Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Crises

This article develops an index of money market pressure to identify banking crises. We define banking crises as periods in which there is excessive demand for liquidity in the money market. We begin with the theoretical foundation of this new method. With the newly defined crisis episodes, we examine the determinants of banking crises using data complied from 47 countries. We find that slowdown of real GDP, lower real interest rates, extremely high inflation, large fiscal deficits, and over-valued exchange rates tend to precede banking crises. The effects of monetary base growth on the probability of banking crises are negligible.     

Costs of financial instability, household-sector balance sheets and consumption

Extant work on costs of financial instability focuses on fiscal costs and declines in aggregate GDP following banking crises. We estimate effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 19 OECD countries, showing consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis, and effects are not captured solely by the impact of crises on standard consumption determinants, income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising leverage, despite financial liberalisation easing liquidity constraints. High leverage implies that banking crises taking place now could have greater incidence than in the past.     

Banking crises and market discipline: International evidence

This paper analyzes the effect of banking crises on market discipline in an international sample of banks. We also evaluate how bank regulation, supervision, institutions, and crisis intervention policies shape the effect of banking crises on market discipline. We control for unobservable bank, country, and time specific effects using a panel data set of banks from 66 countries around 79 banking crises. The results suggest that on average market discipline weakens after a banking crisis. This weakening is higher in countries where bank regulation, supervision, and institutions promoted market discipline before the banking crisis, and where a more accommodative approach is adopted to resolve it.     

Macroeconomic adjustment and the history of crises in open economies

This paper investigates the impact of the history of crises on macroeconomic performance. We first study the impact of past banking crises on the probability of a future banking crisis. We do not detect a learning process from past banking crises. Countries that have already experienced one banking crisis generally have a higher likelihood of experiencing another crisis; and the depth of the crisis does not appear to be affected by the previous historical experience with crisis events. Evidence also suggests that, in middle-income countries, higher de jure capital account openness is associated with lower likelihood of a banking crisis, a lower ratio of non-performing loans during the crisis, and higher levels of forgone output in the crisis' aftermath. In contrast, we find that past crisis experience has a significant impact on savings. When facing considerable political risk, the past does seem to matter – countries with more people who were exposed, over their lifetime, to larger disasters will tend to save more. This association, however, does not hold for countries with more stable political systems.     

Banking crises and government intervention

Intervention has taken different forms in different countries and periods of time. Moreover, recent episodes showed that in front of an imminent crisis, the promise of no interventions made by governments is barely credible. In this paper we address the problem of resolving banking crises from the government perspective, taking into account the fact that preventing banking crises is crucial for the government. In addition, we introduce the moral hazard problem, inherent in the banking system, and consider the interaction between regulation, policy measures and banks’ behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that compares different policy plans to resolve banking crises in an environment where insufficiently capitalized banks have incentives to take risk, and the government has to decide whether to provide public services or impede crises. We show that when individuals highly value public services then the best policy in terms of welfare is to apply the tax on early withdrawals, as the government can transfer those taxes to the whole population by investing in public services (although at some cost). Conversely, when individuals assign a low value to consuming public services, recapitalization is the dominant policy. Finally, when the probability of a crisis is sufficiently high, capital requirements should be used.     

宏观审慎政策协调能否抑制国际性银行危机传染？——基于跨境金融关联视角的实证研究

本文基于跨境金融关联视角对宏观审慎政策能否抑制国际性银行危机传染这一重要的理论与实践问题进行了实证研究。选取亚洲金融危机和全球金融危机时期遭受冲击的10个代表性国家作为样本,构建Logit模型和多元回归模型探讨本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策对本国系统性银行危机传染的影响。研究表明,具有金融关联的国家出现金融危机会显著增加本国系统性银行危机的发生概率,具有金融关联的国家实施宏观审慎政策对本国信贷的影响比对房价的影响更明显,本国及具有金融关联的国家协调实施宏观审慎政策会显著降低本国系统性银行危机的发生概率。在调整银行危机指标及考虑贸易关联和流动性风险的影响后,研究结果依然保持稳健。本文的研究结论揭示了加强宏观审慎政策协调有助于维护全球金融稳定,对于中国政策当局强化宏观审慎管理具有极其重要的政策含义。     

Contagion and banking crisis – International evidence for 2007–2009

Policy makers aim to avoid banking crises, and although they can to some extent control domestic conditions, internationally transmitted crises are difficult to tackle. This paper identifies international contagion in banking during the 2007–2009 crisis for 54 economies. We identify three channels of contagion – systematic, idiosyncratic and volatility – and find evidence for these in 45 countries. Banking crises are overwhelmingly associated with the presence of both systematic and idiosyncratic contagion. The results reveal that crisis shocks transmitted from a foreign jurisdiction via idiosyncratic contagion increase the likelihood of a systemic crisis in the domestic banking system by almost 37 percent, whereas increased exposure via systematic contagion does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking system. Thus while policy makers and regulatory authorities are rightly concerned with the systematic transmission of banking crises, reducing the potential for idiosyncratic contagion can importantly reduce the consequences for the domestic economy.     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

Fiscal sustainability in the presence of systemic banks: the case of EU countries

We provide a first attempt to include an off-balance sheet, implicit insurance to SIFIs into a consistent assessment of fiscal sustainability, for 27 countries of the European Union. We first calculate tax gaps à la Blanchard (OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No 79, 1990) and Blanchard et al. (Revue économique de l’OCDE, 1990). We then introduce two alternative measures of implicit off-balance sheet liabilities related to the risk of a systemic bank crisis. The first one relies on microeconomic data at the bank level. The second one is based on econometric estimations of the probability and the cost of a systemic banking crisis. The former approach provides an upper evaluation of the fiscal cost of systemic banking crises, whereas the latter one provides a lower one. Hence, we believe that the combined use of these two methodologies helps to gauge the range of fiscal risk.     

Macroeconomic imbalances,financial stress and fiscal vulnerability in the euro area before the debt crises: A market view

This paper tries to identify the macro-financial imbalances that exposed the euro area countries to fiscal stress before the outbreak of the European debt crises. Contrary to conventional wisdom that interprets fiscal stress in terms of fiscal sustainability, we focus on short-term fiscal vulnerability as reflected by the conditions of debt refinancing in the sovereign bond markets. We find that market-based indicators capturing risk perceptions of sovereign debts have been influenced by the indicators defined in the European Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) and by variables of financial vulnerability. When pricing the risk of sovereign bonds, the holders of government debts take into account not only the macroeconomic imbalances but also factors such as banking distress, corporate bond risk, liquidity risks in the interbank market or the volatility of stock prices.     

新冠肺炎疫情冲击下主要国家财政状况比较

疫情发生之前,多个国家的财政状况就已经暴露出各种问题.而疫情的冲击更是导致各国财政状况明显恶化.研究发现,财政状况与国家的经济实力及赤字和债务偏好密切相关,平时严守财经纪律可以为危机预留更多的政策空间.因此建议在风险更为多发的背景下,财政政策在正常情况下应该更为审慎,在危机期间更为积极,有必要提高中央政府的统筹能力,以及赋予财政收支更多的弹性.     

Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

The real effect of banking crises: Finance or asset allocation effects? Some international evidence

This paper analyzes whether the decline in economic growth that follows a banking crisis occurs because of a reduction in the amount of credit available (finance effect) or a worsening in the allocation of investable resources (asset allocation effect). We use a sample of more than 2500 industrial firms in 18 developed and developing countries that experienced 19 systemic banking crises between 1989 and 2007. The results indicate that banking crises negatively affect firms’ intangible investments, which intensifies the economic downturn. The negative growth effect produced by the worsening of the investment allocation is stronger in countries with highly developed financial systems and institutions.     

How do bank competition,regulation, and institutions shape the real effect of banking crises? International evidence

This paper studies the influence of bank competition on the real effect of 36 systemic banking crises in 30 countries over the 1980–2000 period and how this influence varies across countries depending on bank regulation and institutions. We find that bank market power is not on average useful for mitigating the negative real effect of a systemic banking crisis. Market power promotes higher growth during normal times in industries that are more dependent on external finance but induces a bigger reduction in growth during systemic banking crises. We also find a country-specific effect depending on bank regulation and institutions. Stringent capital requirements and poor protection of creditor rights increase the benefits of bank market power for mitigating the negative real effect of a systemic banking crisis because bank market power has a positive effect on economic growth during both crisis and non-crisis periods in these environments.     

Government finance in the wake of currency crises

We address three questions: (i) Can classical models be reconciled with the fact that many crises are marked by high rates of depreciation and small increases in seignorage revenue? (ii) What are the implications of different financing methods for post-crisis rates of inflation and depreciation? (iii) How do governments pay for the fiscal costs associated with currency crises? To study these questions we use a general equilibrium model in which prospective government deficits trigger a currency crisis. We then use our model in conjunction with fiscal data to interpret government financing in the wake of three recent currency crises: Korea (1997), Mexico (1994) and Turkey (2001).     

The dialectical role of information and disinformation in regulation-induced banking crises

The severity of banking crises increases with disinformation about the losses banks incur in making politically directed loans and about the budgetary costs to the government of standing ready to absorb these losses increases. When (as it eventually must) such disinformation begins to lose credibility, silent runs test the government's commitment to supporting its insolvent banks. An open banking crisis does not emerge until the size of unbooked obligations has become large enough to overwhelm the government's implicit and explicit support system. Multilateral assistance offered countries that experience banking crises should transmit incentives for prompt insolvency resolution, for reliable information disclosure, and for developing plans for dealing with future financial disasters.     

Investment and bank credit recovery after banking crises

In this paper, we aim to investigate (a) the dynamic adjustment of investment-to-GDP ratio and bank credit-to-GDP ratio following banking crisis episodes; (b) whether the adjustment of investment and bank credit ratios varies with several country and crisis characteristics. Based on a sample of 79 developed and emerging countries over the 1973–2010 period, our results suggest that in the aftermath of banking crises, investment ratio declines but swiftly recovers to its pre-crisis level within two to three years. Bank credit declines significantly and remains stagnated even in the medium run. In terms of country characteristics, we find that investment and bank credit ratios decline significantly more in advanced countries and countries with higher level of capital openness. In addition, investment ratio declines significantly more in countries with higher level of financial development. Finally, we split the banking crises episodes into two categories: those preceded by a domestic credit boom or a surge in net capital inflows, and those that were not preceded by such booms. We find that dynamic adjustment of investment and bank credit ratios differs substantially across the two groups. Existence of a credit boom or a surge in capital inflow in the run-up to the crisis intensifies the length and depth of the decline in investment and bank credit ratios. In fact, we find no statistically significant decline in investment following banking crises that were not preceded by a credit boom or a surge in capital inflows. These results imply that deleveraging is costly to the economy.     

The role of household and business credit in banking crises

Private credit expansions are an important predictor of subsequent banking crises. We revisit that result with a new dataset from developed and developing countries that decomposes private credit into household credit and enterprise credit. We argue that household credit growth raises debt levels without much effect on long-term income. Rapid household credit expansions generate vulnerabilities that can precipitate a banking crisis. Enterprise credit expansions can have the same effects but it is tempered by the associated increase in income. Our estimates show that household credit expansions have been a statistically and economically significant predictor of banking crises. Enterprise credit expansions are also associated with banking crises but their effect is weaker and less robust.     

Exchange Rate Crises and Fiscal Solvency

This paper combines insights from generation one currency crisis models and the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) to create a dynamic FTPL model of currency crises. The initial fixed‐exchange‐rate policy entails risks due to an upper bound on government debt and stochastic surplus shocks. Agents refuse to lend into a position for which the value of debt exceeds the present value of expected future surpluses. Policy switching, usually combined with currency depreciation, restores fiscal solvency and lending. This model can explain a wide variety of crises, including those involving sovereign default. We illustrate by explaining the crisis in Argentina (2001).     

How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline

This paper analyzes in an international sample of banks from 104 countries if the sensitivity of the cost of deposits to bank risk varies across banks depending on their systemic and absolute size. We analyze a period before the 2007 financial crisis and control for endogeneity of bank size, intervention policies in past banking crises, and soundness of countries’ public finances. Our results are consistent with the predominance of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, although this effect is stronger in countries that did not impose losses on depositors in past banking crises and in countries with sounder public finances.