Funding liquidity and equity liquidity in the subprime crisis period: Evidence from the ETF market

Using index and financial exchange-traded funds (ETFs), this study explores the relation between funding liquidity and equity liquidity during the subprime crisis period. Our empirical results show that a higher degree of funding illiquidity leads to an increase in bid–ask spread and a reduction in both market depth and net buying imbalance. Such findings indicate that an increase in funding liquidity can improve equity liquidity, with a stronger effect for the financial ETFs than for the index ETFs. Our study provides a better overall understanding of the effect of the liquidity–supplier funding constraint during the subprime crisis period.     

Share restrictions and asset pricing: Evidence from the hedge fund industry

This paper presents evidence on the relation between hedge fund returns and restrictions imposed by funds that limit the liquidity of fund investors. The excess returns of funds with lockup restrictions are approximately 4–7% per year higher than those of nonlockup funds. The average alpha of all funds is negative or insignificant after controlling for lockups and other share restrictions. Also, a negative relation is found between share restrictions and the liquidity of the fund's portfolio. This suggests that share restrictions allow funds to efficiently manage illiquid assets, and these benefits are captured by investors as a share illiquidity premium.     

Dynamic debt runs and financial fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP crisis

We use the 2007 asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis as a laboratory to study the determinants of debt runs. Our model features dilution risk: maturing short-term lenders demand higher yields in compensation for being diluted by future lenders, making runs more likely. The model explains the observed tenfold increase in yield spreads leading to runs and the positive relation between yield spreads and future runs. Results from structural estimation show that runs are very sensitive to leverage, asset values, and asset liquidity, but less sensitive to the degree of maturity mismatch, the strength of guarantees, and asset volatility.     

Stock returns’ sensitivities to crisis shocks: Evidence from developed and emerging markets

We consider three “crisis shocks” related to key features of the 2007–2008 crisis, for emerging and developed economies: (1) the collapse of global trade, (2) the contraction of credit supply, and (3) selling pressure on firms’ equity. Using an international cross-section of firms, we find that returns’ sensitivities to these shocks imply large and statistically significant influences on residual equity returns during the crisis period (after controlling for normal risk factors that are associated with expected returns). Similar analysis for several placebo periods shows that these effects are generally less severe or absent in non-crisis periods. Relative to developed economies, emerging markets are more responsive to global trade conditions (in crisis and in placebo periods), but less responsive to selling pressures. An analysis of portfolios of firms during various placebo periods indicates that investors are not compensated for the risks associated with the crisis shocks. Finally, a month-by-month analysis of returns during the crisis period shows that the time variation of the importance of each of the sensitivities to shocks tracks related changes in the global economic environment.     

Hedge funds as liquidity providers: Evidence from the Lehman bankruptcy

Hedge funds using Lehman as prime broker faced a decline in funding liquidity after the September 15, 2008 bankruptcy. We find that stocks held by these Lehman-connected funds experienced greater declines in market liquidity following the bankruptcy than other stocks; the effect was larger for ex ante illiquid stocks and persisted into the beginning of 2009. We find no similar effects surrounding the Bear Stearns failure, suggesting that disruptions surrounding bankruptcy explain the liquidity effects. We conclude that shocks to traders' funding liquidity reduce the market liquidity of the assets that they trade.     

Conditional Properties of Hedge Funds: Evidence from Daily Returns*

Using daily returns on a set of hedge fund indices, we study (i) the properties of the indices' conditional density functions and (ii) the presence of asymmetries in conditional correlations between hedge fund indices and other investments and between hedge fund indices themselves. We use the SNP approach to obtain estimates of conditional densities of hedge fund returns and then proceed to examine their properties. In general, a nonparametric GARCH(1,1) model appears to provide the best fit for all strategies. We find that the conditional third and fourth moments are significantly affected by changes in the current volatility of returns on hedge fund indices. We examine changes in the conditional probability of tail events and report significant changes in the probability of extreme events when the conditioning information changes. These results have important implications for models of hedge fund risk that rely on probability of tail events. We formally test for the presence of asymmetries in conditional correlations to determine if there is contagion between hedge funds and other investments and between various hedge fund indices in extreme down markets versus extreme up markets. We generally do not find strong evidence in support of asymmetric correlations.     

Hedge fund pricing and model uncertainty

This article uses Bayesian model averaging to study model uncertainty in hedge fund pricing. We show how to incorporate heteroscedasticity, thus, we develop a framework that jointly accounts for model uncertainty and heteroscedasticity. Relevant risk factors are identified and compared with those selected through standard model selection techniques. The analysis reveals that a model selection strategy that accounts for model uncertainty in hedge fund pricing regressions can be superior in estimation/inference. We explore potential impacts of our approach by analysing individual funds and show that they can be economically important.     

The value of coskewness in mutual fund performance evaluation

Recent asset pricing studies demonstrate the relevance of incorporating coskewness in asset pricing models, and illustrate how this component helps to explain the time variation of ex-ante market risk premiums. This paper analyzes the role of coskewness in mutual fund performance evaluation and finds evidence that adding a coskewness factor is economically and statistically significant. It documents that coskewness is sometimes managed and shows persistence of the coskewness policy over time. One of the most striking results is that many negative (positive) alpha funds, measured relative to the CAPM risk adjustments, would be reclassified as positive (negative) alpha funds using a model with coskewness. Therefore, performance ranking based on risk-adjusted returns without considering coskewness could generate an erroneous classification. Moreover, some fund characteristics, such as turnover ratio or category, are related to the likelihood of managing coskewness.     

Lévy jump risk: Evidence from options and returns

Using index options and returns from 1996 to 2009, I estimate discrete-time models where asset returns follow a Brownian increment and a Lévy jump. Time variations in these models are generated with an affine GARCH, which facilitates the empirical implementation. I find that the risk premium implied by infinite-activity jumps contributes to more than half of the total equity premium and dominates that of the Brownian increments suggesting that it is more representative of the risks present in the economy. Overall, my findings suggest that infinite-activity jumps, instead of the Brownian increments, should be the default modeling choice in asset pricing models.     

Market liquidity in the financial crisis: The role of liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality

We examine the dynamics and the drivers of market liquidity during the financial crisis, using a unique volume-weighted spread measure. According to the literature we find that market liquidity is impaired when stock markets decline, implying a positive relation between market and liquidity risk. Moreover, this relationship is the stronger the deeper one digs into the order book. Even more interestingly, this paper sheds further light on so far puzzling features of market liquidity: liquidity commonality and flight-to-quality. We show that liquidity commonality varies over time, increases during market downturns, peaks at major crisis events and becomes weaker the deeper we look into the limit order book. Consistent with recent theoretical models that argue for a spiral effect between the financial sector’s funding liquidity and an asset’s market liquidity, we find that funding liquidity tightness induces an increase in liquidity commonality which then leads to market-wide liquidity dry-ups. Therefore our findings corroborate the view that market liquidity can be a driving force for financial contagion. Finally, we show that there is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk, i.e., there is a spread between liquidity costs of high and low credit quality stocks, and that in times of increased market uncertainty the impact of credit risk on liquidity risk intensifies. This corroborates the existence of a flight-to-quality or flight-to-liquidity phenomenon also on the stock markets.     

Risk management,corporate governance,and bank performance in the financial crisis

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or directly to the board of directors, are associated with a better bank performance during the financial crisis of 2007/2008. We measure bank performance by buy-and-hold returns and ROE and we control for standard corporate governance variables such as CEO ownership, board size, and board independence. Most importantly, our results indicate that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to the board of directors and not to the CEO (or other corporate entities), exhibit significantly higher (i.e., less negative) stock returns and ROE during the crisis. In contrast, standard corporate governance variables are mostly insignificantly or even negatively related to the banks’ performance during the crisis.     

Hedge fund portfolio construction: A comparison of static and dynamic approaches

This article studies the impact of modeling time-varying covariances/correlations of hedge fund returns in terms of hedge fund portfolio construction and risk measurement. We use a variety of static and dynamic covariance/correlation prediction models and compare the optimized portfolios’ out-of-sample performance. We find that dynamic covariance/correlation models construct portfolios with lower risk and higher out-of-sample risk-adjusted realized return. The tail-risk of the constructed portfolios is also lower. Using a mean-conditional-value-at-risk framework we show that dynamic covariance/correlation models are also successful in constructing portfolios with minimum tail-risk.     

Hedge fund activism,CEO turnover and compensation

This paper examines the governance role of hedge fund activists by analyzing the impact of these activists on CEO turnover, CEO pay, and CEO pay-performance link in targeted companies. Using the difference-in-difference approach, we first find significantly higher CEO turnover following hedge fund activism. After we split target companies into the CEO-turnover and non-CEO-turnover sub-samples, we find that only new CEOs in targeted companies get more compensation following hedge fund activism while incumbent CEO pay does not significantly change. The relationship between CEO bonuses and return on assets following hedge fund activism also differs across the subsamples split by CEO turnover. Pay-performance relationship is enhanced by hedge fund activism for new CEOs, but not for incumbent CEOs. In additional analyses, we document that CEO turnover is positively associated with Tobin’s Q and shareholder votes on Say on Pay in target companies after hedge fund activism.     

Exploring uncharted territories of the hedge fund Industry: Empirical characteristics of mega hedge fund firms

This paper investigates mega hedge fund management companies that collectively manage over 50% of the industry's assets, incorporating previously unavailable data from those that do not report to commercial databases. We find similarities among mega firms that report performance to commercial databases compared with those that do not. We show that the largest divergences between the performance of reporting and nonreporting mega firms can be traced to differential exposure to credit markets. Thus, the performance of hard-to-observe mega firms can be inferred from observable data. This conclusion is robust to delisting bias and the presence of serially correlated returns.     

When active fund managers deviate from their peers: Implications for fund performance

This paper proposes that the extent to which mutual fund managers’ beliefs deviate from the ex ante unobservable representative beliefs of their peers contains information about their skill. A new measure based on portfolio allocations, peer deviation, is used to capture a fund manager’s divergence from the contemporaneously unobservable beliefs of her peers. The portfolio based on representative beliefs of a group of managers investing in similar assets outperforms passive benchmarks, indicating that they reflect informed beliefs. Fund managers who simultaneously arrive at portfolio selections which, in hindsight, are close to those implied by representative beliefs possess ex ante more skill and exhibit future outperformance. Copycat strategies replicating lagged portfolio holdings implied by representative beliefs outperform the actual portfolio holdings of funds that deviate most, but the outperformance dissipates after two quarters.     

Trade credit and company performance during the 2008 financial crisis

We investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis had an impact on companies’ trade credit, and whether changes in trade credit mitigated the crisis’s impact on firm profitability. We document that the availability of trade credit decreased, and that this decline is more pronounced, the higher the companies’ pre‐crisis reliance on short‐term debt. We further report evidence that the redistribution hypothesis holds during crisis periods. Finally, we show that the crisis had a negative impact on company performance, but that this impact was lower (greater) for firms that report an increase in trade receivables (payables) in crisis compared to pre‐crisis periods.     

Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis

Liquidity dried up during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Banks that relied more heavily on core deposit and equity capital financing, which are stable sources of financing, continued to lend relative to other banks. Banks that held more illiquid assets on their balance sheets, in contrast, increased asset liquidity and reduced lending. Off-balance sheet liquidity risk materialized on the balance sheet and constrained new credit origination as increased takedown demand displaced lending capacity. We conclude that efforts to manage the liquidity crisis by banks led to a decline in credit supply.     

Capturing hedge fund risk factor exposures: Hedge fund return replication with ETFs

We develop a new factor selection methodology of spanning the space of hedge fund risk factors with all available exchange traded funds (ETFs). We demonstrate the efficacy of the methodology with out-of-sample individual hedge fund return replication by ETF clone portfolios. This is consistent with our interpretation of ETF returns as proxies to risk factors driving hedge fund returns. We further consider portfolios of “cloneable” and “noncloneable” hedge funds, defined as top and bottom in-sample R² matches, and demonstrate that our ETF clone portfolios slightly outperform cloneable hedge funds out of sample.