Islamic versus conventional banks in the GCC countries: A comparative study using classification techniques

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on Islamic finance by investigating the feature of Islamic and conventional banks in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries over the period 2003–2010. We use parametric and non-parametric classification models (Linear discriminant analysis, Logistic regression, Tree of classification and Neural network) to examine whether financial ratios can be used to distinguish between Islamic and conventional banks. Univariate results show that Islamic banks are, on average, more profitable, more liquid, better capitalized, and have lower credit risk than conventional banks. We also find that Islamic banks are, on average, less involved in off-balance sheet activities and have more operating leverage than their conventional peers. Results from classification models show that the two types of banks may be differentiated in terms of credit and insolvency risk, operating leverage and off-balance sheet activities, but not in terms of profitability and liquidity. More interestingly, we find that the recent global financial crisis has a negative impact on the profitability for both Islamic and conventional banks, but time shifted. Finally, results show that Logit regression obtained slightly higher classification accuracies than other models.     

Islamic and conventional banks' soundness during the 2007–2008 financial crisis

The recent global financial crisis has induced a series of failure of many conventional banks and led to an increased interest in the Islamic banking business model. This paper attempts to answer empirically the following question: What was the effect of the 2007–2008 financial crisis on the soundness of Islamic banks and their conventional peers? Using the Z-score as an indicator of bank stability, our regression analysis (covering a matched sample of 34 Islamic Banks (IBs) and 34 conventional banks (CBs) from 16 countries) shows that there is no significant difference in terms of the effect of the financial crisis on the soundness of IBs and CBs. This finding reveals that IBs are diverging from their theoretical business model which would have allowed them to keep the same level of soundness even during the crisis.     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Efficiency in Islamic vs. conventional banking: The role of capital and liquidity

We show that higher capital and liquidity ratios increase the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks. Using conditional quantile regressions, we further show that the effect is stronger for highly efficient, small, highly liquid, and highly capitalized conventional banks. We also find that more capitalized and liquid banks were efficient during the 2008/2009 financial crisis and the Arab Spring. Our findings support the view that the constraints imposed by Shari'a law may widen the efficiency gap between the two bank types, at the expense of Islamic banks. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the efficiency of conventional banks not only depends on bank capital and liquidity, but also on the level of bank efficiency while the relationship is inconclusive for Islamic banks. These findings provide insight into how capital and liquidity can shape bank efficiency. They suggest that higher capital and liquidity buffers serve a constraint on policymakers and may function very differently depending on the level of bank efficiency.     

Bank-level stability factors and consumer confidence – A comparative study of Islamic and conventional banks’ product mix

This study examines the behaviour of key bank-level stability factors of liquidity, capital, risk-taking and consumer confidence in Islamic and conventional banks that operate in the same market. Using fixed effect for a sample of 194 banks of Gulf Cooperation Countries between 2000 and 2007, we found that liquidity is not determined by the bank's product mix but rather attributed to systematic factors. However, non-performing assets (representing loans to sub-prime borrowers) have a positive and significant relationship with liquidity, implying that during the crisis Islamic banks tend to take stringent risk strategies compared to conventional banks. Furthermore, Islamic banks generally tend to provide higher consumer confidence levels as they were more capitalized than conventional banks, although conventional banks had carried higher averages of liquidity compared to Islamic banks. Consumer confidence levels or depositors’ discipline as proxied by deposits and customer funding over liabilities generally appear to be higher in Islamic banks than conventional banks.     

Stakeholder Returns of Islamic Banks Versus Conventional Banks

Sharia principle shaping the Islamic banking model is most determinant on collection and deployment of funds with its ban on interest. This study aims to look at the results of funded activities in isolation for a healthier comparison between Islamic and conventional deposit banks with respect to their financial stakeholders. The differences are reflected as lower asset returns and lower returns for depositors of Islamic banks. These differences sustain throughout normal and crisis periods. Our findings show that despite differences in asset structures and returns, Islamic banks retain similar returns for shareholders to position themselves close to and in competition with their conventional counterparts.     

Competition and risk‐taking in investment banking

How does competition affect the investment banking business and the risks individual institutions are exposed to? Using a large sample of investment banks operating in seven developed economies over 1997–2014, we apply a panel VAR model to examine the relationships between competition and risk without assuming any a priori restrictions. Our main finding is that investment banks’ higher risk exposure, measured as a long‐term capital‐at‐risk and return volatility, was facilitated by greater competitive pressures for both boutique investment banks and full‐service investment banks. Overall, we find some evidence that more competition leads to more fragility before and during the recent financial crisis.     

Ownership structure,risk and performance in the European banking industry

We compare the performance and risk of a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European countries over the 1999–2004 period and evaluate the impact of alternative ownership models, together with the degree of ownership concentration, on their profitability, cost efficiency and risk. Three main results emerge. First, after controlling for bank characteristics, country and time effects, mutual banks and government-owned banks exhibit a lower profitability than privately owned banks, in spite of their lower costs. Second, public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than other types of banks while mutual banks have better loan quality and lower asset risk than both private and public sector banks. Finally, while ownership concentration does not significantly affect a bank’s profitability, a higher ownership concentration is associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk. These differences, along with differences in asset composition and funding mix, indicate a different financial intermediation model for the different ownership forms.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

Islamic and Conventional Equity Market Movements During and After the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Newly Launched MSCI Indices

This paper examines the relationship between the Islamic and conventional equity indices by employing the newly launched MSCI Global Islamic Indices which began in 2008. We argue for the case of cointegration supported by fundamental, category and habitat theories, and against cointegration due to the fundamental difference between Islamic and conventional stocks in terms of debt ratio, accounts receivable and interest bearing securities. We find Islamic and conventional equity markets move together despite fundamental differences and given that market microstructure, dividends, capital gains, taxation and governance systems are different across the markets. Almost simultaneous movement of the permanent and cycle components of Islamic and mainstream equity indices has been supported by the application of the Beveridge Nelson (BN) time series decomposition technique. Theoretically, the volatility of Islamic equities should be lower due to their low leverage ratio. Surprisingly, permanent parts of the Islamic indices appear to be more volatile during the crisis period and less volatile during the post‐crisis period.     

Time series analysis of financial stability of banks: Evidence from Saudi Arabia

Islamic banks are characterized by their compliance to Islamic laws and practices, primarily the prohibition of interest and the trading of loans. During the 2008–2009 financial crisis, when a large number of conventional banks announced bankruptcy, no Islamic bank failures were reported. However, there is no clear consensus in the literature on the question of whether Islamic banks are more or less stable than conventional banks. To shed some light on this issue, we studied a sample of Saudi banks using quarterly data over a period centered on the 2008 financial crisis. Careful analysis of the data suggested first of all that many of the variables typically used in financial stability studies may be non-stationary, a methodological point largely ignored in the literature. Using time series methods suitable for this type of data, we concluded that individual heterogeneity may matter more than either the conventional or Islamic nature of the banks. Concentrating on the largest banks, we find the Islamic banks contribute positively to the stability of the system.     

Governance and bank characteristics in the credit and sovereign debt crises – the impact of CEO power

The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. A common question is whether the recent experience with the credit crisis has helped in dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. We study more specifically whether banks with powerful CEOs perform better or worse than other banks, and if there is any difference in this relationship between the two crises. Using unique hand-collected data for 378 large global banks, we find that CEO power has a significant positive relation to bank profitability and asset quality, but also to insolvency risk, during the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, strong CEOs do not appear to be detrimental to bank performance. Our results also support the idea that deposit insurance may have contributed to the credit crisis.     

Bank ownership reform and bank performance in China

Using a panel of Chinese banks over the 1997–2004 period, we assess the effect of bank ownership on performance. Specifically, we conduct a joint analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of (domestic) private, foreign and state ownership. We find that the “Big Four” state-owned commercial banks are less profitable, are less efficient, and have worse asset quality than other types of banks except the “policy” banks (static effect). Further, the banks undergoing a foreign acquisition or public listing record better pre-event performance (selection effect); however, we find little performance change in either the short or the long term.     

Unintended consequences of the increased asset threshold for FDICIA internal controls: Evidence from U.S. private banks

We examine the unintended consequences of the 2005 increase from $500 million to $1 billion in the asset threshold for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) internal control reporting requirements. We focus on a test sample of banks that increased their total assets from between $100 million and $500 million prior to the change in regulation to between $500 million and $1 billion within two years following the change. These “affected” banks are no longer subject to the internal control requirements but would have been had the regulation not been changed. We hypothesize that these affected banks are likely to make riskier loans, which will increase the likelihood of failure during the crisis period. We find evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Affected banks have higher likelihood of failure during the crisis period than banks from two different control samples. We also find that auditor reputation (i.e., whether the bank is audited by a Big 4 auditor or an industry specialist auditor) has a moderating effect on the likelihood of failure for these affected banks.     

Banking efficiency in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: A comparative study

We measure cost and profit efficiencies of banks operating in six GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) using heteroskedastic stochastic frontier (HSF) models. Our results show that measures of cost and profit efficiencies of banks vary widely across the six gulf countries over the same period. We examine whether cost and profit efficiencies of Islamic banks are significantly different from that of conventional banks. After allowing for bank risk, asset quality, environmental influences such as the level of interest rate, and country effect, we find that cost and profit efficiencies of Islamic banks are similar to that of conventional banks. Our results suggest that the country-specific variables have significant impact on cost and profit efficiencies of banks operating in GCC countries. Our findings indicate that cost and profit efficiencies of Islamic banks are more volatile than that of conventional banks.     

Hyperbolic distance function,technical efficiency and stability to shocks: A comparison between Islamic banks and conventional banks in MENA region

In this paper, we compare banking performance and resiliency between Islamic banks and conventional banks in MENA region over the period 2002–2014. Stochastic hyperbolic and radial output distance functions are employed to evaluate banking performances. Furthermore, hyperbolic distance function methodology is extended to evaluate bank's business risk through simulations. Historical extreme observed situations in terms of profit loss from the industry are used in order to simulate their impact on the overall profit distribution within the industry. More precisely, we compare the observed profit and the simulated one followed by an abrupt fall in bank lending and non-lending activities. Results find evidence of technical efficiency differences with bank type, some evidence with bank size. It is found that conventional banks are much more vulnerable to an important drop on their lending activities than non-lending activities, while Islamic banks are equally vulnerable to any drop of the activity. Furthermore, Islamic banks are found to be less vulnerable than their counterparts when they are exposed to shocks on their lending activities. Very large banks are much more resilient than small banks whatever is the bank stream. It is also found that bank vulnerability is more important when the banks are not able to adjust their costs in the short run, and increases with the exposure to higher shocks in magnitude.     

Contagion risk in the Australian banking and property sectors

The Australian banking system emerged from the global crisis virtually unhurt, with most banks still profitable, adequately capitalized, and with AA credit ratings. Are there any risks or vulnerabilities in this success story? This paper analyzes Australia’s systemic banking risk and attempts to determine if this risk increased with the recent global crisis and whether this risk is related to the downturn experienced in the real estate market. We use extreme value theory to measure banks’ and property firms’ univariate Value at Risk, as well as multivariate intra-sector and inter-sector contagion risks. Of the 13 sectors analyzed, we find that the property sector exhibits the highest level of extremal dependence with the banking sector. The credit crisis significantly increased the probability of a bank or property firm crashing. Moreover, contagion risks significantly increased not only within the banking and property sectors, but also between those sectors.     

Religiosity and bank earnings management: Revisiting international evidence

The modernization theory forecasts a sharp declining effect of institutionalized religion on human behavior owing to the extensive economic development. However, this prediction is rejected and proved that religious values and beliefs have a pervasive influence on individual conduct. Based on this salient evidence, we examine the influence of religious social norms on bank earnings management behavior with regard to ongoing economic development. We use 20,715 bank-year observations from 1318 listed banks of eight geographical regions. We, further, employ an updated dataset of 2007–2021 to resemble the economic prosperity time period. Our study discards the prediction of the modernization theory and reveals that banks located in countries with high religiosity are less likely to manage their reported earnings. While comparing conventional banks with Islamic ones, conventional banks are found to be less prone to the earnings management practice than that of their Islamic counterparts. We also find religiosity to have a greater magnitude of effect on the accounting manipulation in the crisis period than in the post-crisis one. The cross-regional differences in religious values bring differential effects on this unethical practice. Our results are robust with the alternative measures of earnings management and alternative model specifications.     

Safety-net benefits conferred on difficult-to-fail-and-unwind banks in the US and EU before and during the great recession

This paper investigates the links between regulatory arbitrage, financial instability, and taxpayer loss exposures. We model and estimate ex ante safety-net benefits from increased leverage and asset volatility at a sample of large banks in US and Europe during 2003–2008. Hypothesis tests indicate that, in both crisis and precrisis years, difficult-to-fail-and-unwind (DFU) banks enjoyed substantially higher ex ante benefits than other institutions. Compared to the US sample, safety-net benefits prove significantly larger for DFU firms in Europe and bailout decisions are less driven by asset size. Introducing a proxy for differences in government susceptibility to regulatory capture helps to explain bailout decisions in Europe. Our findings suggest that authorities in both venues could better contain safety-net benefits if they refocused their information systems on monitoring volatility as well as capital.     

Shari’ah supervision,corporate governance and performance: Conventional vs. Islamic banks

The performance and accountability of boards of directors and effectiveness of governance mechanisms continue to be a matter of concern. Focusing on differences between conventional banks and Islamic banks, we examine the effect of (i) Shari’ah supervision boards, (ii) board structure and (iii) CEO-power on performance during the period 2005–2011. We find Shari’ah supervision boards positively impact on Islamic banks’ performance when they perform a supervisory role, but the impact is negligible when they have only an advisory role. The effect of board structure (board size and board independence) and CEO power (CEO-chair duality and internally recruited CEO) on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative. Our findings provide support for the positive contribution of Shari’ah supervision boards but also emphasize the need for enforcement and regulatory mechanism for them to be more effective.