Does institutional ownership increase stock return volatility? Evidence from Vietnam

The literature on institutional ownership and stock return volatility often ignores small emerging countries. However, this issue is more profound, due to the large size of institutional investors and small stock market size, in emerging equity markets. This paper examines the effects of the institutional ownership on the firm-level volatility of stock returns in Vietnam. Our data cover most of non-financial firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh City stock exchange for the period 2006–2012. Employing different analysis techniques for panel data and controlling for possible endogeneity problems, our empirical results suggest that institutional investors stabilize the stock return volatility. Moreover, we document that: i) the stabilizing effect of institutional investor ownership is higher in dividend paying firms, and ii) if firms are paying out more dividends, this stabilizing effect is greater. Our results outline the important role of institutional investors in maintaining the stability in emerging stock markets.     

Does foreign institutional ownership motivate firms in an emerging market to increase voluntary disclosure? Evidence from Taiwan

This study examines the relationship between foreign institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure in an emerging market. By exploiting a unique dataset of daily foreign investment flow and ownership data from Taiwan, this paper examines whether foreign ownership is associated with the likelihood of holding conference calls and investigates whether conference calls are informative to foreign market participants. After controlling for other characteristics of a firm??s information environment, we find that the decision to hold conference calls is positively associated with foreign institutional ownership. We also provide evidence that the trading turnover by foreign institutional investors immediately increases after the conference calls, indicating that conference calls are informative for foreign institutional investors. Our results are robust, after controlling for endogeneity.     

Does institutional ownership matter for international stock return comovement?

We study the link between international stock return comovements and institutional investment. We test whether the rise of institutional ownership has increased cross-country correlations and decreased cross-industry correlations. Using stock-level institutional holdings across 45 countries during the 2001–2010 period, we find that industry and global factors are relatively more important the country factors in explaining stock return variation among stocks with higher institutional ownership. Industry diversification strategies are more beneficial than country diversification strategies for stocks with high institutional ownership. We show that cross-border portfolio investment is a powerful force of international capital market integration and convergence of asset prices.     

Does institutional activism increase shareholder wealth? Evidence from spillovers on non-target companies

This paper presents evidence of the shareholder wealth effect of institutional activism using its spillovers on non-target companies. The spillovers are instructive because they are a response to an exogenous shock and thus create an environment to conduct a clean event study. In particular, we examine the spillover effects of the first target announcement of the Korea Corporate Governance Fund. As the very first sign of institutional activism in the country, this announcement creates an expectation of similar governance efforts even in non-target companies, especially in those companies whose governance is currently poorer and thus the scope for future activism is greater. Consistent with institutional activism contributing to shareholder wealth, we find that, among non-targets, those firms granting fewer rights to outside shareholders experience a more positive stock price reaction. Further analysis lends additional support to the positive wealth effect of institutional activism.     

Do foreign institutional investors drive corporate social responsibility? Evidence from listed firms in China

This paper investigates the effect of qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) on corporate social responsibility (CSR) within the context of listed firms in China. We find that QFIIs offer an incisive channel for improving socially responsible practices. In addition, we find that firms with QFIIs are more likely to comply with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines, and that their sustainability reports tend to be longer. We also find that this positive effect is more pronounced in firms with low initial CSR scores than those with high CSR scores at the time when QFIIs enter the sample. Our empirical evidence further confirms that this positive impact is driven by QFIIs from countries with high social awareness, or QFIIs from geographically distant countries, consistent with their motives, and is linked to the ownership of QFIIs, especially when the QFII is among the top ten of the largest shareholders. Finally, our extended analysis reveals that the increase in CSR performance associated with the presence of QFIIs results in greater firm performance and easier access to finance.     

Does privatization reform alleviate ownership discrimination? Evidence from the Split-share structure reform in China

This paper investigates the institutional origins of ownership discrimination in bank lending through a staggered quasi-natural experiment: China's Split-share Structure Reform. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have an advantage over non-SOEs in securing external financing to protect investment opportunities from cash flow fluctuations. This financing privilege declined significantly after the reform, which mandatorily converted SOEs' non-tradable state-owned shares into tradable shares, sharply increasing the likelihood of further privatization. Consistent evidence also exists in terms of bank lending behaviors. Further, we show both direct and indirect evidence that the effects were more pronounced among SOEs under higher threats of privatization (e.g., firms with larger increases in tradable shares, smaller workforce, and in industries peripheral to national strategy). The evidence suggests that banks proactively prefer SOEs for the perceived safety of loans under implicit government guarantee; when this privilege disappeared after the reform, banks reacted by allocating credits more fairly. This paper provides new evidence on the bright side of share structure reforms in mitigating credit misallocation and enlightens policy makers to practical resolutions to the financing inefficiency in emerging capital markets.     

Are there monitoring benefits to institutional ownership? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings

We provide new evidence on the monitoring benefits from institutional ownership by analyzing the impact of institutional ownership on stock price and operating performance following seasoned equity offerings, a setting where the effects of monitoring are likely to be especially important. We find that announcement returns are positively and significantly related to total and active institutional ownership levels and concentration. Post-issue stock returns are positively and significantly related to the contemporaneous post-issue changes in total and active institutional ownership and the concentration of their shareholdings. Operating performance improvements are also related to institutional monitoring in the one, two, and three years following the equity issue. Our results continue to hold even after accounting for the possibility that institutional investors have an informational advantage that enables them to identify and invest in subsequently better performing firms. We also empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by institutions buying past winners and selling past losers as a way to window-dress their portfolio holdings.     

Do ETF flows increase market efficiency? Evidence from China

Focusing on the equity exchange traded funds (ETFs) in China, we demonstrate the significant effect of ETF flows on the informativeness of the ETF index. Following the novel approach proposed by Xu et al (2019a). to identify different driving forces for ETF flows, we explore whether the forward-looking ETF flows at a day’s closing substantially improve the index’s efficiency on the next day. The mechanism behind it is inter-market information spread: the efficiency effect of the forward-looking ETF flows strengthens when ETFs share more new information; and the forward-looking ETF flows increase the information flow to the ETF index on the next day.     

Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.     

Does auditor choice matter to foreign investors? Evidence from foreign mutual funds worldwide

This study explores whether a firm’s auditor choice affects its ability to access foreign equity capital. Using the equity holdings of 35,665 foreign mutual funds from 30 countries for the period 1998–2009, we find evidence that appointing a Big 4 auditor is associated with the increased level of foreign mutual fund ownership in firms. Our results are robust when conditioned on firm-level information asymmetries, country-level information disclosure quality, and when employing the Enron–Andersen fiasco as the natural experiment. Furthermore, appointing Big 4 auditors is particularly important for firms to attract foreign capital during the 2008 global financial crisis.     

Does bank ownership affect lending behavior? Evidence from the Euro area

We analyze the differences in lending policies across banks characterized by different types of ownership, using micro-level data on Euro area banks during the period 1999–2011 to detect possible variations in bank lending supply responses to changes in monetary policy. Our results identify a general difference between stakeholder and shareholder banks: following a monetary policy contraction, stakeholder banks decrease their loan supply to a lesser extent than shareholder banks. A detailed analysis of the effect among stakeholder banks reveals that cooperative banks continued to smooth the impact of tighter monetary policy on their lending during the crisis period (2008–2011), whereas savings banks did not. Stakeholder banks’ propensity to smooth their lending cycles suggests that their presence in the economy has the potential to reduce credit supply volatility.     

Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis

We investigate the value of stable ownership for a sample of European firms using the global financial crisis as an exogenous shock and pre-and post-crisis years as benchmark periods. Consistent with the argument that stable ownership allows managers to focus on the creation of long-term value, we find that stable ownership resulted in higher stock returns and a higher market-to-book ratio during the crisis. This positive effect of stable ownership was not reversed after the crisis. Stable institutional blockholdings were more valuable in countries with weaker investor protection. However, the positive effect does not apply to firms in which a family is the largest blockholder. Finally, we also find that ownership stability was associated with a higher level of investments, illustrating that stable ownership affects real corporate decisions.

     

Does control‐ownership divergence impair market liquidity in an emerging market? Evidence from China

This paper examines how institutional characteristics of emerging economies influence the effect of control‐ownership divergence on market liquidity. We find that the divergence is negatively associated with liquidity and that this negative relationship is more pronounced in firms with more severe agency problems and information asymmetry. We argue that in an emerging market, the negative effect of the divergence on liquidity is worsened by state ownership and poorer shareholder protection, both of which result in more severe agency conflicts; we also find, however, that this effect is alleviated by the NTS reform, which aligns the interest of different shareholders.     

Do foreign investments increase firm value and firm performance? Evidence from Japan

As empirical evidence on the impact of internationalization on firm performance remains unclear, we revisit the question of whether foreign investments enhance firm value and firm performance. Using a panel sample of publicly listed firms in Japan during the 1990–2016 period, we find that foreign investments are negatively associated with firm value. In addition, foreign investments are negatively related to firm performance at short- and long-horizons. Furthermore, foreign investments appear to reduce revenue growth but have no effect on firm efficiency, suggesting that simply increasing foreign investments does not necessarily enhance revenue growth or firm efficiency.     

Do foreign institutional investors monitor opportunistic managerial behaviour? Evidence from real earnings management

Employing a large sample of 13,860 firms in 41 economies from 2000 to 2017, we document that the ownership by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) is negatively associated with firms' real earnings management (REM) but unrelated to their accrual earnings management (AEM). We adopt a few identification strategies to tackle the endogeneity issues, including firm- and year-fixed effects regression, two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression, and difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation based on the passage of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA). In addition, we show that the role of FIIs in curbing REM is achieved through the expertise channel and the monitoring channel. These results suggest that when facing disadvantages in curbing AEM, FIIs make the most of their monitoring strengths by curbing firms' REM, where they have both incentives and capabilities to monitor. Overall, this study highlights the important role of FIIs in monitoring opportunistic managerial behaviour.     

Is conservative reporting attractive to foreign institutional investors? Evidence from an emerging market

This study investigates the relation between conservative reporting and foreign institutional ownership using a unique dataset of firms in Turkey. In doing so, we distinguish between foreign funds and corporations. Contrary to prior findings, our analysis shows that conservative reporting is not necessarily a desirable accounting feature for foreign institutional investors. We also find that the interplay between conservative reporting and ownership is significantly different between foreign funds and corporations. The estimated negative relation holds only for foreign funds. Further analysis reveals that foreign funds do not find conservative reporting desirable in low-asymmetric information firms and reduce ownership with greater accounting conservatism in such firms. The analysis sheds significant lights on the relevance of conservative reporting in alleviating the negative consequences of asymmetric information.     

Does insiders share pledging stifle innovation? Evidence from China

We examine the relation between insiders share pledging activities for personal loans and firm innovation. Firstly, we find a negative effect of both the existence of pledging and the intensity of pledging activities on firm innovation, measured by R&D and patent application. Pledging by insiders with decision rights is associated with a 4.6% decline in R&D activities and 0.5% decline in patent applications, respectively, which accounts for 4.0% and 10.6% of the mean of each variable. This result holds using a propensity-score matched sample. In addition, we instrument pledging activities by financing constraints faced by other firms controlled by the same controlling insiders who pledge shares. IV estimation yield similar results. Secondly, we find share pledge activities have more pronounced effect on firm innovations when firms are located in areas with strong property rights protection, when firms are non-SOEs, or when pledging insiders serve on corporate boards. Lastly, we also find a negative effect of share pledging of other firms with common shareholders on firm innovations of interest. Overall, our findings suggest that pledging shares by insiders stifle firm innovation because share pledging reduce insiders' preference for risk taking.     

Does FinTech development facilitate firms' innovation? Evidence from China

This study examines the impact of financial technology (FinTech) development on firms' innovation. Using Chinese listed firms' panel data from 2011 to 2021 and the FinTech indicators we constructed, we find that FinTech development significantly facilitates firms' innovation by alleviating their information asymmetry and financing constraints. This finding continues to hold after a series of robustness tests and endogeneity discussions. Moreover, we find that the effect of FinTech development on innovation is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms, firms in the central region, and high-tech firms. These results offer important policy implications as they demonstrate the crucial role of FinTech in the high-quality development of the real economy.     

Does common ownership constrain managerial rent extraction? Evidence from insider trading profitability

This study identifies a new economic benefit of common institutional ownership, which refers to the increasingly contentious phenomenon of U.S. firms sharing stockholders with their industry competitors. We find a significantly negative relation between common ownership and insider trading profitability. The disciplinary effect of common ownership on opportunistic insider trading is particularly evident when the information effects of common ownership are greater, when common owners are more likely to benefit from positive governance externalities, and in the subset of trades made by opportunistic insiders. Using the exogenous variations in common ownership induced by financial institution mergers, we conduct a difference-in-differences analysis and find consistent results. We also provide evidence that common owners encourage firms to impose ex-ante restrictions on insider trading and take ex-post actions to discipline opportunistic insiders by voting against management. Overall, our findings suggest that common institutional shareholders have information advantages, governance incentives, and effective means to constrain opportunistic insider trading.