The Impact of the Reduction in Tick Increments in Major U.S. Markets on Spreads,Depth, and Volatility

This study presents an analysis of the impact of the introduction of quotes in sixteenths of a dollar on the AMEX, Nasdaq, and NYSE in mid-1997 on select market characteristics such as spreads, effective spreads, quoted depth, and volume. The findings of the study document reductions in the bid-ask spread, effective spread, and a statistically significant increase in the number of quotes. Interestingly, we find that liquidity, as measured by the total depth at the bid and ask, declines significantly on the AMEX and NYSE, but increases on the Nasdaq. Trading volume increases on the NYSE, but remains unchanged for the AMEX and Nasdaq. We also find that the proportion of even-increment quotes is a relevant factor affecting percentage spreads for Nasdaq both before and after and for the NYSE only after the change in quoting increments.     

Trading Costs and Exchange Delisting: The Case of Firms that Voluntarily Move from the American Stock Exchange to the Nasdaq

We examine 47 stocks that voluntarily left the American Stock Exchange from 1992 through 1995 and listed on the Nasdaq. We find that both effective and quoted spreads increase by about 100 percent after listing on the Nasdaq. These spread changes are consistent across stocks. In contrast, excess returns are positive when firms announce a switch from The American Stock Exchange to the Nasdaq. We are unable to explain this apparent contradiction.     

IPO Listings: Where and Why?

According to most research, firms benefit from being listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Nevertheless, 224 of 640 firms that went public from 1993 through 2000 and were eligible for a NYSE listing chose to list their stock on Nasdaq. We hypothesize that this choice may be related to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 144. The rule regulates the sale of restricted stock by limiting the amount of unregistered stock that can be sold by an individual. We investigate the determinants of post-IPO sales of restricted stock, examine IPO firms' listing choices, and find evidence consistent with firms selecting Nasdaq to reduce the effect of the limits on selling restricted stock imposed by the SEC's Rule 144. Venture capitalists play an important role in this listing decision.     

Intraday Variation in the Bid-Ask Spread: Evidence after the Market Reform

In this article we show that intraday variation in spreads for Nasdaq‐listed stocks has converged to intraday variation in spreads for NYSE‐listed stocks after the implementation of the new order‐handling rules. We attribute this convergence to the Limit Order Display Rule, which requires that limit orders be displayed in Nasdaq best bid and offer when they are better than quotes posted by market makers. Our findings suggest that the different patterns of intraday spreads between NYSE and Nasdaq stocks reported in prior studies can largely be attributed to the different treatment of limit orders between the NYSE and Nasdaq before the market reform.     

Transactions Costs and Holding Periods for Common Stocks

Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Constantinides (1986) provide a theoretical basis for the proposition that assets with higher transactions costs are held by investors for longer holding periods, and vice versa. We examine average holding periods and bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq stocks from 1983 through 1991 and for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 1975 through 1989 and find strong evidence that, as predicted, the length of investors' holding periods is related to bid-ask spreads. We also find that the relation between holding periods and bid-ask spreads is much stronger on Nasdaq, where spreads are larger, than on the NYSE, where spreads are smaller.     

The Nasdaq-Amex Merger, Nasdaq Reforms, and the Liquidity of Small Firms

After the Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) merged in 1998, officials of the new entity argued that some “smaller, harder to trade” companies on Nasdaq should switch to AMEX to improve liquidity. This recommendation is based on the traditional view among academics and practitioners alike that a substantial trading cost reduction should be realized when a company switches from the multidealer Nasdaq system to the AMEX specialist system. However, in light of the 1997 Nasdaq reforms, we reexamine the validity of these arguments using data from 1996–98 on firms that switch from the Nasdaq to the AMEX or the New York Stock Exchange. Evidence from transaction costs, volatility, and stock returns shows declining benefits to switching during the sample period. Our findings indicate that the liquidity improvement from exchange listing is limited in the wake of the Nasdaq reforms of 1997.     

The competitive effects of US decimalization: Evidence from the US-listed Canadian stocks

This paper analyzes the impact of US decimalization on the Canadian stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (Nasdaq) in the US. Using a sample of 126 firms, we find that the US trading of these stocks increases after decimalization, but this increase is not at the expense of TSE volume. Indeed, the TSE volume increases substantially for those securities that are traded on Nasdaq and increases marginally for those securities that are traded on the NYSE. Most of the increase in volume is in retail-sized trades. The bid–ask spreads and the quote depths decline on all exchanges, but by a greater amount in the US than in Canada. The depths on the NYSE decline from being above the TSE depths to well below the TSE depths. We also find that the decline in the TSE spread is directly related to the size of the firm and to the decline in the US spread, and is inversely related to the pre-decimalization ratio of spreads on the US exchange and the TSE. Overall, our results indicate that the US decimalization had the desired positive impact on trading in both the US and Canada, with a decrease in spreads and an increase in retail-sized trading.     

竞争力、市场微观结构与证券交易所变革

纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克实施的重大并购行动标志着全球证券交易所新一轮并购浪潮的兴起,证券交易所之间的竞争再度趋于白热化.交易所之间的竞争已演变为市场微观结构的竞争.本文对纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克的交易成本进行了比较,无论是上市成本还是交易成本,新兴的纳斯达克都比传统的纽约证交所更胜一筹.因而本文认为有效降低交易成本应是提高交易所核心竞争力的关键所在,而改进交易机制、拓展产品服务以及调整组织架构,可以作为降低交易成本、提高交易所竞争力的具体竞争策略.     

Nasdaq ex‐day behavior: An out‐of‐sample test

We test various explanations of the ex‐dividend day price anomaly using Nasdaq‐listed firms. Similar to NYSE‐listed firms, on average the prices of Nasdaq‐listed firms drop by less than the dividend amount. However, the average Nasdaq price‐drop is substantially smaller than what existing theories would predict and translates to an imputed dividend tax rate that is double the maximum tax rate. We thus find little support for the tax hypothesis. We also find little support for the short‐term trading hypothesis and various other explanations. The significant disconnect we document between Nasdaq dividends and price changes seems to support the “free dividends fallacy.”     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

Cost of Transacting and Expected Returns in the Nasdaq Market

This article empirically examines the liquidity premium predicted by the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model using Nasdaq data over the 1973–1990 period. The results support the model and are much stronger than for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as reported by Chen and Kan (1989) and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) . I conjecture that the stronger evidence on the Nasdaq is due to the dealers' inside spreads on the Nasdaq being a better proxy for the actual cost of transacting than the quoted spreads on the NYSE, since the Nasdaq dealers do not face competition from limit orders or floor traders.     

Competition on the Nasdaq and the Impact of Recent Market Reforms

This paper examines the effect of recent market reforms on the competitive structure of the Nasdaq. Our results show that changes in inventory and information costs cannot explain the post-reform decrease in bid-ask spreads. We interpret this as evidence that the reforms have reduced Nasdaq dealers' rents. Additionally, we find that the difference between NYSE and Nasdaq spreads have been greatly diminished with the new rules. Further, the reforms have resulted in an exit, ceteris paribus , from the industry for market making. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that the reforms have improved competition on the Nasdaq.     

Evidence and Implications of Increases in Trading Volume Around Exchange Listings

After controlling for market volume trends and differences in volume measurement between the Nasdaq and the exchanges, we find that mean trading volumes increase significantly for Nasdaq stocks that list on the Amex or the NYSE. Furthermore, stocks with low (high) pre‐listing volume tend to realize the largest volume increases (decreases) as well as the best (worst) post‐listing performance. Our results support the hypothesis that stocks with high past trading volumes tend to experience lower future returns, and shed new light on the nature and possible causes of poor post‐listing stock performance.     

Factors Associated with Differences in the Magnitude of Abnormal Returns Around NYSE Versus Nasdaq Firms' Earnings Announcements

This study provides an explanation for the 'exchange effect' puzzle documented in prior accounting research. Grant (1980) finds that the magnitude of earnings announcement week abnormal returns is higher, on average, for firms traded over-the-counter than for NYSE firms. Atiase (1987) shows that this incremental 'exchange effect' persists even after controlling for firm size. We investigate potential explanations for this incremental exchange effect. We first show that even after controlling for differences in firm size, Nasdaq firms have less rich information environments and enjoy greater growth opportunities than NYSE firms. We then investigate whether differential predisclosure information environments and/or growth opportunities can explain the incremental exchange effect. The results indicate that although the absolute magnitude of the earnings announcement-related abnormal returns is inversely related to proxies for the amount of predisclosure information, the incremental exchange effect cannot be explained by differences in the predisclosure information environment. In contrast, after controlling for differences in growth opportunities across NYSE versus Nasdaq firms, and investors' heightened sensitivity to Nasdaq firms' growth opportunities in particular, there is no significant incremental exchange effect (whether or not we control for predisclosure information). These results suggest that the incremental exchange effect puzzle documented in prior research is more likely to reflect growth-related phenomena than differences in the predisclosure information environment.     

Trades outside the quotes: Reporting delay,trading option,or trade size?

In the period 1993 through 2002 examined in this study, quoted and effective spreads declined substantially on Nasdaq and to a lesser degree on the NYSE. At the same time, however, trades outside the quotes increased dramatically on Nasdaq. Because investors would prefer to trade at the quotes rather than outside the quotes, we examine why trades outside the quotes are observed. We focus on how the continuous market mechanism itself influences the outcome of orders and the reporting of trades, and we conclude that slippage exists in the market mechanism. Outside-trades occur on Nasdaq, first, because of delays in reporting trades, second, because the ability of dealers to delay execution of trades creates a look-back option, which when exercised results in outside-trades, and third, because large trades can take place at prices outside the quotes. Outside-trades are rarely observed on the NYSE because the market is more centralized. While the pattern of trading on the NYSE is not inconsistent with the presence of a look-back option, our tests provide no direct evidence that specialists are exercising such an option.     

The Operating Performance of Firms that Switch Their Stock Listings

In this article we examine the operating performance of stocks that switch from NASDAQ to the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) or the New Stock Exchange (NYSE) and from AMEX to the NYSE. Specifically, we investigate whether post‐listing operating performance is consistent with the reported negative long‐term drift of post‐listing stock returns and whether there is evidence of self‐selection of the listing time. We find evidence of negative post‐listing changes in operating return on assets and sales, which, on a match‐adjusted basis, are significant for the relatively small NASDAQ stocks switching to AMEX. We also find evidence that firms self‐select the time of listing changes.     

Execution Costs of Institutional Equity Orders

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than on either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G19, G20, G23.     

The Post-Reform Bid-Ask Spread Disparity between Nasdaq and the NYSE

We report further evidence of the difference in execution costs between Nasdaq and the NYSE before and after the 1997 market reforms. We find that informed trading costs are consistently higher on Nasdaq both before and after the reforms. In the pre‐reform period the Nasdaq‐NYSE disparity in bid‐ask spreads cannot be completely attributed to the difference in informed trading costs. However, in the post‐reform period the spread difference between these two markets becomes insignificant with the effect of informed trading costs controlled. Our findings are consistent with the contention that the reforms have largely reduced noninformation trading costs and dealers' rents.     

Competition For Order Flow, Market Quality, And Price Discovery In The Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock

We investigate competition for order flow, market quality, and price discovery in the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ). The QQQ, an AMEX‐listed, exchange‐traded fund, is the most actively traded security in the U.S. equities market. On July 31, 2001, the NYSE began trading the QQQ, marking the first time it traded securities of companies it does not list. The greatest volume of trading takes place on electronic communication networks (ECNs), following by trading on the AMEX and the NYSE. Most of the block trades are executed on the AMEX, where the bid‐ask spreads are narrower. We find that ECNs contribute the most to the price‐discovery process. The spreads on all trading platforms have decreased and market quality and price discovery have improved since QQQ shares have traded on the NYSE.     

Factors Influencing Dividend Policy Decisions of Nasdaq Firms

This study reports the results of a 1999 survey of Nasdaq‐listed firms. Respondents provided information about the importance of 22 different factors that influence their dividend policy. Our results suggest that many managers of Nasdaq firms make dividend decisions consistent with Lintner's (1956) survey results and model. The results also show significant differences between the manager responses of financial and non‐financial firms on nine of the 22 factors. This finding implies the presence of industry effects on dividend policy decisions. In general, the same factors that are important to Nasdaq firms are also important to NYSE firms.