The term structure of sovereign default risk in EMU member countries and its determinants

We analyze the determinants of sovereign default risk of EMU member states using government bond yield spreads as risk indicators. We focus on default risk for different time spans indicated by spreads for different maturities. Using a panel framework we analyze whether there are different drivers of default risk for different maturities. We find that lower economic growth and larger openness increase default risk for all maturities. Higher indebtedness only increases short-term risk, whereas net lending, trade balance and interest rate costs only drive long-term default risk.     

Theory and evidence on the dynamic interactions between sovereign credit default swaps and currency options

Using sovereign CDS spreads and currency option data for Mexico and Brazil, we document that CDS spreads covary with both the currency option implied volatility and the slope of the implied volatility curve in moneyness. We propose a joint valuation framework, in which currency return variance and sovereign default intensity follow a bivariate diffusion with contemporaneous correlation. Estimation shows that default intensity is much more persistent than currency return variance. The market price estimates on the two risk factors also explain the well-documented evidence that historical average default probabilities are lower than those implied from credit spreads.     

Transmission of the financial and sovereign debt crises to the EMU: Stock prices,CDS spreads and exchange rates

This paper tests for the transmission of the 2007–2010 financial and sovereign debt crises to fifteen EMU countries. We use daily data from 2003 to 2010 on country financial and non-financial stock market indexes to analyze the stock market returns for three country groups within EMU: North, South and Small. The following results hold for both the North and South European countries, while the smallest countries seem to be relatively isolated from international events. First, we find strong evidence of crisis transmission to European non-financials from US non-financials, but not for financials. Second, in order to test how the sovereign debt crisis affects stock market developments we split the crisis in pre- and post-Lehman sub periods. Results show that financials become significantly more dependent on changes in the difference between the Greek and German CDS spreads after Lehman’s collapse, compared to the pre-Lehman sub period. However, this increase is much smaller for non-financials. Third, before the crisis euro appreciations coincide with European stock market decreases, whereas this relationship reverses during the crisis. Finally, this reversal seems to be triggered by Lehman’s collapse.     

Foreign exchange market reactions to sovereign credit news

We analyse the reaction of the foreign exchange spot market to sovereign credit signals by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P during 1994–2010. We find that positive and negative credit news affects both the own-country exchange rate and other countries’ exchange rates. We provide evidence on unequal responses to the three agencies’ signals. Fitch signals induce the most timely market responses, and the market also reacts strongly to S&P negative outlook signals. Credit outlook and watch actions and multiple notch rating changes have more impact than one-notch rating changes. Considerable differences in the market reactions to sovereign credit events are highlighted in emerging versus developed economies, and in various geographical regions.     

Global retail lending in the aftermath of the US financial crisis: Distinguishing between supply and demand effects

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects.     

A note on foreign bank ownership and monitoring: An international comparison

This paper empirically analyzes the relation between foreign bank ownership and the three pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord (i.e., capital regulatory oversight, supervisory oversight, and market discipline). Using a new database covering 153 countries, we find that countries with greater market discipline have a lower presence of foreign banks operating in their economy. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that capital regulatory oversight and supervisory oversight are not significantly related to foreign bank ownership.     

On the importance of indirect banking vulnerabilities in the Eurozone

This paper investigates banking and sovereign distress in the Eurozone and the importance of direct and indirect financial exposures. We use BIS cross-border banking claims to link member states in a GVAR framework and jointly model sectoral CDS premia. Based on balance sheet positions of an intermediate debtor country, we calculate indirect exposures and asses how the level of interconnectedness is impacted when indirect links are accounted for. We notice a general slowdown in financial integration and a reduction in cross-border assets in the hope of limiting international contagion. By differentiating between direct and indirect links, we show that the impact of reduced weights on core member states is mostly insignificant and that deleveraging strategies are not generally able to successfully reduce risk.     

Risky public domestic debt composition in emerging economies

This paper explains why public domestic debt composition in emerging economies can be risky, namely in foreign currency, with a short maturity or indexed. It analyses empirically the determinants of these risk sources separately, developing a new large dataset compiled from national sources for 33 emerging economies over 1994–2006. The paper finds that economic size, the breadth of the domestic investor base, inflation and fiscal soundness are all associated with risky public domestic debt compositions, yet to an extent that varies considerably in terms of magnitude and significance across sources of risk. Only inflation impacts all types of risky debt, underscoring the overarching importance of monetary credibility to make domestic debt compositions in emerging economies safer. Given local bond markets' rapid development, monitoring risky public domestic debt compositions in emerging economies becomes increasingly relevant to global financial stability.     

The global financial crisis: Explaining cross-country differences in the output impact

What explains differences in the crisis impact across developing countries and emerging markets? Using cross-country regressions to assess the factors driving the growth performance in 2009 (compared to pre-crisis forecasts for that year), we find that a small set of variables explain a large share of the variation in the growth impact. Countries with more leveraged domestic financial systems, stronger credit growth, and more short-term debt tended to suffer a larger effect on economic activity, although the relative importance of these factors differs across country groups. For emerging markets, this financial channel trumps the trade channel. For a broader set of developing countries, however, the trade channel seems to have mattered, with more open countries affected more strongly and those exporting food commodities being less hard hit. Exchange-rate flexibility helped in buffering the impact of the shock, particularly for emerging markets. There is also some evidence that countries with a stronger fiscal position prior to the crisis were impacted less severely. We find little evidence for the importance of other policy variables.     

The reaction of emerging market credit default swap spreads to sovereign credit rating changes

This paper examines the effect of sovereign credit rating change announcements on the CDS spreads of the event countries, and their spillover effects on other emerging economies’ CDS premiums. We find that positive events have a greater impact on CDS markets in the two-day period surrounding the event, and are more likely to spill over to other emerging countries. Alternatively, CDS markets anticipate negative events, and previous changes in CDS premiums can be used to estimate the probability of a negative credit event. The transmission mechanisms for positive events are the common creditor and competition in trade markets.     

The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during financial crises

This paper shows that the collapse of the global market for syndicated loans during financial crises can in part be explained by a flight home effect whereby lenders rebalance their loan portfolios in favor of domestic borrowers. The home bias of lenders' loan origination increases by approximately 20% if the bank's home country experiences a banking crisis. This flight home effect is distinct from flight to quality because borrowers of different quality are equally affected. The results indicate that the home bias in capital allocation tends to increase when adverse economic shocks reduce the wealth of international investors.     

Supersanctions and sovereign debt repayment

What might happen if a third-party entity had the power to implement fiscal reforms and/or punish sovereign debt defaulters? In contrast to recent history, extreme sanctions such as gunboat diplomacy and “fiscal house arrest” were used to punish debt defaulters during the period 1870–1913. We find that, after a “supersanction” was imposed, a country improved its fiscal discipline. As a result, ex ante default probabilities on new issues fell dramatically and the country spent no additional time in default. Our results suggest some type of external fiscal or monetary control may be effective in imposing discipline on serial debt defaulters.     

The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises

This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term. We find that IMF programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1.5–2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously. Furthermore, IMF programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the Fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances. Other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.     

Capital account liberalization, financial development and industry growth: A synthetic view

This paper synthesizes studies analyzing the effects of capital account liberalization on industry growth while controlling for financial crises, domestic financial development and the strength of institutions. We find evidence that financial openness has positive effects on the growth of financially dependent industries, although these growth-enhancing effects evaporate during financial crises. Further analysis indicates that the positive effects of capital account liberalization are limited to countries with relatively well-developed financial systems, good accounting standards, strong creditor rights and rule of law. It suggests that countries must reach a certain threshold in terms of institutional and economic development before they can expect to benefit from capital account liberalization.     

The macroeconomic sources of systemic risk in the banking sectors of five new EU member states

Rapid credit growth has been one of the most pervasive developments in recent years in Central and Eastern Europe. Our estimates support the hypothesis that the growth of credit and the amount of available finance might harm banking performance and deteriorate non-performing loans (NPL) dynamics, most probably due to the overheating of economies in the five NMSs. The procyclicality of banking sector performance and high economic activities growth is a signal of an economy overheating and therefore a slowdown in economic activity is likely to accelerate the growth of the NPL ratio.     

When and how US dollar shortages evolved into the full crisis? Evidence from the cross-currency swap market

This paper investigates when and how the US dollar shortages evolved into the full crisis in the cross-currency swap market between major European currencies and the US dollar during the turmoil of 2007-2009, using the dynamic factor model with regime-switching β coefficients of each swap price with respect to the latent common factor. The 1-year market entered the high-β crisis regime soon after the onset of the subprime problem in August 2007. The 10-year market entered that regime following the collapse of Bear Sterns in mid-March 2008. Financial credit spreads have significant predictive power for switches between high and low-β regimes.     

Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis

This paper investigates contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the period 2007–2012. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. Using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks, we provide empirical evidence that three contagion channels are at work: a guarantee channel, an asset holdings channel and a collateral channel. We find that banks with a weak capital buffer, a weak funding structure and less traditional banking activities are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion. Furthermore, the impact of government interventions on contagion depends on the type of intervention, with outright capital injections being the most effective measure in reducing spillover intensity.     

Firm values and sovereign wealth fund investments

We analyze the impact of sovereign wealth fund (SWF) investments on firm values and provide evidence consistent with the tradeoff between the monitoring and lobbying benefits versus tunneling and expropriation costs of SWFs as blockholders. The data show significant positive (negative) returns to announcements of SWF investments (divestments). The returns are non-monotonic, first rising (falling) and then falling (rising) with the share sought (sold) for investments (divestments). Moreover, we find that SWFs are often active investors. Slightly more than half of the target firms experience one or more events indicative of SWF monitoring activity or influence.     

The political determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads

This paper analyzes the political determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads using data for 27 emerging markets in the period 1996 to 2009. I find strong evidence that countries with parliamentary systems (as opposed to presidential regimes) and a low quality of governance face higher sovereign yield spreads, while the degree of democracy and elections play no significant role. A higher degree of political stability and the power to implement austerity measures significantly reduce sovereign yield spreads particularly in autocratic regimes, while no significant effect is detected for democratic countries. Overall, political determinants have a more pronounced impact on sovereign bond yield spreads in autocratic and closed regimes than in democratic and open countries.     

The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting

This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the propensity to misreport. We do not find that the sensitivity of other components of CEO compensation, i.e., equity, restricted stock, long-term incentive payouts, and salary plus bonus have any significant impact on the propensity to misreport. Relative to other components of compensation, stock options are associated with stronger incentives to misreport because convexity in CEO wealth introduced by stock options limits the downside risk on detection of the misreporting.