ARE PAIRS TRADING PROFITS ROBUST TO TRADING COSTS?

We examine the impact of trading costs on pairs trading profitability in the U.S. equity market, 1963 to 2009. After controlling for commissions, market impact, and short selling fees, pairs trading remains profitable, albeit at much more modest levels. Specifically, we document a risk‐adjusted return of about 30 basis points per month among portfolios of well‐matched pairs that are formed within refined industry groups. Pairs trading exhibits a lower risk and lower return profile than a short‐term reversal strategy that sorts stocks relative to their industry peers. Notably, both these types of contrarian investing are largely unprofitable after 2002.     

Insider Trading and Option Grant Timing in Response to Fire Sales (and Purchases) of Stocks by Mutual Funds

Mutual funds experiencing large outflows (inflows) tend to decrease (expand) their positions, creating downward (upward) price pressure in the stocks held in common by them ( Coval and Stafford [2007] ). This study shows that corporate insiders exploit the resulting mispricing by buying (selling) their company's stock if it is subject to such fire sales (purchases) by funds. We also show that the likelihood of option grants is greater for stocks that are subject to mutual fund fire sales. Finally, we show that both the insider trading and the option granting activities help speed up the correction of the flow‐driven mispricing. Overall, this study illustrates that insiders enhance personal benefits by trading on their personal account and influencing the timing of option grants in response to mispricing due to flow‐driven fund trading. Moreover, these activities help improve the informational efficiency of stock price.     

Better than the original? The relative success of copycat funds

We construct hypothetical copycat funds to investigate the performance of free-riding strategies that duplicate the disclosed asset holdings of actively managed mutual funds. On average, copycat funds are able to generate performance that is comparable to their target mutual funds, taking into account transaction costs and expenses. However, their relative success increased significantly after 2004 when the SEC imposed quarterly disclosure regulations on all mutual funds. We also find substantial cross-sectional dispersion in the relative performance of copycat funds. Free-riding on the portfolios disclosed by past winning funds and funds that disclose representative holdings generates significantly better performance net of trading costs and expenses than the vast majority of mutual funds. The results indicate that free-riding on disclosed fund holdings is an attractive strategy and suggest that mutual funds can suffer from the information disclosure requirements.     

MUTUAL FUND TRADES: ASYMMETRIC LIQUIDITY PREFERENCES AND FUND PERFORMANCE

We investigate the role of the liquidity of stocks traded by mutual funds on the performance of funds experiencing substantial and sustained redemptions (outflows) or inflows. Accordingly, we identify 770 redeeming fund‐periods and 1,757 inflow fund‐periods and find a statistically significant relation between the liquidity of the stocks they trade and the quantity of the stock traded. Notably, when funds experience redemptions, those with low portfolio liquidity have an elevated preference for selling more‐liquid stocks. In the following period, such funds statistically and economically underperform funds that sell less‐liquid stocks. This is consistent with redemptions detrimentally affecting shareholders that remain in a fund.     

The use of credit default swaps by bond mutual funds: Liquidity provision and counterparty risk

Corporate bond mutual funds increased their selling of credit protection in the credit default swaps (CDS) market during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. This trading activity was primarily in multi-name CDS, greater among larger and established funds, and directed toward counterparty dealers in financial distress. Funds that sold credit protection during the crisis experienced greater credit market risk and superior post-crisis performance, consistent with higher expected returns from liquidity provision. Funds using Lehman Brothers as a counterparty experienced abnormal outflows and returns of –2% immediately following Lehman's bankruptcy, suggesting that funds’ opportunistic trading in CDS exposed investors to counterparty risk.     

What drives the performance of convertible-bond funds?

This paper examines the performance of US mutual funds that invest primarily in convertible bonds. Multivariate cross-sectional analyses show a significant relation between a fund’s performance and its asset composition: the higher the difference in the percentage of assets invested in convertible bonds compared to the percentage invested in stocks, the higher the performance, on average. We show that this result can be explained by factors associated with investment opportunities in the convertible-bond market and trading strategies related to convertible arbitrage, as typically performed by hedge funds. Overall, convertible-bond fund performance measured by alpha is comparable to a passive investment in stocks, bonds, and convertible bonds. This performance is the result of weak selection skills and successful timing strategies related to convertible arbitrage.     

Against the tide: the commencement of short selling and margin trading in mainland China

China's recent removal of short‐selling and margin trading bans on selected stocks enables testing of the relative effect of margin trading and short selling. We find the prices of the shortable stocks decrease, on average, relative to peer A‐shares and cross‐listed H‐shares, suggesting that short selling dominates margin trading effects. Contrary to the regulators' intention and recent developed market empirical evidence, liquidity declines and bid‐ask spreads increase in these shortable stocks. Consistent with Ausubel (1990), these results imply that uninformed investors avoid the shortable stocks to reduce the risk of trading with informed investors.     

Small-cap equity mutual fund managers as liquidity providers

This paper examines the relation between the performance of small-cap equity mutual funds and the liquidity characteristics of their asset holdings. We study the trading behavior of fund managers and show that on average, they tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks. We introduce the notion of net “liquidity creation” by fund managers and examine its role in explaining the cross section of small-cap equity mutual fund returns. Our empirical results show that on average, small-cap mutual fund managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for providing such liquidity services to the market.     

Tax Calendar Effects in the Municipal Bond Market: Tax‐Loss Selling and Cherry Picking by Investors and Market Timing by Fund Managers

Examining municipal bond returns, bond fund flows and buying activities by fund managers over the period 1990–2009, we find evidence of tax calendar‐related rational opportunistic trading patterns by fund investors and fund managers. Specifically, fund shareholders conduct tax‐loss selling in December and re‐invest in January. In April, June, and September, fund investors rationally cherry pick to sell their shares of short‐term bond funds instead of their shares of long‐term bond funds to raise cash to pay estimated taxes. Unlike fund shareholders, fund managers adopt a contrarian strategy of buying in December and selling in January.     

Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds "herd" when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth-oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price-adjustment process.     

Connected Stocks

We connect stocks through their common active mutual fund owners. We show that the degree of shared ownership forecasts cross‐sectional variation in return correlation, controlling for exposure to systematic return factors, style and sector similarity, and many other pair characteristics. We argue that shared ownership causes this excess comovement based on evidence from a natural experiment—the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal. These results motivate a novel cross‐stock‐reversal trading strategy exploiting information contained in ownership connections. We show that long‐short hedge fund index returns covary negatively with this strategy, suggesting these funds may exacerbate this excess comovement.     

What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks?

We examine the portfolio rebalancing, measured by the equity churn rate, of mutual funds from 29 countries based on annual stockholdings over the 1999–2006 period. We find that funds more often trade the stocks of companies located in countries with higher degree of information asymmetry and are less familiar to fund managers, after we control for the effects of stock market development and investor protection. Consistent with the behavioral bias, fund managers more often rebalance stocks in foreign markets that perform well. This bias is exacerbated when fund managers are less familiar with and less informed about those markets.     

Does long-term disequilibrium in stock price predict future returns?

We propose a trading strategy based on error correction term (ECT), the residuals from the cointegration relation between the levels of security and the market portfolio. We find that buying stocks in the top 10 % ECT and selling stocks in the bottom 10 % ECT generates 1.09 % a month for 6-month holding period over 1965–2005. The monthly return increases to 1.57 % when the above trading strategy is applied to stocks with insignificant cointegration with the market portfolio. This profit is robust to three and four factor models. Moreover, this profit is neither driven by small and illiquid stocks nor is the result of any inherent positive serial correlation.     

Mutual fund portfolio trading and investor flow

I estimate the extent to which mutual fund portfolio trading of securities is triggered by investor flows into and out of the funds, and find that this liquidity-induced portfolio trading activity is smaller than previously estimated by Edelen (1999). I obtain estimates from a much larger and broader sample of funds than Edelen’s (1999) sample. Portfolio managers of international funds trade a smaller fraction of investor flow than do those of domestic funds. Index funds invest a larger fraction. A funds’ usage of futures contracts does not have a statistically significant effect on how it trades in response to investor flows, but the unpredictability of investor flow weakly affects the trading response to flow.     

Selling winners, holding losers: Effect on fund flows and survival of disposition-prone mutual funds

Recent studies suggest that presence of a disposition effect in a large subset of investors can create stock mispricings, which has serious implications for market efficiency. We examine whether US equity mutual funds are disposition-prone, how that effect influences performance, investor flows and fund survival, and whether the disposition orientation of mutual funds affects stock prices in a sustained manner.We find that about 30% of all funds exhibit some degree of disposition behavior and that such funds underperform funds that are not disposition-prone by 4-6% per year. Moreover, after controlling for performance, tax overhang and other factors that potentially affect flows, disposition-prone funds attract significantly smaller flows than other funds. The results suggest that mutual fund investors are smart enough to minimize investment in disposition-prone funds. Consequently, disposition-prone funds have significantly higher rates of failure than other funds, thereby reducing the impact of such trading behavior on security prices.     

Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets

This paper examines institutional price pressure in equity markets by studying mutual fund transactions caused by capital flows from 1980 to 2004. Funds experiencing large outflows tend to decrease existing positions, which creates price pressure in the securities held in common by distressed funds. Similarly, the tendency among funds experiencing large inflows to expand existing positions creates positive price pressure in overlapping holdings. Investors who trade against constrained mutual funds earn significant returns for providing liquidity. In addition, future flow-driven transactions are predictable, creating an incentive to front-run the anticipated forced trades by funds experiencing extreme capital flows.     

A unique “T + 1 trading rule” in China: Theory and evidence

Unique to the world, China adopts a “T + 1 trading rule”, which prevents investors from selling stocks bought on the same day. We develop a dynamic price manipulation model to study the effects of the “T + 1 trading rule”. Compared to the “T + 0 trading rule”, which allows investors to buy and sell the same stocks during the same day, we show that the “T + 1 trading rule” reduces the total trading volume and price volatility, and improves the trend chasers’ welfare when trend-chasing is strong. An empirical test using data on China’s B-share stock market supports the model’s theoretical predictions.     

Do mutual funds time the market? Evidence from portfolio holdings

Previous research finds insignificant market-timing ability for mutual funds using tests based on fund returns. The return-based tests, however, are subject to the “artificial timing” bias. In this paper, we propose and implement new measures of market timing based on mutual fund holdings. Our holdings-based measures do not suffer from the artificial timing bias. We find that, on average, actively managed U.S. domestic equity funds have positive timing ability. Market timing funds use non-public information to predict market returns, tend to have high industry concentration, large fund size, a tilt toward small-cap stocks, and are active in industry rotation.     

Is “voting with your feet” an effective mutual fund governance mechanism?

Investors in open-end mutual funds can vote with their feet by withdrawing assets from or adding assets to these funds. This paper assesses the effectiveness of this market discipline mechanism by investigating whether voting with the feet prevents the abusive practices that led to the 2003-2004 trading scandals. The research results indicate that funds with higher flow sensitivity—that is, a higher density of vigilant clients—have lower arbitrage potential and fewer abnormal flows, which in turn implies less opportunistic trading. As a result, these funds have a lower probability of being implicated in scandals. These findings suggest that investor ability to withdraw assets from or add assets to the funds is an effective mutual fund governance mechanism. In funds with less sophisticated investors who cannot use this option, other means of governance are especially important.     

Information flows within financial conglomerates: Evidence from the banks–mutual funds relation

We study how information flows within financial conglomerates by analyzing the relations between mutual funds and banks that belong to the same financial group. We investigate the effect that the lending behavior of affiliated banks has on the portfolio choice of the mutual funds that are part of the same group. We show that funds (fund families) increase their stakes in the firms that borrow from their affiliated banks in the period following the deal by far greater amounts than other unaffiliated funds (fund families). We provide evidence that this strategy is information-driven. The performance of the positions of affiliated funds in the stocks of borrowing firms exceeds that of their other positions in nonborrowing stocks located in the same industry as well as that of other stocks having similar characteristics by up to 1.6% per month. Funds increase (decrease) their stock holdings in those borrowing stocks that subsequently provide positive (negative) abnormal returns, suggesting that they exploit privileged inside information not available to other market participants. This behavior is prevalent largely in funds located in close geographic proximity to their lending banks. Furthermore, it is exhibited mostly by young, small, and poorly performing fund families. Our evidence points to information flows within conglomerates through informal channels such as personal acquaintances.