Agency costs,governance, and organizational forms: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992–2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies’ organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.     

Small-cap equity mutual fund managers as liquidity providers

This paper examines the relation between the performance of small-cap equity mutual funds and the liquidity characteristics of their asset holdings. We study the trading behavior of fund managers and show that on average, they tend to buy less liquid stocks and sell more liquid stocks. We introduce the notion of net “liquidity creation” by fund managers and examine its role in explaining the cross section of small-cap equity mutual fund returns. Our empirical results show that on average, small-cap mutual fund managers are able to earn an additional 1.5% return per year as compensation for providing such liquidity services to the market.     

Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes

This article investigates the effect of social ties between acquirers and targets on merger performance. We find that the extent of cross-firm social connection between directors and senior executives at the acquiring and the target firms has a significantly negative effect on the abnormal returns to the acquirer and to the combined entity upon merger announcement. Moreover, acquirer-target social ties significantly increase the likelihood that the target firm?s chief executive officer (CEO) and a larger fraction of the target firm?s pre-acquisition board of directors remain on the board of the combined firm after the merger. In addition, we find that acquirer CEOs are more likely to receive bonuses and are more richly compensated for completing mergers with targets that are highly connected to the acquiring firms, that acquisitions are more likely to take place between two firms that are well connected to each other through social ties, and that such acquisitions are more likely to subsequently be divested for performance-related reasons. Taken together, our results suggest that social ties between the acquirer and the target lead to poorer decision making and lower value creation for shareholders overall.     

Corporate cash holdings and CEO compensation incentives

We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation incentives on corporate cash holdings and the value of cash to better understand how compensation incentives designed to enhance the alignment of manager and shareholder interests could influence stockholder-bondholder conflicts. We find a positive relation between CEO risk-taking (vega) incentives and cash holdings, and we find a negative relation between vega and the value of cash to shareholders. The negative effect of vega on the value of cash is robust after controlling for corporate governance, is stronger in firms with high leverage, is reversed for unlevered firms, and is not present in financially constrained firms. We also find that the likelihood of liquidity covenants in new bank loans is increasing in CEO vega incentives. Our evidence primarily supports the costly contracting hypothesis, which asserts that bondholders anticipate greater risk-taking in high vega firms and, therefore, require greater liquidity.     

Analyst forecasts and European mutual fund trading

This paper addresses the questions whether European mutual fund managers rely on sell-side analyst information and whether this behavior impacts fund performance. Results show that mutual funds significantly increase (decrease) their holdings in stocks when any of the consensus forecast measures increases (decreases) within the quarter prior to the observation period. Furthermore, mutual fund managers primarily attribute high information value to consensus forecast revisions that contain positive information, that are based on a sufficiently high number of inputs, and with more unanimous inputs to the consensus. Finally, following sell-side research seems to be beneficial for mutual fund managers since our results show that stock trades that are in line with analyst forecast revisions significantly outperform trades that are contrary to analyst research.     

Employment risk,compensation incentives,and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry

We examine the influence on managerial risk taking of incentives due to employment risk and due to compensation. Our empirical investigation of the risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers indicates that managerial risk taking crucially depends on the relative importance of these incentives. When employment risk is more important than compensation incentives, fund managers with a poor midyear performance tend to decrease risk relative to leading managers to prevent potential job loss. When employment risk is low, compensation incentives become more relevant and fund managers with a poor midyear performance increase risk to catch up with the midyear winners.     

Performance evaluation and self-designated benchmark indexes in the mutual fund industry

Almost one-third of actively managed, diversified U.S. equity mutual funds specify a size and value/growth benchmark index in the fund prospectus that does not match the fund's actual style. Nevertheless, these “mismatched” benchmarks matter to fund investors. Performance relative to the specified benchmark is a significant determinant of a fund's subsequent cash inflows, even controlling for performance measures that better capture the fund's style. These incremental flows appear unlikely to be rational responses to abnormal returns. The evidence is consistent with the notion that mismatched self-designated benchmarks result from strategic fund behavior driven by the incentive to improve flows.     

Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting

We address how mutual funds vote on shareholder proposals and identify factors that help determine support of wealth-increasing shareholder proposals. We examine 213,579 voting decisions made by 1799 mutual funds from 94 fund families for 1047 shareholder proposals voted on between July 2003 and June 2005. In an analysis of voting across funds within the same fund family, we find significant divergence in voting within families, emphasizing the importance of focusing on voting by individual funds. We also find that, in general, mutual funds vote more affirmatively for potentially wealth-increasing proposals and funds' voting approval rates for these beneficial resolutions are significantly higher than those of other investors. Our results suggest that funds tend to support proposals targeting firms with weaker governance. We also find that funds with lower turnover ratios and social funds are more likely to support shareholder proposals. Finally, fund voting approval rates significantly impact whether a proposal passes and whether one is implemented.     

Individual investor mutual fund flows

This paper studies the relation between individuals’ mutual fund flows and fund characteristics, establishing three key results. First, consistent with tax motivations, individual investors are reluctant to sell mutual funds that have appreciated in value and are willing to sell losing funds. Second, individuals pay attention to investment costs as redemption decisions are sensitive to both expense ratios and loads. Third, individuals’ fund-level inflows and outflows are sensitive to performance, but in different ways. Inflows are related only to “relative” performance, suggesting that new money chases the best performers in an objective. Outflows are related only to “absolute” fund performance, the relevant benchmark for taxes.     

Investor protection and the value effects of bank merger announcements in Europe and the US

Investor protection regimes have been shown to partly explain why the same type of corporate event may attract different investor reactions across countries. We compare the value effects of large bank merger announcements in Europe and the US and find an inverse relationship between the level of investor protection prevalent in the target country and abnormal returns that bidders realize during the announcement period. Accordingly, bidding banks realize higher returns when targeting low protection economies (most European economies) than bidders targeting institutions which operate under a high investor protection regime (the US). We argue that bidding bank shareholders need to be compensated for an increased risk of expropriation by insiders which they face in a low protection environment where takeover markets are illiquid and there are high private benefits of control.     

An empirical analysis of Mexican and US closed-end mutual fund IPOs

We examine 135 Mexican closed-end fund IPOs and 370 Mexican non-fund IPOs that issued between 1994 and 2003 along with 217 contemporaneous US fund IPOs and document three primary results. First, we find that Mexican IPOs in the aggregate experience no significant underpricing, unlike their US IPO counterparts. Both Mexican and US IPOs experience significantly negative long-run performance. Second, Mexican closed-end fund IPOs experience positive long-run performance, significantly better than Mexican non-fund IPOs which experience negative long-run performance. Unlike Mexican fund IPOs, US fund IPOs experience negative long-run performance. Third, we find that both Mexican and US debt-backed closed-end fund IPOs significantly outperform equity-backed closed-end IPOs. In Mexico, debt-backed funds experience positive abnormal returns, compared to negative abnormal returns for Mexican equity-backed funds, US debt-backed funds, and US equity-backed funds.     

Short-term persistence in hybrid mutual fund performance: The role of style-shifting abilities

Our study analyzes the performance of hybrid mutual funds. Based on two extended Carhart models we determine total fund performance by comparing fund returns to investable fund-specific style benchmarks. Using daily returns and a quarterly measurement interval, we present an innovative return-based approach to decompose total performance into in-quarter abnormal performance and style-shifting performance. In addition, we split total style-shifting performance into active and passive components. In this context, we confirm possible benefits of these performance measures by analyzing several simulated investment strategies. Our empirical study covers 520 hybrid mutual funds from 10/1998 to 12/2009 and shows that hybrid mutual funds (i) do not outperform their benchmarks on average, (ii) partially show positive in-quarter abnormal performance and style-shifting abilities, and (iii) exhibit short-term persistence in in-quarter abnormal performance but not in style-shifting abilities.     

Best-performing US mutual fund families from 1993 to 2008: Evidence from a novel two-stage DEA model for efficiency decomposition

When analyzing relative performance, especially at the institutional level, the traditional data envelopment analysis (DEA) models do not recognize vastly different and important activities as separate functions and therefore cannot identify which function may be the main source of inefficiency. We propose a novel two-stage DEA model that decomposes the overall efficiency of a decision-making unit into two components and demonstrate its applicability by assessing the relative performance of 66 large mutual fund families in the US over the period 1993–2008. By decomposing the overall efficiency into operational management efficiency and portfolio management efficiency components, we reveal the best performers, the families that deteriorated in performance, and those that improved in their performance over the sample period. We also make frontier projections for poorly performing mutual fund families and highlight how the portfolio managers have managed their funds relative to the others during financial crisis periods.     

The effect of conference calls on equity incentives: An empirical investigation

Conference calls have become increasingly common in recent years, yet there is little empirical evidence regarding the effect of conference calls on executive compensation. In this study, we examine the effect of voluntary disclosures on equity incentives. We hypothesize that voluntary disclosures, as measured by conference calls, affect executive compensation contracts. Using a dataset of 6263 firm-year observations from both conference call and non-conference call firms, our results are consistent with the argument that the board of directors substitutes voluntary disclosures for more costly corporate governance mechanisms. Alternatively, in firms where CEOs have less equity incentives, the owners demand more voluntary disclosures. The results of this study should be of great importance to executives and capital market participants internationally, such as investors and analysts, since we provide evidence that conference calls affect incentive based compensation contracts, which were shown in prior studies to be value relevant.     

Mergers and acquisitions in the US property-liability insurance industry: Productivity and efficiency effects

This paper analyzes the productivity and efficiency effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US property-liability insurance industry during the period 1994–2003 using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist productivity indices. We seek to determine whether M&As are value-enhancing, value-neutral, or value-reducing. The analysis examines efficiency and productivity change for acquirers, acquisition targets, and non-M&A firms. We also examine the firm characteristics associated with becoming an acquirer or target through probit analysis. The results provide evidence that M&As in property-liability insurance were value-enhancing. Acquiring firms achieved more revenue efficiency gains than non-acquiring firms, and target firms experienced greater cost and allocative efficiency growth than non-targets. Factors other than efficiency enhancement are important factors in property-liability insurer M&As. Financially vulnerable insurers are significantly more likely to become acquisition targets, consistent with corporate control theory, and we also find evidence that M&As are motivated to achieve diversification. However, there is no evidence that scale economies played an important role in the insurance M&A wave.     

Investor risk evaluation in the determination of management incentives in the mutual fund industry

This paper examines the way in which investors evaluate risk in deciding which mutual funds to invest. New fund investment is found to be positively related to a distributed lag of past fund performance with a strong degree of inertia. The relationship is mostly linear with significant nonlinearities at the upper (and possibly the lower) end of the performance spectrum. Investors appear to use publicly available data in a way that is consistent with the theory, giving equal weight in their decisions to the return and market risk components of the performance measure, while ignoring diversifiable risk. Finally, it is shown that improved performance in any year has a significant impact on the earnings of the management company. Because managers are rewarded on the basis of risk adjusted returns, risk neutral managers have no incentive to manipulate risk, except at very high performance levels.     

Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations

Unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers (CEOs) are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999-2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger. Targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums. Consequently, deal value drops by $62 for every dollar target CEOs receive from unscheduled options. Conversely, acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns. Therefore, deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders.     

Front-running of mutual fund fire-sales

We show that a real-time trading strategy which front-runs the anticipated forced sales by mutual funds experiencing extreme capital outflows generates an alpha of 0.5% per month during the 1990–2010 period. The abnormal return stems from selling pressure among stocks that are below the NYSE mean size and cannot be attributed to the arrival of public information. While the largest stocks also exhibit downward price pressure, their prices revert before the front-running strategy can detect it. The duration of the anticipated selling pressure has decreased from about a month in the 1990s to about two weeks in the most recent decade. Our results suggest that publicly available information of fund flows and holdings exposes mutual funds in distress to predatory trading.     

Reputation stretching in mutual fund starts

This study examines the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual funds. We show that the reputation stretching strategy increases net fund inflows to new funds run by well-performing fund managers and yields a net increase of fund inflows to fund families. Reputable fund managers exhibit one-year performance persistence for managing new funds, which can help investors assess managers when selecting funds. We also find that the decrease in information asymmetry associated with managerial reputation benefits investors by leading to an increase in new fund returns in the short run, compared to those of new funds run by managers without track records. Overall, the reputation stretching strategy benefits both investors, by reducing information asymmetry and improving investment returns, and fund families, by increasing net fund inflows to new equity funds.     

Convenience in the mutual fund industry

I examine the role of convenience in the mutual fund industry. I find that investors pay more for relatively convenient funds, and that the flows to convenient funds are less responsive to performance. These findings suggest that investors do not evaluate mutual funds independently, but rather that investors select a primary fund, likely based on beliefs about managerial ability, and then select funds which are relatively convenient to this primary fund.