Who incentivizes the mutual fund manager,new or old shareholders?

This study tests whether mutual fund shareholders continue to trade in response to fund returns after they make their initial investment in fund shares. It decomposes the relationship between fund returns and shareholder flow in a large, proprietary panel of all shareholder transactions in one midsize no-load mutual fund family. Results show that both new and old shareholders buy shares during periods of good returns; however, shareholder outflow is essentially unrelated to fund returns. This lack of a return-sell relationship is not driven by locked-in pension assets, shareholders’ ignorance of ongoing fund returns, or embedded capital gains. However, there is evidence that exchanges between equity funds in the family are related more strongly to returns of the destination fund than to returns of the origination fund. This may indicate that flow between equity mutual funds is driven by shareholders buying new funds rather than selling old funds. Supermarket shareholders are smart insofar as they exchange into funds that subsequently outperform their prior funds during their individual holding periods.     

What determines mutual fund trading in foreign stocks?

We examine the portfolio rebalancing, measured by the equity churn rate, of mutual funds from 29 countries based on annual stockholdings over the 1999–2006 period. We find that funds more often trade the stocks of companies located in countries with higher degree of information asymmetry and are less familiar to fund managers, after we control for the effects of stock market development and investor protection. Consistent with the behavioral bias, fund managers more often rebalance stocks in foreign markets that perform well. This bias is exacerbated when fund managers are less familiar with and less informed about those markets.     

Are mutual fund fees excessive?

There is a long running debate over whether competition in the mutual fund industry limits the ability of investment advisors to charge fees that are disproportionate to the services they provide. We posit that disproportionately high fees are prevalent in funds with multiple share classes and those with weak governance structures. Using a comprehensive sample of index mutual funds for the from 1998 to 2007, we find that internal governance mechanisms matter primarily for funds with relatively small share classes where investors often face increased search costs and/or restricted access to competitive mutual funds. Additionally, we find that funds managed by publicly held sponsors are associated with disproportionately higher fee spreads (about 28 basis points). The results are robust to the inclusion of board characteristics, share class structure, and investment objectives. Overall, our findings suggest that competition and agency considerations are important determinants in the pricing of mutual funds.     

UK mutual fund performance: Skill or luck?

Using a comprehensive data set on (surviving and non-surviving) UK equity mutual funds, we use a cross-section bootstrap methodology to distinguish between ‘skill’ and ‘luck’ for individual funds. This methodology allows for non-normality in the idiosyncratic risk of the funds — a major issue when considering those funds which appear to be either very good or very bad performers, since these are the funds which investors are primarily interested in identifying. Our study points to the existence of stock picking ability among a relatively small number of top performing UK equity mutual funds (i.e. performance which is not solely due to good luck). At the negative end of the performance scale, our analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis that most poor performing funds are merely unlucky. Most of these funds demonstrate ‘bad skill’. Recursive estimation and Kalman ‘smoothed’ coefficients indicate temporal stability in the ex-post performance alpha's of winner and loser portfolios. We also find performance persistence amongst loser but not amongst winner funds.     

Does advertising strategy matter in influencing mutual fund purchase?

This study explores the role of advertising strategies (informational versus transformational) in consumers’ purchase intentions related to mutual funds. Moreover, this study investigates the possible moderating role of gender and financial literacy in advertising strategy. Findings of the experimental approach applied in this study suggest that advertisement strategy does influence investment intention related to the mutual funds. We also found that females are less likely to purchase mutual funds when exposed to transformational advertisements. Moreover, investors with higher financial literacy prefer informational advertisements. The results also indicate that the informational advertisements are more useful and increase awareness levels among investors.     

Informativeness of mutual fund advertisements: Does advertising communicate fund quality to investors?

We uncover a positive relation between advertising expenditures and skill in the mutual fund industry. Motivated by economic signaling models, we find that funds advertising in magazines outperform their peers by 83 basis points in the subsequent year. We determine that the performance differential between advertising and nonadvertising funds is largest when investment opportunities are high and persists for 36 months. Generally, the positive relation between advertising expenditures and future fund flows is not sensitive to the content of the advertisements and is strongest when investor attention is high.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

Changes to mutual fund risk: Intentional or mean reverting?

An empirical issue is whether a mutual fund’s change in intertemporal risk is intentional or arises from risk mean reversion. Our methodology uses actual fund trades to identify funds that actively change risk. Funds that are statistically identified as trading to change return variance or tracking error variance do not exhibit risk mean reversion. Mostly, funds trade to reduce risk and, in particular, tracking error variance. This is most evident for funds that previously attained a low tracking error variance. We find no evidence of a relation between past performance and intended changes to return variance or tracking error variance.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

Do liquidity and idiosyncratic risk matter? Evidence from the European mutual fund market

This paper examines the interaction of idiosyncratic risk, liquidity and return across time in determining fund performance, as well as across investment style portfolios of European mutual funds. This study utilizes a unique data set including returns for equity mutual funds registered in six European countries. Overall, using monthly data, we find that both liquidity and idiosyncratic risk are relevant in determining mutual fund returns. Our results are robust across different model specifications. We show that model specifications up to six factors are useful as these risk factors capture different aspects in the cross-section of mutual funds returns. The evidence regarding mutual funds subgroups is strongly in favor of the significance of liquidity, and idiosyncratic risk to a lesser extent, as risk factors. Even if liquidity and idiosyncratic risk are considered at the same time, one factor is not significantly decreasing the importance of the other factor.     

Actively managed mutual funds holding passive investments: What do ETF positions tell us about mutual fund ability?

We provide the first in-depth examination of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) within actively managed mutual fund (AMMF) portfolios to better understand why AMMFs make substantial investments in passive ETFs. We examine the association between holding ETF positions and AMMF performance, as well as indirect measures of performance, including market timing, flow management, and cash holdings. We find that over one-third of AMMFs take an ETF position between 2004 and 2015. Our results indicate that AMMFs allocating large portions of their portfolio to ETFs perform worse, by between 0.41% and 1.63% annually using various performance measures. These AMMFs also exhibit worse market timing and hold more cash. In contrast, AMMFs that hold ETFs in small amounts have similar characteristics to non-user AMMFs. Therefore, the act of holding an ETF does not signal inferior ability, however, taking large ETF positions does.     

In which financial markets do mutual fund theorems hold true?

The mutual fund theorem (MFT) is considered in a general semimartingale financial market S with a finite time horizon T, where agents maximize expected utility of terminal wealth. The main results are:

Does corporate social responsibility affect mutual fund performance and flows?

We use an asset-weighted composite corporate social responsibility (CSR) fund score to study the effects of CSR on fund performance and flows. Compared to low-CSR funds, high-CSR funds display poorer performance, stronger performance persistence, a weaker performance-flow relationship, and comparable persistence in flows. These findings are consistent with investors in high-CSR funds deriving utility from non-performance attributes.     

Do machines beat humans? Evidence from mutual fund performance persistence

We study the performance persistence of quantitative actively managed US equity funds. We show that the persistence of quantitative funds originates from poor performers and that there are reversals at the top of the performance scale, which is no different from the widely accepted evidence in the mutual fund literature. When testing for differences in performance persistence between quantitative and non–quantitative funds, we find no differences for poorly performing funds, but we observe significantly more reversals for quantitative funds at the top of the performance distribution. We also find that the differences in performance persistence are not explained by differences in flow–induced incentives to generate alpha, as there is no heterogeneity in investors preferences when allocating capital to these funds. Overall our results are consistent with machines having less skill than their human counterparts.     

What style-timing skills do mutual fund “stars” possess?

Recent studies suggest that certain growth-oriented fund managers have substantial skill but do not stipulate the particular skills that they possess. We examine in detail the style-timing abilities of growth-oriented equity mutual funds over the period from 1993 to 2006. We find that an important contributor to the persistent abnormal returns is growth timing, i.e., switching stocks along the value/growth continuum, and that this explains at least 45% of the abnormal returns reported. No other style-timing skills are observed. Our results also demonstrate that it is easy to misidentify growth timing as market timing.     

Endogeneity in the mutual fund flow–performance relationship: An instrumental variables solution

We use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to examine the effects of dynamic endogeneity when estimating the relationship between mutual fund flows and performance. Unlike the one-stage estimation approach commonly used in prior research, the IV approach allows us to address reverse causality between flow and performance. Through rigorous exclusion tests, we conclude that fund media coverage, risk ranking, and management structure win in a horse race as exogenous instruments for fund flow, while the fund turnover ratio and institutional share perform best as instruments for fund performance. We then demonstrate that endogeneity bias leads to inaccurate inferences in one-stage estimates, as evidenced by the reversals of the signs of flow and performance coefficient estimates when we switch to the IV approach. We find that careful attention to model specification allows us to resolve several widespread inconsistencies in the literature that were likely driven by model misspecification.     

Corporate restructuring in Japan: Who monitors the monitor?

Peek and Rosengren [Peek, J., Rosengren, E., 2005. Unnatural selection: Perverse incentives and the misallocation of credit in Japan. American Economic Review 95, 1144–1166] showed that, when the bubble economy era ended, regulatory forbearance and perverse incentives allowed Japanese banks to engage extensively in evergreening. This is the first comprehensive study to empirically analyze the economics of private debt restructurings of financially distressed companies in Japan, where the corporate monitoring mechanism is not market based but large-stakeholder based – typically, banks and affiliated companies. These stakeholders are expected to efficiently resolve potential bankruptcy or collapse with better information resulting from long-term relationships with the distressed firms. Our study, however, finds that private restructurings led by them failed because of delays in implementing fundamental solutions. Forbearance in addressing the needs of distressed firms demonstrates the weakness of such stakeholders in instituting discipline, hence the need for a system to “monitor the monitor”.     

Who Gambles in the Stock Market?

This study shows that the propensity to gamble and investment decisions are correlated. At the aggregate level, individual investors prefer stocks with lottery features, and like lottery demand, the demand for lottery-type stocks increases during economic downturns. In the cross-section, socioeconomic factors that induce greater expenditure in lotteries are associated with greater investment in lottery-type stocks. Further, lottery investment levels are higher in regions with favorable lottery environments. Because lottery-type stocks underperform, gambling-related underperformance is greater among low-income investors who excessively overweight lottery-type stocks. These results indicate that state lotteries and lottery-type stocks attract very similar socioeconomic clienteles.     

Who benefits in a crisis? Evidence from hedge fund stock and option holdings

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.     

Does mutual fund ownership affect financial reporting quality for Chinese privately-owned enterprises?

This paper examines the role of mutual funds in enhancing financial reporting quality in China. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors. Therefore, they are expected to be more effective at preventing executives from expropriating investors and manipulating earnings as a cover-up, which in turn would reduce the incidence of modified audit opinions (MAOs). Our results, based on the Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2008, confirm this prediction. More importantly, the effects of mutual fund ownership in reducing the incidence of MAOs are greater among privately owned enterprises (POEs), and especially those with higher growth. This is because POEs rely more heavily on the capital market for financing than do state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and because growth opportunities need to be funded by additional external capital. This finding implies that mutual funds form an important part of the external governance mechanism in emerging countries, but this effect is moderated by state control and ownership.