Using a new database covering 153 countries, we find that countries with greater market discipline have a lower presence of foreign banks operating in their economy. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that capital regulatory oversight and supervisory oversight are not significantly related to foreign bank ownership.     

Bank capital regulation and credit supply

Banks can meet the need to increase their capital ratio either by issuing new equity or by reducing loans. It is generally known that banks prefer to reduce assets due to the high cost of equity. With a simple banking model we show that, if incumbent shareholders are to benefit, banks may prefer to reduce loans, even though they can recapitalize by issuing new equity without any cost. The result holds when banks hold relatively small amounts of long-term loans, or when the economy is in downturn.     

Bank runs and investment decisions revisited

We examine how the possibility of a bank run affects the investment decisions made by a competitive bank. Cooper and Ross [1998. Bank runs: liquidity costs and investment distortions. Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 27-38] have shown that when the probability of a run is small, the bank will offer a contract that admits a bank-run equilibrium. We show that, in this case, the bank will chose to hold an amount of liquid reserves exactly equal to what withdrawal demand will be if a run does not occur; precautionary or “excess” liquidity will not be held. This result allows us to show that when the cost of liquidating investment early is high, an increase in the probability of a run will lead the bank to invest less. However, when liquidation costs are moderate, the level of investment is increasing in the probability of a run.