Managerial incentives and risk-taking

We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta.     

Bank Risk Taking at the Onset of the Current Banking Crisis

We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period leading to the current banking crisis. Using a sample of large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we find that BHCs with greater managerial control, achieved through various corporate governance mechanisms, take less risk. BHCs that pay CEOs high base salaries also take less risk, while BHCs that grant CEOs more in stock options or that pay CEOs higher bonuses take more risk. The evidence is generally consistent with BHC managers exhibiting greater risk aversion than outside shareholders, but with several factors affecting managers’ risk‐taking incentives.     

Ceo Compensation And The Transformation Of Banking

We examine the compensation strategies of commercial bank holding companies (BHCs) during 1992–2000. In particular, we analyze whether CEO compensation is more closely tied to the presence of growth options and to risk than is revealed in earlier research. We also examine whether BHC entry into investment banking has influenced compensation policies. Our evidence shows a stronger link between growth options and CEO compensation in the 1990s than observed in earlier studies and that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities are substantially larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. We also find that BHC leverage and variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Finally, we find some evidence supporting the hypothesis that pay‐for‐performance sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases, as agency theory predicts.     

Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.     

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

We analyze how the structure of executive compensation affects the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a sample of acquiring U.S. banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that CEOs with higher pay-risk sensitivity engage in risk-inducing mergers. Our findings are driven by two types of acquisitions: acquisitions completed during the last decade (after bank deregulation had expanded banks' risk-taking opportunities) and acquisitions completed by the largest banks in our sample (where shareholders benefit from ‘too big to fail’ support by regulators and gain most from shifting risk to other stakeholders). Our results control for CEO pay-performance sensitivity and offer evidence consistent with a causal link between financial stability and the risk-taking incentives embedded in the executive compensation contracts at banks.     

How do auditors perceive CEO's risk‐taking incentives?

Prior literature documents that executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives’ portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock‐return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that auditors charge higher audit fees when standard audit procedures do not allow auditors to reduce audit risk including the risk arising from higher business risk. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and audit fees. We also find a negative relation between CEO portfolio deltas and the issuance of going‐concern audit opinions (GCO).     

Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt

Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that short‐maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short‐maturity debt. We also find that short‐maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega‐ and delta‐related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short‐term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.     

Heterogeneity in the Effect of Managerial Equity Incentives on Firm Value

We document significant heterogeneity in the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives and firm value using quantile regression. We show that CEO delta is more effective in the presence of ample investment opportunities, while CEO vega is more beneficial for firms lacking investment opportunities. Further, Tobin's Q increases in CEO delta for more risk‐tolerant firms but increases in CEO vega for more risk‐averse firms. We also observe that higher monitoring intensity after the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act reduces CEO delta's role in compensation. Risk aversion alters the optimal incentive‐value relation, and the nature of this relation also depends on the level of Tobin's Q.     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

The Roles of Corporate Governance in Bank Failures during the Recent Financial Crisis

We analyze the roles of bank ownership, management, and compensation structures in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Our results suggest that failures are strongly influenced by ownership structure: high shareholdings of lower‐level management and non‐chief executive officer (non‐CEO) higher‐level management increase failure risk significantly. In contrast, shareholdings of banks’ CEOs do not have a direct impact on bank failure. These findings suggest that high stakes in the bank induce non‐CEO managers to take high risks due to moral hazard incentives, which may result in bank failure. We identify tail risk in noninterest income as a primary risk‐taking channel of lower‐level managers.     

The impact of bank merger growth on CEO compensation

We examine the impact of bank mergers on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation during the period 1992–2014, a period characterised by significant banking consolidation. We show that CEO compensation is positively related to both merger growth and non‐merger internal growth, with the former relationship being higher in magnitude. While CEO pay–risk sensitivity is not significantly related to merger growth, CEO pay–performance sensitivity is negatively and significantly related to merger growth. Collectively, our results suggest that, through bank mergers, CEOs can earn higher compensation and decouple personal wealth from bank performance. Furthermore, we document a more severe agency problem in CEO compensation as a consequence of bank mergers relative to mergers in industrial firms. Finally, we find that the post‐financial crisis regulatory reform of executive compensation in banks has limited effectiveness in curbing the merger–pay links.     

CEO incentives and the cost of debt

Motivated by concerns that stock-based compensation might lead to excessive risk-taking, this paper’s main purpose is to examine the relations between CEO incentives and the cost of debt. Unlike prior research, this paper uses the sensitivities of CEO stock and option portfolios to stock price (delta) and stock return volatility (vega) to measure CEO incentives to invest in risky projects. Higher delta (vega) is predicted to be related to lower (higher) cost of debt. The results show that yield spreads on new debt issues are lower for firms with higher CEO delta and are unrelated to CEO vega. The results also show that yield spreads are higher for firms whose CEOs hold more shares and stock options. In sum, the results suggest that both percentage-ownership and option sensitivity variables are important in understanding relations between CEO incentives and the cost of debt.     

U.S. Banking Sector Operational Losses and the Macroeconomic Environment

Using supervisory data from large U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs), we find that BHCs incur more operational losses in adverse macroeconomic conditions driven significantly by the higher frequency and severity of tail events. Among different operational risk types, we find that losses from BHCs' failure to meet obligations to clients or from the design of their products are particularly countercyclical. We also show that larger and more leveraged BHCs have a higher macroeconomic sensitivity of operational risk. Overall, our findings provide new evidence regarding U.S. banking organizations' exposure to macroeconomic shocks with implications for risk management practices and supervisory policy.     

What explains the lack of monetary policy influence on bank holding companies?

In this paper, we investigate how monetary policy innovations affect the equity returns of bank holding companies (BHCs). We also examine bank characteristics to determine what explains the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the returns' sensitivity. Similar to non-financial firms, we find that only unanticipated components affect bank equity returns; however, this effect is absent in the second half of our sample period. Smaller, less liquid banks have higher sensitivity; a higher ratio of time deposits to total deposits reduces this sensitivity. A higher ratio of non-interest income to total income also reduces this sensitivity, while capital-constrained banks have a higher sensitivity to monetary policy innovations. We argue that a higher dependence on non-interest income and the use of interest rate derivatives together may explain the disappearing influence of monetary policy on these BHCs.     

Institutional ownership stability and BHC performance

In this study, the association between performance of BHCs and institutional ownership stability is investigated and contrasted to those found for the less regulated utility and industrial firms in order to determine whether regulation displaces owner monitoring. We employ a simultaneous equations model treating firm performance and institutional ownership stability as endogenous variables. Several results are obtained. First, BHC performance is positively associated with institutional ownership stability. Second, this association is weaker for BHCs than for comparable utility and industrial firms, possibly because of the substitution of regulation for owner monitoring in banking. Third, this association is stronger in the recent deregulated years and for BHCs with lower likelihood of regulatory intervention.     

How do ‘busy’ and ‘overlap’ directors relate to CEO pay structure and incentives?

We examine how CEO compensation is affected by the presence of busy and overlap directors. We find that CEOs at firms with more busy directors receive greater total pay, fixed salary and equity‐linked pay and exhibit higher pay‐performance (delta) and pay‐risk (vega) sensitivities. Our results also suggest that CEOs at firms with more overlap directors take smaller total pay and equity‐linked pay and reveal lower delta and vega. We further show that the impact of busy and overlap directors on CEO pay is more visible for firms with less complexity and low information acquisition cost.     

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

This paper tests the proposition that higher tournament incentives will result in greater risk-taking by senior managers in order to increase their chance of promotion to the rank of CEO. Measuring tournament incentives as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior managers, we find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives. Further, we find that greater tournament incentives lead to higher R&D intensity, firm focus, and leverage, but lower capital expenditures intensity. Our results support the hypothesis that option-like features of intra-organizational CEO promotion tournaments provide incentives to senior executives to increase firm risk by following riskier policies. Finally, the compensation levels and structures of executives of financial institutions have received a great deal of scrutiny after the financial crisis. In a separate examination of financial firms, we again find a significantly positive relation between firm risk and tournament incentives.     

Executive stock options,differential risk-taking incentives,and firm value

The sensitivity of stock options' payoff to return volatility, or vega, provides risk-averse CEOs with an incentive to increase their firms' risk more by increasing systematic rather than idiosyncratic risk. This effect manifests because any increase in the firm's systematic risk can be hedged by a CEO who can trade the market portfolio. Consistent with this prediction, we find that vega gives CEOs incentives to increase their firms' total risk by increasing systematic risk but not idiosyncratic risk. Collectively, our results suggest that stock options might not always encourage managers to pursue projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative.